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


**Australian  
Institute of  
Criminology**

# **POLICE RESOURCES AND EFFECTIVENESS**

**Edited by Julia Vernon  
and Dorothy Bracey**

**Seminar.  
Proceedings No. 27  
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# **POLICE RESOURCES AND EFFECTIVENESS**

**Proceedings of a Seminar**

**Held 31 May - 2 June 1988**

**Edited by**

**Julia Vernon and Dorothy Bracey**

**Australian Institute of Criminology  
Canberra ACT**

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The preparation of these proceedings involved a number of people. Dorothy Bracey was rapporteur. Julia Vernon edited the papers with some assistance from Angela Grant. Cheryl McGovern typed the proceedings and Sylvia McKellar assisted in their production.

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## OPENING REMARKS

Duncan Chappell  
Director  
Australian Institute of Criminology  
Canberra

The state of the nations's economy, and law and order, are two topics of intense and current debate. They are also related topics. Worried citizens across the country are voicing their concerns about troubling increases in crime. They are also demanding that governments provide more funds to combat growing criminal activity.

At the forefront of many of these public demands have been calls for more police and more police powers. These calls have not gone unheard. During the past fifteen years, for example:

The police to population ratio in Australia has increased by almost 30 per cent;

The annual expenditure on police departments, taking into account inflation, has increased by about 60 per cent;

A new enforcement agency, which some have called 'Australia's ninth police force', has been established in the form of the National Crime Authority;

Extensive new powers have been granted to police in areas like phone tapping and electronic surveillance.

These developments have been matched over much the same time period by a dramatic rise in the rates of commission of serious crime and by declines in the rates of clearance of these crimes by police. There have also been ever-increasing burdens placed upon police in regard to the many non-crime-related services they provide to the community.

It is trends like these which promise to provide the 'grist for the mill' in this Australian Institute of Criminology sponsored seminar on 'Police Resources and Effectiveness'.

In a special discussion paper prepared for this seminar my colleague Peter Grabosky (Grabosky, 1988) has noted that by the end of this decade the cost of police services in Australia will exceed two billion dollars annually. That is a difficult figure to visualise. It is roughly twice the cost of our splendid new Parliament House or more than twice the amount it is suggested Qantas and Australian Airlines currently require to refurbish their fleet of planes. It is quite clearly an amount which has a substantial impact on the budget of every government in the country and on the pocket book of each taxpayer. Police forces, as Peter Grabosky indicates in his paper, are among the largest and most expensive public sector agencies we possess.

Given these facts, can and should governments continue to increase their expenditures on police forces? Are there ways in which these expenditures can be contained in the future? Are the resources which the police already possess utilised efficiently and effectively? Are there certain functions which the police now perform which should be undertaken by other agencies, public or private? These are some of the key questions which are to be addressed at this seminar. They are questions which I know are being debated already in a number of places. The Federal Government, for instance, is in the midst of a review of its law enforcement responsibilities. Individual police forces are also reviewing the cost effectiveness of their operations as well as experimenting with new approaches to the delivery of law enforcement services. A pioneer in this field has been South Australia. But as far as I am aware this is the first occasion in this country that policy makers have joined with senior police administrators and researchers to discuss these most important issues in an open public forum.

The Institute is delighted to act as the host for this forum and to welcome to it participants from all over Australia and from across the Tasman. We are especially pleased that representatives from the New Zealand police, public service and academic community are able to join us in our deliberations over the next three days. We also warmly welcome two overseas guests to the forum - one from Canada and the other from south of the forty-ninth parallel.

Peter Engstad, who will be presenting the keynote address this afternoon, comes to us from British Columbia. Peter is the Director of that province's well known and much respected Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit. He is also a former senior policy adviser on police issues to the Federal Government of Canada.

Professor Dorothy Bracey joins us from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York. Dorothy, who is going to perform the difficult task of being the seminar's rapporteur, is no stranger to Australia or the Institute. She is currently a Visiting Fellow at the National Police Research Unit in Adelaide.

Public interest in our seminar and its subject is already substantial. You may have seen, for instance, the feature story mentioning the seminar written by Phil Jarratt in the *Bulletin* (31 May 1988 p.58). That story also illustrates the hazards and controversy involved in pursuing the topic of police efficiency. Mr Jarratt's story begins with what he terms bad news including a statement that 'on average each Australian police officer will solve fewer than three crimes a year compared with the nine his British counterparts will manage'.

I blanched when I read this piece of bad news. So too, I imagine, did every Police Minister and Police Commissioner around the nation. They also probably muttered some unprintable thing about the Institute and its misuse of statistics. Well, the fact is the comparison simply does not hold up to close scrutiny. The problem seems to have arisen when Mr Jarratt took the British statistic - United Kingdom police solve nine notifiable crimes per officer a year - from a recent story in the *Economist* ('Managing the fight against Crime' February 13, 1988) - Australian police solve three property and violent crimes a year per officer - taken from the Australian Institute of Criminology's publication *The Size of the Crime Problem in Australia*. Simply put, the 'notifiable' crimes of the United Kingdom take in a large number of crimes such as traffic offences, minor




thefts, etc, not considered in the serious crimes mentioned in the latter publication.

Let me conclude my opening remarks with some good news. To provide a clearer picture of these comparative clearance rates my colleague Dr Mukherjee analysed the Australian rates on a similar statistical basis to that used by the *Economist*. The analysis shows that per police officer the United Kingdom police clear up 9.5 crimes per year out of 30.2 reported crimes, while Australian police forces clear up 12.9 out of 40.0 crimes reported. This makes a clear up rate of about 31 per cent for both countries. Obviously, Australian police have nothing to lose by this comparison with their British counterparts.

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## OPENING ADDRESS

Senator the Honourable Michael Tate  
Federal Minister for Justice  
Canberra

I welcome the opportunity to open this seminar on police resources and effectiveness. These are issues which go to the heart of the relationship between the community and its policing service, in terms of how much the community pays for the service, the say it should have in how its money is spent and the results that it can reasonably expect from its investment.

Since it is ultimately responsible to the parliament and is ongoing mediator in this relationship, the government's task of developing a law enforcement policy framework within which an efficient, effective and accountable policing service can be delivered to the community is a complex and difficult one. The policy development task is substantially assisted, however, by the existence of an informed debate on these issues among police and the community at large and I commend the Australian Institute of Criminology for encouraging such debate through seminars such as this.

As the Minister responsible for the Australian Federal Police (AFP), I am the force's advocate within the councils of government, particularly in the process which decides the AFP's annual budget allocation. But in carrying out this and my other responsibilities, I am accountable to the government, the parliament and the community.

I should like to outline today my thoughts on some of the principles that I see as essential to fulfilling my responsibilities as Minister for the Australian Federal Police in the areas of resources and effectiveness. I believe these principles apply equally to all other Australian Police Forces.

I see the fundamental issue as being the relationship between the need for accountability in resource decision-making and management on the one hand and the independent discretionary decision-making capacity of each policeman on the other. The latter is grounded in the common law powers of each police constable - the fact that a constable is not subject to direction in how he enforces the law and is accountable only to the law and the courts in the performance of his duty. This independent status is primarily to protect the interests of the community.

I fully support the principle that police must perform their duty and pursue their investigations without fear or favour according to law and independent of interference. The Australian Federal Police's operational independence is enshrined in section 13 of its Act which, in providing that the Commissioner of Police has control of the operations and general administration of the force, is the clearest expression of the principle in Australian legislation.

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\* This paper was read by  
Alan Rose  
Associate Secretary  
Attorney-General's Department, Canberra

But the interests of the community are also best served by having a police force which is accountable for its performance in the normal way in a responsible and representative democracy. The AFP is funded by the community. The government is ultimately accountable to the community for how those funds are spent and whether it is getting value for money in terms of the performance of the force. It is no part of the legal independence of the constable's discretion that the force of which he is a member has any right to take to itself the sole or unfettered right to set its mission, objectives and performance measures.

The modern climate of budgetary restraint has made it even more important that I, as Minister, am able to satisfy myself as to whether maximum value is being received for dollars spent and, if I am not satisfied, to take action to ensure that it is. Section 13 of the AFP Act provides me with the power to issue directions to the Commissioner on the general policy in relation to the performance of the functions of the AFP.

It is a delicate task to achieve consensus on the limits of administrative accountability and operational independence. Police organisations traditionally view with suspicion moves to increase the degree of administrative scrutiny and control by ministers as a possible threat to their independence. Nevertheless, I believe that there is considerable scope and need for closer ministerial scrutiny and involvement without interfering with police independence.

One particular article of faith among some police is that police forces are fundamentally different from other organisations. This is used both to argue that police forces should have a special set of standards applied to them in a whole range of areas and also that the views of people outside the force carry less weight because by definition they do not understand the nature of the policing task.

In my view, this is a complete fallacy. While I appreciate the arduousness of the tasks police are called upon to perform, the police organisation itself, in management terms, is like any other corporate entity. It has objectives and goals, professional and management hierarchies, a variety of human and technological resources at its disposal and, one trusts, rational strategies to apply its resources in such a way as to achieve those objectives in the most effective and efficient manner.

I believe that if a Minister is to be able to fulfil his responsibilities to the community, the Commissioner of Police must be accountable to him for those management strategies in terms of their appropriateness to the objectives that have been set for the force. The word 'accountability' is meaningless in this context if the Minister can only request reports on these strategies without having the capacity to direct the Commissioner as to their make-up. I do not think it can be seriously advanced that such ministerial involvement in setting broad management strategies would interfere with the independence of the police in pursuing individual investigations.

This degree of ministerial scrutiny and oversight is essential if I am to assure my colleagues in government who control the purse strings that the force's management is giving the community value for its policing dollar, and argue persuasively on that basis for more dollars.

The reality is that if that cannot be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the financial decision-makers within the government, then the penalty will be that police resource bids will not succeed. Those decision-makers in Finance and Treasury quite properly will have no truck with claims of special status or assertions of needs unsupported by hard evidence and logical argument. Their business is to judge the bids of the police against the bids of many other areas of vital government activity. The police simply must meet the standards that are required of all other government agencies.

To digress for a moment from the strict resource aspects of accountability, there is a further reason why I believe Ministers must have a power of direction over police management policies, though this also proceeds from the need to protect the interests of the community. We are all aware of the problem of corruption within law enforcement agencies revealed by enquiries in various jurisdictions in recent times. To put it bluntly, the potential power and influence of the police in society is great, and corruption too clearly an occupational hazard for responsible governments to allow police forces to run themselves without systematic management accountability in accordance with a regular reporting program.

It may be impossible for any government to prevent an individual police officer choosing to act in a corrupt manner, but it is possible to prevent the development of an insular police organisation, closed to outside influences, within which individual corruption can thrive, become endemic and ultimately dominate the character of the force. A vital element in preventing such insularity is the existence of a source of policy advice to government independent of the police force. By widening the decision-making base, this directly challenges the power of any corrupt interests within the force and forces those interests into the open should they attempt to maintain control of the institutional level decision-making processes.

This course of action can only be successful, however, if the government possesses the power to act on independent advice and to direct that changes be made to those management policies within the force which have the potential to lead to the insularity of the organisation.

Corrupt interests also find it harder to maintain their dominant influence within a force in the face of the introduction of management practices clearly tailored to advance objectives enunciated in a publicly available and government-approved corporate plan for the force looking ahead three to five years. These would include rigorous entry and promotion standards and procedures, higher educational and where appropriate specialist professional standards, lateral entry at senior and middle levels, stringent complaints and management review processes administered from outside the force and strict financial accountability, to name but a few.

I note that police forces have traditionally resisted lateral recruitment, for reasons ranging from its potential damage to a force's relations with other forces from which it may be seen to poach, to the protection of the interests of those members already working their way through the force from the bottom.

It must be recognised, however, that the proper long-term interests of a police force lie in how effectively it performs its functions. Lateral and

specialist recruits can make a major contribution. They not only enrich the skills profile of a force, but they do it quickly, so the force's responsiveness to new developments in the criminal environment is improved. Implemented properly, the contribution of lateral recruitment to the real interests of a force far outweighs in my view the sectional interests or territorial imperatives opposed to it.

As to complaints and management review processes administered from outside the force, I believe their worth has been demonstrated by such examples as the AFP's Complaints Act and the New South Wales Police Board. In the case of the former, the involvement of the Commonwealth Ombudsman as an independent reviewer of police conduct has enhanced community confidence in the AFP and contributes to the individual police officer's awareness of his or her responsibilities. The NSW Police Board is chaired by an eminent person from outside the police force and includes another independent member as well as the Commissioner. It has been instrumental in achieving the management changes which have occurred within the NSW force over the last five years.

Although there are obviously other factors in keeping a police force free from widespread corruption, not least a strong leadership example by the Commissioner, I believe that maintenance of a source of independent advice and of an appropriate degree of ministerial oversight and involvement in a force's management policies can be effective inhibitions upon the ability of corrupt interests to survive and take root within a police force.

To return to the practicalities of resource allocation, as a Minister I am committed to the proper advancement of the agencies for which I am responsible. The AFP and I therefore have a mutual and interdependent interest in putting forward the best possible case to achieve that. I might now outline some thoughts on what ought and ought not to be part of that case.

For a start, I do not believe that assertions, still common in some circles, of a direct relationship between increases in crime (purportedly shown by statistics) and increases in police resources to meet that alleged threat, have any proper place in the process. It is to the credit of my police advisers that I see little of this within the portfolio, but outside the system it appears to thrive as a major part of attempts by interest groups to put pressure on governments by appealing to the basic human instinct to protect oneself and one's family.

Such assertions show a complete lack of professionalism and are no basis for responsible decision-making. Those who lobby by making such claims rarely analyse in any thorough-going way the statistics being put forward, causes unrelated to law enforcement are ignored, solutions other than additional police and additional powers are dismissed out of hand, and the wider consequences for society if the demands are met are never considered.

Fortunately, I see three factors working to diminish the impact of this irresponsible aspect of the law enforcement debate.

Firstly, governments are taking action to establish a more systematic process of national crime statistics collection and analysis to support national policy making. To this end, the Australian Police Ministers Council established late last year a committee under the direction of the Australian

Bureau of Statistics to develop an effective system of uniform national crime statistics. The initial focus of the Bureau's approach is to define the scope of the contribution that such statistics can make to policy making and structure the collection process and the counting rules accordingly.

Secondly, I am confident that the community will become more aware as time passes of the nature of law enforcement issues and recognise the fact that there are no simple solutions to crime and that increased resources do not automatically translate into increased effectiveness.

Finally, I would hope that the obvious importance and complexity of law enforcement issues would encourage a responsible approach by all political parties to calls for police resource increases.

Turning now to what ought to be part of a proper case to government for additional resources, most of the basics can be inferred from what I have said earlier. They include:

A rigorous assessment of needs, based on the objectives of the force as clearly articulated in a publicly available and government approved corporate plan;

Whether the management strategies in place to achieve these objectives are appropriate and deliver value for money;

Cost-effectiveness assessments, right down to the individual operations level; and

Demonstration of effectiveness in periodic reports in utilising existing resources by the implementation, within the corporate plan context, of performance indicators.

The AFP is meeting these requirements more consistently every year and has done well in resource terms over the past five years. Since the Federal government came to office, AFP staffing resources have increased by 25 per cent. The commitment that the government made in 1984 to provide ten million dollars over three years to recruit 294 additional staff for the AFP was honoured, notwithstanding the subsequent tightening of fiscal policy. The details of a further three year program of resource increases for the AFP are currently being worked out as part of the budgetary process. I am keen to settle with the Commissioner what that package for the next three years will be.

I should say that these commitments have not been and are not unconditional. There is always room for improvement. Historically, police forces have been insulated from the most rigorous budgetary scrutiny and are still learning to live in that environment.

Areas to which I would like to see the AFP giving more attention in future include, for example, developing a more sophisticated analysis of the relationship between its staffing and technological resource needs.

Staffing costs represent 75 per cent of the AFP's budget. As the police force in Australia least involved with community policing and most involved in longer term complex investigations into drug trafficking, organised crime and major fraud, I think the force needs to consider very carefully whether its approach must continue to be as manpower intensive or whether there should not be greater adaptation of

technological tools which are high in productivity and appropriate to the AFP's investigative task.

The principal corporate criminals targeted by the AFP have, since the industrial revolution at least, needed no convincing that to be successful they had to consistently operate on the fringe of each technological advance. Public bureaucracies, including police forces, have not until very recently been seized by such urgency. It seems to me that the AFP, not unlike its United States counterpart - the Federal Bureau of Investigation - must keep abreast of technology and its application to the detection, prevention and solution of major, complex crime or risk becoming irrelevant and leaving Australia wide open to international and large domestic criminal predators.

Events of the last ten years in Australia suggest that failures of law enforcement in the 1960's and 1970's have brought us to the edge of that precipice. I hope the chilling view of the potential prospect painted by a procession of Royal Commissioners was timely and shocked the decent and thinking members of the community into paying attention to the needs of law enforcement. Of course, a proper concentration on technological application is no substitute for, but must be complemented by, planned staff recruitment, career and skills development and placement. But staff no longer should be recruited en masse according to lowest common denominator requirements and trained on the discredited assumptions of uniformity.

Just as one looks to fit technology into specific strategic requirements, so one needs at all stages from recruitment to final posting to have clear plans for each member of the force so as to capitalise at each stage on that member's particular performance and potential - plans known well in advance by both force commanders and members.

Only clear career plans based on management requirements flowing from strategies developed within the corporate plan, combined with assessments of performance and future prospects, are likely to return value for each staffing dollar and ensure personal commitment.

There also needs to be further recognition that resource management is not an annual event but a continuous process. It must be instilled into every member of the force that they have a personal responsibility to exercise prudent financial management in their day-to-day activities. In central office, the senior police and civilian managers must continue to place their annual resource bids in the context of achievement of the organisation's objectives over the longer term and accept that this takes into consideration past performance as well as future needs.

To sum up, the general message I should like to get across to police is that they are not as unique an organisation as they may think, and they must meet the standards required of all other public sector agencies. The reality of that situation, and an associated degree of ministerial oversight and involvement in resource management strategies, is in the public interest and can be accepted by the police without compromising their operational independence and must be accepted if they are to be competitive with other agencies in the budgetary process.

Finally we come to effectiveness, which is the bottom line of why a police force is there in the first place and is obviously a critical part of any discussion of its survival and expansion. I have a great deal of sympathy



for anyone who tries to measure police performance or effectiveness. It is no doubt a difficult thing to do. But so it is with most parts of what are properly public enterprises.

The conventional methods one might choose to use, from clear-up rates to response times to rates of reported crime to cost-effectiveness, are all flawed in one way or another. Dr Grabosky in his paper (Grabosky, 1988) for this seminar lists twenty different types of performance measures and admits that this list is not exhaustive and contains no single global measure by which police productivity may be judged.

But if there is no single global measure in the policing field, then the challenge is there for police managers and government to use their professional skills and their imaginations to apply a variety of appropriate measures to the circumstances of the particular force to provide comprehensive reporting to the parliament and the people. Such reporting, among other things, needs to define not only the area of police activity but also that which, if law enforcement by formal processes is to remain effective, needs to be addressed by other parts of government and the community, especially through education and public attitude formation.

In comparison with other police forces, I think the AFP faces particular problems because a large proportion of its activities apply to consensual crime in the drug trafficking area, which demands a concentration on intelligence-gathering activities to support pro-active investigations, and to so-called victimless crimes, such as fraud on the Commonwealth. This makes it difficult to apply many of the conventional measures of performance designed for a community-policing organisation. Nevertheless, I expect it to strive to overcome that difficulty.

I think there is a need to caution policy makers and criminologists who concentrate too much on the mechanics or the techniques of measuring performance against objectives, and perhaps neglect in the process the basic question of whether the objectives themselves are soundly based and appropriate to the law enforcement environment.

There are dangers which we need to be aware of in using measures of police performance without due regard to the dynamic nature of the criminal environment. Such performance measures may well indicate effectiveness against a familiar area of crime, for example sales tax evasion, to everybody's great satisfaction, but that effectiveness would be illusory if criminals had in fact deserted sales tax evasion some time previously for newer and larger fields of criminal enterprise of which we are unaware but which could have been forecast if law enforcement intelligence systems were at least the equal of those used by those financial entrepreneurs who consistently live on the line of legality or just beyond. These entrepreneurs use the sort of professional advisers (both legal and financial) who until quite recently were thought in terms of conventional/traditional wisdom to have no role in a police force. We now know better. We also know that ill-informed use of formal legal power, no matter how great is no substitute for timely intelligence and professional skill.

Again, I am aware of the impossibility of measuring in empirical terms the unknown or unfamiliar aspects of the criminal environment. But within our law enforcement institutions we have made a start in building the necessary intelligence gathering and analytical capacity, we have

contacts with overseas agencies through which we can become aware of developing trends, we have liaison with other government agencies, we have access to criminological research and we have the judgement and experience of senior police officers themselves at our disposal. In short, we have the means to construct reasonable assessments of the nature and direction of the criminal environment or particular components of it, on which we can base forward-looking strategic planning.

I believe it is essential that we further develop such a strategic planning capacity within and between jurisdictions if we are not to be confronted again by royal commissions or other inquiries in the future, telling us what we should know now about the methods by which sophisticated criminals are presently ripping-off society. We need processes to confirm, year by year, that we are ahead of the play and not a kick behind it, before we can seriously talk about being effective.

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## THE DILEMMA OF INCREASED DEMAND

Peter McAulay  
Commissioner  
Australian Federal Police  
Canberra

The Senator's powerful words covered many subjects close to my heart. Accountability - I believe in very strongly. Effectiveness - I believe in that very strongly. Lateral recruitment - is a particular hobbyhorse of mine. I believe also in the law of diminishing returns. I do not believe in pouring ever-increasing police resources into what needs to be done because a point is reached where the returns are not cost-effective. Conversely, there is a level of policing that must be maintained - fall below that level and crime will escalate.

Our Senator's presentation has in it a fair amount of criticism of this country's police forces; much of that criticism is justified. At the same time, I do not think that criticism can be put into perspective unless one reviews the evolution of policing and police forces in this country over at least the last forty years. I can only speak for the last forty years. So I am going to reminisce - which you may think odd, but I hope eventually you will see the point.

I joined the police force in 1951 as a cadet. My salary was six pounds, sixteen and fourpence a fortnight - for you younger people, that was fourteen dollars a fortnight. That was not the community standard for salaries because I left a job at fourteen dollars a week. The police force attracted in those days people who were very dedicated, very stupid, or otherwise unemployable. I am unsure which category I fitted into.

In 1953 I did my basic training. It was good training in the South Australia Police Force - I remember even now some of the lessons I learned in those days. I realised later that some of the skills people were trying to teach me, were skills I would not use for many years. I find - forty years later - as I review our training for the Australian Federal Police, that we are still doing that. Did my training equip me for the job? No, it did not. I had to be inducted into the service.

I can remember my first night on the beat in Adelaide. Duties were assigned to us and I was given Halifax Street. If you know Adelaide, you know that is really down in the 'boondocks'. After we were assigned our duties I said to the sergeant, 'What do I actually do?' He looked at me as if I had just crawled out from under a stone and said, 'Well, the first thing you'd do is check the security of premises'. (In the trade, that is called 'shaking hands with doorknobs.')

And I said, 'What do I do if I find one of these premises open?' He answered, 'In most cases, I'd say 'use your own initiative, in your case you'd better ring me up'. A few minutes later, I actually found one of these premises open, in great excitement I ran to the telephone box and rang the sergeant. 'I found premises open!' He said, 'What's the address?' I told him and he said, 'You bloody fool. That's a boarding house; the front door is always open!' Shortly after, I was transferred to Port Adelaide.

On night shift at Port Adelaide, I heard rattling noises. Down the street I found a man trying to force open the backdoor of residential premises. I crept up on my hands and knees and when I thought I was at the right strategic point, I leapt up over the fence and took him down. After the screaming subsided I said, 'What is your reason for breaking into these premises?' He said, 'I live here and I've lost my key.' It's too easy to gain a reputation for police brutality.

A couple of months later I was on 'reserve duties'. The sergeant called me and told me that there was a brawl down in the Globe Hotel. I left the police station at a sprint and as I was running down there I thought, 'Why am I in such a hurry to get a hiding? Why isn't the sergeant with me? Why don't I slow down a bit? Maybe it will all be over by the time I get there.' When I walked into the premises, my worst fears were realised. There was an enormous man throwing people around. He also had a reputation for throwing young policemen around. I said, 'Is Mr MacDonald here?' He said, 'Yeah. What do you want?' I said, 'I have just received a telephone call that your house is on fire.' He dropped whoever he was doing at the time and left at the speed of light. I stole back to the police station and thought 'Maybe my induction period is over.'

There is a point to all that. We really do not prepare our people for the job they are going to do immediately. It is necessary to find a balance between power and responsibility. We have to develop interpersonal skills. It is important to ease people into police work. We did not do it then and now, forty years later, we are still not doing it very well.

In 1956 I went to Woomera. It was a very busy station in those days, during the construction period. There was an old station sergeant and two young constables. I found out that I was the lowest paid adult male in Woomera. That meant we were still attracting the sort of people we were attracting several years before. And the biggest danger, of course, was that while struggling to make ends meet, there was great incentive to become corrupt. The old sergeant could not do the job - he could not supervise, and he was not an administrator. He had been a reasonable operations policeman earlier in his life, but now we were really carrying him. I started to think then, 'What do we do with old men like this?' A few years later I found out what we do with them.

We had an old vehicle issued to us. It was a Land Rover, one of the first to come into the country. It had been around the clock so many times we had lost count. Fifteen breakdowns in one day was my record. You may think that was the standard for equipment for government departments then. But the Department of Supply had people whom they called Liaison Officers; they drove with modern low-mileage radio-equipped Land Rovers. We had a radio too. It was a good high-frequency set; it had the advantage of being operable outside the vehicle by working off a battery or with the vehicle's power source. The problem was that we only had one, so we never had anyone to talk to. Sometimes these radios are very good and you can speak to people on the other side of the world when you can't speak to people in the next room. But, we were told, 'you can always relay messages.' That was the answer. We could speak from Woomera to Adelaide to somewhere else. They could get on the telephone to the sergeant in Woomera to tell him we were in trouble - but by then it would be too late and he could not do anything anyway, but usually, when trying to relay messages, I would end up speaking to some foreign country in a language that sounded very much like

the mating call of a Siberian trotting duck. Our communications really weren't all that flash.

In 1958 I was a detective in Elizabeth, an interesting place to work, a satellite town. We were working long hours, but doing reasonably well by the standards of the day. The equipment still wasn't too good. I can remember that I was issued with a revolver of First World War vintage and there was very little ammunition for it. I do not think police need guns very often so that wasn't all that important, but one day I decided that I would try the revolver out by shooting at a rusty forty-four gallon drum at ten yards. I fired a shot and felt a pain in my right foot. No, the bullet did not come out of the wrong end of the gun and hit my foot - it bounced off the forty-four gallon drum; I knew I had hit the drum because I had knocked a bit of the rust off. My colleague, an Irish detective, was issued with a nickel-plated Harrington and Richardson revolver in an obsolete calibre. We speculated that it probably went into police service having been confiscated from the notorious bushranger Captain Starlight about eighty years earlier.

One day we were coming back from court and were directed to set up a roadblock north of Elizabeth to intercept if possible, someone who was wanted for a murder committed earlier in the day. By the time we set up the roadblock it was dark. We had a couple of feeble torches, no signs and an unmarked police car - we were in plain clothes and why anyone bothered to stop I will never know. Most people did - they tended to drive their car up and say, 'What's wrong?' Finally, a car pulled up some distance back. I had a premonition about this and I decided I should run. But the only place I could run to was towards the car. So I ran up to the car and saw that a person was trying to manoeuvre a .303 rifle out the window. It was fully loaded with one up the spout, safety catch off. There was not much doubt about what he intended to do. I stuck my obsolete revolver in his right ear and said, 'Good evening sir (or words to that effect), I'm Detective McAulay, I'm looking into a homicide which occurred earlier today. I wonder if you would accompany us to the Elizabeth Police Station where you could assist us with our enquiries.' He came and a few hours later we had pretty well wrapped up the case. We typed up a Record of Interview, it was signed, and the following morning we had a little bit of pathology work to do; a little bit of forensic work - although there was little in the way of forensic facilities in those days; and I suppose we concluded that investigation in about thirty hours, excluding travelling time. The trial ran for one and a half days. Not a bad investigation.

By 1964, I was in Christie's Beach. We were expected to make forty apprehensions a quarter. At one session of the Supreme Court there were thirty-eight cases listed, I was the arresting officer in seventeen of them and I gave evidence in seventeen committals and two trials. That is a bit different from that total of three or four cases a year we talked about earlier.

Statistics were mentioned earlier and they are very important. At the moment, statistics cannot be used to compare between one jurisdiction and the next. We are working hard to sort that out but even when we get it right, I do not think our statistics will be a useful indicator of inter-jurisdictional efficiency.

I know that, around 1964, in South Australia we were apprehending about 400 young people a year for Unlawful Carnal Knowledge; a few years later I looked at the statistics and it was down to fifteen or sixteen a year. That shows very clearly that our law enforcement programs were so effective that

we had almost totally eliminated immorality among young people in South Australia. I was then working a minimum of twenty hours overtime a week, frequently thirty.

In 1966 I reached commissioned rank and was back supervising patrols. I realised that I was no longer shaking hands with doorknobs - I was shaking hands with the people who shook hands with doorknobs. But apart from that there was little change in my duties. In 1967 I assumed command and it was then that I began to realise what we were doing with our old men. I also began to realise that we were doing a lot of what I call 'post officing'. A constable would make a report and I would receive five or six other reports on the way up, all saying substantially the same thing. It has changed a lot now that I am a Commissioner - now I receive thirty or forty reports, all telling me the same thing that the constable tried to tell me in the first place. This indicates to me that we ought to flatten our rank structure.

I served with the United Nations and by 1972 I was back in South Australia, involved in police research. I was pretty proud of that because I think in those days the South Australian police had and still have excellent research capabilities. We were challenging and questioning every assumption we had ever made. Some of those assumptions were standing up and some were not. As a result we re-deployed in the Adelaide Metropolitan Area; we produced better police coverage with eighty people fewer than we had been using and we saved thirty-eight vehicles.

There was some informed speculation about why the force had grown so much in the preceding few years. Discounting natural growth, the force grew 25 per cent in a short time. An increased effort in the fight against crime? No, that was not the reason at all. The fact was that we began to pay overtime for the first time. It had become cheaper to employ more people than to pay the tremendous bill for overtime. The big increase in establishments that occurred in every police force at different times for different forces was attributable to the normalisation of industrial conditions. We were beginning to work under the same conditions as outside industry. Our equipment had improved. We had good vehicles and good communications as a lot of money was being poured into equipment. But was it increasing our capacity? No! I have told you what was happening to our equipment a few years before, so this was just a catch-up situation. It was not really doing anything new or different.

In 1976 I was back in the CIB. There had been a tremendous change in the few years that I had been out. Originally, a crime was reported; we went to the scene; we collected some forensic evidence; we took a few statements; we relied rather heavily on modus operandi; and frequently we found the author of the crime, questioned him and locked him up. They were good investigations - they were not easy, but they were not complex. Now, of course, with the advent of organised crime, especially with the introduction of illicit drugs into this country, no one is coming in and reporting, 'I bought some drugs last night.' We had to change our techniques. Where we had traditionally worked from the crime back to the criminal, we were now working from the criminal to the crime. And that gave us - at least - a mechanism to attack organised crime in this country. But that was at tremendous cost, because the cost associated with the type of investigation may be two-, five-, ten-fold of the cost in the 'old' days. The extra duties of criminal intelligence, targeting criminals, using surveillance, etc. considerably increased the costs of an investigation.

Trials used to be expected to last three or four days in the Supreme Court, now for some types of crimes the trials are running for weeks. One thing that has contributed to longer trials in this country - and the associated increase in costs - is the availability of Legal Aid. I am not saying that Legal Aid is a bad thing but rather that it has pushed up the cost of running police forces in this country quite dramatically. Previously when a client ran out of money, he ran out of defence. Then too, a five thousand dollar investigation would probably cost a ten thousand dollar trial. Nowadays, a hundred thousand dollar investigation could cost us a million dollar trial.

Crimes became prioritised once we realised that we could not afford to investigate all crimes. At a certain stage we have to say 'What are our chances of clearing up this case? How important is it, relative to other cases? Will we spend a lot of money and get nowhere? Is it too expensive?' and we began not to investigate certain cases. This seems to me a proper response, although I notice in a recent article by Professor Harding in *The Bulletin* ('Those who watch the watchers' 31 May 1988, p. 95-96) that in the future we may be held accountable through civil litigation if we do not investigate. That appears to be a developing trend in Australia, I do not know how we are going to react to it.

Community policing has become a buzz term. It is a good concept - not a new one, of course. The police have been doing it for the past twenty years and perhaps for the past two hundred years. But community policing concepts run counter to our interests in combating organised crime. We are aware that Mr Big is out there somewhere and we are always going to do something about him tomorrow, but tomorrow a little girl is raped and murdered down the street. There is no doubt in our minds where the priorities lie but the community's demands and expectations are such that Mr Big will have to wait until tomorrow. But, tomorrow a little girl down the other end of the street will be raped and murdered and we will be back in the same situation again.

As a Commissioner of Police in a very small jurisdiction involved almost entirely in community policing, I knew very well where the priorities had to be and they certainly were not in the areas of organised crime. But because resources were not put into that area we now have the problem we have today. Maybe we would have had it anyway, but it would not be as large if we had changed our priorities sooner.

I said above, that later in my career I was going to find out what became of the old men in policing. I became a Commissioner in 1978 and I really began to understand the problem. The truth is that at the really sharp end of our operation people burn themselves out between thirty and forty years of age. They may still be able to cope with it physically, but there are other considerations - they lose the drive and the moral fibre to go on, they no longer want to take the risks (not only the physical risks but the risks to reputation etc.). But we still have them in the organisation. Some of them become good supervisors, some become good managers of investigation, but some of them we park in clerical positions. Some do their work well and others do it badly, but in the final analysis we are paying too much money for the sort of services they are providing to the police forces of this country. The remedies seem to me to be rather simple. We ought to recruit people on fixed terms of five, ten or fifteen years; or have rank-for-age retirement schemes; or maybe even accept that we have to pay people redundancy.

These are the types of arguments that police commissioners of this country have been putting to governments for as long as I can remember. This is an aspect of policing in this country that is very inefficient and very costly. The police cannot do anything about it - eventually, the governments must bite the bullet.

I said that there was a big jump in the growth of our police forces when our industrial conditions began to normalise. Another big increase in allocation of resources to the police resulted from a change in police tasks.

Thirty-five per cent of my staff in the Australian Federal Police are doing jobs that just did not exist twenty years ago. Some are quite legitimate police enterprises - observation squad, surveillance squad, and intelligence. These are the ways in which we are beginning to get Mr Big and are quite legitimate investigational expenditure. But there are many things we were not doing previously at all and I wonder if it would make much difference if we were not doing them now. There now exist large industrial relations groups that did not exist previously. The investigation of complaints against the police is an important function but, going back to the days when I was a detective, except for the routine investigation of complaints of police misconduct, they were all done in the South Australia Police Force by one Detective Inspector. Between murder investigations he would investigate complaints against the police.

I am not criticising the present system. I believe police have to be accountable and that we have to have the proper mechanism for investigating complaints. But the fact is now that if someone walks into the front office of a police station anywhere in this country to buy a gun licence for instance and decides that the police officer dealing with him was rude, he will make a complaint. I can guarantee that the complaint will be investigated by someone with at least the rank of commissioned officer - Inspector, Chief Inspector or above. If that same man gets home and finds that his house has been broken into and his wife murdered, he might get a Detective Sergeant. That is where a lot of police expenditure is going. As I said, 35 per cent of the AFP are doing jobs that did not exist twenty years ago and a big increase in our manpower has flowed on from these new duties.

There are many areas in which we could improve, but I do not think we are doing too badly. When I went to the Northern Territory Police Force, it had an establishment of 550 people - a very small force. It had grown from 150 in the preceding eleven years. When I left it had an establishment of about 690 so the growth rate slowed down tremendously over the nine years I was there. If you discounted additional functions we had taken on e.g. Marine and Fisheries and a counter-terrorist capacity - the fact is there was negative growth over the time that I was there. If we manage our affairs properly, we can improve our efficiency and we can save money. While I was in the Northern Territory, Darwin's population grew by 80 per cent. The patrol workload increased by some 100 per cent. We met that increase in workload with a 12.5 per cent increase in our patrol staff who were not new people but people re-deployed from other places. At the same time, through the sound use of technology and deployment, we reduced our response time in priority case from twenty minutes to an average of seven minutes. Now, some of you are thinking of the Kansas City Police Patrol Study (Kelling et al, 1974). Obviously, if you tried to reduce response time from forty minutes to thirty minutes at a tremendous increase in cost, it is not worth it. But if you can get your response time down to a figure that means the police are getting there




while the crime is still being committed, you are making progress. Sometimes we had response times that measured zero - that means that from the time we received the call, to the time we processed it, to the time we dispatched the car, to the time it arrived, was under a minute. The clear-up rates look pretty good in those circumstances.

But although we have done well, we could have done better.

Some of the things that have to be done by police forces in the future will not be done by the police forces themselves. They will be done by the people who make the laws, the people who make the policies, the people who make the attitudes - the people who are here today. Please help us in this seminar identify a few of those issues and help us do something about them.

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## POLICE EFFECTIVENESS: OLD DILEMMAS. NEW DIRECTIONS

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### Introduction

The question of police effectiveness has come under considerable scrutiny in recent times. The police have been charged with failing to curb rising crime rates and it is claimed that the thin blue line is in danger of crumbling beneath mounting pressure from the forces of disorder and decay. Many have levelled criticism at the police themselves, alleging the organisation to be handcuffed by tradition and unreceptive to innovation and change. In this regard Gerald Caiden has commented:

Most police agencies are weighed down by tradition, mythology, and dogma despite unmet public needs, contrary research and development findings, and growing evidence of waste, incompetence, ineptitude, and unjustifiable complacency. They continue to replicate 'the useless efforts of the past', perpetuate ineffective law enforcement, and react paranoiacally to threats of re-organisation and virtually all criticism (Caiden, 1977 p. 318).

