CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

Professor Anthony E. Bottoms
University of Cambridge
United Kingdom

TO BE INVITED TO GIVE THE CLOSING ADDRESS AT THE END OF AN HISTORIC conference, such as this one, is indeed an honour and a privilege.

I know that all the Western participants will wish to join with me in congratulating the Indonesian Society of Criminology on the enormous success of this, its first international conference. It is also a very real pleasure to extend to the Society our sincere good wishes for all its future activities.

I have chosen to focus this closing address upon some issues connected with the explanation of crime. I shall pay particular attention to some of the special questions which arise in the context of 'East meets West'.

Aspects of Society and Crime in the United Kingdom

Let me begin with two vignettes from my own country (the United Kingdom) both of which illustrate, in different ways, the complexity of the social dimensions of crime.

My first illustration concerns Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland is an integral part of the United Kingdom, but it is located across the sea from the main part of the country and on the same island as the Republic of Ireland. The total population of Northern Ireland is about 1.5 million; the majority of the population are Protestant, but a sizeable minority are Catholic (as are the great majority of the population of the Republic of Ireland). Many (but not all) Catholics in the North would prefer Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland, and the Constitution of the republic formally enshrines such an aspiration. Such views are strongly opposed by the majority of Protestants in the north.

For just over twenty years now, Northern Ireland has suffered a serious problem of sectarian violence, including the existence of organised paramilitary groups on both sides of the religious and political divide. Sadly, there have been many murders. At the moment, no generally acceptable political solution to the problems of the province seems to be in sight, and the murders look set to continue.

This, then, is a problem of political violence, linked to conflict about the government of the area, but also mixed inextricably with issues of religious affiliation and community identity. The violence has been repeatedly condemned by both Protestant and Catholic religious leaders, but their appeals have not been sufficient to stem the tide of killings.
While Northern Ireland's politico-religious violence is well known internationally, other aspects of the province's crime profile are much less well known. Two features are worth highlighting. First, the general crime rate of the area is low, as was confirmed in the recent international victim survey (van Dijk et al. 1990, pp. 39-42). This is probably partly because of the rural and small-town character of much of the province.

Data presented in the report of the international victim survey suggest that, of all the countries represented in the survey, Northern Ireland had, in 1988, by far the lowest proportion of its population (1.6 per cent) living in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants. In fact, this particular statistic for Northern Ireland is incorrect: I understand from a source in the Northern Ireland Office that the true figure should be 19.0 per cent, not 1.6 per cent. Even with this much higher figure, Northern Ireland is well below the average percentage for all the countries represented in the survey.

As sociologists have for long attested, most rural and semi-rural areas have strong community ties which seem to act as inhibitors of criminality. But additionally, it must be borne in mind that the population of Northern Ireland is, on average, more active in religious affiliation and religious practice than is most of mainland Britain, and there is evidence that active religious affiliation may reduce general crime levels (Tittle & Welch 1983). Hence, interestingly, religious issues may be related—in different ways—both to Northern Ireland's high-profile problems of sectarian violence, and to the low rates of burglary and other property crime.

The second point of interest concerns an exception to the generally low rate of property crime in the province. For Northern Ireland as a whole has a high rate of car thefts, relative to the number of cars in the province.

The province has a relatively low rate of vehicle ownership, so victimisation rates for car thefts calculated on a population base somewhat mask the true level of victimisation. In the international victim survey, the vehicle incidence rate for theft of cars (that is number of offences per annum per 100 vehicles owned) was 2.0 for Northern Ireland in 1988: the province was second only to Spain (2.1) in this respect (van Dijk et al. 1990, Table E7, p. 179). These data refer only to thefts of cars: Northern Ireland does not have a particularly high rate of thefts from cars.

The rate is particularly high in Belfast, and these crimes are known to be committed especially by adolescents living in Catholic West Belfast (McCullough et al. 1990).

In 1987 and 1988, 80 per cent of cars reported stolen in Northern Ireland were taken in Belfast. In 1987, 47 per cent of all cars reported stolen in the province were recovered in West Belfast—though there has apparently been a trend during the 1980s for offenders who live in West Belfast increasingly to steal cars from outside the local area, and then bring them in to West Belfast (McCullough et al. 1990, p. 27).

