THE QUEENSLAND CORRECTIVE SERVICES COMMISSION (QCSC) CAME into being in 1988 following an extensive review into the provision of correctional services in Queensland by Mr J. J. Kennedy. The recommendations of Kennedy's landmark report provided a blueprint for correctional reform and were adopted by the Queensland Parliament with the support of the major political parties.

In his report, Kennedy recommended that one prison under the jurisdiction of the QCSC should be operated and managed by the private sector under contract to the Commission. His rationale for this recommendation was to create a market for corrective institutions in Australia and Queensland and, for the first time, to introduce competition which would provide a real measure against which to test the performance and costs of the QCSC.

Borallon Correctional Centre

In accordance with Kennedy's recommendation, the QCSC called tenders for management of the Borallon Correctional Centre, near Brisbane, which was due for completion in 1989. As a result, a contract for management of the Centre, for three years with an option for a further two years, was awarded to Corrections Corporation of Australia (CCA) in November 1989. CCA was a newly formed Queensland based company made up of a consortium of Corrections Corporation of America, Wormald Security and John Holland Constructions.

Following a change in government in December 1989, the newly elected Labor Government decided to honour the recently concluded contract despite Labor Party policy which opposed private sector managed prisons.

The Centre commenced operation on 2 January 1990 as a 240-bed facility for medium, low and open security prisoners. The Centre initially accommodated a significant proportion of low and open security prisoners but, after about the first twelve months of operation, settled into a prisoner
mix of predominantly medium security prisoners with around 10 per cent of the population as low and open security prisoners.

Community Corrections Centres

The enabling legislation for the QCSC included provision for the establishment of community corrections centres—best described as half-way houses where prisoners nearing the end of their custodial sentences could be supervised in a community setting while undergoing programs or release to work as the final stage of re-integration into the community.

Initially, the Commission established one female and two male community corrections centres operated by staff employed in its community corrections arm. Each of these could accommodate around twenty offenders. During 1990, discussions took place with several community groups regarding the operation of community corrections centres by those groups under contract to the Commission in much the same way that CCA operated Borallon Correctional Centre under contract.

The attraction of such arrangements was threefold. Firstly, unlike the Borallon situation, most of the community groups already had substantially completed accommodation facilities which would preclude the need for substantial infrastructure development by the Commission. Secondly, different groups offered expertise in different types of programs or in dealing with particular offender groups. Thirdly, in a similar way to the prisons, it was considered beneficial to introduce an element of competition with similar Commission operated facilities which may lead to improved cost effectiveness.

As a result, the following contracts for operation of community corrections centres were entered into with various community groups during 1990 and 1991:

- Gwandalan Community Corrections Centre—Brisbane Tribal Council—programs and a release to work facility for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders—twenty-five bed capacity;

- Maconochie Lodge Community Corrections Centre—Shaftesbury Citizenship Centre—work skills and educational programs for younger offenders—twenty-four bed capacity;

- St Vincent's Community Corrections Centre—Society of St Vincent De Paul—programs and an inner-city release to work facility for offenders—twenty-seven bed capacity;

- Goodspell Park Community Corrections Centre—Link-up (De La Salle Brothers)—programs for young offenders in a rural location—six-bed facility; and
In addition, the Commission has entered into contracts with the Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (ACRO) for the operation of two so-called half-way houses. These are similar facilities to community corrections centres, but are not designated as such and do not provide twenty-four hour a day, seven day a week supervision. As such, these are used to accommodate minimum risk offenders on release to work or administratively transferred to these facilities in order to participate in approved work or development programs.

**Remand and Reception (Arthur Gorrie) Centre**

As part of its infrastructure redevelopment program, the Commission undertook the construction of a new, modern, campus-style Remand and Reception Centre to replace the infamous Boggo Road prison, parts of which were constructed at the turn of the century.

In mid 1991, the Commission commenced negotiations with the staff union with a view to obtaining agreement to new work practices and procedures to apply at the Remand and Reception facility when it opened in 1992. These negotiations were unable to bring about any agreement to changes in work practices and the Board of the Commission informed the government in October 1991 that it intended to proceed to call tenders for the private sector management of this facility.