This paper will address some of the issues raised by Caiden and will focus in particular on the police response to such criticisms.

### 'Effectiveness' and 'Efficiency' Defined

Before we begin it is important that we define the term 'effectiveness' and distinguish it clearly from 'efficiency' since the two are often confused.

The concept of effectiveness usually refers to the achievement of stated objectives and can be described as organisational performance in terms of its impact on the external environment (Butler, 1984 p. 41; Collins, 1985 p 70). Efficiency, on the other hand, is more often used to cover all those aspects of resource allocation, management and performance which together facilitate the smooth running of an organisation (Collins, *ibid*). Measuring an organisation's efficiency may therefore involve examining the relationship between inputs and outputs, particularly in conjunction with cost-benefit considerations and analysis.

The two terms are often referred to in unison, as if the presence of one requires the existence of the other. This, however is most definitely not the case. A police force may be efficiently organised in that it functions well, has a minimum of duplicated effort and 'wasted time' and operates easily within budget guidelines. Despite such apparent efficiency, however, it may be ineffective in achieving its objectives. To borrow an analogy from elsewhere, there is no virtue in having travelled from Sydney to Perth at the lowest possible cost if you were meant to be going to Darwin (Kuper, 1975 p. 3). It is possible for the reverse also to be true. A police force may be effective in the sense of achieving its goals, but be grossly inefficient in terms of the costs and wastage incurred in so doing (Butler, 1984 pp. 41-43). To use our travel analogy again, you may have

taken twelve weeks and cost \$12,000 to do so since you chose to travel by camel train!

### Police Mandate

Any discussion of police effectiveness must begin by asking precisely what it is that the police want to be effective in doing. It is generally recognised that the functions of the police are diverse and wide-ranging. They include the prevention and detection of crime; the apprehension and prosecution of offenders; the maintenance of law and order; the handling of sudden deaths; search and rescue co-ordination; involvement in crime prevention programs; participation in law-related education and other youth aid work; and a range of other social service tasks. Many of these functions are derived from the ability of the police to use coercion and enforce compliance (Bittner, 1970) and are thus in some way related to crime, but actual crime control and law enforcement still form only a small part of the police mandate.

### Dominance Of The Crime Fighting Role

Despite this diversity of functions, policing strategies are nevertheless oriented, in both the police and public mind, towards their crime fighting role. As Morris and Heal pointed out:

Popular conceptions about policing tend to draw on the metaphor of warfare: the police are engaged in a 'war against crime'. As a corollary of this, the primary task for the police is seen by many as the suppression of crime and the pursuit of criminals; and the main weaponry in the war are strategies of deterrence (Morris and Heal, 1981 p. 5).

The preoccupation with the crime control dimension of their work has resulted in the tendency for both police performance and police resource needs to be assessed by crime rates and clearance rates. Thus, as crime rates have risen, the police have correspondingly requested more resources to step up the war on crime; and as clearance rates have declined, the police have attributed these not to a failure of their existing performance but to lack of personnel, resources, and powers, as well as social factors such as family breakdown and unemployment.

### Traditional Performance Measures

The notorious unreliability of crime statistics and clearance rates as performance indicators has been extensively documented in criminological literature (Bottomley and Coleman, 1981; Steer, 1980; Couper, 1983; Burrows and Tarling, 1987; Kelling et al, 1980; and Finnimore, 1982).

It is widely accepted that crime rates represent only a small portion of the total number of offenders, and are constructed in such a way that a host of intervening variables may distort and manipulate the final result. Before it becomes part of the official crime rate, any crime must first be discovered and perceived as a crime, reported to the police, recorded as a crime by the police, and classified in whatever is deemed to be the appropriate crime category (Bottomley and Coleman, 1981). Each stage of this process can be affected by different decisions made by either the police or the public and the resultant rates could be more accurately

viewed as indicators of crime reporting and recording practices than of actual criminal occurrences.

Similar problems apply with respect to clearance rates. Clearance rates supposedly identify the proportion of recorded crime 'solved' but, as noted above, variations in recording practices can occur between police departments, thereby making it difficult to compare performance levels. Overall clearance rates can also mask wide variations between different types of crime, since some, such as shoplifting, are rarely reported unless the offender is caught in the act, while others, such as theft, may typically have very low clearance rates (Finnimore, 1982 p. 59). These figures can also be subject to manipulation as, for instance, when the police decide to boost their crime and clearance rates by concentrating on largely self-detecting offences (for example, being a minor in a bar). Clearance rates can also obscure the issue of police effectiveness in that they do not distinguish between how offences are solved - for example, whether the solution can be attributed to detective skills, public co-operation, or just a 'lucky break' (Doone, 1986 p. 59). Research has indicated that fewer than 3 per cent of all cleared cases could be attributed to the use of special investigative techniques (Greenwood et al, 1977 p. 227), and that in 88 per cent of cases cleared by arrest, the perpetrator had been identified before the case was even assigned to a detective (Willman and Snortum, 1984).

#### Limited Potential for Effectiveness

Recently there has been a growing realisation that the crime fighting capabilities of the police are limited. They are now virtually trapped in a no-win situation, which in large part can be seen to be of their own making (Manning, 1985). Through the presentation of themselves as crime fighters the police have helped to create the public expectation that it is predominantly police activity which can be expected to curb crime rates. This belief has also been sustained through adherence to a set of performance indicators based almost exclusively around crime control measurement. As crime rates have risen, the expectation of both the police and the public has been that more police numbers and resources are needed to combat the apparent growth in criminality. In New Zealand this has been evident over the last eighteen months in the campaign being waged by the Police Association to obtain 1,000 additional officers. In their endeavours to attract public support and sympathy for this cause, television and newspaper advertisements have been run which indicate that such an increase is required in order to 'rub out the criminal' and make the streets safer for citizens.

It has frequently been demonstrated elsewhere, however, that no clear relationship exists between police strength and crime statistics. Increased police numbers are, in fact, more likely to amplify than reduce reported crime figures through either greater detection of offences or higher rates of reporting from the public (Carr-Hill and Stern, 1979). The police also face an insatiable demand from the public, who continually desire less crime and more order and whose expectations of police performance will inevitably always surpass the level of available resources (Waddington, 1986 p. 232).

Equating the police mission with their crime control function ignores several key realities. Firstly, the social and economic issues underlying much criminal behaviour are obviously beyond the scope of the police to effect (Finnimore, 1982). Secondly, when measuring the effectiveness of

the police in handling crime, it needs to be remembered that the police are not the only public agency involved in crime control (Jones, 1983). Finally, the nature of crime itself probably imposes the principal constraint of effective policing (Morris and Heal, 1981). The majority of offences are not committed in public places where they would be accessible to police intervention and even those which are committed in public are usually committed quickly, stealthily, and without warning (Clarke and Hough, 1984 pp. 6-7).

### Recent Police Research

Recent research has also confirmed that the potential for improving police effectiveness in crime fighting is limited. In the area of preventive patrol, for example, experiments have been conducted with saturation patrolling to ascertain the effects of an increased police presence (Schnelle et al, 1977; Kelling et al, 1974). Except for isolated examples of extremely intensive saturation patrolling (e.g. Elliott and Sardino, 1971; Gay, 1977), the results suggest that:

Substantial increases in random preventive patrol by police in marked cars do not appear to have any effect on the crime rate nor do they tend to reassure the citizenry about their safety. Police time spent driving the streets waiting for something to happen is not time well spent (Wilson, 1975 pp. 96-97).

With police response time also the assumption has long been that faster response time must inevitably bring positive outcomes, such as increased apprehension of criminals, higher levels of public satisfaction with police performance and reduced injuries to citizens (Blumstein, cited in Manning, 1977 pp. 213-214; Larson 1972). Recent research, however, suggests rapid response to be largely irrelevant to the apprehension of offenders. The most critical component in the response time continuum is not the time delay between call reception and police arrival but rather that which elapses between the commission of the offence and the receipt of the call by the police - in other words, the citizen mobilisation interval (Ekblom and Heal, 1982; Kansas City Police Department, 1978). Even if the police are called immediately, however, the evidence also suggests that the chances of apprehending and arresting the criminal at the scene drop below 10 per cent if just one minute elapses between the time the offence is committed and the time the police arrive (Bieck and Kessler, 1977). Thus unless both the citizen mobilisation interval and the police response time are reduced to a matter of a few minutes or less, the number of criminal apprehensions is unlikely to increase.

From the material already cited on investigations (see above) it will be apparent that there is also limited scope for increasing investigative effectiveness in relation to crime control.

To a large extent this reflects the criteria required for successful case solution. Several studies have shown that one of the most important determinants of whether or not a crime will be cleared is the information about the suspect provided by the victim or witnesses to the patrol officers attending the incident (Eck, 1983 p. 18; Greenwood and Petersilia, 1975 p. vii). One recent case study revealed that in the absence of a suspect description the clearance rate may be as low as 5 per cent, with the solution of only one-fifth of these being attributable to detective work, or 1 per cent overall (Willman and Snortum, 1984). It appears that at most only 20 per cent of cleared crimes could possibly be

attributed to investigative work, and even the vast majority of these are solved largely by the contribution of patrol officers or on the basis of information supplied by the public (Greenwood et al, 1977).

### Financial Pressures

At the same time as research evidence began casting doubts on the extent to which it was possible for the police to increase their effectiveness, concern was being expressed at the growth in public expenditure on the police. The developments in policing which had held so much promise in the 1960's were becoming increasingly burdensome by the mid-1970's.

Police departments now felt overwhelmed by what had come to be called 'the tyranny of rapid response' and the increasing specialisation of functions was being linked to deteriorating community relations (Lewis, 1983). The much hoped for technological solutions to the crime problem, including motorised patrols, two-way radios, and computer-assisted dispatch, were not having the desired effects and, moreover, the oil crisis now escalated the cost of maintaining car patrols. In 1980 Engstad and Evans commented:

It is now apparent that despite massive increase in police personnel and equipment, the magnitude and seriousness of the crime problem has not abated (Engstad and Evans, 1980 p. 141).

Whereas in the past police resource requests had been granted relatively easily, politicians and administrators now began requesting that the police justify all expenditure on them and report not only on their activities but also on their effects (Lubans and Edgar, 1979 p. 2).

### The Police Response

The police response to such pressure became evident in a slowly growing willingness by some departments to experiment with more innovative practices. The commitment to rapid response, for example, began to be questioned and various systems of call prioritisation and differential police response were adopted (McEwen et al, 1986; Tien et al, 1978). Random preventive patrol was replaced in some departments by more directed patrol strategies (Farmer, 1984 p. 46; Weiss, 1986 p. 48), and case screening techniques were developed to reduce the amount of investigative effort spent on essentially 'unsolvable' cases (Eck, 1979; Greenberg and Wasserman, 1979).

Police management also came under scrutiny, and a slow shift began towards implementing explicitly rational and information-based models of analysis and decision-making, with 'policing by objectives' in particular becoming popular (Favreau and Gillespie, 1978; Lubans and Edgar, 1979; Whisenand, 1981; Weatheritt, 1986).

### Efforts to Improve Police Performance Measures

This experimentation and the trend towards more rational management were also accompanied by efforts at improving police performance measures. Developments in the United Kingdom provide a case in point.

In 1983, Home Office Circular 114/83 made it clear that the period of rapid expansion in police resources was drawing to a close and that in

future the emphasis would be on obtaining value for money from existing resources (Collins, 1985 p. 71; Weatheritt, 1986 p. 3). Police forces were urged to set 'objectives and priorities' and to undertake major reviews of their policies in order to assess the extent to which resources were being used efficiently and effectively (Weatheritt, 1986 p. 111). The circular also gave Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary (HMIs) a key role in helping to achieve its aims, through requiring them henceforth to account for a force's performance by reference to explicit objectives and demonstrable achievements (ibid p. 112).

In 1986 it was suggested that a 'matrix' of key indicators be identified which could be used by HMIs to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces (HMIC, 1987). It was intended that such a matrix would enable key data from the various forces to be collated and analysed in a standard form, thereby enabling major variations and deficiencies in performance to be identified (ibid p. 8).

The matrix would be largely output-dominated and thus, it was maintained, 'tells inspectors far more about effectiveness than about economy and efficiency' (ibid p. 9).

By comparing such statistics as the proportion of the population covered by Neighbourhood Watch schemes in various areas or the number of complaints against the police received from one year to the next, it was felt police forces could be called to account for poor performance and given a basis for monitoring subsequent efforts at improvement.

#### Police Innovation a Rare Commodity

There is, however, a cautionary note which must be sounded with regard to the nature of such innovations in both police activity and its measurement. Initially it must be realised that innovation within policing circles is comparatively rare (Caiden, 1977; Weatheritt, 1986). It has often been commented that 'the police service takes pride in its ability to create and sustain a traditional image of itself' (Weatheritt, 1986 p. 5).

This commitment to tradition may help to explain the time lag which seems to occur whereby initiatives and developments in other agencies are often fully implemented or even out-moded when they are finally adopted by the police. Thus, for example, management by objectives was 'old hat' before the police considered it and similarly the trend towards greater community involvement has been well-established for years in many other agencies.

It is also the case that those police departments which are prepared to experiment with new initiatives are generally few and far between and any innovations which do occur can more often be attributed to the vision and enthusiasm of key individuals than to any organisational encouragement. Caiden has argued strongly that police officers themselves should not be blamed for being conservative, self-seeking and resistant to change, maintaining that 'Police officers did not enter unqualified, unenthusiastic, corrupt, and cynical; they were made that way by structural arrangements and internal norms' (Caiden, 1977 p. 344).

The perpetuation of myths about policing has often inhibited innovation, and this is evident in many places, including New Zealand, where community policing developments often meet with sustained resistance from those still wedded to their role as crime fighters.



### Performance Measures Still Efficiency Dominated

The improvements in performance measures are also much more limited in scope than is initially apparent. As Collins has pointed out, one can think of several hundred output measures for the police ranging from the detection of murders to the holding of lost property, but in themselves such measures say little about overall police effectiveness:

It is extremely difficult to devise sets of performance indicators which accurately reflect what the police do, the relative importance of their varied activities, and how well they perform them (Collins, 1985 p. 73).

HMI's Matrix of Indicators represents a more sophisticated and standardised attempt to develop useful performance indicators, but still ends up measuring force efficiency rather than effectiveness. The indicators adopted are predominantly internally generated police statistics, largely based on the traditional crime and clearance rates. It can be argued that the value of the matrix lies in its provision of a standardised basis for inter police force comparison but the underlying assumption seems to be that all forces should be performing all things in identical ways. As such it works against any moves towards developing regionally or culturally appropriate policing methods, since it attempts to abstract policing from the social context in which it occurs.

The efforts being made by HMIs reflect the current popular trend towards obtaining better 'value for money' from public agencies. It has been commented that one characteristic of the value for money approach is its tendency to confuse, often deliberately, the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness (Bradley et al, 1986 p. 145). The requirement to demonstrate results pressures police managers to devise ways of measuring performance and the easiest measures both conceptually and practically are those which are concerned with the cost and use of inputs. Since it is much easier to calculate the cost of the vehicle fleet per mile than to evaluate the effectiveness of crime prevention efforts (Collins, 1985 p. 73), police productivity can end up focusing primarily on how to reduce the costs of such inputs (Bradley, *ibid*; Morris and Heal, 1981 p. 15).

In the context of examining the adaptation of management by objectives (MBO) to the police organisation, Panzarella has noted that the police place an 'extraordinary emphasis' on having quantifiable objectives, and criticises them for displaying 'a predilection for numbers without a corresponding development of statistical skills' (Panzarella, 1984 p. 120).

In his view, 'Policing in particular has failed to use adequate indicators to measure effectiveness. Such indicators as arrest rates, clearance rates, number of citations or summonses issued, value of drugs seized, value of stolen property recovered, hours of training provided, etc, are commonly used but crude and easily manipulated indicators of effectiveness. With measures like these it will usually be possible to demonstrate that objectives have been achieved even when no results have been achieved in terms of reducing crime' (*ibid* p. 119).

He also questions, however, whether the usual MBO emphasis on monitoring external impacts is entirely appropriate to the police organisation. In policing the means are often as important as the ends, for

the police must act within the law and with due regard to public perceptions of their conduct and behaviour (ibid p. 124).

Elsewhere it has been argued that so-called 'performance' measures in fact reveal nothing about how the police actually perform, but instead try to link inputs to outputs without understanding the individual or agency effort involved.

We attempt to assess the effect of some input variable (for example, dollars, personnel, technology, organisational structure) on an outcome without having any idea what the police actually did in the performance or process which linked the input to outcome (Wycoff, 1982 p. 10).

Wycoff suggests that we thereby end up with lists of inputs and outputs but have no way of knowing why or how some things worked and others did not, and hence little of value is learned.

### New Directions

Given the above tale of woe, the issue still before us is: where do we go from here? The seeds of a new direction in policing are apparent in some community and problem-oriented policing initiatives. While no single community policing concept appears to exist, nevertheless a perceptible trend is apparent towards greater practical community involvement in the police mission (Skolnik and Bayley, 1986; Weatheritt, 1986). Generally this involves a perception of police and community members working together as co-producers of crime prevention, with a decentralised system of policing allowing the tailoring of resources to local needs and priorities.

Problem-oriented policing can also involve greater police/community co-operation, although usually the police retain the major decision-making responsibility. This approach was designed to free officers from a largely reactive, incident-driven method of service delivery by encouraging them to identify, analyse and respond to the underlying circumstances that create the incidents (Spelman and Eck, 1987). Thus instead of treating each offence as an isolated occurrence, officers are trained to examine the connections between offences and strive towards finding a workable solution to the problem, whether it be assisting teenagers to obtain employment, upgrading housing estate conditions or whatever.

### Need for New Performance Measures

Community policing and problem-oriented policing have both arisen from a sense of dissatisfaction at current police performance and reflect a desire to improve police effectiveness. It will not, however, be possible to demonstrate whether they do in fact improve effectiveness unless new performance measures are devised. Before such measures can be developed it is essential that the objectives behind such programs should first be articulated. Currently it appears that many community policing initiatives are still firmly embedded with the crime control perspective and can be merely guises for inducing greater public co-operation in the police crime fighting mission.

If a real commitment is made to the partnership concept, then community input into the formulation of police objectives must be sizeable and a much greater degree of accountability evidenced. The new indicators of

effectiveness which will need to be developed could include such factors as the number and quality of informal police/citizen contacts, victim satisfaction levels, and the extent to which joint police/community decision-making exists.

The need for public feedback to the police has often been identified (Caiden, 1977; Doone, 1986; Finnimore, 1982; Panzarella, 1984) and typically a survey methodology has been advocated in response. While survey data can be very useful, the value of qualitative data obtained through more informal police contacts with community members must not be overlooked and, in fact, should be actively pursued as a means of amplifying information obtained from other sources. The real issues of police effectiveness may not always lend themselves to statistical assessment, but it is still important to ask critical questions about what policing is achieving and whose interests it is serving. In other words, we ought not to allow the facade of efficiency in policing to become a substitute for the more difficult task of measuring effectiveness.

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## THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE WITH IMPROVING POLICE PRODUCTIVITY AND PERFORMANCE

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My comments today will not be highly technical, rather, I will be describing how Canadian police departments, governments responsible for policing, and the research community have been muddling through the dense web of conceptual, practical, and political issues having a bearing on police productivity. For the purposes of this presentation, police productivity refers to the extent to which the best possible results are achieved at the least possible cost. While most of my comments will be focusing broadly on the institution of policing in Canada, I will also be touching on productivity as it relates to individual police personnel, to police functions such as investigation or patrol, and to police departments as a whole.

The various positions I have occupied have afforded me the opportunity to view Canadian developments in respect to police productivity from several different angles. Other commentators, who have witnessed or participated in these developments from other perspectives or positions might see matters somewhat differently. It is also important for you to appreciate that I am not a policeman and do not direct criminal investigations.

The co-ordinated law enforcement unit is a provincial agency comprised of seconded police personnel and civilian researchers, analysts, data processors and others employed by the province of British Columbia. While I control the unit's budget and manage the civilian component, our police personnel take operational direction from joint management teams comprised of the chiefs of the participating police departments.

Let me set the stage for you, to assist you in assessing, our progress and identifying issues or approaches which may be pertinent to your own circumstances.

Canada and Australia have much in common:

- a vast expanse of Territory
- abundant natural resources and an important agricultural sector
- a predominantly urban population
- similar common law and Commonwealth traditions
- a large aboriginal population
- increasing concentration of visible minorities
- never-ending debate over whether particular issues are a federal or provincial responsibility.

### Crime in Canada

After a period of dramatic increase in reported crime as the post-war baby-boom passed through the ages of maximum criminality (18-25), the

overall crime rate in Canada has stabilised somewhat, showing an increase of about 4 per cent in 1986 (Statistics Canada, 1986a). Property crimes which made up about two-thirds of offences, rose less than 3 per cent and violent crimes rose almost 8 per cent. Drug offences declined by about 3 per cent.

What these figures mask, of course, is the fact that crime is not evenly distributed among communities or within communities. They also fail to gauge public perceptions of the crime problem and fear of crime. Victimization surveys carried out some time ago suggest that while the objective probability of being victimised is considerable, the subjective perception of risk, particularly among older people, is even greater - causing many Canadians to limit their movement and clearly diminishing their quality of life.

Uniform crime reports and victimisation surveys are also incapable of isolating the extent of organised crime in Canada, particularly in major centres. While media references to periodic gangland killings serve as a sometimes gruesome reminder, I suspect that most Canadians tend to view organised crime as an American problem and underestimate the extent to which bikers, the Mafia, Asian, Middle-Eastern, and Hispanic groups, major drug traffickers and highly sophisticated groups involved in auto theft, residential and commercial burglary, securities frauds, arson, pornography, loan-sharking and gambling are active in their communities.

#### Police Strength

There are approximately 55,000 sworn police in Canada and an additional 15,000 civilian non-sworn personnel. Between 1962 and 1975, the number of police personnel grew by over 90 per cent. By contrast, between 1975 and the present, the number of police personnel has grown by only 12 per cent.

While there are approximately 1,500 separate police departments in Canada, the five largest employ over 60 per cent of sworn personnel.

- The Royal Canadian Mounted Police employ 15,206 officers or 27 per cent of the total.
- The Metro Toronto Police Department employs 5,222 or 9.6 per cent of the total.
- The Montreal Urban County Police employ 4,473 officers or 8.2 per cent and the Quebec Provincial Police employ 4,158 officers or 7.6 per cent of the total.

The forty-six largest police departments account for approximately 85 per cent of reported crime in Canada. The ratio of police to population is declining slightly, and since 1962 there has been a greater increase in civilian employees than sworn personnel. Females make up 66 per cent of civilian strength and 4.1 per cent of sworn personnel (Statistics Canada, 1986b).

#### Policing Costs

Policing costs in 1986, the latest year for which figures are available, amounted to 3.7 billion or \$149 per capita. Stated another way, 66 cents out of every dollar spent on criminal justice in Canada is spent on policing



salaries, wages and benefits which account for 82 per cent of expenditure.

Looking at costs to the three orders of government, municipalities paid 54.6 per cent of policing costs, provinces paid about 30 per cent and federal policing accounted for about 16 per cent (Statistics Canada, 1986b).

The point of all this, of course, is to stress that the policing landscape is very diverse. When I refer from time to time to 'The Canadian Police Community', you will know that it is not as homogeneous as the words suggest. While there are discernible trends, Canadian police departments vary widely with respect to both the pace and content of their development over the past twenty years.

### U.S Influence

Another critical aspect of Canadian experience is the fact that we are figuratively speaking, in bed with an elephant.

Over 80 per cent of Canada's 25 million people live within 200 miles of the American border. The United States is our largest trading partner, and Canadians are bombarded intellectually, economically, politically and culturally with American influences.

American influences are particularly pervasive in respect to policing, this comes about partly as a consequence of U.S. television, partly as a consequence of close operational collaboration between Canadian and U.S. police and other enforcement bodies, and partly through the participation of Canadian police, researchers, and government officials with Americans in professional associations, conferences and training.

Now let us examine the forces which gave impetus to efforts aimed at increasing police productivity in Canada.

In my view, the three most potent forces, which are still at work, are restraint in Government spending, a rapidly accumulating body of knowledge pertaining to policing, and the sometimes forced introduction into the public sector including policing, of private sector budgeting processes and communications and other technological developments.

### Restraint

In the late 1960's and 1970's, North Americans enjoyed seemingly boundless prosperity. In Canada, and in the United States, government services and expenditures, including expenditures on policing, were increasing rapidly.

Quite suddenly this all changed. Oil prices soared, Canada's predominantly resource-based economy slumped, the national debt rose alarmingly, and the left-leaning politics of the 1960's and early 1970's were increasingly displaced by more conservative politics.

As the brakes were applied to government spending, police departments, which had previously been almost routinely awarded the budget increases they sought, suddenly found they had to justify not only proposed increases, but in some cases existing budgets. Most public sector managers, senior police administrators among them, were not well

prepared for this turn of events. Nor, for that matter, were the elected members of federal, provincial or municipal governments with responsibilities for allocating increasingly scarce resources to police services.

### The Growth of Knowledge about Policing

At the same time the brakes were being applied to government spending, a virtual explosion in knowledge was taking place.

In the early 1960's, the literature on policing was scarce indeed. By 1980, and using Police Science Abstracts as a measure, about 1,500 books, monographs, articles and reports were being produced annually, the topics covered the spectrum of police structures, policies and practices and posed numerous challenges to conventional wisdom both within and outside the police community about police productivity. While American researchers were the major contributors, important contributions were made by researchers in almost all western democratic countries.

Some senior police administrators viewed the research results, particularly from such widely publicised works as the Kansas City Patrol Experiment and the Rand Study of Criminal Investigation, with outright hostility. Other Canadian police chiefs took comfort in the view that the results of American studies obviously did not apply to Canada.

For others, however, the debates surrounding the merits of these and other studies provided an opportunity to express their own doubts about the wisdom and effectiveness of some traditional police practices. Out of enlightened self-interest, they provided research opportunities in their departments, worked with the researchers in developing research questions and became consumers of police research.

Waiting in the wings, meanwhile, were other consumers of police research. Among them were elected representatives and their policy advisers who had control of police budgets. This accumulating body of knowledge gave them the capacity to ask more intelligent and difficult questions than ever before. Chiefs of Police found it necessary to develop the capacity to provide more sophisticated, supportable and intimate answers than they had been accustomed to. In the result, the relationship between Canadian Chiefs of Police and civilian authority was dramatically and irreversibly transformed. To this day, police executives who do not keep up with new ideas place themselves in the hands of those who do.

### Management and Technology

This leads me to a brief review of the third major impetus to improving police productivity. Efforts to restrain government spending and the knowledge explosion converged in the introduction, within police services, of private sector budget and management strategies and communications and information handling technology. Federal, provincial and major municipal governments in Canada alternately adopted and later abandoned a long list of private sector budgeting systems that were imposed on police forces falling within their jurisdiction.

Computer systems were created, altered, enlarged, and adapted to accommodate not only police requirements to keep track of crime and their activities, but also to produce the reports and inform the budgeting

processes associated with each new private-sector budgeting strategy as it became popular.

Given the fragmented policing structure in Canada and the fact that few Chiefs of Police had much knowledge about computers and management systems, the cost of these developments has been enormous and computer salesmen and consultants have had a field day.

On balance, however, these continuing developments have without doubt contributed to advances in police productivity. Police capability with computers and information systems has grown dramatically; their capacity to carry out research and evaluation studies has been vastly improved; and their willingness to adopt promising new approaches has grown.

### Public Interest

So far, I have not mentioned anything about the public, the recipients of police services. The reason is that the general public was not very aware and apparently not much interested in the developments I have discussed to this point. Public and media interest focussed largely on accountability issues such as community involvement in police priority setting, treatment of minority group members, the handling of cases of alleged police misconduct recruitment standards for police personnel, and strengthened enforcement of particular laws relating to impaired driving, pornography and drug offences.

On the other hand, surveys of public satisfaction with police in Canada have revealed consistently, that an overwhelming majority of Canadians usually about 90 per cent are very satisfied with police services in their communities. This figure is only slightly lower for those who have had personal contact with the police. Indeed, the very high level of public satisfaction with Canadian police is one of several factors which have militated against efforts to enhance police productivity.

### Forces and Events Militating Against Improved Police Productivity.

Just as the forces of restraint, an expanding body of knowledge and the introduction of private sector budget strategies and technologies have fostered efforts to improve police productivity, there have also been some strong countervailing forces. Principal among these are the consistently high levels of public satisfaction with the police, the inconsistent quality and applicability of research results, disagreement within the police community in regard to the role of the police, an absence of a generally accepted conceptual framework and empirical measures of productivity, and inertia.

### Public Satisfaction

As noted above, some police administrators have held that in view of the consistently high levels of public satisfaction with the delivery of police services, no significant changes are required. 'If it ain't broke don't fix it'.

### Inconsistent Quality and Utility of Research

There are other police administrators who, sometimes for good reasons, have been skeptical of the results of research and the applicability of research findings. Beyond this, police administrators have been

understandably dismayed by the preponderance of research results which raise questions about police practices and the scarcity of studies which generate constructive suggestions for police actions.

Bear in mind that prior to the explosion in police research outlined above, there was no history of police research in Canada, little emphasis on evaluation, and few intelligent questions being asked by politicians and comptrollers. Police managers were typically in-basket (or crisis) oriented (even though only 18 per cent of calls on average are emergencies) and the emphasis on response to calls was pervasive.

### Disagreement Over The Role Of The Police

Policing in Canada, although concentrated in urban centres, is carried out in vastly different geographic, climatic, economic, linguistic, cultural and other circumstances. There is also wide disparity in the nature, scope and availability of related social services and community resources to support policing services. In addition, there are divisions among adherents to strict law enforcement, community policing and other approaches to the delivery of police services. As in other professions, there are also differences in the calibre of police leadership, and crime problems and community expectations vary within major centres and among communities.

In view of the above, it should come as no surprise that there is no generally agreed upon conceptual underpinning and associated empirical measures for assessing police productivity.

### Inertia

The other major factor militating against efforts to enhance police productivity is inertia.

In physics, we understand inertia as a tendency for a body at rest to stay at rest or, if moving, to continue to do so. This property is exhibited by virtually all criminal justice agencies and institutions. It is the property which confounds well-intentioned and frequently impatient reformers both within and outside of police agencies.

Altering the course of a police department, even when the objectives are clearly spelled out, well understood and generally supported, is a very difficult and time consuming process. This barrier to development, loaded as it is with symbolism, the weight of history and habits and accepted ways of thinking about and doing things, does not yield to quick fixes.

This all sounds rather bleak. Here we have a number of potent forces pushing Canadian policing toward greater efficiency and effectiveness, and on the other side, we have a number of countervailing forces, also very potent.

### Productivity

Whether the productivity of Canadian police services is viewed as having advanced a little or a lot depends to some extent on whether one has a tendency to view one's wine bottle as being half-full or half-empty. My own assessment is that progress has been quite remarkable, although there is still a long way to go.

In 1978, while with the Federal Solicitor General's department, I organised an international workshop on police productivity, attended by senior police, government officials and researchers. This wasn't a starting point, since much had already been accomplished, like this symposium, it provided an opportunity to take stock of ideas and efforts to date, and to strengthen resolve, within and outside the police community, to push forward with these developments.

Up to this point, major Canadian work had been done on:

- 1) assessing the impact of response time on the solution of several types of crime (Rizkalla, 1976).
- 2) assessing the effectiveness of various crisis intervention strategies in reducing interpersonal violence and repeat calls for service (Jaffee et al, 1979).
- 3) mobilising community resources to assist in crime control and order maintenance (Wasson, 1977).
- 4) Crime analysis and computer-mapping (Arnold, 1975).
- 5) the role and function of private and contract security, to cite just a few examples (Shearing and Farrell, 1976).

Prior to 1978 the impetus for research and development came by and large from government or from the research community. In succeeding years, the police themselves have played a much more dynamic role in identifying their research requirements, participating in research and in applying the results.

While it is true that we have had our share of applause-meter evaluations, an impressive array of research and development initiatives have ensued. Whether the idea for a particular research initiative emerges within or outside a police department, police, researchers and funding agencies often work together in mounting major projects. Typically, the literature on a particular subject is canvassed and a project is developed taking full advantage of research and policing strategies which have shown greatest promise in other jurisdictions and which appear best suited to local circumstances.

This approach has yielded studies of numerous crime prevention strategies, methods of dealing with spousal assault, shift scheduling, community policing, criminal investigation, public attitudes, repeat calls for service, the use of deadly force and the use of video in taking statements.

Inevitably, these studies, like all research, have yielded somewhat mixed results. Collectively, however, they have demonstrated a willingness within the police community to examine systematically, the effectiveness of their policies and practices.

Indeed, Canadian police departments are making more and better use of research than ever before and in increasing numbers. They are augmenting the research resources available in communities with vigorous, highly skilled operations research staff of their own.

Researchers, meanwhile, can strengthen their contribution to police productivity by:

- Better understanding the police environment and the forces I have discussed earlier, which may be somewhat different in Australia.
- By treating both police departments and governments responsible for policing as consumers of research, and describing their research, research results and implications for policy and practice in a manner and language useful to these consumers.
- By framing research questions in a manner that produces useful results.
- and finally, by paying close regard to the results of this symposium.

### Development of Standards

The Canadian police community has also been a major force in the development and continuing refinement of national standards and support systems.

The Canadian uniform crime reporting system was developed initially by the police community. In recent years, in association with the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, this program has been vastly improved and is being re-born as an incident based reporting system. This will improve the quality and utility of the data, particularly for planning and evaluation purposes.

The Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), which is a national utility managed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and steered by an advisory committee representing the police community, links virtually all Canadian police departments and provides almost instant Canada-wide access to criminal records, outstanding warrants, missing children, stolen vehicles and other information.

The RCMP operate a national fingerprint system and, in co-operation with governments and the police community, is in the process of automating the central fingerprint file with centres also being established in the regions.

The RCMP also has a system of forensic laboratories in place which serve themselves and others in the police community. Other major police departments have expanded their capabilities in this area as well.

There is also a computer-based intelligence system, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC) which links intelligence bureaux in each of the provinces with a national office in Ottawa.

As an aside, I might mention that although there are national, regional, and local criminal intelligence systems in place, there is a growing view, within North America at least, that criminal intelligence is among the most under-utilised of police resources. This is an area where I expect a great deal of development in the future.

The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police has a long and rewarding association with Canada's renowned National Research Council which

has produced state of the art bomb and drug sniffers, bomb disposal suits and robots, laser enhanced systems for lifting latent fingerprints, strategies for removing airborne lead from firing ranges, computergraphics and crime analysis techniques, and numerous other technological advances aimed at increasing both productivity and police officer safety.

Recently, after years of effort by the police community, a Police Information and Technology Centre (PITC) has been established in the Federal Solicitor General's department to assist in the development of a common language for police management information systems and to provide assistance in the introduction and upgrading of computer systems. This initiative is aimed at:

- Facilitating communications and the exchange of information within and among police agencies.
- Strengthening their capacity to use these systems for research and evaluation, and
- To save money through the development of associated computer software which can be widely used.

All of these initiatives have benefited from research in their development and provide new and exciting opportunities for ongoing and future research aimed at improving productivity.

#### Standards of Recruitment, Training and Management.

Major developments have also taken place in strengthening police recruitment, training and management.

The Canadian Police College has enhanced greatly, its specialised technical and police executive training. Recruit selection and promotion have been improved through the use of assessment centres. Recruit and in-service training have been strengthened through the upgrading of services provided by the Justice Institute in British Columbia, RCMP Depot Division in Regina, and Police Academies at Nicolet in Quebec, Holland College in the Maritimes and the Ontario Provincial Police College in Aylmer, Ontario. Canadian police also participate in specialised workshops, conferences, and training provided by the Canadian Police College, law schools, the FBI, Military, universities, the RCMP, the Police Executive Research Forum in the U.S. and many others.

While the link between these developments and improved police productivity may not be direct, they do contribute to the development of a climate, within police agencies, receptive to new ideas and change.

#### Police Leadership

Police leadership is also very important, Canadian Police Chiefs are more knowledgeable and sophisticated than their predecessors, among them, leaders have emerged who are having a powerful influence on their own departments and the police community as a whole. The major police forces in turn, are frequently the training ground for Chiefs of Police in smaller departments, bringing to them, in most cases, a high calibre of leadership and competence.

Here again, the link to improve police productivity is indirect. The literature and my own experience, however, suggest that leadership is as critical to success in policing as it is in the private sector.

### Police Linkages

Recognition that the police alone cannot control crime has given impetus to the development of links with other criminal justice system components, other branches of government, social agencies, the private sector, other police departments and communities.

Community policing, which broadly construed involves mobilising the widest possible range of community resources to control crime and maintain order, has become a major thrust.

Having also recognised that you only catch the criminals you are organised to catch, the use of Joint Forces Operations involving police personnel from a variety of jurisdictions in major complex cases is becoming much more common.

The Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit (CLEU) in British Columbia is perhaps the best and most enduring example of this approach. It is also unique in that it brings together both highly specialised police and civilian researchers, analysts and technicians under joint police and civilian control.

For the participating police chiefs and their departments, CLEU is a triumph of professional commitment over parochial concerns. Modesty, time, and security considerations prohibit my cataloguing our accomplishments.

It is significant, however, that organised crime control efforts throughout North America are becoming increasingly similar to CLEU in their organisation, composition and methods.

The successes of our joint forces operations and the contribution of our civilian researchers and analysts have received national and international recognition.