This occurs despite strong discouragement from the local community, including the main Republican paramilitary organisation, and seems to be related to the strains and tensions of being brought up in a divided and violent society, together with the absence of regular community policing in this particular area.
The police and the army—‘legitimate targets’ in the eyes of the (main Republican paramilitary organisation)—are confined in West Belfast to fortress-like bases with look-out posts and security fencing. Tours of the area are made in heavily armoured Land Rovers, often travelling in convoy . . . the car thief has a fairly low risk of being apprehended in a stolen car . . . (and) the owners of stolen cars discovered in West Belfast usually have to travel into the area to reclaim their cars themselves. Owing to the low level of normal policing, . . . the paramilitary organisations have tended to emerge as self-appointed guardians of law and order . . . (McCullough et al. 1990, pp. 6-7).

Car theft in West Belfast also ‘raises particularly hostile feelings within the community at large . . . it gives rise to a sense of despair and hopelessness . . . which in turn has given the paramilitaries the excuse to use the most drastic and inhumane methods (on known car thieves), such as knee-capping, punishment beatings and shootings’ (McCullough et al. 1990, p. 31).

This brief sketch of the situation in Northern Ireland well illustrates the complexity of the problem of the explanation of crime. The province has three very distinct crime patterns, all co-existing within one quite small society. To emphasise one of the three patterns at the expense of the others would be to fail to understand the whole picture. Satisfactorily to explain all three patterns (including their relationship to one another) requires a quite sophisticated understanding of the social and political organisation and the culture of the province—including some special features of its social life which are replicated in few, if any other, modern societies.

My second vignette comes from mainland Britain—specifically from the city of Sheffield, in which I used to live and work. Sheffield is a city with a population of about half a million, and it is rather self-contained both geographically (it is not part of a conurbation) and culturally. Over the years, my colleagues and I have conducted a number of different explorations of crime in the city; the particular finding that I want to highlight here arose from some studies that we undertook in the mid 1970s. At that time, we were able to identify three residential areas, all of which had high offender residence rates and high offence commission rates (for distinction between these rates, see Bottoms & Wiles 1986, Wikström 1990)—yet socially, the three areas were in many ways very different from one another. In outline, they were as follows:

**Area 1**, which we called 'Redlight', was a small residential area close to the city centre, with fairly high population mobility, but also a stable core of long-term residents. The housing was predominantly privately rented, with some multi-occupation of large houses. The population was very mixed, with a relatively high proportion (about 15-20 per cent) of ethnic minority residents. Redlight was well known in the city as Sheffield's main prostitution district, and it was also known as a small-scale centre for drug dealing. In short, this was in many ways a classic interstitial area, as discussed by the Chicago sociologists of the 1930s (for discussion of Redlight see Bottoms & Wiles 1986, pp. 140-50).

**Area 2**, which we called 'Skyhigh', was also situated close to the city centre, and it too had quite high population mobility. However, unlike Redlight, Skyhigh was a public housing development, built in a high-rise style, and it had only a small ethnic minority population. Prostitution and drugs activities were almost wholly absent from the area, but vandalism was a particular problem. Surveys showed that Skyhigh was one of the most disliked areas of the city, and few of its residents felt at home there. It appeared to be a more anomic area than either of the others mentioned here (for discussion of Skyhigh see Bottoms & Wiles 1986, pp. 128-9).
Area 3, known to us as 'Gardenia', was two miles from the city centre. Like Skyhigh, it was a public housing estate; but unlike Skyhigh, it was a low-rise housing area, with very low population turnover (60 per cent of the families had lived in the area for more than ten years). Ethnic minorities were wholly absent. As regards crime, the area had a thriving, if relatively mild, criminal subculture; but there were no prostitution or drug activities (for a full analysis of Gardenia in the mid-1970s see Bottoms et al. 1989).

These three areas, with their intriguing diversity, give the lie to any simple one-dimensional explanation of high-crime residential area. They emphasise, as does the Northern Ireland example, that a central task for criminology is to get close to and to understand some of the very different social settings in which criminal activity takes place, and the very different patterns of crime which can occur within a particular social context.