Following the registration of expressions of interest, seven companies were invited to tender for the contract. In March 1992, Cabinet approved Australasian Correctional Management (ACM) as the successful tenderer. The contract is for five years with an option for a further two years. ACM is comprised of a consortium of Wackenhut and ADT, an Australian based security company.

This contract breaks significant new ground by contracting the management of the reception function to the private sector. As the Commission's main reception centre, the Remand and Reception Centre performs the initial assessment and classification of offenders and is, thus, a key part of the Commission's sentence management process.

The new Remand and Reception Centre commenced operation under the management of ACM in June 1992 and the old Boggo Road prison was decommissioned in July 1992.

In summary, in a span of less than three years, the QCSC has moved from a situation where all correctional facilities were managed and operated by Commission staff to one where two of its eleven correctional centres and five of its seven community corrections centres are managed under contract by the private sector/community groups.
The Rationale for Contract Management

It has been stated that Queensland was the first jurisdiction in Australasia to experiment with "privatisation" of correctional facilities. Two points of clarification need to be made in relation to this statement.

Firstly, "privatisation" is not an appropriate term to use with respect to the involvement of the private sector in corrections in Queensland. This is because the State remains the owner of the physical infrastructure (at least in the case of correctional centres), the prisoners remain "State" prisoners and can and do transfer between private sector and State operated institutions during their sentence and the State continues to fund the operation of the facilities. In fact, the difference between the State and privately operated facilities is that the latter are managed on behalf of the QCSC by a private sector organisation under contract which employs its own staff. Clearly, contract management is a more appropriate term to use in this context.

Secondly, contract management by the private sector is not a new concept in the administration of corrections in Queensland or in other jurisdictions. Many services have traditionally been contracted to the private sector by the various State operated correctional jurisdictions. These include medical services, cleaning services, maintenance agreements for electronic equipment, vehicle supplies and their servicing, management consultants, and so on.

Thus, the contract management of a correctional centre by the private sector is more a matter of degree rather than a revolutionary new concept. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that it is a significant step compared to the provision of auxiliary services only.

What, then, is the rationale for taking this significant step? Four main considerations have underpinned the QCSC's initial and subsequent decisions in relation to the use of contract management.

As already stated, Kennedy, in his review, foresaw the benefits of introducing competition with State operated facilities in order to be able to make a comparison of performance between privately and publicly managed facilities. Competition would also be a stimulus for improved performance by State prison operators and facilitate cross-fertilisation of ideas between the private and public sectors.

The second consideration in taking decisions regarding contract management has been that of cost. In common with many other jurisdictions, there was a perception in Queensland that correctional centres could be managed more efficiently if restrictive work practices could be identified and removed and improved management processes put into place. Private sector involvement, with greenfield sites and totally new staff complements provided an ideal opportunity to test this hypothesis. Experience in Queensland with contract management by the private sector has confirmed that the scope for substantial improvements in cost efficiency exists with State operated facilities, particularly correctional centres. The most dramatic illustration of this has been with the new Remand and Reception Centre where the QCSC estimated that, to manage and operate the facility itself, it would cost between $16m and $18m per annum depending on whether certain work practices could be altered. The contract eventually entered into
with Australasian Correctional Management is for in the order of $11m per annum to manage and operate the facility.

The third consideration has been that of the need to bring about cultural and attitudinal change in the management and operation of correctional centres. In Queensland, as well as looking for efficiency improvements, we have also sought to improve the effectiveness of our system of corrections.

Specifically, the Commission has articulated its aim to bring about a more rehabilitative environment in its correctional centres where offenders are given opportunities for self-development while in custody. In order to achieve this, custodial staff would need to adopt a much different approach to their work than that of the traditional stony faced guard on a fixed post. Indeed, in a contemporary correctional environment, based on unit management principles, custodial staff are expected to have substantial interaction with offenders and to have the skills to contribute to the rehabilitation of the offenders under their care. The changed approach required on the part of custodial staff could be glibly put as a shift from controlling to facilitating. While this statement may be seen as an over-simplification or exaggeration, it certainly does not overstate the extent of behavioural and attitudinal change required on the part of many currently serving custodial staff. As a result, it has been difficult to bring about the type of cultural change required. Private sector involvement has provided an opportunity to establish centres where staff could be recruited with skills and attitudes commensurate with today's philosophy and direction.