By working in concert with Vancouver's Expo 86 organisation, Vancouver City police, the provincial Ministry of Finance and foreign and domestic law enforcement bodies, the integrity of Expo 86 was assured and millions of dollars in additional revenues were collected in the form of taxes and royalties. Our experience with enforcement, compliance ordinance collection has been shared with officials responsible for Expo 88 in Brisbane.

### The Future

Having commented on the past and present, I would like to take a brief look at the future.

In Canada, we expect an increase in politically motivated crime and increasing criminality associated with immigrant groups who, like their predecessors, may bring indigenous crime problems along with them.



With a rapidly aging population we can expect fear of crime to increase markedly (whether or not this happens in fact) and greater demands being placed on police and all government services.

At least one Canadian police force, the Victoria City police, has anticipated these developments with the introduction of neighbourhood mini-stations staffed by numerous volunteers and a single constable. This initiative, which is being carefully evaluated, has as one of its principal objectives reducing fear and improving the quality of life in neighbourhoods. This is especially important, since the public is becoming increasingly concerned about petty theft, rowdyism, public drunkenness, mischief and other offences affecting peace and order in communities.

Although these offences may be minor in relation to the hierarchy of offences in the criminal code; they pose a serious threat to the quality of life of our citizens. In a recent report to the British Columbia Justice Reform Committee for example, B.C. Chiefs of Police conceded that the government's policy of not prosecuting these apparently minor offences may yield short-term savings in the use of court and prosecution resources and that exercising restraint in the use of the criminal law in controlling minor offences may be highly desirable. They stressed, however, that the consequences for communities may be disastrous both in undermining police authority and respect for the rule of law and in reducing public confidence in the police. Worse yet, if widespread minor crime is allowed to flourish without sanction, it may become embedded in the fabric of the community and seriously deteriorate the quality of life.

At the other end of the crime spectrum, organised and white collar crime can be expected to continue and to become even more sophisticated and complex.

Meanwhile, our recently adopted charter of rights and freedoms is spawning an endless parade of Supreme Court decisions with implications for police policies and practice. The Canadian Criminal Code is itself under review and here again, changes with possibly profound implications for police may result.

Concurrently, the business or administrative aspect of policing is becoming more complex. The RCMP recently hired a senior public service manager at the deputy commissioner rank to strengthen their capability in this area. Similarly, in Toronto, the metropolitan police recently advertised for a chief administrative officer to report to the chief and have control of a budget for 7,000 people. Other large departments can be expected to follow suit.

Governments responsible for policing, in the face of continuing restraint, will press demands for increased economy of operation without corresponding reductions in the high quality of police services enjoyed by Canadians.

Ideally, these calls will be accompanied by support for research, systems development, and the other forms of assistance required to achieve optimum efficiency and effectiveness. Great care will also have to be taken, in this connection, to ensure that positive developments such as those outlined above are not disbanded or dismantled. Sadly, there have been instances where the already modest research capabilities of police departments and governments responsible for policing were reduced or

eliminated so that both personnel and financial resources could be re-directed to more productive endeavours.

Finally, you will recall from statistics cited earlier, that the era of rapid growth of police departments which provided numerous opportunities for advancement, has given way to a period of slow growth. This increases the average age of police personnel, and greatly reduces opportunities for advancement in police service. Along with this, improved police salaries and working conditions have widened the police recruiting pool to include a high proportion of graduates from a wide range of academic and technical disciplines. With significantly reduced opportunities for advancement, many of these talented new entrants to police service are looking at a career as a constable. A major problem for police management is how to make this a rewarding and productive career.

### Summary

As suggested earlier, I believe we have come along way in improving police productivity in Canada. We also have a long way to go.

I fully expect that at some point in the future, someone in this room perhaps, will be sharing Australian experiences with a similar group of Canadians. We have much to gain from your successes, and failures.

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## RECONCILING POLICY AND POLICE PRACTICE

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This section of the Proceedings reflects a panel discussion aimed at airing the important issues derived from consideration of the origins and legitimation of the police; the models and options for exercising legitimate government authority over the police and strategies for policy implementation. Participants in the panel included:

Mr Alan Rose, Associate Secretary, Attorney-General's Department, Canberra.  
Mr Steve Rusbatch, Assistant Commissioner, New Zealand Police, Wellington.  
Mr David Bradley, Dean of Studies, New South Wales Police Academy, Goulburn.  
Dr Peter Grabosky, Senior Criminologist, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra.

The discussion was opened by Mr Rose.

I have been asked to introduce and outline the Law Enforcement Policy Review that is currently being conducted at Ministerial level and also to comment on some aspects of the interaction of policy and practice in the Australian Federal Police.

Shortly after the recent amalgamation of various federal government departments, the Prime Minister asked the Attorney-General to establish a review of the law enforcement policy elements which had been brought together into the portfolio of the Attorney-General. For the first time in many years, at the Commonwealth level, that amalgamation brought together all of the major Commonwealth law enforcement agencies in the one portfolio and also brought together elements of the Special Minister of State and Attorney-General's Departments' policy advising units. While the structures have been brought together, what still remains to be done is for ministers to address the questions and issues which this review will, we hope, produce for them on principal policy topics; institutional questions; questions pertaining to the relationship of Commonwealth and states on law enforcement issues; and the difficulties of co-ordination difficulties which are emerging now, a number of years after the newer agencies were established.

These agencies include the Australian Federal Police; the National Crime Authority (NCA) the Director of Public Prosecutions and the common police services including the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence; the National Police Research Unit; the Australian Police Staff College and the planned National Forensic Science Institute. In addition, there are a number of Commonwealth/state bodies that meet regularly, such as the

Police Ministers' Council; the Standing Committee of Attorney General; and the Correctional Ministers.

Each of those individual institutions has its own statute or agreement; each has, at a different point in time, been given a particular charter; and each is currently resourced at a level that has historical relevance but has not been focussed on broadly in recent times. That means there are a number of policy and resource questions which the Government would like to consider in a connected way before the end of this term. To do this requires consideration of recent work, such as the review of the NCA by the Joint Parliamentary Committee, that is currently being done by the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) on the priorities of the AFP. (This will look at issues of broader Commonwealth-state law enforcement concern and see whether the tracks that have been gone down in recent years in developing common police services are achieving the sorts of results - intelligence, research, training - that the Governments setting up those bodies believed they were going to achieve).

The review, as we see it, is driven very much by the demand from Government for: firstly adequate Ministerial-level performance indicators; secondly, a justification of the outcomes which these bodies are producing, judging them against the prescriptions that were established, in most cases, in the middle-to-late 1970s; thirdly, seeing whether, as each one was usually put in place as a reaction to various Royal Commission reports, those aims and objectives are being achieved in a cost-effective way; whether there are now anomalies that have developed; whether clear and consistent lines of policy are being developed; and finally, whether in addition to those nominated law enforcement bodies and their relations with state forces and state instrumentalities, the other major investigation areas of agencies (such as the Customs Service, the Taxation Office, Health Insurance Commission, the Department of Social Security, and the more recent Fraud Control Committee at the Federal level) have some coherence.

We are developing at Government policy level in the federal sphere clear lines for future resource control, policy development, institutional growth and re-organisation effective measures for Commonwealth-state interaction, and more importantly in fields like drug investigation, adequate Australian-foreign intelligence exchange and investigational support.

Let me conclude by saying that the emphasis is on judging outcome, looking at the criticisms and at the judgments that people are making about effectiveness and seeing if, almost for the first time, the Commonwealth can put down an effective broad-based policy to which it can relate the strategies that the agencies are adopting in developing their own organisations.

The second speaker was Mr Rusbatch.

The New Zealand model is built largely on the British tradition and does not differ greatly from that of Australia. There is a clear theoretical distinction in the areas of control and accountability, a distinction between the administrative side and the operational. The administrative often overlap and are interdependent. There are all of the normal controls on the administrative side through the Parliamentary and Cabinet committees and the Control Department mechanisms, particularly around estimates time. But the operational control is far more complex.

We follow, as I mentioned earlier, the English tradition where the Commissioner is responsible to the law and the law alone; or so the theory goes.

At one end of the continuum it is impossible to imagine, in our context, a minister or any other politician successfully leaning on the police over a particular prosecution. I have no knowledge of that ever having happened and I would be surprised if it has happened in recent history.

At the other end of the continuum, we had a system many years ago in which the number of police was fixed to the size of the population and as the population increased we got more police staff and where to place them was left entirely to the discretion of the Commissioner. However, in recent years, on the few occasions we received extra staff we did so in response to specific proposals for placing staff in particular positions. That being the case, the ministerial control has really come in through the backdoor, because the Commissioner, having made a bid for resources and saying where he intends to use them, is under an obligation to use them there predominantly.

In addition, we are accountable through the courts, through the Ombudsman and also through certain ad hoc authorities. Public opinion, I believe, is probably the strongest control mechanism. It is unthinkable to believe that the government would sit idly by and see a national police service operating entirely contrary to what public interest or public opinion has expressed either directly or through the media. In such a case Government, although thankfully it has not exercised them too often, has quite powerful sanctions in that it can merely replace the senior staff if it so desires. That is the Constitutional position, in broad terms.

What internal action are we taking? In the last twenty years we sporadically got all fired up over things like Policing By Objectives and other innovations that lasted about six months - mainly because no one faced up to the question of resources. In the last three years, however, we have made a concerted effort - and we have shown that we mean business in this area - by assigning resources to new programs. We are reasonably happy with the results of this approach.

We are also reasonably happy with what we have done so far in setting up a Mission Statement. We are, however, 'babes in the woods' as far as the performance measurements are concerned. We are no better - but probably no worse - than most police services throughout the world in this area. We measure activities very effectively and we measure a lot of things. But to what extent, from the macro point of view, the measurements indicate the performance of the organisation in the context of service to the public, I am not too sure.

We start with the premise that as police administrators we should be aware that we are accountable, if we accept that we can get on with the business of how it should be done. I would like to see us setting our sights somewhat higher than response time, sick leave provisions, overtime, vehicle use, workload and activity studies. These are common to most large organisations and in most police forces are done now to varying degrees. I feel that whatever we come up with in this particular seminar we should be testing it against three things - Is it useful? Is it practical? Will it lead to a better service? The police are hammered by a number of writers because we are accused of not being cost-effective in

what we do, and that probably is true in some cases. But it is incumbent upon our critics in this area to show that the means they are suggesting are also cost-effective.

In opening this seminar, the Minister very clearly made the point that the police are not different from other agencies. I believe that we have to look at a number of aspects here, mainly in the area of evaluation. These are points that have to be addressed if we are going to make any fundamental progress in evaluating the performances of the police services at macro-level.

The first point is the nebulous nature of police goals. If one looks at most employing acts governing the police, you see some sort of waffly statements regarding prevention, protection and preservation, but when we get down to laws, what actual laws are we supposed to enforce? What crimes are we supposed to prevent? There is very little in any statute to give us any lead whatsoever. Traditionally, what has happened is that we have taken over the Crimes Act or its equivalent and then moved into voids - statutes which are not enforced by any other organisation. Let us just take one aspect of this. For example, let us say that police are there to detect serious crime. You could get some sort of means-ends analysis and say that is the target for the detectives, so the detective should go and build up their clearance rates for serious crimes from 35 per cent to 55 per cent. That seems to be quite rational. But that is based on the assumption that that is what the community wants. Now, I would like to suggest that the community has no wish to have a super-efficient crime detection unit which would sort out and display all of our peccadillos. I suggest that the justice system could not cope with a major increase in the number of offenders being detected - just reflect on the waiting lists at courts, the remand lists, the expenses of the people in the justice departments - the expenses for judges, prisons and prison overcrowding and Legal Aid. Could the justice system really cope with a 20, 30, or 40 per cent increase in the number of offenders locked up by the police? Finally, would society be willing to pay for all these extra services through increased taxation? If you think about all this, I am driven to ask 'What is in it for the public if the police do become much more efficient?'

There is an inherent conflict among police goals. Prevention and detection, for example, may be in conflict, especially when considering juveniles. How do you isolate these effects? What can be good for detection may be bad for prevention. Demonstrations highlight the conflict between the goals of maintaining law and order and those of detecting crimes. If you go to a demonstration, you can find all sorts of offences and lock up a whole crop of offenders and your statistics would be great. But as we all know, one legally justified but unwise arrest can turn revelry into a riot.

Another difficult area is shared responsibility. In crime causation views differ from expert to expert. There are so many other departments working in the area - health, social welfare, education, justice - the responsibilities are blurred and that militates against that means-ends analysis that is essential to the rational model. But there is something even more important there and that is, if you cannot shoot home the responsibility, how can you hold any one of those departments - including the police - accountable?

There are varying expectations from the community. There is not just one community, there are actually several. They all have different ideas of

what they expect from us, not only based on territorial lines, but also on ethnic, religious, socio-economic variables, and they overlap and change. These are the uncontrollable environmental influences that we are going to have to address if we are going to hold police accountable.

There was earlier mention that we deal only with symptoms and, by and large, that is true. We have little influence over causes. We cannot make parents look after their children. We cannot stop people drinking. We cannot match the influence that teachers have on children, mainly because we do not spend as much time with them. We cannot make enforceable laws. In short, we cannot make people good. In this area, we do not have any control whatsoever.

We also have other calls for our assistance. Many times there are large-scale demonstrations, industrial disputes, royal tours or natural disasters which take police (in their thousands) away from their routine duties. If we have a battery of clerks back at the head office working away at the crime clearance rates and reporting statistics, how will those statistics be affected by these unexpected events that consume so many police resources? The main point is that if we do not have authority over these things, we cannot have accountability.

There is also the issue of overlapping and internal responsibility. The rational model assumes that people can get their areas of responsibility fairly discrete. In the police, this is close to impossible. You only need to look at detection and prevention. Detection is generally seen as a matter for the CIB and prevention as a matter for the uniform branch. But there is the homily that the best means of prevention is detection and if you follow that through into operations, you will see how they do overlap. This does not make it easy to apply the rational model, but it does reflect the nature of policing and before people try to push police forces into a straightjacket that is supposed to accommodate all organisations, I believe that they are obliged to address the nature of policing. That does not imply that no one outside of the police organisation has knowledge of it or that we cannot use the help of other people, it simply states a fact of policing.

Finally, there is the importance of means. Rational models focus on ends and for the police, I suggest, the means by which we achieve our objectives are at least equally as important as the ends themselves. In the investigation area, which is the easiest and most meaningless part of law enforcement to quantify, if you set goals in terms of clearance rates, we can see immediately how susceptible people and officers will be to the sort of pressures that could arise. Any commissioned officer in charge of patrols can organise them to go out, stop, question and turn over people and get a great crop of offenders. With some very good catches from time to time that will make the statistics look excellent. But on the other hand, if they do it in a manner that upsets the local populace, what have they achieved for the greater good? You can really see the importance of means when it comes to dealing with children. The fact that you arrest, prosecute and convict a child probably has far less effect in terms of future offending than the manner in which you deal with that child. But that is not reflected in the statistics.

To conclude, I am not suggesting that these issues are insurmountable, but rather that they are fundamental and that they do need to be addressed if we are to make real progress in this area. If we do not address them, we are doing no more than participating in a cop-out.

The third speaker was David Bradley.

I have been associated with policing for a long time as a management person, going to police colleges and confronting groups of police executives, who sit and dare you to tell them that they are managers. For example, I always hated going to the Scottish Police College on the day it was my turn to talk about policing objectives. That was always a hell of a day. There were a group of police executives who were in charge of very expensive resources and equipment and I had to ask them what they were trying to achieve in the development, control and accountability of those units. At the end of the day they and I, both looked very miserable indeed.

It is very true to say that a great deal of what policing is about and the function that it performs in our society is very difficult to quantify, classify, categorise and measure. It is perhaps as meaningless to measure or quantify much of policing activity as it would be to measure or quantify religious activity. There is something about the police being there and being available; if things go wrong in our lives we have to call somebody and we can no longer easily call on our neighbours. To paraphrase Carl Klockars, when something is happening and it ought not to happen and something ought to be done about it now, call a cop. How do you quantify that and measure it and finally say that this is more efficient than that, I do not know.

It seems from my study of totalitarianism that its most endearing feature - if totalitarianism has any endearing features at all - is its gross inefficiency. I remember an incident when a Grand Marshall of the Soviet Union was passing through Red Square during the war with lines of soldiers on each side and one of them broke rank and started firing at the car in which the general was riding. It took twenty minutes to clear this with the top and be assured that this was not a legitimate activity. If you look at some of the stories about how it takes twenty-eight years for a letter to get delivered or how the bank sent a computerised statement saying you are a half-million dollars overdrawn, you can see how we get delight out of these mistakes - perhaps because these institutions terrify us by usually not making many mistakes at all. Some police inefficiency may be functional.

As has been observed, one of the difficulties in measuring police efficiency or productivity is inherent in the nature of police goals. It is easier to look at policing as a means by which society performs a whole range of functions, many of which are very difficult to anticipate. But when you start to look at policing objectives, when you go beyond the rhetoric of law and order and get down to the nitty-gritty, you find huge ambiguities, conflicting goals and endless chains of means and ends which are very difficult to unpack and decipher. In all of this, one of the biggest issues is the mechanism through which police policy is generated.

Different mechanisms have different levels of legitimacy and therefore the perceived legitimacy of police activities can vary with time and place.

Then there is the mechanism of the police bureaucracy itself. No matter how clearly defined police objectives, policies, or strategic plans are, they have to be carried out with human resources that are often recalcitrant. The outsider may be naive in looking at this, because the outsider tends to see a disciplined force. So, there is a gap between intention on the one



hand and skills, ideology and notions of the nature of real police work that dictate the reactions of the police officers themselves, on the other. This explains why there is so much difficulty in controlling and directing those human resources that represent 80 per cent of the budget. That is also why, from a managerial point of view, it is extraordinarily difficult to police police officers. When police organisations have failed in the past, they have failed because they have not generated internal performance indicators and have not related them to the reward and punishment system - a relationship which would allow better control and direction of police personnel.

My experience in Scotland and to some extent in New South Wales has taught me that police officers are the greatest cynics about the statistics and performance indicators that their own organisations generate. They disbelieve half of what they hear and they see a lot of what they value as not being properly appreciated by their management or outsiders. Somehow we have to bring police officers themselves, as professionals, into the debate about effectiveness and resources. In the end, if we do not recognise that policy has to be implemented and that the main tools of that implementation are trained practitioners, then any talk about grand policy is going to be another cop-out.

The last speaker was Dr Peter Grabosky.

Like many of us, I grew up in the gravy days when the catch phrase was 'a million here, a million there - soon you are talking about real money'. But these days are different. I have fallen under the spell of Senator Peter Walsh, our Federal Finance Minister, and have become very sensitised to issues of expenditure control. As I began, preparing the essay that was circulated earlier, (Grabosky, 1988) I did a quick calculation and discovered that a one-off saving of one per cent of one year's police expenditure in Australia would - from the principal alone - pay my salary for the next 360 years.

The essay was written in the spirit of open and robust discussion. I should mention that the first draft was even more open and robust than the one that was distributed. My self-conscious aim was to challenge some cherished beliefs and raise some interesting questions - I admit that I provided fewer answers.

I do want to touch upon a few issues that I alluded to only briefly in that essay. One concern is public expectations - what the public expects and demands from police. Thus far, it seems that most of you would agree that public expectations are a bit unrealistic. It is the conventional wisdom that the solution to a crime problem is the addition of more police resources. We have agreed that life is more complex than that. But, traditionally, this has been the reaction on the part of the public and, indeed, also on the part of elected officials and those seeking to displace them from elected office. Now we have a public that has been schooled in this thinking. This poses a significant problem in managing public expectations. One does not wish to reveal that the 'emperor has no clothes', as it were because, of course, the police play a very powerful symbolic role in Australian society. To many people they are the embodiment of virtue, order and stability - not unlike the monarch or the flag. To re-educate the public with regard to the capabilities and limitations of law enforcement is a task that must be done with some degree of sensitivity, lest the legitimacy of the legal order be weakened.

Along these lines is the question of adapting to changing public expectations. I dare say that those of you who were in the business of law enforcement two decades ago would not have regarded as a realistic expectation complaints on behalf of victims of domestic violence. Now the expectation that there is a role for law enforcement in the reduction of criminal assault in the home is much more widespread. It can no longer be dismissed as an unrealistic expectation. So, in addition to managing public expectations and injecting a note of realism, there is the challenge of adapting to changing expectations.

The next issue is that of external oversight. Nobody likes an outsider looking over his shoulder. Police have traditionally expressed concern over interference from outside sources. I refer here specifically to financial oversight, the kind of oversight that is provided by Auditors General, Departments of Finance, Parliamentary Public Accounts Committees and similar institutions. These bodies provide a very real incentive to cost reduction and fiscal integrity and although they might be inconvenient, they are very important if we are serious about the task of expenditure control. They can point to management lapses where management lapses may exist and they can vindicate police management by assuring the public and the government that, in fact, a tight ship is being run. They can also provide a manager with clout to use in domestic housekeeping.

There is an ethos that has been inculcated in many public sector agencies by the system of finance and budgeting that exists. This is the 'spend it or lose it' mentality. This reflects the fact that towards the end of financial year, there is often pressure exerted from the top of an organisation to make sure that all funds are expended so that those who write the cheques for the next financial year will not be able to say that the unexpected funds obviously were not needed, so the allocation for the next year will be cut. Ironically, this mentality is antithetical to expenditure control and there really should be some system of incentive that rewards good financial control, rather than one that rewards profligacy.

The whole question of incentive for cost control from within an organisation deserves a good deal of attention. It was suggested by Professor Hudzik (Hudzik, 1988) that such incentive can play an important role in decisions regarding promotion, deployment and other internal rewards.

I would like to end with the exhortation that has been expressed earlier about the importance of experimentation and evaluation in operations research with an eye to the great savings that can be made through those avenues.

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## DEVELOPING PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

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### Introduction

For a number of years there has been a need for police organisations in Australia and overseas to develop methods of evaluating police performance. This need has arisen for two main reasons:

First, police organisations have been forced to look internally at methods and procedures to make police organisations more productive and cost-effective using existing levels of funding. This need is a consequence of adoption by the government of program budgeting and tighter resource availability in recent years. In the past, the common answer to the question of how to reduce crime was to seek more funds for additional personnel and equipment.

Second, the need for police evaluation arises because there is concern by police, government and society in general about the effectiveness of police activities in reducing crime and in the maintenance of public order. This general objective is also of concern to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and other police forces in Australia and is reflected in recent emphasis through the Australian Police Ministers Council activities to improve the scope and perspective of crime-related statistics. Recent background papers on this matter have focused on several requirements that need to be satisfied with an improved data base. These include:

- facilitating the critical assessment by Ministers of Police resource requirements;
- facilitating the establishment by Ministers of national law enforcement policy;
- better describing the social and criminal environment;
- identifying trends and patterns of criminal activity;
- measuring police performance in meeting policy objectives;
- improving the quality of public debate;
- facilitating the response by Ministers to public and media criticism; and
- identifying the major social issues associated with criminal activity.

In addressing these issues it is necessary that a police organisation have output measures which indicate whether it is fulfilling its role. That is, it must have appropriate information on its performance to enable the most effective and economical decisions to be made on resource allocations and policing procedures.

### Experience Overseas

Attempts to assess police performance have been actively pursued overseas for around twenty years. Several approaches to assessment and evaluation have been tried but all have been fraught with difficulty. Most of these early attempts had little previous experience to draw on and little expertise at their disposal. Their initial attempts were therefore largely methods of trial and error. Often, many of these methods sought to be very precise and accordingly devised some quite complex systems of appraisal. These systems usually did not match existing operational procedures or else they relied on output measures which were very difficult to quantify sensibly. For example, one program in the United Kingdom attempted to value police output in monetary terms. Another program sought to log the minute by minute activities of police officers.

In general, there seemed to be more confidence when measuring output in areas which were similar to private sector assessments (e.g. lost property, licensing applications) but in the more traditional areas of police activity (e.g. patrols or investigations) there were very few quantifiable measures of output.

Generally, however, the literature indicates that improved methods have emerged, integrating the broad goals and strategies of an organisation with its lower-order objectives for which output measures were more readily identifiable. Even though these later attempts retained problems of complexity, they were an advance on the evaluation processes. In particular, they not only devised quantifiable measures of output but importantly they related these to a defined corporate plan. For the most part, however, output measures for police activities were subject to a serious drawback in that they were still largely intermediate rather than final forms of output. Intermediate outputs are defined as the visible daily activities of police such as interviews or arrests while measures of final output are more akin to the achievement of police objectives - for example, to ensure that the local community feels that the Australian Capital Territory is a safe place in which to live. While the literature suggests that the use of intermediate measures are a second best solution, they nevertheless provide outputs which are generally easy to measure and which closely reflected day-to-day police activities.

In the end, overseas attempts at evaluating police performance seem to have generated a great deal of criticism and constructive review. In general, the attempts outlined what ideal output measures for police performance should be, but indicated that their measurement attempts fell far short of their vision. However the experience overseas is valuable in demonstrating what cannot be sensibly measured and where possible areas of successful measurement may lie. Thus, these experiences provide some useful guidelines and a useful basis on which to build if we are to avoid the pitfalls that would be encountered in reinventing the wheel.

### Relevant Indicators

In its consideration of evaluating performance, the AFP has been mindful of the progress and problems encountered overseas. The AFP has attempted to firstly integrate its output measures with its broad goals, strategies and lower-level objectives. It has been the experience of the AFP that the correct specification of its structure and purpose - particularly the statement of AFP objectives - has been a useful precursor to the identification of appropriate and measurable output indicators.

For example, in addressing the government's policy regarding the supply and use of illegal drugs, it is clear that the AFP must strive to counter and disrupt the activities of criminals. To achieve that broad objective, the AFP has an operational structure that integrates the various arms of investigation and intelligence into a co-ordinated thrust at targeted criminals. At each of the lower-order operational levels (e.g. surveillance, technical support) there are clear objectives of the required contribution towards the achievement of the AFP's broad drug-offensive goals.

A second matter, which provided a useful basis for the AFP in defining output measures, is the success overseas with the use of easily quantifiable measures of output that reflect the ordinary police activities. As a starting point for devising useful output measures, the AFP has first assembled data based on its operational activities throughout the organisation (e.g. interviews conducted, information reports, matters resolved, drug seizures, briefs prepared, investigations initiated). These activities have varying degrees of importance to the AFP in achieving its objectives. These variations are accounted for by the use of a weighting procedure which apportions their contribution to AFP performance according to their level of importance as activities or achievements in the organisation. Thus, for example, if drug seizures are considered a more important achievement than arrests, their contribution to the assessment of AFP performance is increased accordingly.

In its definition of output measures, the AFP was mindful of the need to compare outputs with other police forces in Australia. In this regard it should ideally be possible to compare not only the raw data, but any analysis which uses that data so as to make useful comparisons between states and over time. The AFP, however, has not been entirely successful in this regard, largely because much is yet to be done to align the criminal and police activity statistics between the various forces in Australia. Attention has been drawn to this shortcoming in police statistics on previous occasions (such as in the 1986/87 Annual Report of the Northern Territory Police) but considerable progress towards overcoming this problem has recently been made through the establishment of committees convened on behalf of Australian Police Ministers and Commissioners. The committees have drawn on the expertise of the Australian Bureau of Statistics and have addressed the particular difficulties that have prevented the development of uniform police statistics throughout Australia in the past.

### Types of Output Measures

In this paper, performance indicators have been divided into three categories: internal measures (i.e. those directly reflecting the activities of the AFP), external measures (e.g. public satisfaction with police) and cost-effectiveness.

In devising its measures of output up to the present, the AFP has focused largely on internal measures - being those which generally reflect the daily activities of the organisation (i.e. arrests, summonses, asset seizures, convictions, etc). As stated earlier, the AFP has been largely directed into this approach in the light of overseas experience in devising various types of performance indicators and the need to establish a practical basis for output measures that can be readily measured. In its choice of particular indicators the AFP has also been guided by its need to report to government and the public in terms that can be easily understood and accepted. It has been our experience that what is described as the intermediate forms of police output - for example the frequency of street patrols in the city area or the number of fraud matters resolved - are the type of responses sought by the public and the media.

Despite the present need to focus on straightforward measurable indicators, the AFP is currently looking for indicators which it believes may be of more use internally. These indicators may prove to be useful also when addressing more specific reports to government regarding the effectiveness of the organisation. For example, while the public and Parliament may more readily come to grips with responses such as the number of arrests or convictions, there are suggestions that the activities of the drug market (e.g. street prices, quality of supply) are also important indicators. Thus, significant, or even subtle, changes in street prices may provide meaningful indications to the AFP of the extent of disruption, if not the true effectiveness, of their activities in containing the spread of drug supplies throughout the community. This attention to price is not unlike the inclination in the private sector to regard price as an important symbol of business focus.

The second broad group of performance indicators addressed by the AFP is known as external measures. The AFP has yet to fully develop its treatment of external measures, such as public satisfaction with the police. The AFP has included this type of output measure in some of its program budgeting. For example, some estimates of greater public awareness of the activities and achievements of the AFP are measurable through its media and publicity activities. Furthermore, some of the more abstract elements of crime prevention and deterrence are evident in some measured activities (e.g. random breath testing, patrols and investigation procedures). In general, the AFP recognises the importance of the public in their observation of police activity, their confidence in the police and their consequent perception of public safety. This concern is further reflected in one of its program performance indicators which attempts to gauge reaction to the police, from both the media and the public.

The third broad category of performance indicators treated in this paper is the measurement of cost-effectiveness. One particular difficulty with measuring police performance and resource use is that there are no common units of measurement for combining different types of police output or for sensibly relating output to expenditure. This problem has been overcome to some extent with the AFP by converting all performance indicators into index numbers. These are then amalgamated into a single measure of AFP output using appropriate weighting factors for each component performance indicator. This is a common form of business analysis used to combine a wide range of diverse elements into a single number. For example, this technique is the basis of the Consumer Price Index, All Ordinaries Share Price Index and many other indexes.

When the output index is compared with the input index for a particular AFP program, the result can be an indication of the efficiency of resource use. However, this facility is merely a guide to the efficient employment of resources because AFP outputs do not occur uniformly and evenly, month after month. Thus, in the same program, resources may need to be committed to operations for several months before a meaningful analysis of the result is achieved.

### Some General Problems

While the output measures adopted at this time by the AFP are readily quantifiable and whilst they improve directly on particular AFP objectives and meet the statistical reporting requirements to Parliament and the public, they nevertheless contain imperfections. Most importantly, the measures retain a second-best status of being intermediate rather than final measures of output. They are therefore indicative only of the extent to which the AFP can be gauged as an effective and efficient organisation.

Despite this qualification, the benefits of this type of output measure are substantial and, while there may be better output measures in theory, those are of little practical use if they cannot be easily quantified.

The second principal drawback of the current approach is that the outputs are largely measures of workload. While an organisation's measures of output may also include some measures which more closely assess the organisation's effectiveness (e.g. arrests, drug seizures) there are generally fewer of this type of output measure.

Finally, when compiling data on performance indicators there have been problems with definitions. For example there have been several interpretations of what is meant by 'inquiry' or what constitutes 'fraud'. The need for uniform definitions becomes important when compilation and classification of data is undertaken by each of the AFP regions located in the various states and the ACT. Such problems are, however, not confined to the AFP's performance indicators and are of general concern in the development of many data bases. For example, the matter of definition and uniformity is the largest problem confronting current attempts to develop a broad data base on crime and police activities to meet the requirements of Police Ministers and Commissioners in all states.

### Conclusion

It is all very well to devise a technically correct and theoretically precise set of output measures by which to evaluate police performance. These ideal measures are of little use, however, if they cannot be easily measured and readily interpreted in terms of an organisation's effectiveness and efficiency. The overseas experience of police assessment has demonstrated this difficulty, particularly as the focus initially was on ways of measuring the final rather than the intermediate outputs of policing. The literature appears, however, to suggest that in the long run the second best alternative of intermediate outputs is likely to be the more realistic avenue to explore.

It is that general approach which has been adopted by the AFP, bearing in mind that the name of the game is to successfully measure outputs which directly impinge on an organisation's basic objectives and which

are also meaningful indicators to the public and Parliament. Within this broad approach the AFP has focused largely on internal measures of output (i.e. arrests, drug seizures, convictions, etc.) and has combined these measures with inputs at the program level to devise some useful measures of cost-effectiveness. The AFP also has in mind the development of other performance indicators which are likely to be more meaningful internally and in more specific reports as required.

The AFP is aware of the importance of external measures of output (e.g. public perception of police activities) but at this stage has not integrated such measures into all of its programs. This problem is earmarked for further attention and some of these measures will be considered for integration at a later stage when refinements and reassessments are made to the structure of performance indicators.

The AFP has not as yet finally settled its regime of performance indicators but is currently embarked on a round of discussions with internal managers at middle levels and higher to refine its output measures and to explain their usefulness in a managerial role. In the latter regard, however, the AFP stresses that its analysis of performance indicators should not stand alone but rather should be integrated with existing methods of management. It is intended that such analysis should be accepted as a guide to be employed by managers in conjunction with their subjective assessments that are developed from 'feel' and experience. The analysis of output measures should fit comfortably with those existing decision making techniques used by managers; they should not interfere with current practices of setting performance goals but rather should supplement such practices. The analysis of output measures serves only as an additional tool for the guidance of managers towards a more efficient organisation.



## CRIME STATISTICS

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National Uniform Crime Statistics Project  
Australian Bureau of Statistics  
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In November 1987 the Australian Police Ministers' Council appointed a committee, chaired by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, to look into the issue of national uniform crime statistics.

The terms of reference of this committee are to:

- examine needs for national uniform crime statistics.
- identify appropriate data items.
- address problems of data compatibility between jurisdictions.
- advise on arrangements for production and publication of statistics.
- advise on a time frame for implementation and resources required.

The impetus for the formation of this committee came from the perceived lack of comprehensive, comparable and timely crime statistics to aid planning and decision making.

Over the last twenty years users had looked to the series 'Selected Offences Reported or Becoming Known to Police' to fulfil this role. It is questionable whether this series alone could serve that purpose. It is also apparent that the series has considerable inadequacies.

When developing any area of statistics the usual approach adopted by the ABS is to first understand the potential uses and users of the statistics. This is the statistical equivalent of 'first define the problem you are trying to address'. In the course of this process, we need to determine:

- How are the statistics to be used?
- What are they needed for?
- What are the issues that need quantitative explanation?
- What are the questions that need to be answered?

Understanding why the data is needed is important in designing a statistical collection because it assists with:

- identifying data items.
- constructing definitions and classifications.
- developing rules and procedures.

Some of the issues identified by ministers when setting up this committee include the need to:

- provide an accurate and meaningful picture of the nature and extent of crime.

- contribute to development of national law enforcement policy.
- examine resource requirements.
- assess police performance in meeting policy objectives
- contribute to public debate on law enforcement.

These are indeed ambitious goals for the statistics. They are also very broad in their scope.

Furthermore, if we reflect on much of the foregoing discussion of this seminar both today and yesterday, it is obvious that there is considerable uncertainty as to what is meant by any of these statements. Reference has also been made to ambiguities and conflicts behind the rhetoric describing policing goals and objectives.

It has also been noted that there are many things that crime statistics cannot do and many questions they cannot answer. To quote from some of the previous speakers:

- crime statistics are a very imperfect reflection of the true rate of crime.
- there is no clear relationship between police strength and crime statistics.
- clearance rates are a very poor measure of police effectiveness.
- up to 85 per cent of police officers' time may be spent on activities other than crime control.

So we are faced with a difficult problem. The inadequacies of the statistics, for the purposes to which they may be put, make it even more imperative that:

- (a) such statistics that are produced are the best possible [subject to practical considerations].
- (b) they are made available with as much support information as possible to better aid their interpretation; and
- (c) they are presented in such a way to, as far as possible, discourage misuse.

Another way of looking at the problem is to consider that any national crime statistics system worthy of serious consideration should address such fundamental issues as:

- How much crime is there?
- Who is committing the crime?
- Who is suffering from crime?

Statistics which could provide insight into these questions would hopefully go a reasonable way towards meeting the expectations of ministers.

It becomes obvious that one must look beyond simple counts of offences reported to police to include information on offenders, victims and unreported crime as well as the nature and circumstances of reported offences.

The practicalities of collecting and producing such data then become an important consideration in determining priorities. Victim surveys and surveys of community attitudes to crime and policing have a place in this.

Turning now to the sources of this data and focusing on offences reported to police compiled and released as 'Selected Crime Statistics', we need firstly to identify some of the deficiencies of this data. These include: lack of compatibility; lack of comprehensiveness; and their presentation in the absence of qualifying and support information.

This is in part a function of the very complexity of the situations statistics seek to measure. Lack of compatibility arises for a number of reasons including: variations in legislation between jurisdictions; procedural differences in the application of rules and definitions and classifications; and differences in enforcement practices.


Now with regard to the problem of the different criminal codes between states, the move to adopt the Australia National Classification of Offences (ANCO) developed by the ABS has provided a classification standard. But ANCO is based on the general principle that an offence be assigned to a category on the basis of the criminal law applying in each jurisdiction, so there is no common definitional base to the classification.

This is unusual. Most statistical classification standards embody not only a structured classification system but also a detailed set of definitions. The United States Uniform Crime Reporting Program is faced with a similar situation of different criminal codes between states. Their approach has been to construct standard offence definitions and seek responses according to these without regard to local statutes. I think we will need to look hard at whether in time ANCO might incorporate statistical as opposed to legal definitions.

The second factor identified above related to procedural differences and reflects the fact that rules seek to cover a wide range of criminal events of quite different character (e.g. fraud, arson, homicide). Statistics are also sensitive to variations in enforcement practices over time.

While there can be no magic wand to wave and eliminate these problems, the committee is optimistic that considerable improvements in selected crime statistics can be made through improved definitions and instructions as well as better presentation of the statistics. In the course of this work, we can obtain valuable insight through examining overseas experience in uniform crime reporting particularly in Canada and the United States of America.

Statistics will never provide all the answers, but they are an important component of the information base to which other speakers have referred. It is important their production is accorded the attention it deserves.