Karl Marx's famous remark that human beings 'make history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing', has perhaps been insufficiently pondered by criminologists. For crimes, too, are committed by human beings who (usually) make choices to offend, but within the context of lives shaped crucially by social and cultural contexts not of their own choosing. That is true in Northern Ireland and in the three areas of Sheffield that I have highlighted. But it is also true, as the papers of this conference have very ably demonstrated, of various kinds of crime in Indonesia—though the social and cultural context in Indonesia is, of course, very different.

West Meets East

I have deliberately entitled this second section of my address 'West Meets East', because what I want to offer here are a few remarks concerning what I, a Westerner, have learned about crime in a major Eastern country (Indonesia) from the papers at this conference.

It is not, of course, possible to mention all the papers about Indonesia, and the points that I have selected for comment are simply the ones that specially interested me. There is, naturally, a great deal of other valuable material in the papers, upon which the Indonesian Society of Criminology should be warmly congratulated.

I shall begin with Mr Muhammad Mustofa's paper on the 'Siri' phenomenon in a rural community in South Sulawesi. *Siri ripakasiri*, I have learned, is the deep feeling of shame of a person whose dignity has been degraded by others in public; and according to the customs of the Buginese-Makasserese community, this shame requires retaliation, or 'the duty to restore *siri*'. This duty falls upon the kin of the victim as well as the victim him/herself.

We immediately see here the strong sense of community, or *communitarianism*, found in most traditional societies. However, I shall not dwell on this, but rather move on to comment on three special points of interest in Mr Mustofa's analysis.

Firstly, according to the traditions of this community, the disputing parties may, in certain circumstances, seek mediation from the *Pabicara*, or community leaders (though the Pabicara do not initiate attempts at mediation). Mediation of this kind is not always successful but, where success is achieved, the result seems to be a very clear example of what John Braithwaite (1989) has termed *reintegrative shaming*. That is to say:

- there is a clear acknowledgement of wrongdoing by the person who has violated the *siri*; and
- apologies and reparations are made which help to rebuild the fractured social bonds between the parties.
However, if the mediation is unsuccessful, the result is rather what Braithwaite has termed disintegrative shaming—that is, condemnation of the wrongdoer by most of the community, but no rebuilding of social bonds, and potentially serious tensions (perhaps including serious physical injuries) within the community.

Secondly, the decline in the number of Pabicara in recent years has made this mediation option less available, possibly leading to more violent retaliations (though I understand there is no firm data on this point). Moreover, the modern Indonesian legal system does not officially recognise the potentially reintegrative and violence-reducing role of the Pabicara: and here we see some clear tensions between customary laws and official state laws within a developing country.

Thirdly, a police operation in South Sulawesi in 1985-88, which was intended to reduce violent siri-related retaliations by the confiscation of weapons (badik) from owners, sellers and producers, in fact failed to have the desired effect. To the Western observer, this is very interesting as an example of the failure of a particular kind of situational crime prevention (that is, reducing the opportunities for crime; see Hough et al. 1980). The main reason for the failure, in South Sulawesi, was apparently largely the strength of the cultural norms within the Buginese-Makasserese community, supporting the traditional siri customs.

It is important not to dwell too long upon examples of the kind just discussed, because of course most criminal problems in Indonesia (and hence most of the papers in this conference) do not now occur in these rural and traditional communities, but rather in the main cities and the industrial sites. For Indonesia, like many other developing countries, has experienced very rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in recent decades.

The Western observer (or at least one who knows the history of his/her own country) is at first inclined to draw strong parallels between the recent experience of industrialisation and urbanisation in a country like Indonesia and the experiences of the same phenomena in the West in the early nineteenth century. But, as my Cambridge colleague Dr Colin Sumner (1982, ch. 1) has valuably pointed out, this kind of parallel contains many pitfalls. (However, my theoretical orientation is different from that of Dr Sumner, and I would not subscribe to the argument of his paper in full.) In fact, the developing countries' experience of industrialisation and urbanisation has been different from the earlier experience of the West in at least three crucial respects:

Firstly, because modern developing countries are surrounded by more developed economies, whose multinational corporations are anxious, wherever possible, to make profitable entries into the developing economies. 'Capitalism in one country' is not an option in the way that it largely was in the nineteenth century.