Finally, experience with the private sector is providing the QCSC with comparative information which will assist in assessing future options for the development of correctional services in Queensland.

Commission/Contractor Relationships

Having determined to proceed with private sector involvement in the administration of corrections, the question arises as to the interworking of the privately managed centre(s) with the remainder of the correctional system and with QCSC management.

*Operational autonomy*

The approach taken in Queensland has been to grant the management of the centre as much autonomy in their day to day operations as practicable. The reasons for this are twofold.

Firstly, the organisational structures currently in place in the QCSC are based on the concept of correctional centres as discrete, self-contained, organisational units headed by a "general manager" responsible for the full range of organisational objectives including security, finance, rehabilitation and industries. The idea is that correctional centres are the fundamental building blocks or units of the correctional system and that the role of central office is one of policy formulation, planning and coordination rather than that of direct management. In this organisational structure, the limits to the autonomy of each general manager are only set by primary and subordinate legislation, the need for consistency when applicable, coordination issues and
the abilities and initiative of the individual general manager. Maximum extension of autonomy of operation to private sector managed centres is thus consistent with this internal organisational environment.

Secondly, contract management in Queensland has been undertaken on the basis of contracts which, in general, specify outcomes rather than processes. This gives the operator the maximum degree of freedom to manage the centre using different approaches to those traditionally adopted in the State-run system as long as specified outcomes are achieved. That is, autonomy goes hand in hand with accountability for results.

**Corporate level relationships**

In the same way that QCSC operated centres have a QCSC Central Office, the contract managed centres have a corporate central office to whom they are accountable for agreed outcomes. Technically the contract is, in each case, between the QCSC and the corporate entity rather than the centre management. Thus, while day-to-day operational issues will, in general, be sorted out at officer level with the general manager of the contracted centre, policy matters, major contract compliance issues and contract disputes and/or renegotiation's take place between the QCSC Central Office and the corporate office of the contractor.

**Contract evaluation**

The contracts between the QCSC and private sector operators contain a "minimum performance specifications" section which specifies the required outcomes under headings such as:

- food services;
- physical security and control;
- centre prisoner management;
- health services; and
- psychological services.

These specifications form the basis for ongoing evaluation of each contractor's performance by the Commission's audit section and, in particular, the "Contract Auditor" assigned to the particular centre. Feedback is also obtained from those QCSC staff who provide day-to-day operational support to the contracted centres, particularly with respect to security and prisoner management issues.

Formal evaluations of contractor performance also occur through ad hoc audits and a particularly thorough audit and evaluation is undertaken prior to the decision being taken on exercising the option to extend the contract.

There is currently strong interest in academia regarding performance evaluation and comparison of publicly and privately managed facilities. In Queensland, two academics are researching the operational performance of
Borallon Correctional Centre and a similar Commission operated facility in North Queensland (Lotus Glen Correctional Centre). It is hoped that these studies will contribute to increasing the effectiveness of comparative performance evaluation techniques.

**Operational Considerations**

Entering into a contract with a private sector operator for the management of a correctional centre raises some unique issues regarding the day-to-day operations of corrective services. Of particular importance are the areas of:

- day-to-day operational interface;
- consistency in dealing with offenders;
- meeting mandatory legislative requirements;
- role of contract monitors/auditor or liaison officers; and
- the provision of centrally controlled operational support agencies.

While each of these matters are equally important in dealing with State-run centres there are particular aspects in the world of contract management that can cause difficulties for correctional administrators if not dealt with right from the start of the contract management process.

**Day-to-day interface**

As with all correctional centres, there is a need with contract managed centres to ensure that adequate procedures and agreements are in place to ensure day-to-day operational interface occurs. The interface arrangements apply not only to the relationships between the centre and central office but also between the contracted centre and other centres. In establishing this interface care must be taken to ensure commercial and contract considerations are not violated. Any tendency by officials to interface with the day-to-day operations of the centre must be vigorously resisted. The guiding principle is that correctional officials must focus on what is required, that is the desired outcomes and standards and not allow themselves to become involved or interfere in how the contractor achieves these outcomes.

Success depends on clearly defined reporting relationships that define the reporting structure and the matters that can be legitimately dealt with on a day-to-day basis. First and foremost such a relationship must aim to facilitate communication. It is essential that the contractor receives the same information pertinent to good correctional management as the rest of the organisation. Likewise incidents or happenings in the private centre that have the potential to impact, particularly negatively, on the wider correctional community must be communicated to the correctional administration in a timely manner.