## THE ROLE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE MEASUREMENT OF POLICE PERFORMANCE

Robert Whelan  
Director  
Public Policy Research Centre  
Sydney

I would like to speak to you about the role social research can play in the measurement of police performance and its application as a determinant in the formulation of police policy.

In this discussion I will endeavour to demonstrate to you how social research can, in very practical terms, guide police in the effective execution of their function. In doing this I expect to challenge some of the more traditional notions about the role of police in society.

This paper will examine the following issues to better define the role and application of social research in this context.

Firstly however, I will provide you with some relevant details about the Public Policy Research Centre; who we are and what we do.

### The Public Policy Research Centre

The Public Policy Research Centre is a specialist division of the national market and social research company - Yann Campbell Hoare Wheeler. The division specialises in the application of social research techniques to the development, measurement and modification of government and corporate policy initiatives. Our services include:

- social surveys
- community and attitude studies
- statistical analysis
- policy analysis and strategy planning; and
- personnel and corporate research.

Our clients include many of the major commercial and public sector organisations throughout Australia at the local, state and federal levels.

The Public Policy Research Centre was established in recognition of the particular and specialised needs of public sector clients.

Our approach to research is characterised by a commitment to:

- a high degree of technical skill in survey methodology;
- vigorous adherence to the requirements of statistically valid research;
- thorough training and supervision of interviewers; and

- strategically useful data analysis and interpretation backed by a high level of personal consultation.

It is always sound research practice to obtain, at the outset, a working definition of what it is you intend to measure. The measurement of police performance is no exception. Indeed a definition of the role of police is essential in determining the most appropriate means of measurement.

Traditionally the role of the police in society has been defined in terms of their function as enforcers of the law and apprehenders of criminals - they are the means of maintaining social order. My concern with this functional approach to defining the role of the police is it lacks recognition of the interrelationship between the police and the community which they serve.

To a certain extent, the reliance on crime statistics as the primary measurement of police performance has evolved because of this functional view of the police role. In many respects crime statistics are an inward looking measure concerned with measuring the incidence and prevalence of crime rather than the effects and influences of crime.

This is not meant to denigrate the value and importance of crime statistics as a measure; it is simply that they are geared to a view of the role of police which I would argue is too narrow. Just as the traditional notions of the police role lack an appreciation of the social dimension of police activity, crime statistics cannot measure the social impact of police performance.

How then can we obtain a broader definition of the role of police - one which takes into account the social impact of policing? I propose to use an approach borrowed from the disciplines of marketing. An alternative definition of the police role can be achieved by endeavouring to answer the following series of questions:

- What is the nature of the service provided by the police?
- What need does the service seek to fulfil?
- Who are the consumers of this service and what are their expectations?
- How well does the service satisfy their needs?

Results from recently completed qualitative social research conducted on behalf of the New South Wales Police provide some insight into how the community views the role of the police. The research, which was conducted with a broad cross-section of the public, used the qualitative technique of focus group discussions to canvass the range of opinions and attitudes in the community towards the issues of crime and the police. I will return to discuss this technique and the results in more detail later. For the present however the findings are useful in gaining a broader view of the police role.

Taking the answers to each question asked above one by one:

#### **What is the nature of the service being provided?**

The community expects the police to protect them from crime. That is, the police are expected to function in order to make the community a safe

and secure place in which to live through both the prevention of crime and the quick and efficient detection of crime.

### **What need does the service seek to fulfill?**

Anthropologists tell us that one of the driving forces behind the development of complex societies is the collective need for security. It would appear that in today's urban society, unfortunately, our need for protection from internal threats is at least as great as that from external sources. Consequently, the police function is to serve a need for security which, as our study showed, is often disproportionate to the actual level of threat. The need for security is based more on perception than experience and this need appears to vary across age, sex and very possibly ethnic groups.

### **Who are the consumers and what are their expectations?**

In modern democratic societies the police are seen to be the servants of the people, functioning for the protection and benefit of the Commonwealth. The police serve the people.

The people can be an individual, a community, a suburb, a district or a state - all have expectations of service. Expectations of service are often based on individual experience with local police, usually on petty matters. These experiences however have an important influence on perceptions of police efficiency and responsiveness.

### **How well does the service satisfy the need?**

If we accept that the police are a service industry then the answer to this question is, I believe, fundamental to the measurement of police performance. A true assessment on this basis can only be obtained through the application of social research techniques.

How then would the role of the police be defined with such a perspective? Let me offer this as an alternative definition - one which views the role of the police as a service industry.

*It is the role of the police to provide all members of the community, both collectively and individually, regardless of age, sex or ethnic background, a safe and secure physical and psychological environment free of threat against person or property.*

How this role is fulfilled will vary according to circumstances and will no doubt always require a multifaceted approach.

An approach which seems to recognise the service aspect of police work and the relationship with the community is the policy of 'community-based policing'. The philosophy inherent in the policy of community-based policing clearly recognises and is committed to a police role which is firmly based on a relationship with the public and takes account of community needs in the planning of police activity, the aim of the policy being to forge a partnership between police and the community.

The policy has been defined in a NSW Police Department Policy Document as :

'A system of policing in which police and the community establish a partnership which results in a significant proportion of policing services within the community being provided voluntarily by the community' (Community-Based Policing - Paper No.3 Implementing Community-Based Policing p.8).

In such a partnership it is essential that reliable, consistent and accurate lines of communication be established, not the least of which is some means of obtaining feedback on community needs and opinions in regard to police activity.

The implementation of community-based policing in New South Wales led to the development of a program of social research designed to monitor community opinions and attitudes as performance indicators of service delivery. The program comprised the following stages:

### **Quantitative Benchmark Community Surveys**

These surveys were designed to test the application of social survey techniques in the monitoring of public opinion and in the identification of key performance indicators sensitive to police initiatives.

In 1987 two broadly based community surveys were conducted in New South Wales in August and December. The sample comprised 660 men and women aged eighteen years and over. The survey set out to measure the community views on:

- crimes causing most concern
- feeling of safety in local neighbourhoods
- likelihood of contacting police about suspicious persons
- visibility of police in neighbourhoods
- interest in having a say in policing
- incidence and reason for contact with police degree of satisfaction with police contact; and
- problems police should concentrate on.

Chart 1 provides a graphical summary of the key results:

There was a heightening of community concern about crime between August and December. Burglary was the crime causing most concern while concern regarding street assault and car theft showed the greatest increases.

Chart 2 shows that perceptions of police performance improved only marginally during the August to December period. Strongest increases were in enforcing the law, traffic safety and assisting the community.

Perceptions of government performance on policing were mixed as is seen on Chart 3. The only consistent area of improvement was in increasing the number of police on the streets.


Chart 4 indicates little change occurred in the level of satisfaction with police contact. The level of satisfaction among males decreased while the level among females increased.

Drugs remain the main priority for police in the view of the community, as is shown in Chart 5. However, the importance of car theft and burglary increased over the August-December period.




CHART 1

# CRIMES CAUSING MOST CONCERN TRENDS SINCE AUGUST 1987



(Source: NSW Police Community Survey)


# RATING OF POLICE PERFORMANCE TRENDS SINCE AUGUST 1987



(Source: NSW Police Community Survey)


CHART 3

# GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE ON POLICING TRENDS SINCE AUGUST 1987



(Source: NSW Police Community Survey)


# SATISFACTION WITH POLICE CONTACT TRENDS SINCE AUGUST 1987



(Source: NSW Police Community Survey)

CHART 5

# CRIME PRIORITIES FOR POLICE TRENDS SINCE AUGUST 1987



(Source: NSW Police Community Survey)

These initial surveys gave an indication of how community opinions can be used to guide and track police activity. To further refine this process qualitative research was used to define more closely the critical performance indicators.

### **Qualitative Developmental Study**

This consisted of a series of qualitative focus group discussions designed to canvass the range of community opinion on crime and the police to fine tune appropriate performance indicators.

Qualitative research is a commonly used technique in social and market research. It is a process by which individuals or groups of people are interviewed in informal surroundings by trained moderators using semi-structured open response questioning techniques which encourage spontaneity and frankness.

In this instance the aim of qualitative research was to gain insight and understanding of the range and depth of opinions which exist in relation to crime and the police and to better define the nature of those issues critical to the measurement of police performance.

The current study used the technique of focused group discussions. These consist of between eight and ten people at a time, usually selected on the basis of age and sex, discussing a range of topics among themselves with the guidance of a moderator. A total of eight discussion groups were conducted with males and females drawn from a wide cross-section of age and socio-economic backgrounds.

Some of the key findings to emerge from the study were:

- Crime is seen to be on the increase and becoming more violent and unpredictable in nature.
- Women in the young to middle age group feel most threatened by violent crime, particularly sexual assault.
- Women in this age group also express considerable anxiety about the safety of their children.
- The level of fear or anxiety about violent crimes appears to be disproportionately high in comparison to actual experience of crime.
- The media seems to play a key role in community perceptions of crime particularly the perceived level of threat.
- Deterioration of social values, particularly discipline among the young, diminished respect for authority and the growing materialism in society are seen as major contributors to the worsening crime rate.
- Petty crime such as house-break-in and car theft are the most commonly experienced crimes and cause the most annoyance. Violent crime such as street assault, sexual

assault, murder and rape (while rarely experienced) cause greatest concern and anxiety.

- Fear of crime has affected peoples' lifestyles and behaviour. Some of the typical effects are: avoiding the streets at night; locking up when home alone; avoiding public transport at night; escorting children around the neighbourhood; avoiding certain parts/suburbs of the city.
- Police were seen to be doing a difficult job to the best of their ability with limited resources. There appears to be a high degree of latent support in the community for the police.
- Sheer visibility of police in the local neighbourhood, especially foot patrols, has a profound effect on perceptions of security and safety.
- Judgements regarding the responsiveness and effectiveness of the police were often based on personal contact over fairly minor incidents.
- There was a considerable degree of frustration with the failure of the judicial system to impose harsher sentences and the penal system for failing to punish criminals and provide a deterrent to crime.
- The overall level of trust in the police seemed to be at a low ebb. Continuous media exposure of corruption allegations appears to have eroded public trust and confidence.

### **Quantitative Regionally-Based Community Surveys**

This comprises a program of bi-monthly community surveys sampling New South Wales residents across all police districts. The surveys are designed to monitor public opinion and attitudes on a series of performance indicators at both the total state and individual district level.

The planning involved and the results from each stage of this program exemplify the use of social research in the measurement of police performance.

The region-based Community Survey Program is currently in the planning phase. It will involve the continuous monitoring of community opinions over a two year period within each police district in New South Wales. The aim of the survey program is to provide feedback at the district, regional and state level on police performance. The surveys will monitor the community every two months to determine: awareness of crime; prevalence of crime; perceived level of threat; perceived level of security; performance of police; performance of government on policing; awareness of police activity; satisfaction with police contact; confidence in police; attitudes to crime and the police; and priorities for the police.

Trends in these measures will emerge over time demonstrating the impact of police initiatives on the community. Additionally, comparisons from district to district will identify strategies which are most effective in achieving the aims of community-based policing.

## Conclusions

My intention in this paper was to show:

- that the measurement of police performance is to some extent dependent on how we define the role of the police;
- that the prevailing concepts of the police role lack an appreciation of the interrelationship between police and the community;
- that an alternative definition can be obtained by taking a perspective of the police as a service industry;
- that the delivery of service to the community can be seen as a measurable objective of the police;
- that community perceptions and fear of crime are often unrelated to the actual incidence or experience of crime and that social research is the only means of measuring these perceptions;
- and that social research has a legitimate role to play in the measurement of police performance through the provision of accurate, reliable and objective community feedback;

In conclusion, I would like to leave you with a thought which seems to encapsulate what I have been arguing:

'Policing, not unlike its judicial counterpart, not only must be done but must also be seen to be done'.



## EFFECTIVENESS IN DEALING WITH CRIME

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Director, Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit  
Ministry of Attorney General  
British Columbia  
Canada

As policing came under increasing scrutiny from within and without, it was inevitable that criminal investigation would become subject to systematic examination. A concise review of the literature up to 1982 is available (Chappell et al, 1982).

### Motives For Research on Criminal Investigation

Three sorts of motivation have given impetus to research on the criminal investigations function.

One, which I call scholarly interest, has inspired academics of various flavours to inquire into the conduct and effectiveness of investigations.

A second motivation, which is shared by some police chiefs, governments responsible for policing and researchers is simply a practical desire to find ways of improving investigative efficiency and effectiveness.

A third motivation, which is rarely talked about, is the desire of some Chiefs of Police to gain control over and provide adequate supervision of their investigative units.

It should come as no surprise that highly mobile police in unmarked cars, wearing plain clothes and working odd hours on sometimes very complex cases, are hard to supervise. Moreover, investigative units typically have a lot of power both inside and outside the police department and are sometimes viewed as a threat to the established order. Their power derives from the fact that they usually have intimate knowledge of the department and its personnel, local political and business leaders and potentially damaging intelligence.

As you might expect, these varied motivations, individually or in combination, have yielded a variety of research methodologies and results of varying quality with respect to scholarship and utility from the police point of view.

### Availability of Data

It is also important to bear in mind that researchers, whether inside or outside police departments, are to some extent captives of the availability of data. They tend to count, classify and correlate whatever data are available to them given their personnel and financial resources and the degree of co-operation and participation by the police departments being studied.

## Categories of Research

Three broad categories of research on criminal investigation will be discussed.

### 1) Macro-Analyses

These studies examine e.g. the relationship between expenditures on policing and crime rates; or the relationship between the magnitude of police resources devoted to criminal investigations and the solution of cases.

One of the principal contributions to research of this type was the report of Wilson and Boland (1978). A second and more sophisticated approach was the study by John Burrows and Roger Tarling (1982) of the Home Office. In both studies, it was concluded that increasing police personnel resources does not lead to significant improvement in the solution of crimes:

While I have great regard for the researchers who have made these leading contributions, I attach little value to this type of research. At one point, Burrows and Tarling (1978) measured the effect of population size, urbanisation, unemployment, average earnings and social class on clearance rates (or clear-up rates).

They failed to say why or how these factors should affect clearance rates. They also appeared at various points to confuse explaining, in the statistical sense, with the everyday use of the word. This kind of study can be seen to be a largely atheoretical statistical fishing expedition.

### 2) Organisation Studies

Organisation studies, the second broad category of research, have examined the effect on clearance rates, arrests, and other purported measures of effectiveness of different ways of organising the detective function.

One of the best examples of research of this sort is the Rochester Study (Bloch and Bell, 1976). In Rochester, the Detective Bureau was decentralised into teams of about 30 patrol officers, four to seven detectives, and several supervisory personnel. Teams were responsible for particular geographic areas. It was found that this organisation strategy did improve both arrest and clearance rates. Other studies, including the Rand Study (Greenwood et al, 1977), have suggested that the way in which police organise their investigative personnel does not influence the outcome of investigations.

In my view however, organisational studies continue to provide a potentially very profitable line of inquiry.

### 3) Detailed Examination of Investigations

The third broad category of studies, those involving a detailed examination of investigations, are in my view the most interesting and for police, likely to be the most promising. Included in this category are:

- 1) The Rand Study and its derivatives which focus on what investigators do, how long it takes them and the results.
- 2) Studies of the attributes of highly successful investigators; and finally,
- 3) Studies of intelligence analysis - an aspect of the criminal investigation process which has been virtually neglected to date.

### **The Rand Study and its Derivatives**

The Rand Study spawned numerous follow-up studies of what investigators do and with what result. The work of John Eck (Eck, 1983) of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) stands out in this connection. In the preface to this book, PERF President, John F. Duffy, Sheriff of San Diego County, states 'not only has this report produced new information regarding how investigations are conducted, but the information has been combined with findings from previous studies to form a comprehensive set of quantifiable measures of investigative productivity'.

In this report, the productivity measures for cases include: the screening decision, reasons for unsolved cases, how suspects were identified, arrests expected, arrests obtained, acceptance by the prosecutor and convictions. The measures for suspects include: suspects identified, suspects arrested, reasons for non-acceptance by prosecutors, charges against suspects and convictions of suspects.

Commenting further, Sheriff Duffy states, 'use of these productivity measures not only show how well an investigation unit is performing, but suggests ways in which productivity can be improved. Additionally, the study shows how investigation case flow can be regulated and suggests an alternate approach (Targeted Investigation) to traditional methods of conducting criminal investigations'. He goes on to say, 'Police executives now have proof to show detectives can be productive in solving crime. But they should also be mindful that they have an obligation to manage and conduct their investigations with the proven procedures indicated in this report'.

The significance of these remarks, is that they are made by a senior police official speaking for an organisation comprising many of North America's most forward-thinking and creative Police Chiefs. The question only you can answer, however, is whether, or to what extent these proven procedures are applicable to Australian Police Forces.

### **Attributes of Successful Investigations**

Numerous studies of criminal investigations have revealed that a small number of investigators are responsible for a disproportionately large number of arrests and arrests leading to convictions (quality arrests). This recurring finding led to attempts to identify the attributes of highly successful investigators and corresponding detective selection and promotion techniques. The most impressive research done in this area is described in a U.S. National Institute of Justice Report (Cohen & Chaiken, 1987).

In preparing this report, Cohen and Chaiken conducted a thorough review of the literature on selection, assignment, and promotion of law enforcement personnel, and assembled information and materials on

current detective selection procedures from over a dozen police departments in the United States. They also conducted on-site visits. In their report, the authors describe the characteristics of superior investigators along with valid measures for assessing these attributes.

Arrests, investigation skills, communication ability and supervisor rating were found to be among the best measures of investigators performance. Civil service exams, verbal ability, education and academy performance were among the best predictors of success as an investigator. Beyond this, the report shows how peer review, assessment centres and other techniques can be used in conjunction with the predictors just mentioned.

In summary, this report makes a very important contribution to understanding and improving the effectiveness of criminal investigations. However, it is necessary to consider the applicability of the United States findings to Australian circumstances.

### Analysis of Criminal Intelligence

The final aspect of criminal investigations that I will touch on is the analysis of criminal intelligence.

In most police departments, but particularly those whose mandate includes the investigation of organised crime, considerable effort and expense is typically invested in the gathering of criminal intelligence and the creation of computer systems for storing, retrieving, and sharing intelligence. Comparatively little effort or expense is devoted to the analysis of criminal intelligence. Thus, while the potential contributions of rigorous intelligence analysis to organised crime control is frequently mentioned in the literature, it is rarely achieved in practice.

British Columbia's Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit, I am pleased to report, is one agency where a large portion of this potential is being realised. Indeed, intelligence analysis, including the analysis of open sources, is one of the keys to our success.

Understandably, the intelligence function has not been the subject of much research. The work of Blakey (1978), Ianni (1974), Reuter (1983), and a limited number of others are among the major contributors. The general thrust of their conclusions is that without a more rigorous and sustained approach to the intelligence function, there will be no real success in combating organised crime. Slowly, police officials are coming to share this view.

There is one article on this topic (Martens, 1987) incidentally, which I would categorise as a 'must read' for police administrators and researchers alike.

For researchers, even this brief review of some of the key developments in criminal investigations provides a vast array of ideas and much inspiration.

For police, this knowledge explosion creates somewhat of a dilemma. Police administrators contend, quite understandably, that they cannot possibly read and absorb all of the material that is being produced.

Do not despair. While you cannot know everything, it is possible to know what is important, relevant and useful. I hope you will find, upon

Do not despair. While you cannot know everything, it is possible to know what is important, relevant and useful. I hope you will find, upon reflection, that my remarks and the sources I have cited have helped you along the way.

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
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## POLICING THE ROADS: THE TASMANIA POSITION

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### Police Objectives

For many years the most commonly espoused police objectives have been: the protection of life and property, the preservation of peace and good order, and the prevention and detection of crime.

In recent years, as police departments have become increasingly conscious of the need to more closely define their objectives (which has been brought about by a variety of reasons, including program budgeting) the stated objectives have become more detailed and often include recognition of 'policing the roads' - the topic of this paper.

A number of police departments have also moved towards producing and publishing Corporate Plans and Strategy Plans. In bringing into existence such reports, forces have usually set out their mission and general objectives, and each of the departments making up the particular force have then detailed the objectives of such departments and the strategies and programs aimed at achieving such objectives.

Tasmania Police are presently developing, for the first time, a Corporate and Strategy Plan. The Mission of the Force is:

'to optimise the delivery of (police) services to the public by the efficient and effective use of resources aimed at achieving the force's stated objectives.'

### Traffic Objectives

Tasmania Police have a number of departments and the mission of the Traffic Control Branch is:

'to reduce the number and severity of road collisions, thereby reducing the number of persons killed and injured on our roads'.

The objectives of the Traffic Control branch are stated as:

- development and implementation of traffic strategies and programs aimed at achieving our mission;
- assisting with creating public awareness of new traffic laws and procedures, traffic hazards and difficulties and other necessary driver information;
- prevention (deterrence) and detection of traffic offences;

- investigation of fatal collisions; and
- facilitation of traffic flow.

### Police Resources and Management

In recent times, many police forces have had to cope with limited resources (manpower, equipment and finance). In some instances there has even been a reduction in such resources. As a consequence, together with increasing accountability (including financial management, program budgeting, more highly trained police managers, an expansion of common police services, joint operations, co-operative efforts with non-police agencies [e.g. National Crimes Authority, Corporate Affairs], and the consideration and application of the 'user pays' principle), police have given greater attention to efficiency, effectiveness and productivity in regard to police strategies, programs, operations and resources.

Police managers in Australia today realise they will probably have to exist with limited resources and, of necessity, compete with other priorities in the allocation of the public funds to police departments. Consequently, greater concern and attention is being given to ensure that the police 'services' to the public are provided in the most cost-efficient and cost-effective manner possible.

All police forces in Australia today are conscious of the need to ensure their executive officers are well trained, particularly in the area of fiscal management. The Australian Police Staff College at Manly, New South Wales, is attended by selected senior executive officers from all police forces in Australia. Some of the larger forces (e.g. Victoria) also conduct their own Senior Executive Courses, to which smaller forces (e.g. Tasmania) also send officers. These courses are often attended by police from interstate and overseas forces and public servants working in the law enforcement area. Additionally, selected police officers also attend 'outside' courses such as the Administrative Staff College at Mt. Eliza, Victoria, and courses conducted by the Australian Institute of Management. Members from some forces are also selected to attend training overseas, such as at Bramshill College in England, the ICAC (Independent Commission Against Corruption) courses in Hong Kong and others. Planning and management of police budgets and resources are generally addressed at such courses.

Further, more members of the police forces in Australia today have degrees and tertiary training than at any earlier time. The majority of Commissioners of Police of the Australian police forces today have degrees.

### Financial Management

In an effort to create greater overall awareness of the limitation of available resources within the Tasmania Police Force, budgetary control over finance appropriated for salary related allowances such as overtime and shift allowances, and finance for the maintenance of police accommodation and buildings has been delegated to District Commanders who, in turn, delegate to their Divisional Officers.



### Research and Researchers

It can be suggested that one of the difficulties often facing police managers is the fact that researchers are not always available to assist in the planning and evaluation of strategies, programs and operations.

To overcome this difficulty, traffic departments in some police forces work in fairly close co-operation with their state's transport department or traffic authority. In such cases, there can be consultation in the planning, implementation and evaluation stages as such departments/authorities have qualified researchers on their staff. The benefits to the police (and ultimately the public) of research can be illustrated by the following information on policing the roads in Tasmania, which details the Open Road Accident Program and the Urban Alcohol Accident Program. These programs which have been carried out in recent years have seen the deployment of police resources based on research of accidents data and evaluations of the various enforcement strategies.

It is suggested that the section on 'Policing and Roads in Tasmania: An Accident/Offence Deterrence Enforcement Model' shows that consideration has been given by police managers to the efficient and effective utilisation of police resources - and, in this particular case, with an accompanying saving of human lives and injury by the reduction of fatal and serious injuries resulting from vehicular collisions. It also shows the cost-savings of preventing fatal and serious injury crashes.

### Policing The Roads in Tasmania:

#### An Accident/Offence Deterrence Enforcement Model

The enforcement element of traffic control within Tasmania consists of two components: detection and deterrence. On the Tasmanian evidence to date, there is little doubt that, in the long term, deterrence may be the better form of control, especially when subject to effective, continuing review and evaluation of the police strategies, programs and deployment of resources.

The accident-deterrence enforcement effort is substantial in Tasmania. The method used, devised in 1984 after a literature review of world practice, involves two elements: (1) a use, recommended by various studies, of computerised accident analysis to indicate high risk times and areas of offence related accidents; and (2) a random number based vehicle deployment methodology shown in some research to enhance the speed reduction effectiveness of stationary patrol vehicles.

While accident data has been used in some police jurisdictions in various countries, no other case is known where the above development methodology has been systematically implemented as part of routine police practice.

The aim in establishing such deterrence operations was to attempt to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Tasmania Police Traffic Control in accident reduction and, consistent with preliminary reviews indicating cost-effectiveness, to continue and extend such operations to enable the preparation of a definitive analysis demonstrating the benefit or otherwise of such concepts in 'real world' police traffic control operations.

In the three and half years since accident deterrence operations commenced, sites which have experienced the specified level of attention have displayed encouraging results, with up to 58 per cent reduction in the level of serious accidents, and an estimated saving to the state in accident costs of up to \$20 for each dollar the program has cost to run.

Tasmania Police are currently experimenting with two different types of programs based on the above methodology. The aim in each case is to deter offences by increasing the public's expectancy of certainty of detection after first establishing an increased expectancy of a police presence in an enforcement role.

### Open Road Accident Program

The first style of program is designed to treat identified open road 'black spot' traffic areas which display an over involvement of speed-related accidents. Police attending accidents prepare statistical reports containing all details relevant to the accident including offence, cause, time of day, day of week and direction of travel. This data is forwarded to Transport Tasmania and stored in a computer by means of which, after a period of time, particular stretches of road, each involving a distance of 15 or 20 kilometres, are identified as 'black spots'. This information is often linked to other data from the Department of Main Roads which will indicate the eighty-fifth percentile speed of vehicles, again with day of week, time of day and direction of travel.

The treatment of such 'black spot' areas by offence deterrence operations involves two stages - first, the establishment stage and, second, the maintenance stage.

Each black spot route is broken into fifteen to twenty segments and initially is served by a police officer using radar for at least four two-hour periods per week. The officer works in a highly visible mode on detection and deterrence. During the establishment stage the aim is to raise the public's expectancy of seeing a police officer in an enforcing mode in the black spot area. It is considered important that the exact segment being serviced, time of day and day of week cannot be predicted by motorists. A random pattern of service is a vital part of the initial program.

Normally, after three weeks, the program can be reduced to the maintenance phase requiring service of approximately three two-hour periods every two weeks.

At the end of each three month period the results of each deterrence program are systematically evaluated. The accident history at each site during the program is compared both with the site's previous accident history and that for a control group - in this case all non-treated other rural roads in the state. The current accident levels of the control group are used to derive an expected current accident level for the programmed areas based on their past experience. Using this expected value, the change, if any, in accident levels at the programmed site can be determined.

(Police diary details for each are also reviewed to confirm that site attendance is satisfactory).

Should the evaluation indicate that a sufficient reduction in speed and accident rate has not been achieved, it may be necessary to reprogram a further establishment stage before again continuing the maintenance of the area.

Police are aware that a migratory effect to alternate routes can occur by constant offenders seeking to avoid the treated area. This effect is taken into account by successive accident analysis which will identify any newly developing 'black spots'.

The program achieves a twofold result - firstly, by reducing speed so that, should impact occur, severity of impact is reduced and secondly, because other offences such as 'fail to keep left' or 'overtaking in the face of oncoming traffic' are reduced, so the predicted rate of these accidents is also reduced. In trial areas where the pre-program eighty-fifth percentile speed was recorded at 130 km/h in a 110km/h speed limit zone, the after treatment eighty-fifth percentile speed was recorded at 90 km/h.

As mentioned, to date up to 58 per cent reduction in predicted casualty accidents has been achieved in the serviced areas and, taking into consideration costs to the community of: \$450,000 for each fatality; \$92,000 for each serious injury; and \$10,000 for each minor injury the conservative saving has been \$400 for each police man hour cost at \$20 spent on servicing the program. Revenue from penalties generated from the offence detection has not been taken into account in arriving at this figure.

Twelve open road speed-related 'black spot' areas are currently being treated in Tasmania.

#### Urban Alcohol Accident Programs

This program methodology has been trialled in urban 'black spot' areas brought about by alcohol-related accidents. Similar data is used to identify location, direction of travel, day of week and time of day. With alcohol-related accident areas, the treatment is in the form of random breath test units, highly visible, but with alternate routes also subject to a police presence.

The use of this program has revealed an offence detection rate as high as 15 per cent where the normal random breath testing has a detection rate of approximately 1.5 per cent as well as drastically reducing the alcohol related accidents in that area.

Based on the results of the trial, a major urban alcohol related program has been established in Tasmania. A current study of alcohol injury accidents has identified the fact that in excess of 40 per cent of these accidents occurred in a time span extending from 6.00 p.m. on a Friday to 10.00 p.m. on a Sunday, and were limited to 80 kilometres of the state's 22,000 kilometre road network, which is less than 0.5 of a per cent. Six programs were designed to service these areas and commenced on 1 June, 1987.

It is accepted that for deterrence to operate effectively, programs once established must be maintained indefinitely. This requirement is therefore fundamentally different from that of the 'blitz' approach. However, effectiveness per-unit-manpower is such with deterrence operations as

run in Tasmania that it is believed such ongoing requirements can easily be managed as part of normal routine, even in provincial areas using general police. In this connection, strong anecdotal evidence is gathering to suggest that programmed police presence on major routes for traffic purposes is significantly assisting non-traffic policing effectiveness. Vandalism problems have been reduced in certain areas - vandals generally travel by car - and in one instance Random breath testing (R.B.T). operations led to the detection and release of a kidnap victim from a car stopped for R.B.T. purposes.

It is considered that a further twelve months trialling of the programs are necessary before, if current trends continue, the results can be claimed as conclusive. The initial achievement of 58 per cent reduction has been rewarding and has significantly indicated that traditional policing methods can be supplemented by a cost-effective policing method targeted at high risk areas indicated by accident analysis.

When offence deterrence, as opposed to detection operations, has been conducted in Tasmania, a number of management issues have sometimes arisen relating to officer motivation and feedback on the results of effort expended.

Operations aimed at offence detection carry conveniently within them an instant form of evaluation for participating officers - the number of infringement notices or traffic briefs issued. However relevant (or not) to reducing the key accident causing offences, the greater this number the more effective the operation and the better the performance of officers involved can be seen to be.

Offence Deterrence Operations have been shown to be just as effective - or even more so - in lowering the accident rate and the road toll. Yet, a two-hour deterrence program may be diligently worked with few or no infringement notices issued. This can give an impression to the involved officers of little effectiveness or even that the whole two-hour period has been nothing but a 'waste of time'.

While understandable, especially after a night of bleak weather conditions, this impression is far from the truth, given of course that the enforcing officers had been vigilant and active in the enforcement period. There are two important reasons for this that go to the heart of the concepts behind offence deterrence. For effective deterrence operations, it should be understood that it is vital that all enforcing officers are made aware of these concepts and of the results achieved.

The first is that, where deterrence is concerned, a low rate of detection of offences for the period can in fact indicate that any offence-prone passing motorists have been successfully deterred from offending.

The second major reason for low offence detection rates can be that the level of passing traffic is low (e.g. in late night surveillance of medium to low volume routes). In these situations, officers need to be aware that all routes programmed for deterrence attention have shown a higher than average rate of serious accidents in the past and so warrant attention. (another reason for low detection rates can result from motorists passing on to approaching motorists the presence of police - by use of CB radios, scanners and the flashing of headlights).

Furthermore, it is basic to the whole concept of traffic offence deterrence that motorists are never able to predict where or when an enforcing police vehicle may be encountered. For this reason, it should be understood that a certain percentage of unit development must be on low volume roads and at various times of day.

If, of necessity, offence deterrence provides less immediate feedback as to its worthwhileness than enforcement involving detection, it is far from the truth that there is no means of determining its usefulness. Officers should be made aware that sophisticated accident analyses, using computerised data and rigorous statistical methods, are routinely used to review the results of all offence deterrence operations. In Tasmania, the results of these analyses provide both advice to management of any changes required to the program and, in the form of bulletins attached to program-timetable updates, inform all involved officers of the results of their work.

It should be understood that in many situations offence deterrence operations do not provide the immediate feedback given by other forms of enforcement. However, the feedback which is ultimately provided - a direct measure of accidents prevented - is perhaps the most relevant of all in terms of the prime goal of police traffic control: removing death and injury from our roads.

#### Development of New Devices

In the area of equipment, Tasmania Police have been involved in the encouragement of innovation in the development of both an electronic breath analysis and a roadside screener capable of detecting and indicating the presence and level of THC on the breath of a motor vehicle driver. Previous research carried out at the University of Tasmania indicated that up to 16 per cent of deceased drivers had levels of THC present in their blood which would affect their control of a motor vehicle. This research certainly indicated that further research should be carried out in relation to surviving drivers. At the present time there is no drug screening instrument available that can be used for this purpose. An evaluation of a prototype THC detector is presently being carried out at the University of Tasmania.

#### Traffic Infringement Notices and Demerit Points

A complete review has presently been made of the traffic infringement notice system with increased demerits on the more serious offences and a lessening of the less serious.

The demerit system is believed to work in Tasmania and is strengthened by a reminder notice sent out to a driver after he or she accumulates six demerit points.

The Tasmania Police does not impose a quota system on its officers as traffic law enforcement in Tasmania is based on deterrence and is not a revenue raising instrument.

Random breath testing in Tasmania is possibly the most effective and intense in the Commonwealth (bearing in mind the small population of Tasmania and the size of its police force) with 204,000 tests carried out in the year ending 30 June, 1986, out of a driving population of

approximately 260,000. This program resulted in the charging of 3,154 motorists.

This year, 1987-88, because of the redesign of the program, fewer motorists (180,000) will be screened but, because of improved methods and use of more precise data, the effect of detection and deterrence should be increased.

Standard R.B.T. is supported by special operations prior to and extending over high risk periods such as during Easter 1987, and again in 1988 (when the road was free of road deaths, and injury accidents decreased). A decreasing percentage of drivers (down to 0.4 of a per cent on Easter Saturday) were detected, indicating a successful deterrence effect.

The use of statistical data allows the early identification and treatment of high risk locations and driver categories by means of publicity, education or enforcement and, in Tasmania, this is proving to be successful.

There has not been any great accent placed on revenue earning through traffic fines although, in round figures, some \$3,000,000 would be generated annually from the issue of some 50,000 infringement notices and the receipt of \$300,000 from fines imposed on drink-driving offenders. As opposed to this, there is an annual cost in excess of \$5,000,000 to maintain a traffic control force of some 100 officers throughout the state, together with a fleet of BMW motor cycles and Falcon sedans.

The real benefit is in accident reduction and prevention. For the year ending 31 December, 1986, ninety one people died on our roads. The following year this number was reduced to seventy seven with a pro rata reduction in injury accidents. Therefore, at the pre-quoted figures on accident costs, a saving to the state of some \$6,300,000+ has been achieved through effective traffic policing programs.

Can it be said that 'Policing the Roads in Tasmania' is not approached in the right way? We believe our strategies, programs and operations are efficient and effective in real terms, including cost analysis, and that the proper use of our resources, as shown by analytical research, is helping to achieve the mission of the Tasmania Police Traffic Control Branch - to reduce the number and severity of vehicular accidents and the number of persons killed and injured on our roads.

## RESEARCH TO MAXIMISE PRODUCTIVITY

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### Introduction

The Victoria Police Force, like most government agencies, is subject to tight budgetary constraints. As a result, police are conscious of the need to optimise the use of existing personnel and resources. Since the mid 1960s, the force has continually developed methods/systems to monitor performance and improve productivity. In this context, productivity is concerned with getting more and better results from resources used, or using fewer resources to maintain the basic level of needed results (Wolfe, 1975, p.35).

The purpose of this paper is to briefly highlight some of the major areas of productivity research undertaken by the Victoria Police, e.g. crime screening; police patrol in Victoria (The Prahran Patrol Evaluation); Shopstealing Warning Program; the various workload analysis systems developed, and more recently the evaluation of the Mention Court System.

Other issues to be addressed will include the capacity of police to undertake such research and the role of external researchers. The discussion relating to these latter topics will be treated subjectively, based on the personal impressions of the author. It is hoped that the points raised will be received as pragmatic contributions to this subject.

### Police Patrol in Victoria (The Prahran Patrol Evaluation)

In 1978, police attached to the Management Services Bureau (later to become part of the Research and Development Department) initiated an experimental patrol method within the inner Melbourne suburb of Prahran. The experiment was designed to establish whether the centralising of police from two smaller police stations at a third larger station and the resultant increased availability of patrol resources (i.e. personnel and vehicles) would produce an increase in patrol activity, a reduction in the crime rate and increased feelings of citizen security (Brown, 1980).

Results of the twelve month study showed that patrol activity did increase, most types of crimes decreased within the area concerned and there was evidence to show that the public felt more secure.

### Crime Screening

In 1981, the Management Services Bureau devised a method of screening certain property crimes which was intended to allow detectives more time to investigate serious offences. Some property offences which were

previously investigated by detectives were now investigated by uniform police.

The procedure involved the creation of a crime screening 'device' to assign property offence investigations according to the selected criteria of seriousness and solvability, and the construction of a model predicting the operational outcome of the device (Bayley, 1983).

A four month pilot study to test this device was conducted in 'U' District (a police district covering an area in the south-eastern suburbs of Melbourne). The pilot study showed that there was no significant increase in the workload of uniform police as a result of crime screening. The average time spent by uniform police at crime scenes had risen by 2.65 minutes. On average, the property offence investigative workload of each C.I.B. Division was reduced by 28 per cent or the equivalent of 0.77 staff. Crime screening was subsequently implemented throughout the state.