Secondly, the developing countries are surrounded by, and cannot avoid using, the advanced technology of the modern world. This technology, however, has its own social effects, which are not always welcome. For example, Mardjono Reksodiputro has referred to the growth of fear of crime in Indonesia as a result of the overdramatisation of crime stories in the mass media.

Thirdly, most developing countries are former colonies whose political and legal systems have in one way or another (by continuity or rejection, or a combination of both) been crucially influenced by their colonial past; and these politico-legal features have often been important in the shaping of economic and social policy.

Some of the criminological consequences of the current socioeconomic situation in Indonesia have been very well brought out in the papers of this conference. For example, I could mention:
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- Professor Sahetapy's forceful paper on environmental pollution by industrial plants;
- Dr Soesanto's analysis of corporate crime in Indonesia, including the apparently widespread violation of the minimum wage legislation, despite the fact that the minimum wage is, on any objective analysis, itself very low;
- Arif Gosita's paper on child exploitation showing, among other things, that in the big cities there are numerous children from underprivileged families who become completely detached from any family relationship—with a considerable potential, in Mr Gosita's opinion, for delinquency;
- Mardjono Reksodiputro's authoritative overview of crime in Indonesia, which draws attention amongst other things to: the weakening of family and social ties with urbanisation; housing problems in cities; the development of organised crime (including drug trafficking and fraud); and, in a political context, some crimes of corruption by government officials.

Hence, we see clear evidence that Indonesian criminologists are giving serious attention to a range of different crime problems (including crimes by children, adult street crimes, crimes by businesses, and crimes within the government service) that arise in the context of a developing country. One participant at the conference aptly called all this 'the dark side of modern cultural development'.

I should like to comment on one other matter, of a rather different character, arising from the paper by Mardjono Reksodiputro. This concerns the low prison population in Indonesia and the fact that the recorded crime rate seems not to be rising, despite rapid urbanisation. Also, Professor Sahetapy's pioneering victim survey in Surabaja, mentioned in Dr van Dijk's paper (see also van Dijk et al. 1990, pp. 43-5) does not suggest an unduly high crime rate for a dense urban area.

These matters clearly require further study. But it is most interesting that modern Japan has a low crime rate (now confirmed in the international victim survey—see Dr van Dijk's paper to this conference), and that, in the period since the Second World War, Japan has not (despite rapid urbanisation during this time) suffered the kind of dramatic increases in crime experienced in most Western countries. Scholars usually attribute these findings to the strongly communitarian nature of Japanese society, retained so far despite urbanisation—though it is interesting to learn from Dr Sugihara's paper to this conference that he feels these communitarian features of Japanese society may now be weakening.

Could it be that Indonesia, like Japan, is also retaining some communitarian features despite urbanisation, and that this is helping to keep the recorded crime rate stable? I cannot, of course, answer this question: but the question seems to me to be an important one and, if there is any truth at all in such a suggestion, then the issue of how such communitarian features might be sustained is surely worth the most serious attention of Indonesian criminologists and policymakers.

In concluding this section of my address, I would like to comment on just two more of the Indonesian papers. The first is the presentation by Dr Soedjono Dirjosisworo on the crime defence strategy in Western Java—a paper which had, to the Western observer, a number of familiar features. In Western countries in recent years, including both the United Kingdom and The Netherlands, governments have increasingly been trying to develop coordinated crime prevention strategies of this kind, not infrequently referred to as 'crime management strategies'.
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I do not have the time to discuss these strategies in depth here, but I should just like to offer one word of warning, which arises from my observations of these kinds of approaches in Western countries. Professor Philip Selznick has recently suggested a useful conceptual distinction between management and governance (see Garland 1990, pp. 58-9). 'Management', he suggests, is an activity based upon concepts of rational efficiency in which aims tend to be taken for granted, and there is an emphasis on planning, efficiency, and administrative effectiveness: 'this is the realm of administrative rather than political decisions'. 'Governance', on the other hand, cannot limit itself to the single-minded pursuit of narrowly-conceived goals. It implies a broader responsibility for 'all the interests that affect the viability, competence, and moral character of a social system'. In short, governance, unlike management, emphasises vital moral and political dimensions of social life.