The reporting relationships established at the operational level must also be such that they facilitate the transfer of responsibility for inmates/offenders.
transitioning through the system. Procedures for property transfer, details of visits and so on must be maintained.

Sentence management

This leads to the critical area of ensuring consistency in dealing with the needs and expectations of inmates. An inmate should be able to expect a minimum consistent standard of treatment, privilege and conditions regardless of where he/she is accommodated. It is therefore vital that agreements with private sector suppliers of correctional services, specify the minimum procedures to apply for the routine management of inmates. To ensure the effective ongoing management of inmates the following should be considered as a minimum:

- a common database and information management system;
- minimum standards and scales for clothing issue;
- visits;
- use of telephones;
- medical treatment; and
- privileges.

It is in these areas where it is permissible for the contract specifications to be prescriptive. In addition the contractor should ensure the correctional jurisdiction is kept aware of any improvements in those service areas to again ensure a degree of uniformity throughout the system.

Legislation

The minimum requirements under legislation must also be clearly articulated and routine procedures for implementing the law be agreed to and in place. Ready access to persons having legal obligation or authority must be available with the contractor using common instruments of delegation and recording procedures.

Often State legislation lacks the flexibility needed to permit the smooth transition to private sector management. Although the Queensland legislation made some allowance for private sector involvement it clearly reflected the traditional view that punishment was the prerogative of the State and should therefore be administered by the State. The Commission, through complicated administrative arrangements, was able to work within the existing framework of the law. Nevertheless with the letting of a tender for the second facility it became apparent that amendments were needed to the legislation if maximum benefit and efficiency was to be gained from privatisation.
A major lesson from the Queensland experience was that careful legislative review and amendment should be carried out prior to entering into a contract management situation. Particular areas to note include:

- delegation of statutory power;
- provision for contractors to exercise routine legal obligations;
- authority for contractors to exercise powers under related Acts; and
- power to discipline prisoners.

*Operational support*

To enter agreements in which the contractor is required to duplicate the full range of operational support services such as transport, escort and specialist dog squad could in some circumstances make the cost of the contract prohibitive. This is especially so in locations where such external services are already provided to State operated facilities. In such cases economy of scale can be achieved by incorporating the conditions for use of those services in the contract. However there is a danger that contractors may overly rely on such centrally provided services as a means of reducing their costs. Therefore if the State retains the responsibility for providing such services, careful agreement must be reached on such things as:

- circumstances in which they can be used;
- conditions of use;
- frequency of response;
- legal liability;
- circumstances where use will be a direct cost to the contractor, for example escapes; and
- command and control.

Any such agreement should stipulate the method for requesting such support, the approving authority and responsibilities. Care must be taken to ensure that the contractor's access to these services is consistent with that of any other centre.

*Monitoring the contract*

Contract management, particularly in the early stages will raise a number of issues that would not normally arise in a State operated facility. These are normally caused by differing interpretation of contract provisions, unfamiliarity with procedures or legislation. The long-term success of the relationship between the correctional jurisdiction and private contractors will
be ensured if such issues are dealt with promptly and to each party's satisfaction. The resolution of such issues from a remote central office is often impractical, slow and likely to result in a decision not reflective of the problem as it is perceived on the ground. The use of an officer employed by the State jurisdiction but located on site can be extremely beneficial in these circumstances.

There are a number of ways of providing such a service:

- liaison officer;
- contract monitor; and
- contract auditor.

Each have some common duties but can provide a very different approach at different times during the life of the contract.

The QCSC experience has been to see an evolution in the role that changes with time.

**The liaison officer**  This role has proven beneficial during the pre-commissioning and set-up period. This period extends from the time the contract is awarded to the time the centre is fully operational. The role of the liaison officer during this period is to ensure the smooth implementation of the contract. Considerable work is involved in ensuring that all aspects prescribed by the contract are in place prior to the centre opening.

**The monitor**  Once the centre is fully operational there is a need for the correctional jurisdiction to carefully monitor the contractor's performance against the contract and specifications. Instances will occur where adjustments will need to be made to the formal arrangements. These will occur as the centre settles into a routine and the physical constraints of the facility itself will give rise to inaccuracies in the contract. In this role the monitor provides a day-to-day capacity to evaluate performance. It has been found desirable for the monitor to operate on site during this critical phase.