### Workload Analysis

Since its inception, personnel attached to the Research and Development Department have designed, implemented or improved a number of workload analysis systems to assist in monitoring performance indicators, which complement productivity measures. For example, crime screening, when implemented, relied on the data gathered in the Criminal Investigation Branch (C.I.B.) workload system to determine the impact on C.I.B. divisions.

The station workload analysis system, which was developed in 1964, produces a measure of seventy different functions performed at police stations. Many of these functions are allocated a standard time weighting (others measure actual time), providing a measure of time spent actually performing those functions as well as a measure of the frequency those functions were performed.

The Criminal Investigation Branch workload system, which has already been mentioned, was developed in 1981 for C.I.B. divisions, not specialist squads. The system measures both investigative and non-investigative duties performed by detectives. Standard time weightings are used for some of the functions, while actual times are used for others. This system provides a means of allocating staff and resources according to a measured need.

A workload information system was also designed for the police Traffic Operations Group. This System operates on similar principles to those previously mentioned and began operation in 1987. Due to a lack of programmers, this system is not operating at its maximum level.

### Shopstealing Warning Program

The Shopstealing Warning Program is a diversion program which was introduced to increase police operational productivity. It was designed to reduce the time spent by police in processing first offenders for shopstealing, provided that certain criteria were met. If the criteria are satisfied, the offender may be warned by the attending police rather than be processed and charged before a court.



A pilot study was conducted in the Ballarat Police District and the program was implemented state-wide on 1 July 1985. A thorough evaluation of this program was completed in 1987. The mean processing time for offenders warned under the program was estimated to be twenty eight minutes per offender compared with two hours forty five minutes prior to the introduction of the program (Barnes, 1987).

### Mention Court System

The Mention Court System is a procedure which obviates the need for police and prosecution witnesses to attend Magistrates Courts in matters which are going to be heard as guilty pleas. The Victoria Police initially proposed such a system in 1978 but it was not accepted at that stage. Further submissions were made and in 1984 a four month pilot study was conducted at the Prahran Magistrates Court and the Moonee Ponds Region in Melbourne. On 1 March 1985, the system was expanded to all metropolitan courts and Geelong. It was progressively introduced to all regions after that date.

A comprehensive evaluation of the Mention Court System was carried out in 1987 by the Research and Development Department. The evaluation had the following objectives:

- (a) to determine the effect of the Mention Court System on the Victoria Police by the use of qualitative and quantitative methods, and
- (b) to produce sound empirical data relating to the system which will assist the force to develop strategies and procedures to deploy personnel and resources more efficiently.

In the areas surveyed, it was found that there was a reduction of 39 per cent of police attendance at Magistrates Courts in the metropolitan area, compared with 71.8 per cent in the country. At face value, these savings were substantial but they were offset by factors such as additional form requirements and greater demands for use of police as court orderlies. Many of the other findings of this study also impact on the productivity of operational police.

### Police and Research

The incomplete list of projects discussed in this paper gives some indication of the importance the Victoria Police place on productivity research. The Research and Development (R&D) Department, which is the smallest of the force departments, has in the past devoted much of its resources to this type of research. Because of resource limitations at R&D, other force departments have also generated independent research of this type. In such cases, R&D staff co-ordinate and liaise between the various departments to prevent overlap or duplication of effort.

Two divisions within R&D are most involved with productivity research: the Planning Division (actual staff of eight police, three public servants) and the Projects Division (actual staff of one police officer). Both divisions address operational/administrative issues which have an impact on productivity and require varying degrees of research.

An example of current work being done in these areas by the Planning Division is the viability of the 4 x 10 hour shift roster for the force. Projects Division, although severely handicapped by a lack of staff, has begun a

broad overview of the effectiveness of the Victoria Police over a ten year period.

In considering whether or not police have the capacity to undertake such research, it is necessary in my opinion to make a clear distinction between the words 'ability' and 'capacity'. I believe that appropriately trained police have the ability to carry out most forms of productivity research on behalf of the force. There is an extensive number of internal training courses (118 in fact), as well as tertiary courses available to police which will enhance their skill levels and professionalism. This is particularly evident in R&D, where most police have the benefit of extensive policing experience as well as tertiary training in a variety of disciplines.

The point being made here is that the Victoria Police are no different to other sections in the community. As in all other professions, there are varying levels of skills. It is the role of management within each organisation to select the best qualified people to perform the required tasks. The Victoria Police go through this process, as I am sure most other organisations do. Why should the Victoria Police or police in general be any different to the rest of the community?

One of the most important issues related to any form of research is 'problem identification'. It is essential that an accurate assessment is made of any problems encountered, otherwise strategies devised to correct them may be ineffective. Because governments expect police to make the mechanisms of the various laws pertinent to policing work, police experience any shortcomings or inadequacies, first-hand. In addition, police are generally the first point of contact between the community and the criminal justice system. This close proximity of police to the systems they work with and in qualifies them to conduct productivity research.

If the definition of the word 'capacity' is interpreted as 'the ability or power to contain, absorb or hold' (Collins, 1984) then I would say that there are constraints on the police capacity to undertake productivity research. As indicated previously, these constraints are not related to ability, but associated with resources which include staffing. These real life factors (which do not only apply to police) will inhibit the quality and quantity of research done by police.

The Victoria Police who have been innovative in introducing many new programs and procedures to cater for perceived policing needs in the community and for improved productivity, have suffered to some degree from resource constraints. The main area affected, from a research and management perspective, is the evaluation of initiatives which have been introduced. For example, programs such as Neighbourhood Watch and crime screening have been thoroughly appraised by the force.

Other procedures which are required to be adhered to or performed by police due to legal requirements also need to be evaluated, e.g. the effects of section 460 of the Crimes Act (the six hour rule and its associated procedures in applications for extensions of interview time). The police have a duty to contribute to social debate on these issues because they impact on effectiveness and productivity.

### External Researchers

There is a need for both police and external researchers to become involved in productivity research to ensure a balance of views in any research done. The Victoria Police support external researchers in undertaking various police related topics. There exists a Research Co-ordinating Committee within the force which does provide external researchers with assistance and access to data, subject of course to security, confidentiality and the availability of resources.

My experience has been that police researchers are in fact liaising quite extensively with outside agencies, ensuring a cross-flow of information and ideas. One example to highlight this point occurred during the evaluation of the Mention Court System. The project team, in which I was the Project Leader, had designed two questionnaires to canvass police informants and prosecutors regarding the operation of the system. Drafts of the proposed questionnaires were completed and staff from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) consulted in regard to their design and content. The advice obtained was gratefully received by the project team.

It is not the intention of this paper to criticise any group of people working in this field but to put forward constructive points of view which may, in the long term, improve the type and quality of research done in the areas of policing. As I stated previously, because police have a deeper insight into policing, they are suited to doing research to improve productivity which may involve problem-solving. Some external researchers have a tendency to produce material in an 'academic' or philosophical manner, which operational police do not find attractive and perceive as being research for the sake of research. This specialised area of productivity research should have practical objectives at the outset of a study and practical results at its completion. The former approach may lead to conflicts between operational police and external researchers. Conflicts of this type, in my experience, can only be minimised if external researchers take cognisance of the following points:

- (a) any research to be undertaken must be seen to be meaningful in the eyes of operational police. In some cases, proper marketing of a study will assist in this regard;
- (b) clear objectives for improvement of productivity must be established (i.e. what benefits can the community expect);
- (c) to achieve maximum support from the police, external researchers must take the trouble to make themselves aware of the police sub-culture in which they are going to work. For example, researchers should become familiar with the actual working environment to be studied rather than relying on second or third hand accounts; become familiar with the jargon of the sub-culture, etc. (i.e. be able to communicate effectively). This will also assist the researcher to interpret qualitative results more accurately.

## Conclusion

Policing is a dynamic profession requiring flexible and practical research to keep abreast of community change and expectation. Police researchers generally have the skills necessary to conduct productivity research. Like external researchers, if police lack expertise in specific disciplines, they have available to them many outside agencies who can provide personnel with the appropriate skills, albeit often at a cost.

In summary, there is a need and a place for external research into policing; however, to avoid conflict and ensure co-operation of operational police, any research conducted must be seen to be meaningful.

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**NSW POLICE SERVICE 1984 TO 1988  
MAXIMISING PRODUCTIVITY AND SERVICE**

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John Avery became Commissioner of the New South Wales Police on 7 August 1984.

Avery brought with him a philosophy of policing developed in the early 1970s. His book (Avery, 1981) set out a notion of policing by consent with community involvement - community-based policing was the principal operational strategy.

Many of the social changes which occurred during the 1970s impacted directly on policing. Avery, through his role in police education, sought to have police adapt to their changed role and become more responsive to and representative of the diverse elements of the community they serve.

The cutting edge of reactive policing often meant that police were in conflict with citizens who wanted to exercise their rights to peaceful protest. This included groups such as aborigines, homosexuals and anti-conscription sympathisers.

Victimless crimes of gambling, vice and prostitution exposed the police to moral and social dilemmas as well as corruption and organised crime influences.

Increased police sensitivity to victims' rights, particularly child abuse, domestic violence and sexual assault, caused established practices and procedures to be questioned. Significant resources have since been devoted to the investigation of these offences.

To review the Avery stewardship to date and to project what might follow in the future the widely used and highly regarded McKinsey 7-5 organisation model, is used. It provides a coherent explanatory framework which is especially relevant as it views an organisation as a single wholistic entity bonded by a set of shared values.

The Goal: To make the New South Wales Police Department the best in the world; to rid the organisation of the dark shadow of corruption; to encourage a high degree of professionalism; and to introduce community-based policing as the principal operational strategy.

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\* The original document was prepared by Christine Nixon and Chief Superintendent Jeff Jarratt, Commissioner's Policy Unit.

## Shared Values

**Those ideas of what is right and desirable (in corporate and in individual behaviour) which are typical of the organisation and common to most of its members.**

In 1984 the organisation was inward looking and seemingly operated on the premise of competent men and women of action knowing what they were about, being frustrated by an unknowing bureaucracy and public.

This attitude was based on myths which in essence held that input from people other than police was interference from lesser mortals, be they politicians, lawyers, minority groups or ordinary citizens.

These organisation and individual centred values reinforced the status quo and tended to lead to increasing organisational insularity. Emphasis seemed to be on 'sticking together' against a threatening outer world to protect our own ideas and methods of operation.

The self-protective and insular approach provided an environment in which corrupt behaviour could develop, and not be confronted, in some quarters.

The first step for the Avery administration was to admit that corruption was an issue.

In confronting the corruption issue, the administration began to ask people to reflect on the nature of the problem. No forms of corruption were ignored, but initial emphasis was necessarily on those more ingrained aspects.

The approaches taken to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the corrupting influences included:

- tough, fair investigation and sanctions
- creation of a high profile Internal Affairs and Internal Security
- actions intended to be an object lesson to others
- creation of professional role models
- improved training at the Academy and
- support for the role of the Ombudsman.

The Police Board was and is instrumental in the administration's stand and continued thrust against all forms of corruption. However, it also recognises that corruption is not peculiar to police.

The outright attack on corruption has tended to polarise certain internal elements, but the Board and administration view is that if it is hurting, then it must be doing some good. At the same time, public confidence in the capacity of police to operate within the law has grown. The Police Board is playing a critical part in that changing attitude.

A Statement of Values has been publicised as the gauge against which all police performance and behaviour is to be judged. The administration aims to inculcate the values into the everyday activities of all members of the Service. An extensive education program to explain the values and the rationale behind them is being conducted. Increasing emphasis is being placed on the values as the administration seeks to professionalise policing and the police mode of operation.

### Statement of Values

Each member of the New South Wales Police Service acts in a manner which:

- upholds the rule of law;
- preserves individual's rights and freedoms;
- places integrity above all;
- seeks to improve quality of life by community involvement in policing;
- strives for citizen and police personal satisfaction; and
- husband's public resources - both money and authority.

Integrity above all is the theme, but unequivocal professional standing in the community is the objective. Efforts to change the operating culture of the police service, in the short term, will meet with public scepticism and internal cynicism. It is well recognised that such a standing will not come quickly or easily. However, the Avery administration is seeking to imbue every member with a value-based outlook while simultaneously making the whole organisation value-driven.

The underlying philosophy of the past has been that police needed to be 'ruled' or 'instructed' on how to carry out their duties thereby unnecessarily constraining their flexibility and independence of operation.

This over-regulatory and constraining approach is exemplified by the old fashioned idea of placing numbers on police. No other 1988 service is required to have the vast majority of its members identified by a number worn on the uniform. Such a requirement is more appropriate to the early 'police' in the colony who were 'trusted' convicts.

It is planned that many of the rules and instructions which limit the type of freedom and authority granted to police officers by the values, without improving their general accountability, will be gradually removed.

However, in the same way as those rules and instructions were developed progressively over time, their review will also be a gradual matter.

As part of the drive towards an effective value-driven professional organisation an Office of Professional Responsibility is to be adapted to account to the administration for the fairness and efficiency with which the organisation and individual officers use authority and adhere to the values.

Education - formal and informal - is a way to create an awareness generally among members of the Service of the critical importance to the good of the individual, the organisation and the society at large of value adherence. The future challenge for police is to become competent thoughtful responsive value-driven professionals.

### Strategy

**A coherent set of actions aimed at providing, to a predictable degree, good quality, uniform and dependable service to citizens.**

The current administration strategy is threefold: attack corruption first; then build an accountable corruption-resistant management team and organisation; and focus on community-sensitive responsive services as the keystone of policing in the state.

This section is devoted to the third element, the principal operating strategy of the Service/community-based policing.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s police credibility was increasingly questioned and external pressure mounted for policies and strategies to be enunciated for public consumption and comment.

So, over that decade, as well as having doubts raised about basic operational strategies of police, Commissioners became answerable to a multitude of external agencies of Government, such as the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, the Traffic Authority, the Privacy Committee, the Ombudsman, and the Anti-discrimination Board, to name but few of the twenty-nine. The last of these was the Police Board in January 1984.

While there was strong initial resistance to the recommendation of Judge Lusher that there should be a Police Board, the current administration embraced the concept, seeing the Board as:

1. A window into the police force
2. A very experienced and independent selector for and monitor of senior positions
3. A catalyst to many changes in the administration
4. A very strong support during times of change
5. A buffer to possible political interference
6. A sounding board for ideas
7. A source of profound advice.

At the outset, the longer term issues for this administration and the Police Board were and continue to be:

- community policing
- research into policing
- strategic planning
- economic resource management
- policy development
- inculcation of ethics



- better industrial management
- greater accountability
- team management
- positive reinforcement
- improved performance.

Judge Lusher in his report on the administration of the Police Force noted a commonly held belief that the Service lacked clarity of purpose and direction. Several efforts were made to define the purpose of the organisation. Then in February 1985 a final statement of purpose or Mission was developed by the senior executive and subsequently endorsed by the Police Board and Police Minister.

### Mission

To provide for, and with the assistance of the people, a high quality, ethical and cost-effective Police Service in New South Wales as defined by the Parliament, Government and relevant legislation, including -

1. Protecting life
2. Preventing crime
3. Enforcing law
4. Maintaining peace and good order
5. Safeguarding property
6. Facilitating safe and free movement of people and traffic

To perform all these functions with impartiality and integrity and engender a feeling of safety and security within the community.

In March 1986, the senior executive enunciated a set of corporate objectives, which have since been refined to:

### Corporate Objectives

1. To increase feelings of safety and security in the community by giving priority to crime prevention and detection programs
2. To make policing services more responsive to the needs and feelings of the community
3. To encourage greater involvement of citizens in policing
4. To influence changes in driver behaviour, with the object of reducing road deaths and injuries
5. To improve management and the organisation to optimise use of resources
6. To minimise corruption within the Police Force.

Broad corporate priorities were then developed to guide planning to achieve those objectives.

## Corporate Priorities

The corporate priorities in support of the Corporate Objectives aim to:

- adhere to the Statement of Values.
- reduce street and family violence.
- reduce the supply of and trafficking in illegal drugs.
- reduce the incidence of sexual assault.
- reduce child abuse and exploitation.
- reduce motor vehicle theft.
- reduce property breakings.
- reduce the incidence of arson.
- rehabilitate juvenile offenders and reduce juvenile crime.
- implement community-based policing.
- emphasise beat policing.
- progressively redeploy police to increase the general duty response strength in patrols.
- expand Neighbourhood Watch, Safety House and other community-based programs.
- establish community consultative committees.
- intensify the random breath testing program.
- raise awareness of responsibility of all police to enforce traffic laws.
- emphasise speed reduction in traffic laws enforcement.
- restructure the police force to increase line management authority, responsibility and personal accountability.
- introduce a divestment program to improve use of capital and personnel resources.
- upgrade management reporting systems.
- review effectiveness of large resource users.
- Implement merit based promotion for Senior Sergeants by 1 April 1989.
- include a police ethics component in all training courses.

- further impact on causes of corrupt behaviour.

The essence of these corporate priorities is the principal operational strategy of community-based policing.

Historically, police departments, all over the world have developed strategies on the basis of meeting daily incidents and occurrences, rather than on a long term or problem-oriented basis. New South Wales is no different.

Needless to say, it is imperative to maintain a capacity to provide rapid response in emergency circumstances. However, there is no requirement to build the whole police response on the odd emergency call.

In New South Wales emergency calls for police service constitute less than one per cent of all calls, according to figures provided by the Radio Operations Centre.

Thus, split level response which encompasses a combination of quality reactive and community-based police response is the ideal for which the Service is striving.

In a significant majority of instances criminals are convicted primarily on evidence of citizen witnesses. There has been and will always be need for highly skilled investigators and interrogators to piece together the many parts of a criminal investigation for presentation to a court.

However, it is critical to keep an open line to the principal sources of information on criminal activity - the citizens - and to have the means of converting that information into intelligence and then into admissible evidence. This latter aspect has been somewhat neglected in New South Wales and in other forces.

The fundamental strategy for the future will be built around the professional community-based police officer working with the particular community of her/his beat to solve [or contribute to the solution of] local problems, supported by a responsive command structure.

Resources saved from the difference between traditional policing methods and directed response can be employed as community-based beat police. Overseas experience indicates that such beat police will lower the level of community fear and apprehension. The presence of locally based beat police will also raise the level of information fed to police for analysis by intelligence units. The net effect of the rational resource reallocation is increased community satisfaction.

In the same way as medical general practitioners have developed a preventative model which addresses the health of the whole person rather than a specific illness, it is now intended that the police 'general practitioners' will work in the same preventative way in their communities to generate feelings of citizen personal safety and improve their security.

Single officer patrols are a critical part of community-based policing strategy. The current emphasis on two officer patrols must shift. As well as increasing the general coverage achieved with single officer patrols, research now confirms that citizens are much more likely to approach single officers on patrol than two officers working together. Likewise,

research suggests that two police officers patrolling together are more likely to talk to one another than to members of the community. Other research suggests that it is just as safe as and more efficient and effective than two officer patrolling, if implemented appropriately.

Officer safety will be a key consideration in the change in emphasis and trials are currently being conducted at Liverpool and Sydney Districts to gauge police and public acceptance of the single officer patrols.

Expert support will continue to be provided by detectives, crime scene analysts, intelligence analysts, highway patrollers, fingerprint analysts, traffic researchers, helicopter crews, dog handlers, tactical response and special weapons operators, radio operators, prosecutors, accident investigators and so on.

Information and intelligence gathered by police from regular contact with citizens will provide the basis of the majority of police operations and investigations. The role of intelligence in police planning and operations will increase. A network of police with skills in analytical and logical techniques will be built throughout operational commands to improve the capacity of all police to provide quality service to the community by providing early warning of issues and problems and providing factual information which can be converted into admissible evidence.

However, like medical general practitioners, experts will be called on a referral basis by police 'general practitioners', who will be the primary community link and intelligence gatherers. The role of the experts is to consult with, advise and train the large number of generalists.

Community Consultative Committees are and will continue to be an important part of the community-based policing strategy. They are a primary form of police contact with the community, as well as forums for Patrol Commanders to meet at a community level to pass on and receive information. Also, they provide a mechanism to work with community representatives to address larger problems, which cannot be resolved at neighbourhood level.

While a substantial majority of the departmental resources will be directed to community-based policing activity, organised crime must also be combated. The administration's efforts to reduce this influence is based on a multi-disciplined task force approach. This approach incorporates intelligence analysis, investigation (including investigative accountants) and prosecutorial functions. The basis of the process is target development through intelligence assessment and allocation of specific resources to pursue the principal criminals to conviction.

Management and leadership of these task forces is critical, regardless of the particular type of organised criminal activity. Management is provided at State Command level and is supported by the leaders of the State Drug, Investigative, Intelligence and Operations Support Groups. Organisational commitment to this role has never been stronger.

### Structure

**The organisation chart and accompanying descriptions that show who reports to whom and how tasks are both divided up and integrated.**

The interrelationship between strategic planning, program budgeting and structure highlighted the need to clarify lines of command to make accountability much clearer. In some cases it was considered that corruption had been able to fester because of duality of command and lack of specific accountability at various command levels.

In January 1987 the administration made a submission through the Police Board to the then Minister recommending that there be a fundamental change to the command structure of the police force. Emphasis was to shift from functional responsibilities to Geographic Commands.

The effect of the new management arrangements was to place the majority of services at local level and to make lines of accountability unequivocal - through state, region, district, division and patrol.

To achieve the 'regionalisation' four Assistant Commissioner positions were recast from Crime, Traffic, General and State Emergency Services to four Region Commanders. The Deputy Commissioner (Administration) position was disestablished and the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) changed to State Commander. Six districts were created while two were disestablished, leaving a total of twenty-four districts.

Each of the four regions occupy about a quarter of the State and are seen to be similar in a number of respects, such that valid comparisons can be made on performance. The Region Commands are designed to be a microcosm of the Commissioner's job, while being limited to implementing policy laid down by the Commissioner, on advice. Otherwise, they are largely autonomous. Each region has six districts. The districts are the major administrative points above the patrols where the emphasis is on service delivery.

Each police station has a designated commander and to emphasise the geographic importance of the community therein they are referred to as Patrol Commanders. A number of Patrol Commanders positions have been upgraded and a review is taking place regarding a number of smaller patrols with a view to designating them sectors of slightly larger patrols. Patrol Commanders are expected to range generally in rank from Senior Sergeant to Chief Inspector.

A critical consideration for the Commissioner is the shape and function of Police Headquarters. Police Headquarters is the seat of the Chief Executive Officer.

A proposal endorsed by the Police Board holds that the Charter of Police Headquarters is to support the Commissioner in meeting the organisational, moral, legal, social and political obligations of Office, by provision of high class professional knowledge and skills which aid quality control and enhance service delivery while retaining line command accountability.

There are several overriding considerations in the construction of headquarters:

- it must be flat and lean.
- staff must be small in number and high in quality.
- current existence is not reason for continued existence.

- each existing or proposed position must be shown to add value to the corporate performance or be abolished.
- the positive impact of civilianisation must be obvious to the casual observer.

The headquarters functions are to co-ordinate and direct operations; plan strategically; provide policy guidance, analysis and support; project professional responsibility; negotiate corporate contracts; service regional needs; review organisational performance against established criteria; ensure nothing impairs the public perception of the attack on corruption; and give the police and people of the state a shared and vital purpose.

The main body to advise the Commissioner on policy, planning, priorities and performance is the State Executive Group [Commissioner, State Commander, Executive Director, Assistant Commissioner and Region Commanders].

Headquarters structure will have five major components:

1. State Command, which will be the central operational command under the direction and leadership of the State Commander.
2. Policy, Planning and Evaluation. This Office is to provide high quality corporate policy, planning and evaluation services by integrating the various components of strategic planning, policy development and analysis, program management, performance evaluation, work performance appraisal, program evaluation, statistical analysis and media and marketing services into a corporate whole.
3. Professional Responsibility. The Charter of this office is to account for the fairness and efficiency with which individuals and the organisation use authority and adhere to organisational values - particularly those relating to integrity, equality, legal authority and use of force.
4. Procurement, Finance and Data Transmission. This office is to use advanced technology, budgetary and financial accounting services and administrative assistance to support police operations, and to procure, provide and maintain facilities, accommodation and equipment to maximise the quality of police service delivered to the people in New South Wales.
5. Human Resources. The overall objective of this office is to provide ethical, consistent equitable and cost-effective human resources service to accommodate the organisational and individual needs, featuring policy advice, consistent procedures, co-ordination of inter-region personnel arrangements and a central personnel record system.

The final outline of the new integrated headquarters structure has been endorsed by the Police Board, but is still to be endorsed by the Minister.

The foundation of police service delivery in a community-based style is at the Patrol level. At the end of the restructuring process it is likely that there will be between 250 and 300 Patrols throughout the state. Each Patrol will be constructed to specifically relate to the particular community it serves. In country areas it is likely that there will be an aggregation of

smaller towns as sectors in a Patrol. The model below will be used as the general standard for establishing a Patrol.

### Skills

**Capabilities possessed by the organisation as a whole as distinct from those of individuals. Some companies perform extraordinary feats with ordinary people.**

A revamped police education system driven by the Police Board, on advice from the Police Education Advisory Council, is seeking to raise the quality of the service delivered by broadening police educational standards.

The Police Recruit Education Program (PREP) commences in 1988 with the objective of producing even higher quality police officers in future to work more effectively 'in the system'. The aim is to increase internal educational standards and entry standards, while lowering physical and age barriers.

PREP seeks to take high calibre people, who possess many skills, and to enhance them to maximise the impact on community-based policing. This simple statement requires substantial investment of people and capital now for a long term return.

At the other end of the spectrum, Executive Development is a key to the professionalisation of police services in New South Wales. Improved management skills of senior police officers is a must. To this end an executive development program is planned for commencement in the first half of 1989. The program will be personally directed by the Commissioner, because the most critical phase for the administration now is identification and development of tomorrow's leaders.

The executive development plan seeks to tie together elements of the present ad hoc arrangements which include internal and external courses, proposals for secondment to and from other public and private sector organisations, staff development efforts and work performance appraisal elements.

The plan is to use some 4 Superintendent, 6 Chief Inspector, 20 Inspector, 35 Senior Sergeant and 60 Sergeant, 15 Graded Public Service positions as executive development posts. Officers identified by their commanders or self nominated will be selected on a competitive basis to participate in the six month executive development program. The program will involve:

- six months at a designated development post for experimental exposure.
- six two day executive development workshops with other members of the program to develop corporate perspective
- strategic placement on appropriate internal/external courses/seminars to establish professional networks.
- return to position of origin or take up a newly won post to employ capacities to improve organisation performance.

The prime purpose of the program is to bring a strategic outlook to and to significantly improve the performance capacity of some 140 officers (or about 1 per cent of the Department) each year. Personnel attached to headquarters or in staff positions will also be involved in various phases of the program, as part of their ongoing development and co-ordination of the program.

Specialist Development has a number of important aspects. The first is that community-based policing is about having specialist general police. Secondly, currently held expert skills and knowledge must be retained, developed and broadened. Thirdly, new knowledge and skills must be gained and applied.

In the first category, overspecialisation has tended to occur to the severe detriment of the general duty police officer. Considerable skills and experience have been developed by a few while those of the many have been dissipated. Responsibility for performance of designated functions has tended to shift to small specialist groups rather than to police in the broad, with a consequent general loss of skills.

The use of experts in a directive way must generally give way to their use in a supportive and consultative way. Maximum exposure of those skills on a broad front in support of the delivery of the whole range of police services by general practitioners is the challenge to confront in specialist development.

In addition to the range of skills and knowledge currently held by personnel, ways need to be found to introduce new skills and knowledge which are relevant to policing in this era. Investigative and technical skills now need to be complemented by development of broad based intelligence analysis and negotiation skills.

The administration has placed and will continue to place great emphasis on the development of problem-solving techniques and analytical skills throughout the organisation. Coaching and tutoring skills must become significant tools of trade in the kit of commanders and supervisors.

Patrol Management is a critical component of the skills element. In essence, this Department is made up of normal ordinary people. The leadership and guidance those quality ordinary people get at patrol level will be a major determinant in the ultimate success or failure of even the simplest or most sophisticated strategies of the body corporate. Enhancement of Patrol Commanders' planning and coaching skills is critical.

### Staff

**The people in the organisation considered in terms of corporate demographics, not individual personalities.**

Broadly, there are only three roles within any organisation, including this Department:

- operatives or hunters
- leaders or elders and
- staff or campfollowers.



Operatives, of course, are those members who deliver the service for which the organisation exists. Within the operatives area there are what might be termed apprentices, tradespeople and masters, or in police terms, Probationary Constables, Constables and Senior Constables. Many trades or crafts (general patrol, investigation, intelligence, analysis, physical evidence, fingerprint, water police, air wing and rescue) will be carried out by those people. This group makes up 75 per cent of the Service.

Elders are the leaders who guide the organisation. Through policy planning and evaluation they seek to incrementally improve 'the system' within which the operators, as well as providing them with resources to, perform. Working 'on the system' is the role of commanders and supervisors, who should constitute about 10 per cent of the Service.

The third role is that of staff. Those people who maintain the home base while the hunters are in the field. They carry out the majority of processing and advisory functions in support of the command. In the police context, this includes public service and police officers in all roles which are outside specific operational community contact, but which provide support to it.

Within this framework there are many positions which when interrelated make an organisation productive. In the minds of many there is confusion between rank and job (or position). It is not uncommon for a police officer to say what their rank is when asked 'what is your job?'. Sergeant, Inspector or Superintendent do not equate with any particular job or position in the Department.

Position definition is a critical precursor to placement of people. Equally, positions must form part of a coherent structure. For some years, with the assistance in the first place of Hay Associates, a lot of effort has been put into relating positions, structure and strategy. The next phase is fitting the right person to the job.

The thrust of appointment to position is - particular job; specific location; relevant salary; and for the sake of identification as a police position a rank is applied. This approach contrasts with the previous arrangement where a person was promoted to a rank with accompanying salary, was sent to a location and was then given a job.

Extraordinarily, in the old system some people actually had the skills appropriate to the job they were given. But most did not. Matching the right person to the right job was more a matter of good luck than good management. More likely, the promotion often meant extensive family disruption, loss of personal satisfaction and a fall in overall performance.

Positional Promotion for commissioned officers began stage one of the position location salary rank system on 1 October 1984. Its successful implementation has been overseen and guided by the Police Board. Refinements of procedures have taken place and appeal arrangements are currently being reviewed by the Chairman, Government and Related Employees' Appeals Tribunal. Appeal rights exist for Inspectors and Chief Inspectors.

The major impact of the promotion system has been to better align individual capacities to position requirements. In the process, the

average age of officers on promotion has been significantly lowered, which enhances tenure and continuity in those positions.

Promotion on Merit for Senior Sergeants began on 1 January 1988 and promotion to Sergeant is proposed to be merit-based from 1 April 1989. Again, the emphasis will be on the best alignment of individual skills with positions and overall development of members of the Service.

The present number of Commissioned Officer positions in the Department is presently 525. There is the prospect of a minor increase as the devolution of divisions and upgrading of Patrols continues. The significant thing is that about 4.5 per cent of the Department is made up of Commissioned ranks, so there is a 95 per cent chance of not being a Commissioned Officer at any given time, although over time that prospect increases with service and improved performance.

The expectation which must be generated by this fact is different from that which has pervaded the organisation for the past forty years - that is, everyone could expect to make Commissioned rank.

In fact, the expectation was never realistic, but nonetheless was taken at face value by many officers. The effect has been disillusionment for those whose expectations could not and have not been realised. The fundamental change is that there are certain command and staff positions which are considered to have a particular job size, which equates with a particular salary level.

To complement the positional promotion on merit system, the policy regarding an incremental wages package (incorporating all aspects of financial reward, including overtime, shift allowances and specialist allowances) is being examined. The new policy aims to put square pegs in square holes and match skill level to reward. At the present time recognition of skilful performance mostly comes through promotion, which often serves neither the individual nor the organisation. The new award will seek to improve the delivery of community-based policing services, while better satisfying corporate and individual needs.

Optional Retirement based on a lump sum option commenced on 1 April 1988. The policy document upon which the package was worked out also contains reference to a 20 year disengagement package. It is planned that this option also be pursued to fruition so that police officers who wish to leave the system after twenty years may do so. This will give greater organisational flexibility.

The potential for younger people to be promoted to more senior positions means that there possibly will be fewer opportunities for promotion. It is important to have officers who are able and willing to continue to perform at high levels in the field of community-based policing. Likewise, it is important to have an outlet for those who feel that they no longer wish to remain. Resignation is, of course, an option, but without twenty year disengagement many might choose to stay (somewhat unwillingly) for another ten years service before retirement with a consequent effect on overall performance. Naturally, for those who wish to continue in the field every opportunity and encouragement will be provided.

Civilisation of many aspects of the Department is internal and government policy. Already some 500 positions have been identified for replacement of police with civilian staff. The actual process of replacement could be

significantly improved. In this respect, it is proposed to revamp the Establishment Review Committee composition to represent the major parties.

Under the revamped Personnel portfolio, it is proposed that a senior industrial relations exponent be employed to support the Commissioner in dealings with the three unions and to facilitate the resolution of corporate industrial issues generally. As well, it is planned that an individual relations officer or Police Association representative be attached to each region with a view to improving industrial relations at the work face through local and more rapid resolution of industrial issues.

### Style

#### **The way managers collectively behave with respect to use of time, attention, and symbolic actions.**

In organisational terms, it is the appropriateness of style displayed by management and staff that is vital to service delivery, public image and ultimately productivity. The style of significant officers is used as a role model by many other staff.

The perceived style of the current role models of the Department is one of 'competent men and women of action who know the answer'. However, the blustering, and some times aggressive, approach used by many police to overcome a lack of confidence or knowledge must progressively give way to a professional approach.

This approach says that it is all right not to know the answer, provided there is a willingness to find out and provide the appropriate response to the client. In some cases, the organisation needs competent reflective thoughtful people who are searching for the answer.

Historically, police activities in this state have been directed at confronting crime and criminals. The police view, supported only too happily by the public, was that crime control should be the exclusive province of police. In short order, a complementary style of behaviour arose. Police and police managers were classified as being operationally competent, tough-minded and not afraid to confront problems.

In a circuitous fashion, police progressively came to reflect their own publicity. The net result was a confirmation and expansion of this particular style of behaviour. Thus, the image that emerged to describe police management was one of hard-nosed people who were operationally proficient and who were not afraid of a fight. This view also excluded women, minority groups, short people and those with less than perfect eyesight.

Police managers tend to be concerned with operational competency, assertiveness (sometimes aggressiveness) in dealing with situations, people and issues and enjoying favour of subordinates.

This militaristic style of management was appropriate in a police environment where the primary function was to deal with hardened criminal elements, hooligans and social riff-raff. Doubtless, it was also appropriate in an environment where police were not expected to deliver any particular form of service to, or have any great degree of interaction with the community.

However, as 70 per cent of calls from citizens are for service, the style is patently not suitable for the significant proportion of policing services sought. Police are well trained and increasingly better educated. The administration has set about authorising and encouraging police to take the initiative and to provide a useful social service; they are expected to be thoughtful and deliberate in their actions.

Successful managers in community service operations need a style (and indeed a self-image) which evinces not only competence and willingness to wrestle with difficult problems, but a confident, professional and reflective manner.

This Service has tended to believe that it is exclusively in the business of 'looking up crooks'. Maintenance of our competence in that phase of service is important. However, the citizens believe that we are here largely to provide a community reassurance service. Our apparent collective inability to provide the appropriate response to that perceived community need is a matter which must dominate the strategic considerations of our managers.

While recognising the value of legislation, statutes, rules, and instructions, professionals do NOT rigidly follow them and assume that they are appropriate in all instances. Rather, such imperatives are used to guide response. A professional understands that while personally responsible and accountable for the resolution of particular situations, there is considerable discretion in such matters.

The style of present and prospective police managers is a key part of an effective service organisation. The creation and encouragement of effective role models, with customer oriented and community-based outlooks is a critical requirement if the style of the organisation is to change.

### Systems

#### **The processes and procedures through which things get done from day to day.**

This organisation, like most others, is enveloped by a host of systems. They range from 'operational' (e.g. methods of dealing with the public, criminals, station procedures, records) to the 'administrative' (requisitioning, supply, rostering, leave, overtime, allowances, sick-report) and to the more recent 'computer-based' systems (e.g. CIIS, SVI, DMT, Personnel, Financial, Workload Analysis etc.). These together represent, in a very real fashion, the way we get things done.

In one sense, the terms 'system' and 'bureaucracy' are synonymous. Bureaucracies, the police department included, rely heavily on codified sequences of processes and procedures. In most instances, these procedures have been developed as a result of and in support of specific policy directions.

Over the last twenty years, management scientists have gradually been drawn to the conclusion that it is not the existence of systems which is a cause for concern, but rather the methods of their design, implementation and review that is critical to the health of an organisation.

In essence, modern systems theory concentrates on a structured approach to problem solving. The structured approach to system design involves six simple steps:

1. Problem definition
2. Feasibility study
3. Analysis
4. System design
5. Implementation
6. Maintenance/Review

It is perhaps at step six that most problems arise. Operational police face difficulties in dealing with vast quantities of repetitious, complex, time-consuming and sometimes purposeless paper work. Many of these procedures remain in place simply because their continued existence has not been challenged.

The effect of an haphazard set of processes on police (indeed on public generally) is negative. A professional cannot operate effectively in an environment where practice is constrained by outdated processes; where information is not available and where a large percentage of time and energy is devoted to paper warfare.

Underlying the introduction of Community-Based Policing as the principal operational strategy and the subsequent restructuring of the organisation, is the notion of clear role definition. The restructuring process had a number of objectives which in essence were designed to streamline the organisation - to make it 'leaner' more effective and more efficient - by distinguishing between those who work 'in the system' (the operatives) from those who work 'on the system' to refine and improve it (those with 'super' vision, staff and management responsibilities).