This distinction was developed by Selznick in a broader context than that of criminal policy. Nevertheless, in my view it is useful to mention the distinction in discussing modern crime prevention strategies, because there is a danger (at least in Western countries) that the rapid growth of management-style thinking in relation to these strategies is causing at least some officials on some occasions to lose sight of important moral and political questions relating to key dimensions of public order and public feelings of safety—which a well-balanced criminal policy should not neglect. As Indonesia develops crime prevention strategies such as that in West Java, I would suggest it would be useful to bear in mind these potential difficulties.

Finally, and on a methodological note, I feel I must mention the paper by Mr Paulus Hadisuprapto, which tests Hirschi's control theory in an Indonesian context. The main interest of this paper for me lies in its timely methodological warnings about the oversimplistic transfer of social concepts (such as 'attachment') from one cultural context into another. These warnings re-emphasise the point which I made at the end of the first section of this address—namely, that in all our criminological work, both within a given country and when working cross-culturally, we must be extremely sensitive to the social and cultural context.

John Braithwaite's Theory of Reintegrative Shaming

In this third section of my address, I want to focus upon an important book published by the Australian scholar John Braithwaite in 1989, and entitled Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Braithwaite 1989).

This book has already been mentioned in several of the papers presented at this conference (for example, those by Professor Kellens and Professor van den Heuvel). It seems to me to be of special interest in the context of an 'East meets West' conference, for three reasons;

- because it bravely attempts a general theory of crime, that is, it seeks to offer an overall explanatory framework for most criminality in most countries (including white-collar crime). (However, Braithwaite explicitly excludes from his theory 'the small minority of criminal laws that are not consensually regarded as justified' (p. 3));

- because it explicitly draws upon some concepts (such as 'shaming') which are now more familiar in Eastern than in Western countries;

- because a discussion of Japan's low crime rate features quite prominently in the argument of the book.
Before offering some comments on Braithwaite's book, it is first necessary to explain briefly (and obviously, in the time available, somewhat inadequately) the main features of the general theory of reintegrative shaming which is proposed by the author.

This theory has, perhaps, two main features. First, it can reasonably be regarded as an extended discussion and attempted correction of labelling theory. Labelling theory, argues Braithwaite, has only modest empirical support in the criminological literature, but few criminologists have seriously investigated under what conditions labelling might amplify initial criminality, and under what conditions it might actually reduce crime. Braithwaite's hypothesis is that reintegrative shaming (as discussed in the previous section of this paper) will reduce criminality, but disintegrative shaming will increase it.

The second main feature of Braithwaite's theory, as I see it, is that it is a deliberately eclectic approach, seeking to blend creatively some elements from control theory, subcultural theory, labelling theory, opportunity theory of the type adopted by Merton (1957) and Cloward & Ohlin (1960), and learning theory. Some criminologists might immediately be repelled by this kind of eclecticism, but, like the sociologist Anthony Giddens (1984, p. xxii), I have never been able to see the force of this kind of objection, provided that the various different elements which are utilised in an eclectic theory are epistemologically compatible, and are carefully related to one another in a coherent way—as, certainly, they are in Braithwaite's book.

Turning then to the substance of Braithwaite's theory, a key idea is that clear moral boundaries are essential for societies which wish to achieve low crime rates. A society without shaming mechanisms for wrongdoers becomes too permissive, and generates high crime. But not all shaming is equally effective: as previously discussed, reintegrative shaming is considered to be greatly superior to disintegrative shaming in reducing crime.

The various elements of Braithwaite's theory are presented by him in a summary diagram, reproduced here as Figure 1. At the top of the diagram are the two linked concepts of communitarianism and interdependency: communitarianism is a concept relating to social groups, and interdependency refers to the individual's degree of attachment to significant others such as in families, schools and neighbourhoods. Braithwaite postulates that, where communitarianism or interdependency are strong, crime will usually be low, and vice versa. Various characteristics representing weak communitarianism or interdependency are shown above the boxes at the top of the diagram (for example, urbanization = a weakening of communitarianism). This part of Braithwaite's theory obviously draws strongly on control theory.