**The auditor**  As operations mature, the need for constant on-site supervision reduces. In the Queensland experience this has been after about twelve months operation, at which time the QCSC has found it is able to move to a process in which the contractor is formally evaluated for performance against the contract by means of periodic and/or ad hoc formal audits.

**Contract Development**

*Objectives of contract management*

For the contract to be successfully developed, the correctional jurisdiction must first clearly define the role and objectives for the centre to be managed. Before proceeding with the development of detailed documentation a concise statement of purpose is essential.
The provisions of the contract or agreement will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending on the prevailing laws. However there are a few key aspects that should be considered:

**How is the yearly management fee to be escalated?** While a number of formulas are available particular attention needs to be paid to the degree of productivity to be achieved by the contractor during the life of the contract. If this is not considered there is a real risk that the jurisdiction will be required to absorb all cost increases incurred by the contractor.

**Insurance** This is a difficult issue with most governments carrying their own insurance. However, as the philosophy of user pays spreads this is becoming less and less a viable proposition for government. In the case of the private operation of a large and expensive facility and over which the State has little or no direct control there is a case for the contractor to insure against loss or damage. This is particularly beneficial should major structural damage occur requiring the State to find alternate accommodation for a large number of prisoners with a resulting high capital cost. There is also the issue of repairing or replacing a facility affected by major structural damage.

**Liability of the contractor in cases of escape** Escapes from secure custody invariably place an additional unforeseen cost on correctional administration and the government in general. Overtime is incurred. Police are redistributed from normal circulation and the public is placed at risk. Greater awareness by the contractor of its responsibility to ensure these costs are not incurred can be achieved by a penalty clause. In the interests of fair dealing it is suggested that such a claim take the form of either;

- a specific dollar fine; or
- a detailed charge for specific additional costs such as overtime incurred by correctional staff and police.

While the contract itself, from a legal perspective, is important, success or failure will depend on the adequacy of the performance specifications against which the contractor will tender. In order to obtain the best result there are a number of golden rules to be followed:

- except when required by law do not be prescriptive. This will only increase costs;
- be comprehensive. Ensure all aspects of the centres proposed operations are covered;
- be outcome driven. Tell the contractor what you want done but not how to do it;
- ensure the intent of each area of the specifications is clearly stated;
state the minimum standard of performance required. This will form the basis of subsequent audit and evaluation;

have the specification independently evaluated before issue.

Achieving the required level of detail in the specifications requires the adoption of a disciplined approach to their development. Steering committees and evaluators must be ruthless in demanding quality and not allowing the specification to be prescriptive to reflect an individual author's way of doing something. Effort at the front end will be rewarded by any easy transition to contract management and trouble-free operation during the life of the contract.

Tender evaluation

This is a critical area. All areas of government have rules and procedures for evaluating tenders and there is no reason to vary these. However, we do operate in a people business that must continue whether the contract fails or not and therefore there are a number of aspects that need special attention:

ownership and financial viability. The need for continuity of operation suggests that clear lines of company ownership should be identified and provision inserted in the contract to prevent this changing without agreement from the correctional jurisdiction. A good safeguard is to build in the provision for financial responsibility to rest with the operating companies' owners;

reference checking must be thorough and if possible include a detailed study of the company's existing operations; and

include independent evaluators on the team.

Lessons Learned

The ability to measure performance against clearly defined standards and then use this to improve performance throughout the correctional system is a major advantage. All too often prisons develop a comfortable routine. Inefficient and ineffective methods of operation become entrenched and it becomes difficult to recognise the need for change. The forced discipline of developing implementing and evaluating specifications for contract management breaks the inertia. New ways and new technology become accepted and productivity improvement throughout the system can be achieved.

The Queensland Corrective Services Commission has learned a number of lessons from its experience with contract management. These took the form of either pitfalls to avoid or guard against or elements of the process that could be improved upon in the future. A few of the key lessons are summarised below.
Staff reaction Existing staff are unlikely to take kindly to contract management. This is particularly so if jobs are displaced or privatisation is deliberately used as a catalyst for cultural change. The reaction can vary from openly hostile industrial action to lobbying to a drop in overall performance. To reduce the impact, correctional administrators should plan to be pro-active. Steps such as:

- good staff communications;
- comprehensive contingency plans;
- early notification of staff redundancy or early retirement packages; and
- a well planned public relations plan,

will help minimise the negative effects of the staff reaction.