These actions now need to be complemented by a commensurate attack on practices, procedures and processes. Corporate recognition of the problem processes and willingness to act to improve them may lead to a partial resolution of the situation. However, the key to achieving ongoing incremental improvements to procedures and processes is the development of a feeling of strategic responsibility in every member of the department.

Strategic planning drives the organisation, so it is said. One of the real short-term challenges for the department is to make planning part of the everyday life of line commanders, functional directors, supervisors and field operatives.

Efforts in the past to increase the planning base have not prospered. However, in the words of Professor Mark Moore from Harvard University 'So, it didn't work first time! Then do it again, and again and again'. Corporate emphasis is on good planning being one of the three major functions of commanders and supervisors.

The Office of Policy and Evaluation will be responsible for integrating the various components of planning at the executive level. However, strategic planning must be seen as a valuable operational tool at all command and supervisory posts. It is proposed to refine the existing strategic planning process to make it an integral part of the everyday activities at command levels from Sector to State.

The same five basic strategic planning components will apply, although the names may vary:

1. Mission, Charter or Purpose
2. Objectives or Key Result Areas
3. Targets, Priorities, Problems, Projects or Programs
4. Action planned or what you intend to do
5. Endorsement, feedback and evaluation.

Plans or proposals can be endorsed regularly in a semi-formal way. Line commanders must be seen to support/approve proposals at the level closest to the source. This aspect is critical to the eventual integration of strategic planning as a standard operating procedure of the organisation.

Satisfied strategic plans or problems, projects and programs can then form part of performance records and annual appraisals of individuals from region commanders to sector supervisors. Records would be retained at the local command level (rather than centrally).

These plans would also be one of the indicators of performance used in evaluating the service delivery of that command. Individuals could also use them as examples of performance in applications and interviews for positions.

Program co-ordination provides the framework for corporate issues to be given program status and allocated a co-ordinator. It is designed to give maximum exposure to critical corporate issues.

The primary role of program co-ordinators is to provide support, advice and co-ordination of effort to improve performance in the specific program area, across the organisation. Functions include research, monitoring, education, legislative review, budget and resource advice and evaluation.

The mechanism for addressing the program issue is through strategic planning (or problems, projects and programs) in line commands. Current program issues are:

- Drugs
- Domestic Violence
- Child Protection
- Random Breath Testing
- Street Safety
- Sexual Assault
- Speed Reduction
- Neighbourhood Watch/Property Breaking
- Motor Vehicle Theft
- Arson

The program co-ordination framework also links with the program budget arrangements. The Policing Services Program Areas under the State Program Budgeting arrangements are:

- Personal Crime
- Property Crime
- Crimes of Vice
- Public Order Maintenance
- Traffic

The Program Development and Co-ordination Unit is trying to develop a factual and reliable information system to provide a solid foundation for reporting to government on corporate service delivery, performance and use of budget allocation.

Performance evaluation has four dimensions in the context of police service: independent public survey; service delivery assessment; comprehensive audit; and program evaluation.

Two independent public surveys have been conducted and have provided the beginnings of a useful database on community perspectives, particularly fear levels. Refined regular district specific surveys will form the cornerstone of the assessment of organisation performance. Internal opinion can no longer be the primary source of information regarding performance. However, there should be cautious reaction to early results from surveys.

Surveys of police to gauge understanding of strategies, identify problem areas and to see the difference (if any) between the perspective of the public and that of the police will also be conducted regularly.

Comprehensive internal audit is another arm of the performance evaluation process. Using the sample approach, it is seen that this arm can provide professional opinion on whether legislative and corporate requirements are being met. This particularly applies to financial regularity, efficiency and effectiveness of the accounting service and management information systems.

District service delivery assessment is probably the most critical, and yet is perhaps the least objective and therefore the most difficult dimension. Assessment can be related to the type of report an investigative journalist may make on an assignment. It will include: matters relating to corporate objectives; anecdotal aspects; intuition; local opinions; consultation with police, public, business sector and newspaper editors; reference to strategic plans; statistical data regarding crime and demographic aspects; folklore references; and any number of other sources. All this must be distilled into a rational valid vignette (for presentation to the State Executive Group) to show the broad ranging performance of the command under review.

The validity of such a process will depend largely on recognised successful field commanders forming part of multi-disciplinary assessment teams. Again, the focus would be on in-depth sampling at say district level, rather than annual ongoing assessment of all organisational units which, of necessity, must be somewhat superficial and is potentially destructive.

Policy direction and control will reside with the State Executive Group. Implementation of policy is a line responsibility and will remain so. Emphasis will be on broad guidelines supported by standard operating procedures.

### Conclusion

In essence, the goal is to make the New South Wales Police Service the best in the world. To achieve this end priority is being given to:

- the Statement of Values as the overall organisational guide.
- delivery of a community-based policing service which is responsive to and reflective of the desires of the many communities across the state.
- the continued attack upon organised criminal elements by highly focused intelligence and investigative elements at state level, supported by the staff of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
- continued refinement of the decentralised structure, including review of the role of divisions and evaluation of the value added by headquarters units to corporate priorities.
- integration of police and public service positions to maximise the numbers of police available to perform duties at community level.
- alignment of people and well-defined positions in conjunction with positional promotion for command and supervisory positions and civilianisation, to maximise performance.
- skills development and enhancement with particular focus on Executive Development, Supervision and Police Recruit Education.
- a staffing package of incremental skills based salary and twenty year disengagement.
- development of professional role models.
- achievement of incremental improvements to 'the system' through involvement of all members of the Service.

Finally, high quality ethical management and operational performance, based upon sound strategic planning, is the determination of the administration.

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## FINANCE - THE ULTIMATE CONTROL

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### Introduction

Finance is one of the central elements of any discussion on Police Resources and Effectiveness. It is essential to look at the interaction between finance and policy to ensure that these are properly integrated in the budget and operational planning cycles. This paper outlines some of the strategies being pursued in Victoria to achieve economies, program performance improvement and enhanced effectiveness. These issues are developed under the following headings:

Pressures for Reform  
Police Resources in Context  
Organisational Responses, and  
Strategies for Improvement.

### Pressures for Reform

#### **International Perspective**

The external pressures on government and police forces to be more accountable and to achieve 'more with less' have been evident internationally for more than a decade. In the USA, Canada and elsewhere, administrators and managers are having to respond to demands for greater fiscal responsibility (Hofley, 1978, p. 1).

The pressures for reform also come from within police forces (Hoover 1984, pp. 7-13). It is true there are not profit and loss measures in public employment - but it is essential to develop appropriate performance measures. The link between budgets and operational management is pervasive and not just peculiar to police organisations.

#### **The Australian Context**

In recent times there has been increasing debate about the relative benefits of 'big - vs - small' government with repeated emphasis on the role of cost containment in the framing of Federal Government budgets. Two major factors pressure state budgets and public sector managers to achieve more within available resources:

- (i) revisions of tax and cost-sharing arrangements for federal, state and local government; and

- (ii) the tendency for functions (particularly in the human services fields) to 'migrate' down government hierarchies from federal to state and local levels.

Building on the Commonwealth Government's 1983 statement 'Reforming the Australian Public Service the major reforms of the 1980s' at Commonwealth level have included:

- functional presentation of budget information leading progressively to the development of program budgets to:
  - show how resources are being used to achieve identifiable ends and thus allow the assessment of management performance (Commonwealth Government, 1983, p. 30);
- integration of staffing levels with overall budget management by bringing these aspects of resource management together in the one central agency (Department of Finance);
- continuing external reviews of program performance, efficiency and effectiveness through the Cabinet Expenditure Review Committee, Auditor General and Parliamentary Committees;
- the requirement for department managers to arrange regular internal reviews of ongoing functions to ensure efficiency and effectiveness are considered both within and outside the budget cycle;
- the requirement for department heads to prepare each year a management improvement plan for consideration by ministers and to focus attention on the critical strategic issues to be addressed in the coming year.

These reforms should foster a greater ministerial involvement in the development, management and evaluation of the Government's programs on decisions about the level, mix and distribution of resources.

### **The Victorian Scene**

The Victorian Department of Management and Budget is reviewing resource management legislation. A number of major reforms in the Victorian public sector budgeting and resources management processes and related corporate planning activities have been implemented during the 1980s, including:

- program budgeting (in 1983); (Budget Development Division, Department of Management and Budget, 1982);
- portfolio strategy plans to highlight key policy priorities for Cabinet consideration (in 1985);
- departmental Management Improvement Plans and associated Senior Executive Service Performance Improvement Plans (progressively from 1983) to focus

service delivery and management action on the key strategic priorities for the particular annual planning cycle; (Public Service Board of Victoria, 1986);

- enhanced overall corporate planning, integrated with budget planning processes (progressively since the 1970s, but with heightened emphasis and activity in conjunction with other recent reforms). (Programme Development and Review Division, Department of Management and Budget, 1987).

However, as expressed recently by the Premier when introducing the Social Justice Strategy:

Governments today operate in a climate in which more and more is expected of them. The dilemma we face stems from competing community demands for less taxation and more and better services (Cain, 1986).

In summary, of course there are financial constraints - no manager, in either the public or private sector, can expect to get all the resources she or he would wish. However all managers, public or private, can expect to be held more accountable for their performance and the outputs they achieve with the available resources.

#### Police Resources in Context

##### **Growth in Police Resources: 1911 to date**

**Police Strengths** Table 1 shows that Australian population totals and density have progressively and significantly increased since 1911. Population per square mile in 1911 was 1.50; in 1987 it had increased to 5.38 (excluding the ACT). Likewise, the strength of state police forces has grown steadily throughout the 1900s from a total of 6375 in 1911 to 33,969 in 1986-87. In the early years the population to police ratio was consistently between 700 and 800 to 1. Since the 1960s, however, police strengths have significantly increased ahead of population growth, to the point where by June 1987 there was a state police officer for every 466 Australians.

**Funding.** In 1911 the combined expenditure of all state police forces was 1.33 million pounds, or 3.26 per cent of overall State expenditure. The cost of state policing activities in 1986-87 was \$1.65 billion, 4.33 per cent of the State's budgets or about \$100 per person each year - Table 2.

TABLE 1

## AUSTRALIAN POLICE STRENGTHS AND POPULATION RATIOS

1911-87

Year	NSW	VIC	QLD	SA	WA	TAS	NT	ACT	TOTAL**
<u>1911</u>									
Population/sq.mile	5.31	14.97	0.90	0.46	0.29	7.29	-	-	1.50
Police Strength	2487	1640	1011	502	481	232	22	-	6375
Population/police	664	810	608	891	596	820	151	-	704
<u>1921</u>									
Population/sq.mile	6.80	17.42	1.13	1.30	0.34	8.15	-	-	1.83
Police Strength	2738	1736	1105	593	493	240	30	-	6935
Population/police	770	885	690	839	677	889	130	-	787
<u>1939</u>									
Population/sq.mile	8.41	20.71	1.41	1.53	0.45	8.68	0.01	9.52	2.23
Police Strength***	3907	2333	1460	905	600	296	48	17	9566
Population/police	708	807	704	662	789	812	167	767	733
<u>1949</u>									
Population/sq.mile	9.65	23.38	1.65	1.70	0.51	9.81	0.02	18.00	2.55
Police Strength	4382	2697	2040	996	759	363	58	43	11238
Population/police	725	833	581	703	735	770	264	514	720
<u>1961</u>									
Population/sq.mile	13.44	35.0	2.40	2.80	0.82	14.22	0.06	90.19	3.79
Police Strength	5378	3867	2647	1498	1142	550	103	79	15164
Population/police	703	739	565	631	632	625	248	680	673
<u>1986-87*</u>									
Population/sq.mile	17.86	47.39	3.89	3.61	1.48	16.94	0.28	282.48	5.38
Police Strength	11608	8980	5072	3661	3287	1038	675	-	34321
Population/police	483	469	527	381	455	433	234	-	466

\*Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics and Police Annual Reports.

\*\*Totals exclude ACT.

\*\*\*Police Strength 1933.

TABLE 2  
STATE EXPENDITURE

YEAR	STATES							TOTAL
	NSW	VIC	QLD	SA	WA	TAS	NT	
<u>1911</u>								
Police	.493	.329	.235	.107	.125	.041	*	1.331■
Totals	15.277	9.999	5.966	4.451	4.101	1.065	*	40.859■
Pol. %	3.23	3.29	3.94	2.40	3.05	3.89	*	3.26%
<u>1921</u>								
Police	1.030	.585	.476	.195	.175	.079	*	2.541■
Totals	34.477	18.942	12.591	7.544	7.476	2.189	*	83.219■
Pol. %	2.99	3.09	3.78	2.59	2.34	3.63	*	3.05%
<u>1939</u>								
Police	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	3.733■
Totals	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	128.159■
Pol. %	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	2.91%
<u>1949</u>								
Police	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	6.906■
Total	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	226.425■
Pol. %	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	3.05%
<u>1955</u>								
Police	6.199	4.464	2.826	1.203	1.316	.635	*	16.697■
Total	195.187	115.453	73.602	50.918	46.554	14.707	*	496.421■
Pol. %	3.17	3.87	3.84	2.36	2.83	4.32	*	3.36%
<u>1964</u>								
Police	12.602	9.523	5.299	2.934	2.382	1.263	*	34.006■
Total	341.996	222.437	130.227	99.878	85.341	34.788	*	914.667■
Pol. %	3.68	4.28	4.07	2.94	2.79	3.63	*	3.72%
<u>1986/87*</u>								
Police	516.121	439.958	262.145	184.399	169.665	51.975	40.031	1664.292■
Total	11639.453	10476.467	5648.701	4592.662	3277.562	1278.019	1246.914	36912.829
Pol. %	4.43	4.2	4.64	4.02	5.18	4.07	3.21	4.36

Sources:

1986/87 State budget papers/Police Annual Reports.

Other Years: Australian Year Books

\* no data available

As a percentage of total state budgets, police expenditure has moved more than a full percentage point during the 1900s - at a time when state budgets have been expanding in real terms. The rate of growth of police budgets has been much greater than the growth of state budgets, although in recent years (83/84 & 84/85) this not been the case. According to John Hudzik (1988), the reduced rate of growth from 1981 to 1987 (20 per cent in real terms compared with 51 per cent real growth in police budgets between 1974 and 1980 suggests that the American experience of a long period of growth followed by a period of little growth might be repeated in Australia. Hudzik also reports that:

The police share of total state and local government direct expenditures in the United States has remained fairly stable at about 4 per cent since 1950 (Hudzik, 1988, p. 20).

This level is comparable to the proportion in Australia, although there are structural differences between policing in Australia and the USA. There are more than 17,500 police forces in the USA, each serving on average 1400 people. 'Tasmania ... with about 1000 sworn officers is larger than all but about 30 of the largest American Forces.' (Hudzik, 1988, p. 11).

#### Police Resources 1986/87.

Table 2 shows the actual expenditure and related police/population and resources data for the state and Northern Territory police forces for 1986/87.

From a traditional line item budgeting perspective, police resource inputs are divided into three categories: salaries and related expenses; operating expenses; and capital works and services shown in Table 2.

With 70-80 per cent of the budget taken up by salary related costs, the management of budget reductions is a difficult task without staff number adjustments. The corollary is that with so much of the resource inputs tied up in salaries (a particular feature of human service delivery areas) increased importance has to be placed on the effective management of staff time. For policing, this simply means managing the time of 'operational police on the beat' and getting the maximum proportion of available staff time devoted to operational tasks.

Managers have claimed for some time that the annual budget cycle does not provide flexibility for long term planning. In fact, for most organisations, more than 80 per cent of the budget rolls forward from year to year and can be projected over a two to five year time frame without too great a difficulty. In that context triennial budgets can be developed, as they have been in Victoria, and applied by program managers to enable long term plans to be brought to fruition progressively in accordance with program objectives.

This overview of police resources does not include the costs of Territory and Federal Government enforcement and public security agencies. With those, the costs of policing services in Australia would already be around \$2 billion p.a. It is not necessary to wait until 1990 for that level of resource input as suggested by Grabosky (1988, p. 1).

## **Private Security Industry**

The resources applied by private sector security services have not been included in the above analysis. The same market forces of supply and demand which allocate economic resources between and within other industries are also at play in respect of personal and property safety and security.

A 1970 USA study found some 300,000 people employed in private policing activities - about half the prevailing level of police employment. Subsequent studies suggest continuing growth in the private security industry to the point where public and private employment would be comparable (Skoler, 1980, p. 121).

It is essential to consider, at a policy level, the role and operations of the private sector and its interaction with public policing. The effects of public policy resource allocation decisions (both in the aggregate and between competing internal police priorities) on the level and nature of private sector operations can be weighed and appropriate policy responses implemented.

To summarise this section pressures on state budgets indicate that despite significant real increases in police resources in recent years, this pattern may not continue. Police managers at all levels are therefore becoming increasingly aware of the need to limit costs whilst improving services, and to apply modern management techniques to achieve this goal.

## Organisational Responses

Any organisation facing budget constraints will first seek to expand revenue before taking the harder and more painful decisions to cut costs. This is particularly the case where cost reduction is seen to be possible only by reducing the range or quantity of services provided.

This raises the two areas of fee for service/user pays; and revenue retention.

## **'Fee for Service' - 'User Pays' Principles**

*Legislative framework* Most governments have undertaken extensive reviews of services and service recipient profiles to extend where appropriate 'fee for service' arrangements. User groups are directly meeting some or all of the program costs, rather than the costs being borne indirectly by the public through general taxes and charges.

The application of appropriate fees and charges for 'public goods and services' enables public sector agencies to better manage the true demand for particular services. If no fee is charged, significant over demand situations may develop. For some time the Victorian Government policy has been to adjust existing fees and charges annually in line with consumer price index forecasts and, where appropriate, to set new fees and charges at a level which recoups the costs of the relevant services. Various charges for police services have been in place in

Victoria for more than ten years - for details of charges refer to the Police (Charges, Expenses and Allowances) Regulations 1977.

*Revenue Gained* Victoria Police fees, charges and other revenue for 1986-87 were \$28,175,368. Whilst substantial in itself, the revenue generated meets less than 6 per cent of the cost of the Victoria Police Force.

*Sporting and Entertainment Events* Victoria and Queensland charge for police services at sport and other entertainment or special events. Other states are understood to be examining this option. The Queensland arrangements are significantly different to Victoria's in that individual officers are engaged and paid directly by the organisers. In Victoria, members are rostered for ordinary duty and the organisers pay the police force.

It is readily apparent that where public police resources come 'with a price attached' the potential users of police services re-examine their requirements accordingly. A charge would not be levied for police attendance at sporting or other entertainment events where the organisers do not charge a fee and are operating as a community organisation on a non-profit basis. An assessment of police resource levels is still required to ensure that the appropriate number and type of police attend according to real policing needs.

*Proceeds of Crime* The sequestration of the proceeds of major crimes, particularly drug offences, could be viewed as another application of the 'user pays' philosophy.

The Victorian Drug Rehabilitation and Research Fund (The 'Costigan' Fund) was established in 1982 to receive money confiscated by the courts for certain offences. Further Commonwealth and state 'proceeds of crime confiscation' legislation enacted in 1986 and 1987 has expanded the scope to freeze and dispose of assets deemed to be profits of criminal activity.

With significant increases in the central and local police drug investigation capacity over recent years (increases for the Drug Squad and the establishment of District Support Groups) the fund has grown considerably since 1986.

The confiscated moneys are now made available to support drug rehabilitation, education and law enforcement programs which would have otherwise been competing for scarce Consolidated Fund resources.

*Warrants* Another area where a fee has recently been introduced is for the service of warrants for recovery of traffic fines. With the introduction in 1986 of the Penalty Enforcement by Registration of Infringement Notice (PERIN) Court, a fee (now \$11.60 per warrant) is added to the face value of the warrant to cover some of the costs of having to proceed which would not have been incurred by government (courts and police) if the offender had paid the fine earlier. Some other states are examining the operations of the PERIN Court with a view to introducing similar arrangements.

*Volunteer Inputs* It is appropriate to include community volunteer involvement in this general category of user inputs. Significant resources are being made available under Neighbourhood Watch, Safety House and



similar schemes, utilising some government funding in association with community input and a measure of 'sponsorship' by interested private sector groups, e.g. insurers.

### **Revenue Retention**

For managers to watch the revenue being collected and not ask 'How much can be redirected back to my program resources?' would be strange indeed. The practice in Victoria has been to direct all revenue to the Consolidated Fund (but for a small number of remaining Trust Funds) from which Government allocates funds to meet agreed program targets.

Program managers are therefore able to implement plans which could include increased expenditure for new or expanded services to be offset by reduced expenditure in other areas, or include a projected revenue stream which would cover costs. If the revenue proposal is endorsed and the initiative proceeds, revenue would still flow to the Consolidated Fund to enable tight funds management and ensure that maximum interest is earned. The program appropriations are then increased to reflect the new initiative costs.

### **Cost Saving Measures**

Having pushed the boundaries of earning capacity, an organisation's balance sheet may still need some further treatment. The next area for study then becomes cost containment and internal efficiency improvement.

*Recent Productivity Improvement Measures* The Victorian experience in this area has been substantial in recent years. A number of management initiated improvements have yielded significant gains. Some examples are listed below:

- uniform issue system on a 'needs' basis to replace an allowance;
- residence design changes;
- shop stealing warning program - police time reduced from 2.75 hours to 0.5 hours for each offender;
- civilianisation - reduced salary costs in administrative and technical support areas;
- fingerprint computers - reducing search times from days or weeks to minutes.

Major impacts are expected to flow from the following initiatives which are currently being implemented:

- the absorption of Victoria State Emergency Service administrative services; and
- information technology improvements at local and central levels.

Continual internal overhead value analysis is crucial for good budget management. The relatively simple action of delegating local matters like some purchasing and minor works arrangements to each cost centre can reap massive effectiveness benefits and reduce overheads substantially - provided the accounting system can cope with such a cultural shift. Minor delegations can also foster very real budget consciousness at a local level which is not present when administrative systems are seen by all to be wasteful. The unit cost of items can be reduced by:

- delegation of minor purchasing matters to each cost centre thereby reducing expensive internal overheads arising from a centralised system;
- competitive tendering and negotiations for bulk purchases;
- automation of procedures where possible, for example, the introduction of automatic petrol bowsers to replace outdated manual delivery and recording systems.

### **Savings Retention**

What happens to all these 'savings' now being generated? Under program budgeting as presently applied in Victoria, agencies receive appropriations for each program in four 'blocks':

- salary and related expenses;
- operating expenses;
- specified operating costs;
- works and services.

Whilst resources may be transferred between 'blocks' and between programs, this requires the Treasurer's approval. However, if savings are made in a particular element or cost centre within one 'block', e.g. reduced salaries in one unit, the agency is able to redeploy the 'savings' within that 'block' for the same program.

As each of the four Victoria Police programs has the four interdependent 'blocks', the Victoria Police has sixteen 'resource pools' within which resources can be reallocated by police managers to meet new and emerging needs. Across these sixteen resource pools there are more than 100 cost centres.


This has provided an incentive for managers to pursue cost savings. The central finance agency is monitoring expenditures at a global level across programs, providing managers with the flexibility to redeploy savings to other priority activities consistent with agreed overall objectives.

### Strategies for Improvement

#### **Performance Management**

There is now in place in Victoria a 'Performance Management Improvement System' which integrates budget planning with corporate and strategic planning, with ministerial priorities and strategies and, importantly, with individual senior executive management performance - Figure 1.

FIGURE 1 CORPORATE PLANNING: AN INTEGRATING MECHANISM



Agencies are being asked to develop a management improvement plan which incorporates individual senior executive performance improvement plans and is linked to government policies and priorities through the budget process. Senior executives are thereby made responsible for the delivery of the actions which will result in the attainment of the agency's management improvement plan.

The benefits of the performance management approach are:

- a clear link between and closer integration of government, agency and senior management priorities;
- a strategic focus on key priorities;
- clear and objective evaluation of performance against an agreed plan;
- a clearer accountability mechanism for government agencies and managers.

The system ensures that government's expectations are clarified with emphasis on high priority programs. This enables chief administrators and senior executives to properly integrate government and agency objectives, priorities and policies. The recognition of strong performance and the implementation of development plans where performance needs to improve, ensures regular and comprehensive performance feedback to senior executives.

In Victoria, the individual performance improvement plans are linked to remuneration through performance assessment against the plans and the SES performance pay system.

### **Program Budgeting**

Essentially, program budgeting has two key features:

- (i) it focuses resource management decision making on the outputs (goods and services) produced rather than continuing the incremental adjustment of inputs; and
- (ii) through the various program evaluation and performance measurement techniques it seeks to ensure that all program components are periodically 'brought under the microscope' and resource requirements are tested against present day approved objectives.

Although it is usual for new initiatives to be fairly rigorously tested, ongoing and more established activities are often not re-evaluated to ensure the objectives and client bases remain relevant and the level of resources applied is still appropriate.

In summary, the program manager's focus has shifted more toward the external measures of effectiveness and equity whilst retaining a concern for the inwardly relevant measures of economy and efficiency.

## The '4 Es'

The public sector operating system can be characterised in the tradition of systems theory: inputs being converted to outputs which in their aggregate have an impact on society and individuals. It is useful to define the four 'Es' - economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity in these terms.

Economy focuses on acquiring and using appropriate inputs, and could be defined as 'the acquisition of resources of adequate quality at minimum cost', that is, obtaining the cheapest inputs consistent with minimum standards. At its most basic the question is: Are we incurring the least cost for this activity?

Effectiveness focuses on providing the most appropriate output which optimally assists the attainment of agreed objectives and ensures that outputs are not produced where there is no demonstrable need. Basically, are we doing the right thing?

Efficiency is determined by how well the transformation of inputs to outputs is achieved. Efficiency is concerned with the most streamlined utilisation of resources to get the most output for given inputs or to use the least inputs for a standard output. Basically, are we doing the thing the right way?

Equity involves ensuring that outputs are consistent with community standards and social objectives. Basically, are we being fair to all concerned?

## Program Performance Measures (PPM's)

To manage this resource to outputs conversion process, managers require 'feedback' on the performance at various points in the system. This is provided by monitoring key program performance measures.

The seven basic kinds of PPM's are:

- (i) Work load measures: an indicator of work effort required to carry out a program (or component or activity);
- (ii) Staffing Ratios: staff time required to accomplish specified workloads;
- (iii) Output Measures: the quantity and quality of final products (goods and/or services);
- (iv) Economy Measures: cost savings, cost accounting, cost comparisons;
- (v) Efficiency Measures: unit costs, input/output ratios;
- (vi) Effectiveness Measures: the extent to which a program reaches its objectives and satisfies real needs of client groups;

- (vii) Cost Effectiveness Measures: resource expenditure compared with program impact - the cost to move the effectiveness measure one percentage point.

### **Information Management**

One critical factor for performance management and improvement is information - real data for sound decision-making. However, one should recall Mark Twain's comment that collecting data is similar to collecting garbage - it is essential to know what you are going to do with it before you start.

The corporate resource management information systems need to be developed to support this approach - not to capture anything and everything but to have readily available to managers the key data needed for the management improvement plan to succeed. The new Victoria Police Information Technology Modernisation Plan is directed at just this end.

### **Decentralisation of Decision Authority**

As mentioned earlier, unit cost savings achieved by delegation of minor purchases to local cost centres is one demonstration of the relevance of resource management delegations in facilitating more relevant, timely and cost-effective decision making. In Victoria, three key aspects of resource management delegations are being reviewed. These are the need to:

- (i) closely link significant personnel delegations (staff employment and classifications) with financial commitment delegations;
- (ii) extend delegations from central agencies (Public Service Board, Department of Management and Budget, and the Minister) beyond the police force headquarters to regional and functional managers - to avoid simply replacing one bureaucracy with another;
- (iii) integrate police sworn and unsworn personnel management arrangements to ensure that unit managers responsible for a mix of staff have the appropriate management authorities to fully integrate work routines and exercise proper management for all staff in their area of responsibility.

Various pilot delegation projects are presently underway to address each of these three factors and test these arrangements for three to six months before more widespread delegations are introduced. However, the extension of delegations without adequate management accountability, may lead to 'unfettered enterprise' i.e. high levels of activity to implement local management initiatives rather than agreed programs (Cullen, 1985).

The preferred option, which is being pursued in Victoria, is where increasing program (operational) and resource management delegations are being matched with significant steps toward increased management accountability for program performance. Detailed controls are removed to enable managers to get on with implementing agreed projects and

programs in pursuit of predetermined and agreed objectives - that is, the achievement of negotiated results. In summary, to delegate in an environment of enhanced accountability.

### **Regionalisation/Integration**

Extensive change processes are underway in the New South Wales Police Force with the implementation of community-based policing under a revised regional structure. The Victoria Police presently has underway two pilot regionalisation projects to test revised management arrangements which fully integrate all uniform, crime, traffic and unsworn personnel and related resources in regions (districts). In association with these pilot projects new local information management systems and revised administrative procedures are also being developed. Each of these regions is also a pilot site for the first phase of enhanced resource management delegations, which, in association with stronger operational responsibility and accountability, have developed a higher degree of management autonomy at the local/regional level.

### **Extraneous Duties**

The civilianisation program is aimed at releasing fit, trained police for operational duty - more than 500 positions have been converted since 1982. Similarly, the ongoing review of police work has highlighted a number of functions presently performed by police which could well be undertaken by other agencies. The transfer of these responsibilities would release further police time for reallocation to priority areas. Two examples of 'extraneous duties' presently being assessed are:

- serving non-apprehension warrants, and
- conducting wide load traffic escorts.

### **Resource Management in Victoria - A Strategic Approach**

In an environment of significant demand growth, the principal objectives for police service delivery are to:

- (i) extend patrol activities to enhance the community feeling of safety and security;
- (ii) minimise response times for urgent calls;
- (iii) maximise crime prevention effectiveness;
- (iv) minimise the number and severity of traffic accidents.

Patrol activities can be measured by the percentage of all shifts devoted to operational policing and the percentage of operational shifts devoted to preventive foot, mounted or mobile patrols. If all or most of the available operational time is presently deployed on response to calls, attempts to increase proactive patrols could affect reactive response times. Both areas are affected by the level and quality of operations support services in two ways:

- (a) increased support service efficiency would enable better support services at lower cost thus returning resources for operational tasks; and
- (b) better support services will directly impact the level and quality of operational services. Faster and more precise communications and information should enhance response times.

The Victorian approach of combining action plans relating to each of the areas discussed above will produce improved levels of operational police output from a restructured resource mix. The result will be to:

- reduce lost shifts;
- see more shifts applied to operational tasks;
- ensure adequate administrative, clerical and technical support services;
- streamline administrative practices;
- modernise information technology and EDP systems at central, regional and local levels; and
- free police from non-operational tasks.

### The Real Picture

It is possible to analyse the corporate strategic and budget planning interfaces between governments and their police forces from the theoretical and academic perspectives, but there are a number of very important practical factors:

- police are a central element of the government of a democracy and in respect of operational matters, stand apart from government;
- police resource requirements are in part 'demand led' which can constrain usual management decision priorities;
- police are the central public sector agency in the supply of human services public 'goods'. This entails operating 24 hours of every day with an implicit if not explicit role of providing assistance virtually to all those who seek help, and therefore the consumption pattern may not lend itself to normal 'price/demand' management;
- it may also be necessary to weigh the cost of a service against whether it is to be delivered at all. In this environment the 'cost' to the consumer is measured by response time which can be one overall measure of the effectiveness of police service delivery.

There is a risk in emphasising one measure like response time in the absence of other suitable measures. Resource allocation decisions may be unduly skewed if one indicator or measure is overemphasised.



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
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## CHANGING POLICE ACTIVITIES

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Australian Federal Police  
Canberra

In addressing the subject of changing police activities I intend to traverse a range of police administrative and operational functions as well as examine some of the ways in which government and the bureaucracy may be able to assist the Australian Federal Police in giving the taxpayers better value for their dollar.

Initially I will discuss the innovations that have been introduced into federal law enforcement on the initiative of the AFP. I will also detail other innovative pro-active methods introduced into criminal investigations.

There are resource-intensive functions for which the AFP are responsible that are non-productive in terms of the achievement of our objectives and priorities and which may, with some administrative thought and legislative fine tuning, be eliminated from the AFP's work responsibilities.

First of all, I wish to discuss the administrative innovations in federal policing that have been introduced on our initiative over the last twelve or so years. The first and most important was the recommendation to government that a single criminal law enforcement authority be established at Commonwealth level by merging the Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory police forces. This recommendation followed a government decision in 1977/78 to provide the Commonwealth with a more effective law enforcement arm by upgrading the then-Commonwealth Police. The argument that the police put forward when advising on this issue was that the Commonwealth would achieve better and more cost-effective results by dissolving the major existing law enforcement agencies and forming one new organisation from those resources - the Australian Federal Police.

Other innovative action that has flowed from this fundamental decision of government includes the development of common police services, on the recommendations of the police attached to the Task Force on the creation of the AFP; the extension of the Overseas Liaison Officers program, initially introduced by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics; the transfer of the Protective Services component to a new organisation and, in more recent times, the career structure review initiative which will result in the reduction of police work levels from eleven down to five.

The career structure review and the initiatives flowing from it are perhaps the most innovative and far reaching administrative actions taken by police for many years. A leading United States researcher in the area of police management once said that:

'changing police rank structures in the United States can be likened to bending granite' (Guyot, 1979).

The AFP is achieving its objective with much more success and staff acceptance than has been experienced in other countries and

jurisdictions. The career structure review is also recommending changes in police training and promotion procedures which will result in a more efficient and effective police organisation.

I would now like to move to innovation in police operations. The AFP since its inception in 1979 has introduced into Australian policing some innovative techniques not previously used to any great extent in this country. The telephone interception powers which came to the AFP with the merging of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics have been used to their fullest extent. When linked to other technical listening devices available to the AFP under judicial warrant and other surveillance techniques, the result has been some outstanding successes in combating organised crime.

The remaining topics which I would like to cover are those relating to duties that have been traditionally matters for the police but which should now be discarded.

My first submission is that it is time for committal proceedings in indictable cases to be dispensed with. The time and resources applied to committal hearings in Courts of Petty Sessions/Magistrates Courts around Australia by the AFP is reaching extraordinary levels. The AFP is involved in several hundred committal proceedings each year, some requiring up to eighteen months of court time to complete. The courts, which are already overloaded with criminal prosecutions, are finding that where pleas of not guilty are entered for summary offences they have to remand cases in committal proceedings for hearing, sometimes for periods of twelve to eighteen months. The expenditure of legal aid resources must also be significant. This problem in the criminal justice system could be alleviated if administrative hearings such as committals were dispensed with. Committal hearings in the days before the appointment of a Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) were, in my view, relevant and necessary but since the development of highly professional and independent DPP Offices throughout Australia, they have become an unnecessary and time consuming irrelevancy. I envisage a procedure that could be adopted whereby briefs of evidence would be provided to the DPP by the police and depending on the case and the law relating to its prosecution, the DPP would initiate prosecution proceedings in a Magistrates Court or in a court providing prosecution before judge and jury. It would perhaps be necessary in these cases for the police brief to be provided to the defence well before any decision by the DPP to allow for representations by counsel for the defendant. At any rate, it would not seem to be beyond the wit of man to develop some reasonable and just procedures for this purpose.

There are other time consuming and manpower intensive duties for which the AFP is responsible that could also be dispensed with, allowing for the total commitment of the organisation to the pursuit of crime and criminals without adversely affecting the criminal justice system.

One area in need of reform is the process by which police are used as debt collectors for the courts where fines (mainly traffic) are not paid on time. This process involves the issue of commitment warrants or, in intense cases, warrants of apprehension that have to be executed by the police in order to recover debts owing to governments. This process is far from being cost-effective. It would seem to be that the use of credit cards at the time of conviction or the use of some other more modern commercial type of debt collection process would be much more efficient

than the use of warrants. In the Australian Capital Territory, the AFP has warrants in its possession awaiting execution with a face value of more than \$1 million - not good business. It would also result in significant manpower resources being diverted from our primary law and order and crime prevention and detection responsibilities.

The service of other court-related process (summons and subpoenas) is another time consuming resource intensive operation and a waste of scarce and expensive police resources. Imagine a constable at our Sydney office being told to go out to Palm Beach to serve a summons or subpoena, only to find on reaching the address there was no-one home. The costs to the AFP and the Australian taxpayer of allowing this process to continue is enormous. The AFP serves thousands of summonses each year. Why can't the issuing court serve summonses and subpoenas of this nature by certified mail?

Sir Robert Mark at paragraph 21 in his 'Report to the Minister of Administrative Services on the Organisation of Police Resources in the Commonwealth Area and Other Related Matters', when referring to airport policing said:

The concept that federal property, both ground and buildings, including airports, outside the ACT, should necessarily be policed by a federal force may be justifiable administratively but operationally is disadvantageous. It is a token gesture in disregard of the realities of policing which call for clarity and unity of the command role in an emergency and for the immediate availability of extensive police resources at short notice when necessary. Indeed, the creation of a second or duplicate body for what are, after all, conventional police purposes is likely to detract from, rather than enhance, the effectiveness of police arrangements.

Sir Robert's sentiments still apply. I have nothing further to add.

The AFP performs a range of bailiff duties for the Family Court. These duties are also time consuming, expensive and not related directly to the enforcement of the criminal law. There have been cases of AFP officers being required to arrest and escort interstate Family Court litigants at AFP expense with the resultant diversion of resources away from our objectives and priorities. Even the proper functioning of program budgeting would suggest that the process is inappropriate. I suggest that the AFP be relieved of these responsibilities and the duties be transferred to bailiffs employed by the court.

There is no doubt that as the resources provided by government to the criminal justice system diminish, we will need to look even more critically at our methods of running the system. If my suggestions regarding Family Court bailiff duties, airport policing and the service and execution of process are not acceptable then it may be necessary for the police to apply the user pays principle to the departments responsible for the administration of those systems and agencies.

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## RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

Lloyd Taylor  
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While I do not necessarily disagree with some of the statements that have been made, I hope to convince you that there is another side to policing, a side that is often neglected. There has been a lot of talk so far about the problems of governments, administrators and the community; but little has been said about police officers' problems.