The next element of the theory—for those who have not been held away from crime by the controls of interdependency—is shaming. This is shown in the box in the middle of the diagram, which incorporates the reintegrative/disintegrative distinction. As previously indicated, this part of the theory seeks to improve upon labelling theory. Braithwaite devotes a whole chapter to the mechanisms of shaming, but it is not possible to elaborate upon these here.
Figure 1

Summary of the Theory of Reintegrative Shaming

Interdependency
(eg 'attachment' to parents, school, neighbours, employer)

Reintegrative Shaming

Stigmatisation

Participation in Criminal Subcultures

Low Crime Rates

High Crime Rates

Low educational and occupational aspirations ('commitment')

Legitimate opportunities systematically blocked for critical fractions of population

Criminal Subculture Formation

Illegitimate opportunities to indulge tastes

Urbanisation

Residential mobility

Communitarianism

The theory then postulated—as shown at the bottom of the main part of the diagram—that the stigmatisation produced by disintegrative shaming will be more likely to lead to participation in delinquent subcultures. Additionally, as in Cloward & Ohlin's (1960) theory, the social blocking of legitimate opportunities, plus the availability or otherwise of illegitimate opportunities (for example drug dealing for gain), is seen as independently likely to produce high crime rates (see the right hand side of the diagram; also Braithwaite 1989, p. 103). In these ways, subcultural theory and opportunity theory make their contribution to Braithwaite's overall framework.

The final theoretical strand of Braithwaite's eclectic approach is learning theory, which is not specifically represented in Figure 1, but which in a sense pervades the whole diagram.

John Braithwaite at one point says of his own theory that 'with one crucial exception (reintegrative shaming), there is . . . no originality in the elements of this theory, simply originality of synthesis' (Braithwaite 1989, p. 107).

Whilst this statement is, formally speaking, correct, it also seems to me to be too modest. The theory of reintegrative shaming is, in my judgment, a superb essay in criminological synthesis, and surely one of the most stimulating pieces of writing in the field in recent years. (Among its positive features, I would particularly recommend the very clear-headed chapter 3, which deals with 'the facts a theory of crime ought to fit', and 'the failure of the dominant theories to explain these findings'.) But of course, as Braithwaite would be the first to insist, it is only a theory and certainly requires both theoretical refinement and empirical testing. I would hope that some interest in the theory might be shown in Indonesia, because a rapidly developing society such as this would be a very good site for the testing of some of its central hypotheses.

It will be apparent that I find much of value in Braithwaite's theory, but I do also have four main criticisms of the work, which I shall now elaborate briefly. I hope that these criticisms might lead to constructive refinement of the theory, by Braithwaite or by others.

The first criticism is that the theory is very offender-focussed and says little about crimes. This crime/offender distinction is a potentially very important one for criminological explanation, as environmental criminologists in particular tend to emphasise (see for example Wikström 1990). At a practical level, the significance of the distinction can be seen when, for example, a sudden quarrel between acquaintances might become murder if there is a gun available, but there would be no crime at all without the availability of such a weapon. In other words, even motivated potential offenders will not necessarily offend at all if other appropriate conditions are not present, the most important of such conditions being opportunity. (The concept of 'opportunity' is however itself a complex one. The concept can include, for example, the ready availability of potential criminal targets; the availability of adequate means to accomplish a particular crime; the absence of capable guardians or adequate surveillance; and so on. For a full discussion see Clarke (1983).) In Britain, this 'crime as opportunity' thesis has been pressed hard by the proponents of situational crime prevention (see Hough et al. 1980) and they have succeeded in demonstrating its importance, even if not quite to the extent that original versions of the approach seemed to want to claim (see generally Clarke 1983; Bottoms 1990).

Braithwaite's theory contains an opportunity dimension, but, as indicated above, this relates solely to the kind of opportunity theory put forward in the 1950s and 1960s in the wake of Robert K. Merton's (1957) Social Theory and Social Structure—that is to say, it refers to such matters as the social arrangements which block systematically, for a majority of the population, the routes (or opportunities) to material and career success; or, in a different vein, the availability or otherwise in a particular locality of illegitimate opportunity structures (for example organised crime syndicates). This Mertonian kind of opportunity theory is thus primarily offender-centred, and is significantly different from the offence-oriented opportunity theory referred to in the previous paragraph.
An example of the potential importance for criminological explanation of this kind of 'crime-as-opportunity' dimension may be seen in considering the problem of explaining the rapid growth of crime in most Western countries since the 1950s. Indonesian criminologists might be surprised to learn that this important question has rarely been systematically addressed by Western criminologists (see Bottoms 1987); and John Braithwaite is to be congratulated on tackling it. However, his solution to the problem is simply that of 'a decline of interdependency and communitarianism and a progressive uncoupling of punishment and shaming' (Braithwaite 1989, p. 106): that is, it is an offender-based explanation referring to social change in families and neighbourhoods, for example. (Specifically, Braithwaite argues that 'this has been a period when urbanisation, residential mobility, delayed marriage and marriage breakdown, and an explosion of the 15-25 age group have occurred in most countries' (p. 106).) Plus an element referring to the penal strategies of Western countries during the period in question.