Public reaction Contract management of corrections can be an emotive subject. The prerogative of the State to punish mentioned earlier can become an issue. Public sector industrial unions are most likely to be opposed to contract management because of the potential impact on their members and consequently their membership numbers. Lobby and special interests groups may take issue with certain aspects of the proposal and attempt to discredit the Administration's actions. Calls for a reversal in the decision to contract management will include such emotive catch cries as "no prisons for profit". These groups and staff are also likely to try and input some flaw in the contractors' ability to provide the required standard of service usually by the use of some sensational overseas media story. All this can prove at the least embarrassing and at the worst damaging to the Administration's steps. Counter action found to be effective includes:

- a thorough investigation into the contractor's background. Reference checks, inspections and credit checks are essential;
- inspections of the contractor's other operations if possible;
- a media search to uncover any adverse reports; and
- a sound public relations plan including regular communication with special interest groups.

Cost Comparisons

Cost comparisons between publicly and privately managed correctional centres are difficult to make as the differences between centres need to be normalised in order to make a true "apples and apples" comparison. Specifically, in comparing correctional centres the following factors have to be taken into account:
The Issues—Corrections

- physical infrastructure;
- classification mix of prisoners;
- functions performed by the centre;
- qualitative issues; and
- administrative overheads.

On this basis, the QCSC has made a comparison of the unit costs per offender between the Commission operated Lotus Glen Correctional Centre and the CCA operated Borallon Correctional Centre.

Considering each of the above factors in turn:

- the differences in infrastructure between Borallon and Lotus Glen Correctional Centres are minimal;

- Borallon Correctional Centre accommodates mainly medium security inmates (over 80 per cent with the remainder low and open) whereas Lotus Glen has a small number of high security inmates with approximately 40 per cent of the inmate population medium security and a further 40 per cent low and open security. Thus, it is difficult to compare the two centres on the basis of inmate classification mix as a small number of high security inmates at Lotus Glen will make for an additional drain on resources whereas the much larger numbers of low and open security inmates at that Centre will have an opposite effect. On balance, it could be expected that the large numbers of low and open security prisoners at Lotus Glen Correctional Centre would at least offset the additional costs associated with the small number of high security inmates;

- Lotus Glen Correctional Centre performs a wider range of functions than Borallon Correctional Centre. However, it is difficult to quantify what effect, if any, this should have on costs;

- qualitative issues are the most difficult to compare. However, it should be noted that Borallon Correctional Centre provides the highest program content of any correctional centre in Queensland. This is demonstrated by the number of staff employed on the "programs" side of the centre—forty-nine, compared with twenty-five management, administrative and programs staff at Lotus Glen;

- in order to complete the comparison, overhead costs need to be added back to each centre. The administrative overheads which should be distributed to Borallon from the QCSC are minimal as Borallon operates as a "stand-alone" centre. On the other hand, the QCSC correctional centres are substantially supported by administrative elements in central office and these central costs
should be apportioned to each centre on the basis of the number of offenders (see Table 1).

Further work is required to further refine this cost comparison. However, it shows that, as a first order comparison, the cost of Borallon Correctional Centre is approximately 20 per cent lower per offender than Lotus Glen Correctional Centre.

Table 1

Cost comparison between Borallon and Lotus Glen Correctional Centres, 1991-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BORALLON CORRECTIONAL CENTRE</th>
<th>LOTUS GLEN CORRECTIONAL CENTRE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total cost:</td>
<td>$9.29m</td>
<td>$8.23m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of daily offenders</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>Add Industry Expenditure $0.59m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit cost per annum per offender</td>
<td>$39,200</td>
<td>Gross Budget $8.82m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Average number of daily offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unit cost per annum per offender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apportioned Central Office overheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Normalised unit cost per annum per offender</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. CCA are returning industry revenue to capital infrastructure development for industries at the Centre. Thus, it is more valid to compare their costs with Lotus Glen Correctional Centre's gross rather than net budget.