Policing is not like other occupations. It is not unique, but it is different. It is different because of police responsibilities, their legal and political accountability and because it is a total occupation with its own sub-culture based on a role of making life-and-death decisions on the street. The police need to be concerned with how well they control their own work and this is where police associations and police unions play their part.

### Unions and Change

Police unions play an important role in achieving improvements in productivity. They are also aware of their responsibility to assist in implementing change. The challenge to police associations is to ensure fairness to their members. At times they are accused of resisting change because they question the reason and motivation behind change. They do this because the industrial side of policing is very important.

In addition to being President of the Police Federation, for a number of years I have been President of the Police Association of New South Wales. With 12,000 members, New South Wales has one of the largest police forces in the western world. As a representative of those workers, one would expect that the Police Association would be consulted on important changes but often it is not. One situation where the union was not consulted properly was where the New South Wales Police Force, under the name of regionalisation, was totally restructured. In hindsight, this may have been a good idea. But the attempt to do so was originally made without any real consultation with the New South Wales Police Association. The Association had to seek urgent meetings with the Commissioner and the government so it could find out something definite about regionalisation.

The doubt and concern at the time about members' career prospects left a lot of unanswered questions. The prospect of four regions created the fear that there would be four police forces, with each member of the department perpetually locked into one force. With proper consultation those fears and concerns could have been avoided.

Unfortunately things have not changed significantly. Recently, the Association received a document outlining plans for the devolution of headquarters and the removal of some people working there. There was no disagreement with that idea. But the Association received a lengthy

document on this subject on May 10 and was given only nine days to comment on something that could have serious implications for its members. We had to ask the Minister to put a halt on this because the procedure was incorrect and there was no consultation. One does not just tell people what is happening, they have to be consulted. These moves will affect 12,000 people out in the field, not just the people in headquarters who formulate these schemes.

The New South Wales Police Force certainly may have needed restructuring and to the Commissioner's credit much work has been done on that. These criticisms are only to suggest that perhaps the restructuring could have been done in a better way.

The two examples cited highlight a problem caused by police administration and government. Of course police unions will resist change when there is uncertainty about what is to occur.

Several years ago the then Government decided that more police should be relieved of certain jobs, e.g. desk jobs. The then Police Minister said he wanted to 'get police bums off seats'. The Association thought that was a good idea, but believed it should be involved in deciding which jobs could be properly civilianised without risk to its members or loss of efficiency. A committee was set up involving the police union, the police administration and the Public Service Board (who are the employers under the Police Regulation and Industrial Arbitration Acts). This co-operative approach resulted in the police union conceding over 700 former police positions to civilians, thus freeing up operational police. That was a good move.

There was an example of a union being prepared to accept change while at the same time improving productivity and efficiency in policing. I do not know of any other union in New South Wales that has been prepared to concede jobs. The Association did that subject to some criticism from its own members, but it showed that it is certainly prepared to be involved in change.

### Productivity

Modern management practice dictates that every effort should be made to measure and improve productivity. But what does productivity mean in policing? Does it mean the same thing in all areas of the service? What is to be measured and what do those measurements mean? It is one of the ironies of industrial relations life that as the qualifications, pay and work environment of the police improve, increased effort is made to reclassify police work as civilian work. This means that the greater a success the Police Association has, the greater the pressure to reduce the number of jobs that are held in the service. Someone mentioned earlier that the police have sold themselves cheaply. They probably did with respect to tertiary qualifications, but what is of concern are which functions the police force are going to concede next. Is it perhaps rescue, white-collar crime or patrol of Commonwealth-funded highways? There are many people out there who want to take over the traditional role of policing and that is of concern.

### Communication and Participation

For innovations to work properly there is a need to involve the people who will be most affected by any changes. This is said in both government



and administration management manuals but regretfully is not always practised.

Obviously, police unions have an important role in change. Without union support the job of implementing change will be more difficult and sometimes impossible. Management has a responsibility to ensure that there are clear lines of communication to the troops. It may be that in some police forces there are too many chiefs and not enough Indians. Operational police often feel that ideas that are thought up and then quickly transcribed into orders lack practical understanding. The traditional role of labour and management is seen as adversarial. The unions - are the good guys, - the management - are the bad ones, and never 'the twain shall meet', except perhaps over the collective bargaining table or the Arbitration Court's bench. The challenge facing the Association now is to demand participation in developing what would otherwise be an impersonal strategy and to participate in police management manpower planning without becoming subservient to management.

Back in 1979, the then Government (perhaps under pressure from some minority groups) abolished the Summary Offences Act in New South Wales. There was no consultation with the union that represented the operational police. The union said it would cause problems and resisted the change. It resisted it strongly and publicly through the media, but people dismissed the resistance quite lightly. This continued for five years with some discussion with Attorneys General and others about the problems. After five years it was accepted that the union was right and the legislation was amended. Unfortunately, it was too late. The damage had been done. About seven or eight thousand police have been recruited in New South Wales in that time. They are a new breed of police officers who probably do not even know what the Summary Offences Act means. The old Summary Offences Act had problems and needed amending, but abolishing it went too far and police officers' morale, in relation to policing the streets was destroyed.

The State Government in New South Wales is now introducing new Summary legislation. Legislation is written on paper but the 'blood and guts' of the law is the police officer. Police officers are the ones who have to implement the law. Regardless of the laws passed and what is said, ultimately there must be a policeman to enforce the law. If the union and similar people had been consulted, and note taken of their concerns, many of today's problems would not exist. It is not good enough for associations and unions to find out through the back door what is happening as that creates uncertainty and rumour.

Police are expected to accept change whenever somebody has a good idea. In New South Wales in about 1980, the 'big buzz' was that the police had to centralise. A great 'Taj Mahal' known as the Sydney Police Centre was built and all police were put in the one place. This was somebody's great scheme, which has now been discovered not to be a good idea at all. It cost eighty million dollars, which while that money was being spent, prevented other police stations getting improvements. There were some building union problems but the cost rose from thirty-three million to eighty million dollars. Now it is a white elephant, and the police are starting to decentralise. Who is being held responsible for what happened? The politicians? The police administration? Nobody! People retire or get kicked out of office, we are left with the Taj Mahal and the great planner of that period has disappeared!

Currently, there is a new plan of community-based policing before us. The concept is terrific and has considerable merit. Anyone who says it should not be trialled is wrong. It is about getting to know the people. However the police officers must be convinced. Two-thirds of New South Wales police are young officers who need direction and certainly better direction than they had in the past. But the main responsibility of a police association is to defend its members and protect them from unfair and unsafe practices. It is not necessary to protect them from innovation and progress. But where innovation is introduced which places police officers at greater risk or at a disadvantage regarding work conditions, then the association is obliged to act to protect its members.

Management has obligations to act to protect its' members, to run the police force efficiently and effectively. When, through inadequate planning, insufficient consultation or unforeseen circumstances, the management plan is opposed by the union, such opposition should be seen as an attempt to rectify the perceived problem before such plans produce undesirable results. Negotiations require a full flow of relevant information and acceptance from both sides. Where a management plan and Police Officer Working Standards are in conflict, the Association plays a management role by highlighting such conflict and by instigating a process that will ideally correct the imbalance. This leads to greater co-operation and an efficient police operation. Without such union representation, management would - perhaps unknowingly - introduce many new programs that would prove unsuccessful due to officer frustration. With no representation, resistance due to perceived safety risks through a lowering of conditions would become entrenched.

One problem, of this type, is single-unit patrols. They have been around for many years and many police in New South Wales do work single-unit patrols. But traditionally, there have been two-unit patrols in most places in the metropolitan area. At the present time the union is prepared to negotiate about this although we are strongly opposed to the idea, but apparently it is part of the total community policing plan. This is exactly the type of issue the union wants to sit down and talk about.

Lack of communication is the Association's criticism of the administration, and all the Association asks is that people communicate with it. In New South Wales the Association has been very fortunate in recent years. The Commissioner has an open door policy whereby he listens to the Association all the time, though he does not always agree with it and it does not always agree with him.

### Unions as Initiators of Change

In recent years, there are a number of areas in which the police unions themselves initiated change. For example, in New South Wales it was the union that said that drivers licence testing should not be a police function. Now, in most places in New South Wales licence testing is not carried out by police. The union has said that serving summonses should not be a police job. We were involved in a task force which recommended a policy on minor accidents, now police do not waste their time through heavy involvement in minor accident reporting. Court security is another job that the union would be very happy to see disappear. All these changes resulted from Police Association initiatives.

Many years ago one of my predecessors, as President of the Police Association, had the idea that police should be better educated. No one disagreed with that. It resulted in the justice administration course at Mitchell College. The idea did not come from the police administration but from the police union which was heavily committed to getting that course off the ground. The union president believed that this was something the union should be involved in and now hundreds of police have been through that four or five year course, received diplomas in Justice administration and many have gone on to further education. To suggest that the union does not take the initiative is definitely incorrect.

Earlier there was mention of the 'deadwood' in the police force. Supposedly that means people who have not achieved high levels of academic qualification. However, the people out in the street are needed, so one does not have to be an academic genius to be a good cop. Some of the best cops have come from the backwoods and the farms, they know how to talk to people and how to communicate.

There was mention yesterday of increments. The Association believes that with the new promotional scheme there is a real need for increments. An operational senior constable should be able to earn the same money as an inspector as he may be worth the same amount to the organisation. This is something that has been neglected in police forces, especially in New South Wales. It is encouraging that the administration has moved in that direction and hopefully soon there will be something in place. It is worthwhile to pay a good cop a reasonable salary.

### Resistance to Change

The subject of this presentation, 'resistance to change', is an unusual subject for me. It is doubtful that the Association is resistant to change, because with the continuing police force shake-up in New South Wales it has been involved in so much change.

In the regionalisation case there was caution and concern only because of lack of information. The civilianisation move was very successful because the union was supportive and co-operative because it was involved. The New South Wales Police Recruit Education Program which will be one of the best in the world - the union is supportive of, because it has been involved in it and there has been consultation.

Another matter is the condemnation of uniforms, which was mentioned earlier. What a waste. The police used to receive boxes of uniforms every year, at enormous cost to the community. What were needed were quality uniforms e.g. proper jumpers for the ski areas. The Association agreed to the condemnation program and now police are getting better equipment. Uniforms are of better quality and are only dispensed when needed. The Association agreed to that because it was involved.

With regard to the proposals for integration of police and public servants under the same chain of command there needs to be more consultation.

It is important to be budget conscious, but at times it has been to the detriment of policing. There are a lot of police in New South Wales now and the new Government is committed to providing more police, thus continuing the policy of the previous Government. It cost the Association about fifty thousand dollars to make a film that was shown on television, telling people that there were not sufficient police to ensure their safety.

There was considerable coverage and as a result police numbers were increased by a couple of thousand immediately. This pre-empted the next stage where mass meetings had been planned to attract the much-needed support for the police. The credit for getting these extra police should lie fairly and squarely with the Police Association.

### Police Rights and Powers

It has been asked if the members of the community know their rights. What about the police? It was observed earlier that police do not really have any great powers. Does anyone realise the lack of powers of the police? Politicians have let New South Wales police down badly. For example, the union has been trying to establish what powers the police have to fingerprint offenders. I am confident some police take it for granted that they can fingerprint anyone, but that is not so.

As to establishing road-blocks, police have no power to establish a road-block anywhere. In the case of the Milperra Massacre where seven people were gunned down, there were twenty-five suspects and a hundred witnesses. If they had all commenced to walk away the police would have had no power to demand a name and address. Does the public know this? If someone announces that he is leaving, the police grab him - but they are doing it to prop up the system, nobody has given them the power.

Currently there is a writ against a New South Wales police officer regarding detention for questioning. The Williams case, a 1986 High Court decision, can easily be interpreted to read that police have no power to detain people for questioning. Imagine what would have happened at the emotive, highly publicised trial of the Anita Cobby murderers if the defence had raised that High Court decision. Police detained those people and spoke to them at length, surely that is what the community wanted? The other day, police were charged by the Commissioner for misconduct because they detained a prisoner for questioning. Where are we going? An urgent clarification of powers from the Commissioner has been requested. The Minister when asked by the Association replied that he was seeking Crown Advocate advice.

The police are working seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day and are hampered by unclear powers and inordinate delays in receiving replies to their requests for clarification. The basic needs of police are what the union is trying to address. Governments seem to be able to waffle along without answering the basic questions. If the police were a militant union they would be out on strike. But the police have never done that. They expect to be responsible, and they also expect governments to be responsible.

There are police being charged because of faulty laws. The Northern Territory has addressed the problem by having special powers allowing the police - 'acting reasonably' etc. to detain people for questioning. This is what the people want. If the police act unreasonably, let the judges say that they have done wrong. There are other problems areas - fingerprints, road-blocks, and the right to demand names and addresses. The police can demand names and addresses if you drive your car on the footpath, since there is the power under the Motor Traffic Act, but not if you commit a murder. It is quite an unusual situation.

It is ironic that people are worried about police powers when in actuality police have very little power.

Another concern is the erosion of the traditional role of policing. Australia has a tendency to create exotic remedies such as setting up Crime Commissions, National Crime Authorities and similar bodies to deal with difficult problems encountered in law enforcement, rather than strengthening the resources available to police officers to combat the problem. If the criminal justice system is inadequate to deal with organised crime, isn't that a compelling argument to strengthen the powers granted to police? Instead there has been enormous expense and duplication of effort. Police forces are very accountable. They are accountable to the Commissioner, to the Minister, to the Parliament and ultimately to the people. They are the people's police force. Why not give powers to an organisation that is accountable? The ironic part is that the National Crime Authority's best investigators are members of state police forces, so why not put them under a Commissioner of Police? The Director of Public Prosecutions, Ian Temby, was quoted recently, as saying 'The number of bodies involved and the overlap of their responsibilities is conducive to inefficiency'. There are not too many police, but there are certainly too many agencies - everything from fruit-fly inspectors through to the National Crime Authority. Although unachievable, the country would be better off with a single police force.

In New South Wales there is now another agency, the Independent Commission Against Corruption. It is supposed to be the 'cure for all ills'. However it is doubtful whether anything has come out of the last five Royal Commissions in New South Wales that has really benefited anybody. Royal Commissions are extremely expensive and produce nothing! The Commissions' narrow terms suit politicians, because for a time they can claim they are doing something. They will not produce anything because the problems are greater than commissions can deal with. But the attitude still seems to be that if commissions are set up they will solve the problem. Instead of commissions, what is required is greater support for existing police forces.

Police need incentive, motivation, and job satisfaction. If these essential needs are not met, policing will falter and not be as effective as desired.

Commissioner McAulay indicated earlier that police are burned out at thirty to forty years of age. I agree. Policing has become much more difficult and more complex over the years. For a long time there have been problems with superannuation. New South Wales finally has a reasonable superannuation scheme which allows people to retire with some dignity and many people are taking advantage of it. This new scheme was due to hard work, not by the administration, but by the Police Association.

#### Accountability for Resources

Returning now to the topic of accountability in the use of resources, years ago little attention was paid to police spending enormous amounts of time investigating crime. Suddenly, because of union pressure, police were paid for overtime. That made an enormous difference in investigating crime. Now the budget allows for only a fixed amount of overtime, i.e. homicide detectives are only allowed a certain number of hours a fortnight. They are allowed to carry on if there is a serious murder, but the truth is that nowadays detectives work very much to budgets.

In all probability, it is better that police are more financially accountable these days.

### Definition of Police

There has been talk of a need for a new definition of police. I think the old definition of police - 'protectors of life and property' - covers everything and that is what it is all about. I am here today representing the Police Federation of Australia and New Zealand. They have come together as a group, recognising their common interests. Similar problems and similar complaints flow through the police industry. If the community only wanted the police to protect them from crime, then their job would be easier. Most policing does not involve solving crime, rather it is a service to the public which the public expects. In New South Wales, it is uncertain whether the police are a service, a department, or a force. The Commissioner is also unsure. Eventually there will be a decision, but 'Let's get it right this time'.

### Police Concerns

What kinds of things worry police? Suspension, for one. Currently there are more than fifty New South Wales police on suspension without pay - in some cases for up to three years. About 94 per cent of these people will be acquitted at their trials. To get their backpay will be an horrendous ordeal. After fighting the bureaucracy to be cleared of the charges that have been laid, the backpay is taxed as if it were one week's pay. The result is a huge loss in taxation which would not have happened if the pay had been weekly. Although these police have been acquitted they still have to suffer a penalty. The Association accepts that sometimes people do have to be charged, but judges, magistrates and politicians are also charged and they get paid while they are suspended. This is not so for the poor old constable. He must be guilty. After many years of fighting and arguing, the government has just rectified that. Police will now be presumed innocent, like the rest of the community. This resulted not from the administration or the government, but from the union, trying to get fairness for its members.

A criminologist was reported the other day as saying that extra police will not solve the problem of crime. The Association does not disagree with that - to a point - but, it would certainly help. New South Wales needs more police as do most states and I am concerned to hear that South Australia are cutting back their numbers of police. This seems incredible at a time when law and order is a major issue. The Government of New South Wales was elected because the public wants law and order. Without law and order it would be mayhem! In New South Wales that is recognised so police numbers will increase. In the next ten years or so New South Wales will probably have another three thousand police amounting to a police force of fifteen thousand. If these police are used in the correct way, perhaps crime will be able to be contained.

### Conclusion

In closing, policies, priorities, objectives and strategies can all be good things. But they need the support of the working police officer to be successful. This support can be gained by communicating with him through the Police Associations because, love them or hate them, they do have support. No one is compelled to join the union in New South Wales,

but membership is 100 per cent. The Association informs its members what it can do for them in the very areas discussed above - whether it be suspensions; superannuation; extra police or a whole range of things. Not one of the Association's members has ever lost an hour's salary by going on strike and look at what has been achieved in comparison to some of the more militant unions.

I hope I have demonstrated today that unions realise that they have a responsibility toward change, and that they are not against it - but in fact, are very much for it. Unions however, care about fairness. One cannot forget the person who has to carry out the new role and it is the job of the union to make sure that person is not forgotten.





## ALIGNING POLICE PRODUCTIVITY TO ORGANISATIONAL GOALS

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### Background

During the first half of the 1980s, the Research and Development Department of the Victoria Police Force piloted police/community involvement initiatives as a basis for decision-making in this vital field. The two major undertakings were the Police/Community Involvement Program and the Neighbourhood Watch Program, both conducted within the Westernport Police District.

These projects were based on a 'management by objectives' approach which relied on defining problems; setting objectives; identifying effectiveness and efficiency indicators; and measuring results of efforts. While the projects were considered successful, there was considerable difficulty in aligning this method of policing and management with the more traditional approaches inherent in policing. A major problem was the virtual absence of information systems to provide a basis for management decision-making at any level. Throughout the duration of these earlier projects, much emphasis was placed on developing information systems to measure the progress and results of the pilot schemes. Although time consuming and difficult to accomplish, it was essential to the outcome of these projects.

The lessons learned from this experience were clear:

- Policing can be shown to be successful only to the extent that the success is observable and measurable.
- Adequate management information to show that police are achieving their goals effectively and efficiently is not available.

What was also identified from these earlier experiences and reinforced throughout current projects was:

- there is uncertainty about the role of police in many fields of police responsibility, with lack of clearly defined policy and direction.
- there is a shortage of skilled managers to put innovative policy into effect through leadership, sound managerial practice and training.

This part of the paper outlines the key elements of policing, policy and management that have influenced the direction of police productivity management.

## The Police Role

### Organisational Philosophy

The Organisational Philosophy of the Victoria Police Force states the objectives and guiding principles which determine, in general terms, the direction and activities of the organisation and its' members. In summary, police seek to protect life and property; prevent crime; detect offenders; and preserve the peace. This is to be achieved by maintaining a professional and impartial service which depends on securing and maintaining the willing support and co-operation of the public.

These objectives and principles are based on those laid down by Sir Robert Peel in 1829. In issuing a General Instructions to the New London Police in that year, the Commissioners left little doubt as to the priorities of these objectives:

It should be understood, at the outset, that the principal object to be attained is the prevention of crime. To this great end every effort of the police is to be directed. The security of persons and property, the preservation of public tranquillity and all other objects of a police establishment would thus be better effected than by the detection and punishment of the offender after he has succeeded in committing the crime (Critchley, 1978).

Peel's principles have been the cornerstone of policing throughout the English speaking world and are as valid today as when first introduced. Unfortunately, most police forces, while espousing the virtues of their policies, have been unable to show effectiveness and efficiency in achieving their purpose of preventing crime. A result has been that a greater emphasis was placed on responding to situations or becoming reactive after problems have occurred.

### Reactive Policing

Over the last several decades the nature of policing has evolved in line with society change. Altered standards and patterns of behaviour within society, together with increased urbanisation, mobility and communication have, influenced the policing function in becoming 'demand-led' or reactive to problems. This in turn has diminished the police capacity to attend to preventative measures.

As Sir Kenneth Newman, former Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police states:

Reactive policing places the emphasis on responding to incidents. Typically, reactive policing goals and experience are expressed in terms of activities (patrol, investigation, etc.) rather than in terms of specific areas of achievement or of defined outcomes. Reactive police managers do not attempt to influence their environment. Under reactive policing the police force is an anvil on which society hammers out its tensions (Newman, 1982).

## Proactive Policing

To meet present and envisaged challenges facing police in the fields of crime, public order, traffic and community service, greater emphasis should be paid to the proactive capability of policing. Proactive policing can be described as:

All police activity resulting from a planned course of action designed to prevent criminal activity or anti-social events from occurring.

The term can be used to describe activities ranging from the planning process itself to the patrol function that is tasked to achieve special objectives. Proactive policing seeks to influence the environment in which police activity takes place and emphasises a planned preventative approach to tasking.

The most dramatic example of proactive police effort is the Victoria Police Neighbourhood Watch Program. This community-based crime prevention scheme currently comprises 590 individual Neighbourhood Watch areas with approximately 1.2 million people residing within these areas. The police have accepted the responsibility, and accountability, to meet with representatives of each of these areas on a regular basis and to supply local crime statistics on a periodic basis. Targeted crime has been reduced dramatically as a result of the proactive role of police in this program.

## A Balanced Approach

Each style of policing needs to be viewed as being complementary to the other and efforts must be made towards an integrated system which balances the reactive and proactive functions of policing to achieve the overall aims of the organisation. Identifying and defining these functions and making decisions about their effectiveness and efficiency in alleviating problems is what police productivity is about.

## Police Productivity

Productivity is a difficult concept, but is central. Without productivity objectives, a business does not have direction. Without productivity measurements, it does not have control (Drucker, 1974).

Productivity of an organisation comprises the outcomes of its efforts in achieving objectives, which is effectiveness, and the cost of achieving the outcome which is efficiency. Productivity of this type will require the development of systems other than the methods traditionally employed in policing.

## Traditional Approach

The wide range and complexity of activities undertaken within a police organisation have long evaded detailed measurement:

Because police forces in general are the products of slow and ill-defined evolution, there is little consensus on the concise objectives of the police function... Police lack a clear common unit

of success - as profit serves in private enterprise - to indicate whether police programmes are working to achieve their goals. Not only does the police manager lack a well defined set of measures to indicate performance, but he often does not have the means of accurately monitoring how resources are being used, let alone measuring the results of effort (Australian Police College 24th Officers Course, no date).

### Traditional Measurement

In the absence of measurement related to defined objectives, police organisations have relied on traditional means of recording activities and outcomes to provide statistics in the following categories:

- a. crimes reported and detected
- b. clearance rates
- c. complaints against police
- d. traffic accidents
- e. traffic enforcement
- f. workload measurement
- g. financial statements.

These and similar categories provide indicators which, in the main, offer only a general picture of what is occurring in the fields of police responsibility. In the form these data are currently analysed and disseminated, scant management information is provided which can be used as a basis for a planned effort in assessing situations and effectively addressing problems. While proper use of data as a management tool does occur within some areas of the force, it is the exception rather than the rule. The findings from a report by the Miami Police Department appear applicable to the Victoria Police Force:

The Miami Police Department currently collects large amounts of information. The problem lies in the fact that we have failed to properly utilise and disseminate this data because of a lack of analytical capabilities. As a result, much of the planning done by the department is reactive in nature. Commanders and line supervisors are often forced to make decisions based on available information rather than the best information and this situation serves to exacerbate a 'supervisory' style of management historically prevalent within the department (ICAP Steering Committee, 1981).

### A Modern Approach to Police Productivity

Productivity is the ultimate means of an organisation's performance. It is the indication of both the efficiency and effectiveness of the whole operation... In any organisation productivity is about people. It is about the goals they are pursuing and how they pursue them. It is about conviction, team-work, morale, motivation... Management which fails to recognise that type of people organisation inevitably fails to maximise an organisation's productivity (Short, 1981).

It is incumbent on management to provide the environment and direction for planned productivity to take place. It is of utmost importance that all members of the organisation have a clear understanding of what they are

expected to achieve and the manner in which they are expected to achieve it. As one writer on organisation has stated:

It's tough to know when you're there if you don't know where there is before you start (Heizlinger, 1980).

### Government Policy

The most significant influence determining the need to systemise and measure police productivity is the Victorian Government's program budgeting policy, applicable to all government departments.

### Program Budgeting

Program budgeting has been introduced by the Victorian government (1982-83) as part of its stated policy to 'improve the economic and financial management of the state'.

The following extracts from government budgeting documents provide some information as to the methods of accountability now required of all government departments, including the Victoria Police Force:

The Government has now determined that all departments will be required to define objectives, programs, evaluation criteria and decision-making processes in order to present their expenditures and estimates in program format for the budget setting process (ibid).

In further explanation of this policy the Department of Management and Budget in its document 'Implementation Program Budgeting' provides the following advice:

It is appropriate for management to commence the preparation of a clear statement of goals and objectives bearing in mind the need to express the latter in measurable terms, capable of desegregation into a hierarchy of programs, sub-programs, components and activities.

The criteria for each (government) department's program structure consists of five main parts:

- (a) Description - Purpose of Project
- (b) Conditions - Events that result in need for the program
- (c) Need - A demand for a particular service or course of action by the department
- (d) Objective - A description of the expected accomplishments of the program
- (e) Assessment Criteria - A group of indicators selected to form the basis of an evaluative process (ibid).

Clearly, the intention of the government is to require detailed accountability for the way in which the resources of the force are used. It follows that future appropriations to police will depend on management's ability to show the need for resources and the expected, and actual,

outcome of resources used, these being measured in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.

### Conclusion

The police role is still firmly based on the goals expressed by Sir Robert Peel, with an increasing emphasis on prevention aspects. These guiding principles must necessarily conform to present day standards of responsibility and accountability. This in turn has led to a recognition by police administrators that both traditional and alternative methods of policing will need to align with accepted management practices. Included in this is the capability to demonstrate the degree to which objectives are being met, and the cost of effort in given fields.

Experience has shown that there are no quick and easy answers in aligning the broad goals, philosophies, and practices of policing, to acceptable measurement of productivity. The process will be evolutionary with the pace of development being ever stimulated by both external and internal influences.

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## OVERVIEW - STANDARDS AND THE SYSTEM

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My brief for this summary included commentary on the desirability of establishing standards for productivity, the importance of information sharing among police forces, and consideration of the effects on the total criminal justice system of increased productivity and standard-setting. Let me share some conclusions and suggestions on these subjects with you.

1. It is undesirable to establish productivity standards since any force that does so will be held to them and that could cause all sorts of problems.
2. Why should you share information? Let those creeps in the other departments work as hard as you did!
3. There is certainly no need to consider a bunch of weak-kneed judges and the social workers who run the prisons when planning police activities.  
- and motherhood leads to population explosion and the apples in the pie are all contaminated by pesticides and chemical fertilisers.

My aim in formulating these observations is not merely to be perverse, but rather to point out that the general principles are no longer open to debate. The need for all these things is now well agreed upon and the discussion has moved to questions of implications and implementation.

To bring about implementation calls for fundamental change in the way things are done. Listening to the discussion of the last three days has made me think deeply about the ways in which you can introduce fundamental change into an organisation:

1. that has not changed structurally since it was founded;
2. whose lowest-ranking members a) have great discretion; b) have the most contact with the client; c) are experts at avoiding supervision by superiors; and d) are convinced that managers and policy-makers no longer remember what conditions are like on the coal face;
3. that has always jealously guarded its autonomy from the political process;
4. whose members are strongly convinced that no one who has not served in the organisation can really understand it;
5. whose goals are abstract, vague, and often in conflict with each other;

6. whose ability to deliver its services is strongly influenced by factors over which the organisation has no control;
7. whose clients and constituency are often both vociferous and inconsistent in their demands;
8. which is judged as carefully on the means it utilises as on the ends it achieves;
9. the social value of which has always appeared self-evident both to its members and to the community, so that there is deep resentment at contemporary demands that it justify itself in terms of dollars; and
10. which is now faced with citizens who have taken on the roles of increasingly critical consumers.

I hope that no one thinks that I have been talking about police departments, because what I have just described is a university. This is not to deny that police agencies are unique in some ways, but not necessarily in the ways that affect their ability to be efficient, effective and accountable. The difficulties that police face in meeting demands for efficiency, effectiveness and accountability are very real, but they are difficulties that are shared by other organisations.

Let us examine some of the mechanisms for meeting these demands that we have mentioned over the last few days. In each case we can identify some problems, but in doing so it is important to remember that problems are not impossibilities and that criticism is not a signal to stop, but rather an incentive to work harder.

One theme that has run through much of the past three days is the concept of the police as a service delivery organisation. This is a concept that fits well with the current interest in community policing and problem-oriented policing and it provides a way of reconciling the historical and necessary discretion of the constable with the need for accountability to the community - accountability not just in fiscal terms, but because accountability to the citizenry is the way in which things are done in a democratic state. What are some of the questions raised by police willingness to share policy-making decisions with the community?

One of these is the fact that the public's perceptions of what is needed are so easily influenced - by community leaders, by the media and by the police themselves. We have been reminded earlier that a citizen's opinion of the police is often based on a personal encounter with a single police officer - often over a trivial incident. It is important that community input into police policy not be based on little more than transitory and idiosyncratic perceptions.

What is the relationship between what the public says it wants and what is actually done? Mr Whelan's survey indicates that citizens think of police in terms of their crime prevention and detection role. What would an analysis of calls for police service show? What percentage of such calls concern public order, emergency services or some other need that no other public agency can fill?



How does the drive toward police professionalism fit with the concept of a service delivery organisation? A professional is someone whose knowledge and experience produce a level of judgement that is not available to the layperson; how does such a professional respond to the demands of the lay client or consumer?

Another thread that has tied together a number of our sessions is that of resource allocation and development, particularly those human resources that consume between 70 and 80 per cent of the police budget. How do you get the proper mixture of skills and abilities into law enforcement and how do you guarantee that they will be at the right place at the right time? We have discussed various methods of hiring, including term contracts based on the idea that not everyone who joins a police department will stay with it until retirement age. Other methods mentioned include lateral entry and specialist recruitment; secondments; better use of civilians, both in public service positions and on short-term contracts; more extensive application of the task force approach, including its use in investigation; more appropriate training both for recruits and for experienced officers; and improved methods of assigning people to particular duties. Perhaps relevant to the last concern is a recent study of psychological interviews of recruits and subsequent monitoring of their careers. One outcome was that recruits who began sexual activity early in life became better investigators than those who began later. I would not touch the implications of this piece of information with a bargepole, but I pass it on to you for what it is worth.

The information explosion was another phenomenon underlying much of our discussion. Innovation and experimentation are taking place all over the world. How does a particular police department monitor this activity in order to find out what is working - and what is not working - in other agencies? Short and relevant versions of research can be found in such publication as *Police Science Abstracts* and *Criminal Justice Abstracts*; *Law Enforcement News* and *Police Studies*, both published by my home institution, John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York; the *Trends and Issues* series of the Australian Institute of Criminology; and the National Police Research Unit's *NPRU Review* and its *Research Return*. Print can be bypassed entirely by systematically debriefing people on secondment and those who have returned from secondment and by making good use of that most efficient of research instruments, the telephone. Another idea that has emerged from this meeting is that of the single issue conference - a small, short, but intensive meeting to consider one narrowly defined topic of common interest.

We also observed that both efficiency and effectiveness demand continued evaluation; this is true not only of new projects, but also of those that have been in place for a long time. Too often new programs are simply added to ongoing ones; a department which is efficient as well as effective will not only ask What does this accomplish? but also, What can this replace? Innovations must be consistently monitored to see how they can be improved and, ultimately, whether they should be retained. Exactly how this monitoring and evaluation is to be carried out remains an interesting question - but not nearly as interesting as deciding who is going to tell the commissioner that his pet project - inaugurated with great confidence and fanfare - is a complete and total dud.

Ways of paring the budget and demonstrating the cost-effectiveness of police functions are among the most concrete outcomes of a conference like this one. The concept of user pays - on its surface so simple -

actually demands that a police department examine its entire philosophy of service provision. The distinction between services to the community that have already been paid through taxes and services to an individual that the community should not be asked to subsidise with its taxes is not always an easy distinction to make. If the latter can be identified, is it preferable to ask the user to purchase them from the police department or for the police to refuse to provide such services and refer the user to the private sector? Closely related is the identification of services that police should not or need not be providing at all. If such services are simply transferred to another government agency, has the total efficiency and/or effectiveness of the system improved? Should one government department charge another for services rendered?

Comparing the economy-of-scale advantages of central purchasing and distribution of equipment with the flexibility and low overheads of making small purchases locally is another cost-cutting device; like many of the others, it is most useful when considered on a case-by-case basis rather than by the application of an iron-clad rule.

Police can also recommend changes in other parts of the criminal justice system. We have heard suggestions for the abolishment of committal proceedings, the reduced use of police as debt collectors for the courts when fines are not paid on time, and the delivery of summonses and subpoenas by certified mail.

The Tasmanian experience shows that incidents prevented - such as traffic injuries and fatalities - can be assessed in terms of their cost to the community; subtracting from this the cost of the prevention program gives a dollar figure of the program's value. It also shows that the private sector can profitably be involved in police programs.

Really useful performance indicators still seem elusive and those in which we can feel some confidence tend to measure efficiency rather than effectiveness. Many rely on police-generated data and measure inputs (number of miles driven, cost of maintaining a vehicle) rather than outputs. Intermediate measures, such as number of interviews conducted, are far easier to come by than are final measures, such as the community's feeling of safety. Intermediate measures often seem more satisfactory because they are usually quantitative, but they do not always relate directly to police objectives and they are easy to manipulate. Although progress is slow, a number of the reports presented here have indicated that measures of community response and satisfaction are being developed.

In looking for direction for the future, it may be helpful for police departments to examine their own corporate culture, the set of shared experiences, values, and beliefs that shape action. Corporate culture is created by an organisation's history, its environment and its heroes.

History refers to the ways in which the past continues to influence the present. If a history of your department were being written today, what would be emphasised and what would be omitted? What would be a source of pride and what would be a cause for shame? What events and what trends produced the present situation and how do they support and constrain innovation?


The environment provides demands and opportunities with which the organisation must live. What are the external constraints on change and what are the external demands for change?

Heroes provide the role models. Who is celebrated and why? Who got the medals and who became the legend? Is the person who is celebrated today the same type of person who was celebrated in the past?

The corporate culture of police departments has commonly found strength in its common traditions. Its environment has provided little stimulus for change and has often worked actively to prevent it. The heroes have been those who utilised courage and stamina to apprehend criminals and rescue those in danger. It has celebrated ingenuity in detection and speed in response.

The culture must now support those who direct courage, stamina, and ingenuity toward providing and being seen to provide to government and public services that that can be evaluated in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability. The police must take the initiative in doing this; if they do not, someone else will. In all probability, individuals and individual forces will have to develop the methods that are most suitable to their history and environment. No one said it was going to be easy.

I salute you as tomorrow's heroes.



## APPENDIX

### EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN AUSTRALIAN POLICING: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO POLICE SERVICES

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#### Introduction

By 1990, the cost of police services in Australia will exceed two thousand million dollars per year. State and territory police departments are among the largest public sector agencies in their respective jurisdictions. Police expenditures have increased significantly over the past decade, both in actual and in constant dollars. As the cost of policing continues to rise, and as Australian governments experience an indefinite, if not permanent, fiscal crisis, Australian police executives will be called upon increasingly to justify their budgetary requests and to demonstrate that their resources are efficiently deployed.

This paper presents an overview of issues relating to the analysis of police performance in Australia. It is aimed at a lay readership and was written in order to stimulate critical thinking in an area of public policy which tends to be the subject of emotional rather than rational discourse. Inevitably, generalisations made in the pages below will not apply uniformly to all of the police agencies in the Australian federal system.

The introductory pages set out basic principles which justify the widest public discussion of issues relating to police resources and their allocation. The second section defines such key concepts as efficiency, effectiveness and productivity in policing, and suggests how they might be measured. The third section suggests how such strategies as operations research and systematic program evaluation may be employed to achieve value for money in policing. The concluding section summarises the main arguments which have been made, and presents a number of recommendations on how greater productivity in Australian policing may be realised.

#### Part One: Police Resource Allocation and Democratic Governance

In the Australian democratic system, ultimate accountability for public safety rests with the elected representatives of the people. The proportion of available public funds devoted to criminal justice, as opposed to health, for example, is essentially a political decision. Within the domain of criminal justice, the proportion of funds devoted to policing, as opposed to prisons, is again a policy choice for which elected representatives are ultimately accountable.

Many decisions which police have traditionally defined as operational, and therefore, in their view, appropriate to be insulated from political control, entail fundamental judgments about moral values, the balancing of

competing interests, and the allocation of finite resources. Principles of constabulary independence notwithstanding, the relative priorities accorded areas such as vice enforcement, public relations, and domestic violence by police departments represent strategic choices for which elected governments ultimately must answer.