I must here leave aside this last point, which raises issues that are both controversial and very complex. The controversies would include both whether there has in fact been a 'progressive uncoupling of punishment and shaming' in post-war Western societies, and, if so, whether this has necessarily led to increased crime rates. Rather, I want to compare Braithwaite's analysis with one which appeared in a Dutch White Paper on crime, published in 1985 (Netherlands Ministry of Justice 1985, p. 10). This referred, very much in the same vein as Braithwaite, to 'a decline since 1960 in the influence of many traditional social institutions within which the behaviour of individuals is effectively normalised, such as the family, clubs and associations, the church and the schools'. 'Society', the White Paper declared, 'has become more individualistic'. (Among other things, the White Paper suggests that increased alcohol consumption and drug use are products of a more individualistic society.) But the analysis did not stop there. As an additional dimension, it was argued that 'because of greatly increased prosperity many more goods are in circulation which can be stolen or destroyed than in the past. The growth in private car ownership in particular has greatly increased the opportunities for crime'.

Now, it can of course be correctly argued by opponents of the 'crime as opportunity' thesis that increases in criminal opportunities will not necessarily increase the incidence of crime—if, for example, the citizens are well-socialised and well socially-integrated. But that is not really the point at issue here. The issue is—given that there has been a decline in communitarianism and interdependency in the West in the post-war period, would the increase in crime have been as rapid if there had been no increase in the available stock of valuable and portable private possessions such as cars, televisions and videos? The Dutch White Paper in effect answered this question in the negative, and it seems to me to be overwhelmingly likely that it was right to do so.

The second criticism that I would make of Braithwaite's theory tackles it much more on its own home ground or offender-centred theory. It is clear from much recent research in criminal careers that the distribution of offences as between different offenders is very skewed: for example, in a British study by the Home Office Statistical Department it was found that nearly 1 in 3 males born in 1953 had been convicted of a 'standard list' offence by the age of 28, but only a small proportion of these (5.5 per cent, or 18 per cent of those convicted), had six or more court appearances before this age, and they accounted for 70 per cent of all the known offences committed by the whole cohort born in 1953 (Home Office 1985). Similar, although slightly less extreme, results have been found in other cohort studies both in the United States and in Britain, and the conclusions are supported by self-report research as well as by research on official arrests and convictions (Farrington 1987; Balvig 1988).

A corollary of this kind of research finding is that explanations of offending might differ as between occasional offenders (those who only offend once or twice), moderate offenders...
(those with intermediate levels of criminality who then desist) and persistent offenders. Braithwaite's theory could perhaps be suitably modified to take account of this possibility: but, as it stands, the theory does not adequately confront the empirical challenge presented by the kind of research findings outlined above.

My third critical point concerns issues of place and of time. 'Place', in criminology, can refer either to the places where offences are committed, or to the places where offenders live (see Bottoms & Wiles 1986; Wikström 1990): I shall restrict attention for the moment to the former. It is now quite clear from the relevant criminological literature that both the spatial patterning and the timing of offence commission can be very skewed indeed (see, for example Brantingham & Brantingham 1984; Sherman et al. 1989; Wikström 1985). These patterns are undoubtedly explicable partly in terms of opportunity variables, but it is clear that this is not the whole explanation. Environmental criminologists have increasingly turned also to aspects of offenders' routine activities (in their ordinary, non-offending daily lives) to help explain place/time variations (see Brantingham & Brantingham 1984; Wikström 1990): on routine activities theory see Cohen & Felson 1979). To develop these themes more fully would take me deep into the literature of environmental criminology: suffice it to say, therefore, for present purposes, that Braithwaite once again does not adequately confront these issues. Nor should the issues be regarded as trivial: at least one major modern sociological theorist (Giddens 1984) accords to space/time considerations. ('Space' is a different concept from 'place', but the complexities of this distinction cannot be discussed here.) And to daily routines, a central role in the understanding of social life. (Elsewhere, I have argued that criminologists could usefully engage more fully with the implications of Giddens's sociological approach: see Bottoms & Wiles (1992).)

The fourth and final criticism of Braithwaite that I would offer is that the theory says too little about power. This is so at several levels. At a micro level, it is regrettably the case that some males within high interdependency family contexts nevertheless use their power within the family unit to commit offences of domestic violence or the sexual abuse of children. Female partners, in particular, may attempt to stop this kind of behaviour by intra-family tactics of reintegrative shaming: but the evidence suggests that they are usually unsuccessful, and crimes of this sort often develop into a repeated series of violations. It can be argued that it is a serious weakness of Braithwaite's theory not to discuss crimes of this kind, the issues of physical and social power which are inextricably linked to them, and the implications of these matters for his theoretical position.

Moving to a meso level of social organisation, power at this level can be extremely important to criminological explanation, notably as regards the direct and indirect results of various allocative decisions taken by, for example, local government officials concerning schools and housing, for example. If we return for a moment to the three areas of Sheffield discussed in the first section of this paper, Paul Wiles and I would want to argue that the high offence rates of these areas are in each case linked (though not exclusively so) to their being high offender-rate areas; and that the key to the understanding of both why all three areas are high offender-rate areas, and the intriguing differences between the areas, lies ultimately in the operations of the local housing market, and their immediate and longer-term social effects (Bottoms & Wiles 1986). This approach, therefore, takes one, as a criminologist, into issues of power that are not considered within Braithwaite's theory.

If we turn finally to the macro level of social organisation, Braithwaite's theory specifically excludes crimes about the proscription of which there is no social consensus. His own main example of no-consensus crime is a victimless crime (for example, drug offences); but in fact, non-consensuality can extend to more serious crimes than this, linked to overt political struggle, as the sectarian murders in Northern Ireland remind us. In a society such as Northern Ireland, crimes of this sort can be of dominating importance—and
Concluding Reflections

we need to be aware, in considering a theory like Braithwaite's, that, although it is a general theory of crime, it does not claim to be able to explain this kind of criminality.

I repeat that these various suggested criticisms of Braithwaite's theory are offered in a constructive rather than a destructive spirit. His theory has much to offer us, and I hope it will receive the attention that it deserves in the criminological community.

Necessary Features of a General Theory of Crime

Braithwaite is not the only criminologist to have put forward a general theory of crime in the past year or so: another important attempt at such a theory has been offered by Gottfredson & Hirschi (1990). I thought, therefore, that it might be worth concluding this address by considering briefly some of the necessary features of such a theory, if it is to be successful in its task.

Reflecting on Braithwaite's theory in particular, it has seemed to me that the necessary features of a general theory should include the following:

1. It must fit the facts concerning the main characteristics of (a) crimes and (b) offenders;
2. It must explain the differences between occasional and persistent offenders;
3. It should probably be eclectic, and if so it should be coherently eclectic;
4. It must have an adequate dimension of place and time;
5. It must give adequate attention to human agency and to daily routines (real people making real choices in society—including choices to commit crimes—but doing so within the context of the routines of daily life);
6. It must have an adequate grasp of the social organisation and the power structures of society, the way in which they are perceived and acted upon by various social actors, and the implications of this for criminality.

I offer this list mainly to stimulate comment: I have no time here to defend in detail the various suggested features, and I realise that the list is very likely to be incomplete. Applying the list to Braithwaite's theory, I would argue that his theory adequately meets features 1(b), 3 and (in part) 5, but not the remainder of the criteria.

I should finally comment that features 4, 5 and 6 in the list above, taken together, and taken seriously will help us to ensure that our criminological explanations take adequate account of cultural differences. And, as I have argued from the outset of this paper, that is a matter of central importance, not least in the context of 'East meets West'.

References

Balvig, F. 1988, Delinquent and Not-Delinquent Youth (Kriminalistisk Instituts Stencilserie No. 43), Copenhagen, Institute of Criminal Science, University of Copenhagen.