To be sure, certain decisions in law enforcement should entail the exercise of independent discretion. The decision to investigate, to arrest, or to charge a particular suspect should be made without fear, favour or partisan considerations. But to equate the independence of the police with that of the judiciary is misconceived. The responsibility of Australian governments to ensure that public monies are used effectively, efficiently and economically applies to the domain of policing as it does to criminal justice generally, as indeed it does to the public sector in its entirety.

Traditionally, in the United Kingdom, there was widespread belief within the police service that police alone could comment legitimately on law enforcement matters (Weatheritt, 1986). Suggestions that the introduction of basic management principles could result in greater efficiency in law enforcement were rebutted with the assertion that 'policing is different'. But such views have been eclipsed under the Thatcher Government where, despite a firm commitment to law and order, strict accountability of all public sector expenditures, including police expenditures, is imperative (Great Britain, 1986). There seems no justification in Australia for excluding police operations and expenditures from the most rigorous scrutiny and the widest possible discussion.

There is a growing awareness of the limit to the amount of public funds which can be allocated to the police function, and a growing appreciation of the need to cope more efficiently with limited resources. Yet police are still regarded by many citizens as the solution to a wide range of community problems. Some of the issues of which police executives and responsible governments need be aware are reflected in the following questions raised by the Neesham inquiry into the Victoria Police Force.

Is the force making the best use of manpower? Is it innovative and using modern technology? Are resources concentrated on priority police functions such as the prevention of crime and maintenance of order, or dissipated upon duties which can just as efficiently be performed by civilians? (Committee of Inquiry, Victoria Police Force, 1985, p. 36).

Claims from both sides of politics, and from police themselves, that law enforcement resources are insufficient to cope with demand for police services, have become a familiar refrain. This level of discourse neglects the question of how improvements in administration and management may in themselves lead to increases in effectiveness, thus obviating the need for additional resources.

At least in their public profile, police, like many agencies of government, have not been reknowned exponents of efficiency as a governing principle of resource allocation. Rather, their priorities have traditionally rested on what is traditionally defined as the primary responsibilities of the police - preventing crime and catching criminals. The importance accorded these goals, by both the police themselves and by members of the general public, has tended to transcend considerations of efficiency in goal attainment.

The traditional subordination of cost control to other police values meant that skills in expenditure reduction did not receive a great deal of emphasis in training or in promotional criteria. Many Australian police command personnel have no previous training in fiscal management and did not reach their present positions with these skills in mind (Hudzik, 1988). Moreover, Australian police forces enjoyed an historical exemption from outside scrutiny of their management practices. Any operational data which police might have collected on a systematic basis and which might have raised public consciousness about issues of resource deployment and utilisation has tended not to be published. The public, and their elected representatives, remained generally incapable of asking hard questions about priorities in law enforcement.

Public concern over statistics of reported crime is often used to support claims for increased police resources and power. Less immediately apparent both to the public and to their elected representatives are two considerations, discussed in more detail below, which bear significantly upon the police role as traditionally conceived. First, a significant proportion of police resources are devoted to tasks quite unrelated to the prevention of crime and the apprehension of offenders. Second, crime is the product of many factors, most of which are beyond the ability of the police to influence.

A hard analytical look at the economics of policing would address a number of issues. Are the products of police services subject to increasing, decreasing, or constant returns to scale? Some analysts suggest that in policing, as in other public services, costs tend to grow in geometric proportion to benefits (Panzarella, 1984, p. 120). An initial increase in funding tends to be targeted at the easiest problem; further funding is devoted to objectives increasingly more difficult to attain. Is there an optimal level of police expenditure, beyond which costs would increasingly exceed benefits? (Pyle, 1983). To state the issue in concrete terms, consider that one additional patrol car, fully manned, on a twenty four hour basis, would cost some \$300,000 per year. Would the population of any state or territory of Australia receive \$300,000 worth of additional services by adding one patrol car? Precisely what would they receive?

Central to the discussion which follows are three questions: Precisely what contribution would an incremental increase in police resources achieve? Can better deployment of existing resources obviate the need for increased resources? Can a modification in police operations reduce crime without increasing costs? The questions are more than idle speculation, for a mere 10 per cent increase in police expenditures Australia-wide would cost taxpayers some two hundred million dollars per year.

## Part Two: Concepts and Measurement

Within a climate of fiscal permissiveness and lacking the discipline of a market environment, the public sector has generally lagged behind private enterprise in developing performance measures to permit evaluation and financial accountability (Marx, 1978). Policing is no exception. We now turn to some basic concepts of police performance, and to some alternative means by which that performance may be measured.

Effectiveness in policing is the extent to which the police department is accomplishing its purpose.

Efficiency reflects the relative unit cost at which the police agency is undertaking its activities. Whilst the ideal police department is both efficient and effective, the two conditions are by no means inextricably linked. An operation may be effective, but still inefficient; consider a successful criminal investigation, which results in the arrest of the offender, but which could have been achieved in as timely and as thorough a manner with half as many detectives as were in fact employed. Conversely, an activity may be efficient, without being effective. An increase in traffic enforcement activity may be reflected in a greater number of tickets written, and a corresponding reduction in the unit cost of issuing a traffic citation. To achieve such an increase necessitates a concentration on relatively minor moving violations, at the expense of drink-driving and reckless driving charges, which entail more time-consuming procedures. The overall objective in question, a reduction of death, injury and property damage, may not be achieved despite significantly increased efficiency in traffic enforcement.

Productivity, on the other hand, refers to the output, or degree of effectiveness, obtained by a police agency for a given amount of resource investment, or input (Hatry, 1975). Unfortunately, productivity in policing is easier to conceptualise than to measure, for the ultimate ends of policing often resist quantification. An ideal measure of crime prevention productivity would entail the number of offences prevented by police activity divided by the cost of police crime prevention operations. Because events that have not occurred are exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to measure, hard indicators of police productivity, at least concerning crime prevention, remain elusive. It is simply not feasible to determine how many crimes would occur in the absence of any policing, although in the rare event of a police strike, some indication of the resulting disorder would become apparent. One can, however, devise systematic estimates of the impact of marginal changes in police operations. Certain research techniques, discussed below, can thus permit some assessment of police productivity.

Cost-benefit analysis addresses whether a particular activity represents a worthwhile use of resources, by comparing the monetary costs of an activity with its monetary consequences. The systematic assessment of costs and benefits is relatively unfamiliar terrain in the criminal justice system. One explanation for this is the difficulty of quantifying both the costs and the benefits of a particular activity. As Hudzik (1988) notes, program budgeting methods, which might permit systematic cost analysis, have yet to be implemented fully by Australian police agencies. Quantification of benefits, on the other hand, is complicated by the intangible nature of much crime-related phenomena. For example, it should be easy enough to determine the cost of doubling police patrols in a particular area. Much more difficult is the task of estimating the number of crimes prevented by, and determining the incremental gain in feelings of public security which result from, the increased patrols. Most difficult of all is assigning a monetary value to these outcomes, so that they may be weighed against the costs entailed.

Where some quantifiable benefit may be derived from an activity, it is possible to calculate cost benefit ratios. For example, the cost of issuing a firearms licence may be five dollars, while the revenue received in



licence fees may be twenty dollars. The cost benefit ratio of the existing system of licencing is thus 1:4.

Cost-effectiveness analysis determines how a particular objective can be attained at least cost. It differs from cost-benefit analysis in that cost-effectiveness analysis does not ask whether the activity is worth doing in the first place. Nor does it entail the monetary quantification of the activity's effects. It may well be more economical for police to proceed against nude sunbathers by summons rather than by arrest. The wisdom of proceeding against nude sunbathers at all is an important question, but one not amenable to cost effectiveness analysis.

Cost-effectiveness analysis can, however, provide a basis for strategic planning. Assume that a given activity results in 85 per cent of an objective being attained at a cost of \$500,000. An additional investment of \$250,000 would produce a further 10 per cent of the objective. Thus, 95 per cent of the objective can be attained at a cost of \$750,000. Managers must decide whether to invest the additional \$250,000 in the given activity, or alternatively, in activities aimed at other objectives.

Those involved in the formulation and implementation of police policy should also be sensitive to the concept of opportunity cost. Briefly stated, opportunity costs are the actions and outcomes foregone when one course of action is selected in preference to another. Resources devoted to the arrest and prosecution of public inebriates or of persons engaged in consensual homosexual activity could otherwise be allocated to the arrest and prosecution of domestic violence offenders. Efforts directed at suppressing the supply of cannabis could otherwise target more harmful substances such as heroin. The identification and weighing of opportunity costs are integral to strategic decision making.

### **Levels of Analysis**

Efficiency, effectiveness and productivity can be assessed at various levels of analysis within a police organisation. The smallest is that of the individual police officer, the largest that of the police department as a whole. In between these extremes are various units, squads, divisions or regions, whose names and organisational boundaries will vary depending upon the department's administrative framework. Particular operations, whether in the form of a specific investigation or a program such as Neighbourhood Watch, may also serve as units of analysis.

### **Varieties of Police Functions**

The functions of police in contemporary Australia are many and varied. By no means are they limited to the prevention of crime and apprehension of offenders. Without going to exhaustive detail, police in Australia engage in traffic control, accident investigation, and perform a variety of emergency services from assisting the pensioner who has misplaced her housekeys to finding lost children and retrieving cats from trees. In addition, police provide a variety of welfare and counselling services, mediate interpersonal disputes, engage in ceremonial functions, and administer firearms regulations. They have also engaged in political surveillance.<sup>(1)</sup> Analysts of North American police operations suggest that up to 85 per cent of a police officer's time is spent on activities

unrelated to crime control. The situation is not likely to differ dramatically in Australia.

### **Police and Crime**

Police will privately concede that their ability to control crime is limited. Crimes vary in terms of their vulnerability and accessibility to police operations. Most serious crime, including murder robbery and rape, are rarely if ever encountered by police on patrol. A great deal of crime occurs in private, beyond the preventive reach of any patrol activity. A significant proportion of sexual assault, for example, is committed in non-public settings by persons known to the victim. Although much police work is grounded in the assumption that the threat of detection and ultimate arrest will deter prospective wrongdoers, many criminals act on impulse, without attempting a rational calculation of the risk of apprehension and the value of ill-gotten gains.

Crime, moreover, results from a variety of other factors, some of which are entirely beyond the ability of police to control. Economic conditions, social and demographic influences, and such environmental considerations as the availability and intensity of street lighting are but some of these.(2)

Moreover, the processes by which police resources impinge upon the incidence of crime are often overlooked. It is not merely the availability of additional police resources, but how these resources are used, which determine the nature and extent of their impact on crime. Overall strategies, management techniques, and resource allocation decisions may facilitate or inhibit the attainment of crime related goals. The assumption of a direct relationship between police personnel strength and a reduction in the crime rate is thus a gross oversimplification. Additional resources per se do not necessarily make a difference. Resources may be managed and deployed in such a way that they might make a difference. And the potential effects of additional resources may be diminished or neutralised by external factors.

### **Police Performance**

Because of the multifaceted nature and the inherent limitations of policing in Australia, there neither exists nor can there exist a single measure of police performance. Rather, it is appropriate to select from a variety of measures those which focus upon that specific element of police activity one wishes to evaluate.

Police performance may be conveniently analysed at two stages (Whitaker, 1984). The first concerns the processes by which resources are translated into operations - how, precisely, police spend the funds which they have been granted. If, for example, one's crime control strategy is to maximise visible police presence, one must determine what forms of organisation, management tools and procedures are most conducive to getting more patrols on the street. The obvious focus of this analysis is efficiency.

The second stage of performance assessment concerns the impact which police organisation and deployment have on what it is police are seeking to achieve. Can more police patrols and faster response time

lead to fewer household burglaries, safer streets and less public fear of crime? The focus here is on effectiveness.

### **Measuring Police Resource Utilisation: Workload Statistics**

One elementary measure of police activity is basic workload. Such an indicator would include the number of calls received or the number of offences coming to the attention of the police. Such measures do not reflect the relative difficulty of cases, or work actually accomplished, however. Beyond these measures of demand for police services, one may develop a descriptive measure of police activity, such as the number of accidents attended, the number of arrests made, or the number of random breath tests administered. Such measures of workload accomplished reflect the range of police activity, including complaints investigated, security checks conducted, warrants processed, arrests by type, accidents attended, street distances patrolled; among many others (Barbour, 1980, p. 931).

Here it should be noted that through proactive enforcement, police generate much of their own workload. Parkinson's law, that the amount of work will expand to occupy the staffing levels available to perform it, would appear to apply to policing no less than to other public sector activities.

The next step beyond simple enumeration of an organisation's workload is to determine the cost of the respective tasks performed. This is accomplished by adding the operating costs of the activity in question to the appropriate share of capital costs and supporting services which the activity entailed.

One may then assess the efficiency of the operations in question by calculating a ratio of workload to input. It thus becomes possible to speak in terms of the cost per mile of vehicle patrol, the dollar cost per arrest for public drunkenness, and the unit cost of prosecuting on a charge of simple possession of cannabis.

### **Human Resource Management**

Since approximately 90 per cent of contemporary police expenditures relate to personnel, a basic question facing police executives is whether they are getting the most out of the personnel they have. The costs of training and maintaining a sworn police officer are considerable; the extent to which uniformed personnel are under-utilised may reveal substantial potential savings. In this respect, the access of senior police to management information systems which provide reliable data on manpower needs and personnel allocation is an important step towards more efficient use of these human resources. A variety of measures reflect the degree to which personnel resources are efficiently deployed.

It has long been observed that a number of duties still performed by police officers, from typing to courier work to sweeping floors, could as effectively be performed by civilian personnel, at less cost. Such reliance upon civilian staff would then free trained police officers to perform those duties which they are uniquely qualified to perform. Although Australian police agencies have sought to reallocate extraneous duties to public service personnel, these initiatives have met with some resistance from police associations.

Similarly, it should be possible to account for the proportion of an officer's time on duty which is devoted to non-productive activity. Time spent awaiting court appearances is but one example. The proportion of a detective's time which is spent on actual investigation as opposed to the preparation of reports or evidence is another.

Other indicators of sub-optimal resource utilisation include absenteeism. Whilst there are aspects of policing which are arduous and stressful in the extreme, illness and injury are not inevitable, and can be reduced through good management practices. Careful monitoring of sick leave patterns of individual officers and units can indicate where improvements may be achieved. A simple measure such as the rate of absenteeism can be useful to this end.

Personnel turnover can also entail significant costs to a police organisation, as the loss of professional expertise requires the costly training of replacements. Having already spent thousands of dollars on the recruitment, screening, training of a police officer, it must repeat the same expenses on the recruitment of a successor. The loss of that officer thus doubles the agency's cost. Whilst some personnel wastage may be inevitable, close observation of resignation rates may indicate management practices which are in need of reform.

It is also possible to measure the functional distribution of police resources. The percentage of personnel assigned to crime relevant functions as opposed to ceremonial or public relations duties are illustrative. The overall police to citizen ratio may be deceptive as an indicator of crime control resources. It might be more useful to compare the overall police to citizen ratio with the ratio of police 'on the street' to the general population.

Ultimately, it is possible to calculate the cost of specific police functions, such as the cost per hour of operating a one-person patrol car, a two-person patrol car. Other measures which may be derived include the cost of prosecuting a burglary, or the relative cost of proceeding by arrest or summons.

It is also desirable that police resources, whether human or capital, are deployed in the places and at the times when they are required. Demands for police assistance are not randomly distributed across time and space. Proper workload analysis can avoid a situation wherein police in one location are deluged with work, whilst those at another remain idle. Australian police forces spend millions of dollars each year on payments for overtime, an expenditure which could be reduced significantly through improved management.

### **Capital Resources**

Capital resources are also amenable to utilisation analysis. For example, it is important that managers be able to determine the extent to which various forms of capital equipment are efficiently used. Aircraft, whether fixed wing or helicopters, are expensive. By dividing the number of hours flown in a given month by the manufacturer's specified maximum, one may determine just how much use one obtains from a particular piece of equipment. It is also possible to determine the proportion of a department's vehicle fleet which is on the road at any given time. Consistent patterns of under-utilisation indicate that the equipment may

be excessive, or that rental may be a cost-effective alternative to purchase.

### **Measuring The Impact of Police Operations: Crime Statistics**

The argument most often used to justify increases in police resources is the increase in the rate of reported crime. Implicit in this argument is the understanding that an increase in police personnel, or powers, or financial resources will reduce the crime rate to some extent, whether by deterring potential offenders, or by incapacitating those who do offend.

As noted above, there is a variety of social forces, quite independent of police activity, which affect the incidence of crime. The relative influence of policing amidst these other factors is unknown. The police mission, moreover, is extremely diverse. It is thus by no means certain that an increase in police resources will automatically bring about a decrease in crime.

Measurement of police activity should be undertaken with great caution. Statistics are often imprecise and ambiguous. Analysts should be sensitive to what a particular measure is, and is not, revealing. One of the classic pitfalls of police performance analysis is the tendency to use crime statistics to measure effectiveness. It has become increasingly evident that in Australia, as elsewhere, crime statistics are a very imperfect reflection of the true rate of crime. Many factors intervene between the commission of a crime and its transformation into a crime statistic (Black, 1980). Not all crimes committed come to the attention of the police. Some, including the more skilfully executed frauds, are never detected. Consensual transactions, including activities involving illicit drugs, tend to come to light as the result of proactive policing. That is, the more police assigned to a particular area, the more offences those police will detect. Statistics which purport to reflect these and other offences which lack aggrieved victims tell us more about police resource allocation than they do about the target criminal activity.

Victims of more conventional forms of crime such as assault and theft may, for a number of reasons, be disinclined to report offences to police. Such reasons may include the victim's perception that the matter was too trivial, that the police could not or would not be of much assistance, or that further pursuit of the matter would entail unnecessary stress and discomfort (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1986, pp.49-67). A British Home Office study suggests that the more accessible the police, the greater the tendency of a citizen to report an offence. That is, more widespread telephone ownership and greater police manpower lessen the inconvenience of contacting the police and thereby facilitate citizen reporting (Clarke and Hough, 1984, pp. 2-3). Thus, ironically, an increase in the rate of reported crime can as easily be interpreted as indicative of police effectiveness as it could be regarded as cause for alarm.

Reliance upon crime statistics poses numerous additional problems. Overall totals of crime encompass a wide range of offences entailing vastly different degrees of heinousness. A 5 per cent reduction in crime may embrace murder or unseemly words. Moreover, the legal and operational definitions of some crimes are subject to change. In South Australia, for example, the offence of rape includes a variety of behaviours which in other jurisdictions may still only constitute indecent assault. Assaults which in some states are classified as serious or aggravated may

in other jurisdictions be defined as minor. Recording practices in a given jurisdiction may change, so that an apparent increase in serious assault may reflect the inclusion of offences previously classified otherwise. It is more useful therefore to focus on particular types of reported crime, such as armed robbery and motor vehicle theft, which are less subject to ambiguity of definition and which are reported with relative consistency.

## Surveys

One means of overcoming the flaws inherent in statistics of reported crime is the sample survey. Not only can such methods provide insight into the volume and distribution of unreported as well as reported criminal activity, they can also be used to assess public perceptions of police performance and to determine the citizen's own priorities with regard to the allocation of limited law enforcement resources. Subjective indicators of performance, such as perceived fairness, honesty, responsiveness and legality of police operations can only be obtained through surveys. Survey research can, moreover, point to strengths and deficiencies in public knowledge, attitudes and practice relating to crime prevention activities.

The potential utility of survey research in the design, implementation and evaluation of law enforcement policy should not be overlooked. Surveys can assist in evaluating the relative impact of differing levels of police resources in particular geographic areas, and the impact of similar resource levels in different areas; they can thereby assist in determining optimal levels of resource allocation. Although some Australian police agencies have begun to use surveys as tools for policy development, their full potential has yet to be realised.

Blind reliance on simple measures can convey an inaccurate impression of police activity. Such reliance can, moreover, lead to dangerous and unanticipated consequences. Consider the total number of arrests as an indicator of police output. A strict quantitative measure, total arrests fails to reveal how many were 'bad arrests' - arrests of innocent persons or under circumstances where evidence was insufficient to frame criminal charges. Similarly, the gross total fails to distinguish between 'easy' arrests - those for relatively trivial matters - and arrests for serious offences. To account for these qualitative differences, analysts have devised weighted indices of arrest productivity, incorporating such factors as offence seriousness and whether the arrests led ultimately to conviction (Hatry, 1975, p. 113).

These measurement issues aside, mechanistic tabulation of arrest statistics can produce a 'production quota mentality' and create pressure to pursue certain types of cases to the exclusion of others.

Another measure of police performance, ostensibly more refined than gross arrest totals, but not without serious flaws, is the percentage of offences 'cleared'. This statistic purports to identify the proportion of all offences coming to police attention which have resulted in an arrest or admission by the perpetrator, or in some other obvious disclosure. A police agency may thus declare that 85 per cent of all homicides or 75 per cent of all armed hold-ups coming to its attention have been so cleared.

Despite their superficial attractiveness as a measure of police performance, clearance rates fail to distinguish between those offences

which occur as a result of police activity (for example, drug seizures), those which clear themselves 'automatically' (murder-suicides) and those which are cleared as the result of careful investigation. In the majority of crimes cleared, the identity of the offender is known at the outset. Clearance rates may thus reveal as much about victim-offender relationships and victim behaviour as they do about police performance (Greenwood et al 1975).

Yet another means by which offences may be deemed to be 'cleared' can involve the admission by an offender of having committed a previously reported, but as yet unsolved, crime. It is not uncommon for an offender to request that a number of previous matters be 'taken into consideration' by a sentencing authority. This may provide an incentive for police to persuade an offender to assume responsibility for offences as yet uncleared.

Another way in which police may influence clearance rates is to concentrate their energies upon such self-detecting offences as shoplifting. Such selectivity of police attention to particular offences will result in an increase in their recorded incidence. In light of these subtleties, it should be apparent that clearance rates are vulnerable to changes in administrative procedures and recording practices to the extent that their usefulness in comparisons over time or across jurisdictions is quite suspect.

Analysts have suggested refined measures of investigative effectiveness which avoid some of the potential distortion noted above. Such a refined clearance rate would exclude self-detecting offences, exclude all offences taken into consideration, and all offences which do not result in criminal proceedings, or in the eventual conviction of the offender. (Burrows and Tarling, 1987). Despite the inevitability of some limitations, clearance rates which have been carefully compiled and audited on the basis of well-defined criteria, can be a useful indicator of police performance.

Economists use the term 'production function' to describe the relationship of resources to objectives. Conventional wisdom assumes the relationship between police manpower and the crime rate to be negative - that is, an increase in police resources will produce a decrease in the incidence of crime, and a decrease in police manpower will result in an increasing crime rate. Whether this proposition is true or not, it is accepted as an act of faith by members of the public and publicly embraced by police themselves.

Less thought has been given to the contours of this assumed production function. A perfectly linear relationship would mean that crime will decrease in direct proportion to the increase in police manpower; that is, a 25 per cent increase in police manpower would produce a 25 per cent decrease in crime. Alternatively, the relationship could reflect diminishing returns, where the impact of each additional police officer is less and less, or economies of scale, where the impact is greater and greater.

The nature of this production function, indeed, whether it exists at all, has yet to be accorded systematic research in Australia.

Some examples of police performance and productivity indicators are presented in Appendix One. The list is by no means exhaustive. As heralded earlier, it contains no single global measure by which police productivity may be judged. The indicators may, to varying degrees, be

sensitive to factors beyond the control of the police. They may also be sensitive to manipulation by the police themselves. They should therefore be carefully audited and monitored for consistency and conformity to such basic principles of measurement as reliability, validity and comparability.

### Part Three: Operations, Research, Evaluation and Expenditure Control

Improvements in efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity of policing do not occur spontaneously, but rather through systematic analysis and the application of modern management principles. This section will review some of the approaches which have been heralded as contributing to police performance.

There are a number of research questions which have the potential of contributing to productivity. Again, it is useful to distinguish between the two stages specified above - resource utilisation and ultimate impact.

The potential of research for improving police performance is great, but only if that research is designed and conducted properly. A great deal of discourse on policing has an evangelistic quality about it. Police research should be undertaken not to justify strategic choices and resource commitments which have already been made, but rather to inform the process of decision making. Research in the genre of the patrol analyses conducted by the Victoria Police (1980) are illustrative.

### **Evaluation**

Police operations should be subject to rigorous repeated evaluation in order to assess their efficiency and effectiveness. Police should conduct carefully controlled experiments in order to assess the relative efficiency and effectiveness of alternative deployment strategies.

One type of research which might usefully inform resource allocation decisions is marginal utility analysis. This enables executives to identify the effects of incremental changes to resource levels of existing units. It poses the basic questions: What would occur if a given unit were reduced in strength by a specified number of officers? Can staffing levels in function X be reduced without any sacrifice in efficiency or effectiveness? An extensive program of marginal utility analysis would provide managers with a set of optimum allocation levels across an entire department.

One of the more notable examples of this type of research was the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling et al, 1974). This research involved the systematic analysis of fifteen patrol sectors (or 'beats') over the period of one year. Beats were randomly assigned to one of three categories. In five of the beats, the number of marked patrol cars was trebled. In another five beats, preventive patrol was eliminated entirely, with police presence occurring only in response to calls for service. In the remaining five beats, normal patrol levels were maintained. The experimental treatments had no apparent effect on the incidence of crime (as measured by surveys as well as official crime reports). Nor were there any significant differences in citizens' reported fear of crime or attitudes towards police.



By contrast, a subsequent evaluation of foot patrols introduced in another jurisdiction revealed a reduction in citizens' fear of crime, but no apparent impact on the actual incidence of crime (Police Foundation, 1981).

Another example of operations analysis involved a survey of detective and investigation practices in many different jurisdictions in the United States. It found that the most important factor determining whether a case will be solved is the information provided by the victim or a witness to the police officer first responding to the call for service. Most detectives' time was spent on cases unlikely to be solved and detectives accounted for only a small proportion of arrests. In those cases which were solved, more detectives' time was spent on post-arrest processing than on pre-arrest investigation (Greenwood, et al, 1975). Work study analyses of this kind can distinguish between fruitless activities and those with actual productive payoff.

The traditional disinclination of police to make arrests in cases of domestic assault was based upon the assumption that violence between spouses was essentially a private matter, as opposed to 'real crime', and that police intervention would accomplish little. It is also regarded as potentially dangerous for the police officer. But analyses have shown that police intervention can have a deterrent effect on domestic assault. The Minneapolis Police Department conducted an experiment which randomly assigned one of three intervention strategies to cases of common assault by one spouse against another. The strategies included (1) arrest; (2) an order to the suspect to leave the premises for eight hours; and (3) advice, which included informal mediation in some cases. Arrested suspects were significantly less likely to engage in subsequent acts of violence than were those suspects assigned the other intervention strategies (Sherman and Berk, 1984).

It has long been assumed that the sooner police arrive at the scene of a reported crime, the more likely they are to apprehend the offender. Response time, therefore, has been regarded by some as indicative of police effectiveness. Research, however, suggests that other factors may confound what has become received wisdom. Not all crimes are susceptible to the impact of a timely police response. Many are not discovered until some time after their occurrence, when the suspect has already left the scene. Moreover, not all victims notify the police immediately when they become aware that a crime has been committed. Thus, the potential impact of police response time is largely dependent upon the timeliness of victim reporting. Only in a small proportion of calls for service will improved response time further law enforcement goals (Spelman and Brown, 1981).

Research findings from overseas are not necessarily generalisable to the Australian setting. But the existence of rigorously designed and well executed studies which suggest that some of the conventional assumptions underlying very expensive law enforcement strategies may well be false certainly invites closer scrutiny of Australian practices. Conversely, those studies which identify successful innovations in policing do not necessarily guarantee that such innovations will succeed if and when they are introduced in Australia. But they do merit the attention of police executives.

### **Problem-Oriented Policing**

One alternative to conventional law enforcement strategy which has attracted increasing overseas interest is Problem-Oriented Policing (Eck and Spelman, 1987). In contrast to the traditional style of policing which emphasises response to individual incidents, problem-oriented policing encourages the identification of recurring problems, the analysis of their underlying causes, and the development of policies directed at their abatement. Resources are focused at the cause, rather than at the symptom, of a problem. In law enforcement as in public health, policy goals may be more efficiently achieved through the elimination of underlying preconditions than through treatment on a case by case basis.

The methodology of problem-oriented policing encourages police to look beyond their immediate domain and to undertake broader analyses of public policy. Solutions which flow from this approach may entail a variety of public and private resources. If for example, a particular neighbourhood appears unusually vulnerable to vandalism, a local council may be encouraged to commission murals, or to sponsor other opportunities for community artistic expression.

Problem-oriented policing inevitably entails a considerable degree of cooperation between police and other public sector agencies. Coordination is almost always preferable to a fragmented, insular approach to policy matters.

### **Budgeting**

One widely supposed path to efficiency in police resource allocation (but one without much direct evidence of success) is program budgeting (Hudzik, 1988). This requires the precise specification of the various objectives of a police agency, the explicit identification of those activities undertaken in furtherance of each objective, and the assignment of costs to each activity. The budget is structured hierarchically, by objectives, by programs supporting each objective, by sub-programs supporting each program, and with each sub-program embracing a number of discrete activities. By requiring the specification of costs associated with each program or program component, program budgeting permits a logical analysis of resource utilisation, and facilitates the monitoring, control and assessment of activities. Program budgeting has only recently been introduced, and has yet to be fully implemented, by Australian police forces. Full implementation of program budgeting will greatly assist in the management of police resources.

### **Oversight**

Whatever progress the police themselves are able to make in relation to efficiency and expenditure reduction can be encouraged and reinforced by external oversight. Critical analyses of police budgetary proposals by responsible ministers and by finance or treasury officials can foster more rigorous cost accounting and resource allocation. Finance officials are, moreover, in a unique position to discourage the 'spend it or lose it' mentality which often characterises public sector activities towards the end of a financial year.

Financial auditing of government agencies, including police agencies, is a fact of public sector life. This too imposes a modicum of budgetary discipline upon a police department. Less common is the efficiency audit, which extends beyond financial accounts to administrative matters generally. In the United Kingdom, an Inspectorate of Constabulary conducts periodic audits of provincial police agencies and reports to the Home Office on their operational efficiency.

Australian police agencies are in a position to conduct their own internal audits, both financial and operational. The actual number of personnel assigned to this function in a given department could perhaps reveal its relative importance in the eyes of top administrators.

Parliamentary oversight by bi-partisan public accounts committees can also contribute to efficiency in law enforcement resource allocation. A commissioner of police who may be called upon publicly to justify a particular decision is likely to be less reckless in his spending or his management than one who is never brought to account. The impact of parliamentary scrutiny, moreover, extends beyond police to the elected government and its own monitoring apparatus.

Another potential guarantor of fiscal accountability on the part of police agencies, is the scrutiny of police resources accorded by the news media. Whilst routine budgetary matters are not generally regarded as of sufficient interest to warrant news coverage, critical discussion of issues in police expenditure and the occasional exposure of what may appear as a waste of taxpayers' money (Adams, 1984) can have a beneficial effect on the cost-consciousness of police in general, and police executives in particular.

Various oversight bodies are often in a position to act cooperatively to identify and to investigate apparent waste and inefficiency in police expenditures. The New South Wales Auditor-General has referred anomalous overtime payments and sick leave expenses to the parliamentary public accounts committee for further inquiry. Their subsequent reports have received widespread public attention (New South Wales Parliament, 1986).

Police executives themselves are crucial to improved efficiency and effectiveness in law enforcement. The policy statements they make, and the examples which they embody set the tone for the entire police organisation. A cost-conscious approach to policing begins at the top. Beyond making the point, unequivocally and convincingly, that expenditure control is a good thing, police executives may take other steps to encourage efficiency and effectiveness in law enforcement.

Just as police departments quite properly award citations for heroism and bravery, so too could they formally recognise and reward contributions to efficiency. From the moment of recruitment, expenditure control should be instilled as an essential value in police occupational culture. The capacity of police executives successfully to manage their resources might also be taken into account in selection procedures for more senior positions.

One of the organisational innovations with great potential for contributing to managerial efficiency is decentralisation. As noted in the introduction, Australian police departments are very large organisations indeed. With managerial control and financial accountability concentrated at the top of

a rigid hierarchy, it becomes all too easy to let cost control become somebody else's problem. The organisational and often geographical remoteness of management invited the abdication of fiscal responsibility. Recent developments in the regional decentralisation of police administration provide not only for the assignment of responsibility for efficient operation to line managers, but also inspire a degree of competition across divisions. The manager who must personally explain why his officers take twice as much sick leave as those in other divisions is more likely to take ameliorative action.

#### Part Four: Conclusion

Australians can no longer afford the luxury of being able to base public spending on faith alone. No public sector agency should be able to command an increase in resources unless it can demonstrate that its current allocation is being used efficiently, and that its resources are targetted at specific, measurable objectives in a logical manner. 'Professional judgment' alone is no longer an acceptable justification for the expenditure of millions of dollars. The public and their elected representatives are entitled to know just what these millions of dollars may be expected to purchase. Police must now demonstrate that the resources and authority provided to them are used productively.

The keys to efficiency in policing are improved management training, access to more timely cost and expenditure information, continuing decentralisation of police administration, and the requirement that any request for additional powers or resources be accompanied by detailed and thorough justification. Throwing new money at old problems may be politically expedient, but it is unlikely to result in a cost effective contribution to public safety. Simple increases in resources are no guarantee of improved performance. The indiscriminate investment of additional resources in traditional strategies, themselves never subject to critical scrutiny, can only be a recipe for waste. More imaginative use of existing resources, based on systematic operations analysis, and experimentation with new organisational arrangements and new operating procedures may be a more effective alternative to increased investment in conventional practices. It is essential for police executives to determine how resources are transformed into police activities, and how these activities impact on their targets. The basic questions are (1) What strategies do work? and (2) At what price? Research and experimentation with new approaches to manpower allocation, new models of organisation, and new technologies can provide at least some answers.

The essential basis for cost control in law enforcement is leadership. Personal commitment to economy in the allocation of taxpayers' money must be demonstrated first by the people's elected representatives. Within police ranks, it is the Commissioner who is the moral exemplar, the person who sets the tone for the force as a whole in matters of efficiency as well as honesty and integrity.

It is also essential that the public and their elected representatives develop a realistic appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of the police. Not all the ills of mankind are within the power of the police to control, nor should all of the problems of the community become responsibilities of the police. Police play a symbolic as well as an instrumental role in protecting Australian society. It can be just as costly simplistically to portray them as paragons of omnipotence, as it is to portray them as

paragons of virtue. To hold the police to account for objectives which are impossible to attain is both unfair to the police and bad public policy. To require or even to pretend that they uphold ambiguous, contradictory and unpopular laws is an invitation to cynicism and corruption.

Police executives, public officials and members of the public in general should learn to ask the right questions regarding police resources and their allocation. The expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars on law enforcement should be grounded in rationality, not in intuition.

## **Appendix One**

**A Partial Inventory of Performance Measures  
(Stage II: Impact) Adapted from Hatry et al, (1977).**

### Prevention of crime

1. Reported Crime Rate. Number of reported crimes (total or by specified crime type) per 1000 population. Source: police reports.
2. Victimization rate. Number of reported and non-reported crimes (total or by specified crime type) per 1000 population. Source: general citizen survey.
3. Household/ Business victimisation. Percentage of (a) households and (b) businesses victimised. Sources: General citizen survey; business survey.
4. Physical casualties. (a) Number and rate of persons physically injured (b) killed in the course of criminal or non-traffic, crime related police work.
5. Property loss. Dollar property loss from crime per 1000 population (for businesses, per \$1000 sales).
6. Patrol effectiveness. Number of crimes observable from the street per 1000 population.
7. Crime Prevention Inspection Effectiveness. Number of crimes against businesses per 1000 establishments in relation to time since last crime prevention inspection.
8. Peacekeeping in domestic disturbances and other localised quarrels. Percentage of disturbance calls with no arrest and with no second call within a specified time elapsed.

### Apprehension of offenders

9. Crimes solved. Percentage of reported crimes cleared, by type of crime, and whether cleared by arrest or by other means.
10. Arrest quality. Arrests for indictable offences as a proportion of all arrests; Percentage of arrests for indictable offences resulting in committal for trial.

11. Stolen property recovery. Percentage of stolen vehicles which are subsequently recovered; Percentage of total property value subsequently recovered.

#### Police responsiveness

12. Response time. Percentage of emergency or high priority calls responded to within 5 minutes; Percentage of high priority calls responded to within 30 minutes.
13. Perceived responsiveness. Percentage of (a) citizens and (b) businesses calling for police assistance who report that police came fast enough when called.

#### Fear of crime

14. Perceived personal insecurity. Percentage of (a) citizens (b) businesspersons who feel unsafe walking in their neighbourhood at night.

#### Honesty, fairness and courtesy

15. Perceived fairness. Percentage of (a) citizens (b) businesspersons who feel that police are generally fair in dealing with them.
16. Perceived courtesy. Percentage of (a) citizens and (b) businesspersons who feel that police are generally courteous in dealing with them.
17. Police Misconduct. Number of complaints of police misconduct per 100 sworn officers; percentage of complaints of police misconduct sustained by subsequent investigation.
18. Overall citizen satisfaction. Percentage of citizens rating police performance as excellent, good, fair, or poor, by reason for response.
19. Security of custody. Proportion of individuals who escape from police custody.
20. Safety of custody. Proportion of persons who suffer death or injury whilst in police custody.

### Footnotes

- (1) See generally Cain (1983); Waller (1980).
- (2) Couper (1983) lists the following non-police factors which contribute to the incidence of crime:

1. Community size.

Larger communities may be expected to have a higher crime rate than smaller communities.

2. Age structure.

Communities with a high proportion of residents aged between sixteen and twenty-four may be expected to have a higher crime rate.

3. Population density.
4. Residential mobility/transience.
5. Economic conditions/job availability.
6. Education.
7. Recreational opportunity.
8. Religious practices.
9. Climate.
10. Prevailing judicial/correctional practices.
11. Public attitudes toward crime.
12. Citizen reporting practices.

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
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