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**JUVENILE CRIME AND
CRIME PREVENTION**

**Estimating Costs and
Reviewing the Alternatives**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PART ONE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE COSTING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

1. A Conceptual Framework has been established for understanding the benefits of juvenile crime and delinquency avoidance. For analytical purposes we distinguish between the costs attributable to the actual commission of juvenile offences and the costs attributable to crime prevention.
2. In assessing the costs of juvenile crime and the benefits of delinquency prevention programs we are aware that costs tend to be both *immediate* and *budgetary* while the majority of benefits are deferred. Because of the difficulties of quantifying, in precise terms, how much crime is committed and because of difficulties in differentiating juvenile justice administration from that of adults, figures presented in this report are estimates only. Most figures presented are for the financial year 1986-1987.

PART TWO A SOME DIRECT COSTS OF CRIME

1. We believe that \$150 million is a reasonable estimate of the costs to the community of *car theft* committed by juveniles.
2. Our estimate of the total cost of *household burglaries* committed by juveniles is \$90 million. This figure does not take into account the cost of burglaries of commercial premises.
3. Our estimate of the cost to local governments of *vandalism* committed by juveniles is about \$4 million annually. This is a highly conservative estimate, given that some damages may be regarded as normal wear-and-tear, and not identified as a result of vandalism.

5. Approximately \$12 million is spent by State government departments having responsibility for administering *non-custodial sanctions* imposed by the courts on young offenders. We also estimate that remanding or committing juveniles to institutions costs taxpayers some 12 or 13 times more per day than does a probation or community service order.

6. It is very possible that of the total *private security industry* budget about one quarter, or \$250 million, is spent on preventing juvenile crime.

7. When we add together the direct cost of juvenile offending and both private and public sector expenditures on juvenile crime prevention, we derive a figure of approximately \$1.5 billion. This is our estimate of the cost of juvenile crime to the community.

PART THREE JUVENILE CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS

1. In considering juvenile crime prevention programs, it is important to recognise that a small minority of juveniles commit a large proportion of all juvenile crime.

2. Though there are some advantages in targeting prevention programs at high risk individuals, there are also economic and political arguments for targeting at-risk communities and groups.

3. There is strong empirical evidence to suggest that *pre-school based prevention strategies* - such as pre-school education - reduce the potential for individuals to engage in delinquent behaviour. Components of these programs that appear to be successful include well-trained staff, a low staff to pupil ratio, good relations between staff and parents and the use of an effective curriculum model derived from principles of child development.

4. There is strong empirical evidence to suggest that *school-based strategies* focused on low-income schools can reduce delinquency levels. In particular, evaluation studies show that schools which are generally 'instructionally effective' are also effective in reducing the potential for individuals to engage in delinquency.

vandalism on trains, house-breaking, vandalism on public housing and in other behaviours - is considerable.

CONCLUSION

1. We have estimated that the direct cost of juvenile crime is at least \$610 million. This figure is a rough estimate only and does not include all categories of crime. The need for better costing and reporting of juvenile crime by State agencies is critical especially if juvenile prevention programs are to be successfully evaluated.
2. It is apparent that incarcerating young offenders is perhaps twelve times more expensive than releasing juvenile offenders under some form of non-custodial supervision. Both types of disposal are equally effective in terms of recidivism rates.
3. Though we have analysed conventional and experimental methods of both processing and preventing delinquency, we believe that a strong economic argument can be made for directing resources away from the criminal justice system and into social programs in order to prevent delinquent behaviour. By focusing on educational, health, housing and employment problems of the young and disadvantaged, it may well be possible to reduce our need to put increasing resources into the criminal justice system.
4. In confirming the above point, we note that our evaluation of strategies that prevent delinquency confirm the efficacy of pre-school, school and parent-effectiveness programs as effective ways of reducing delinquency.
5. Though other programs have not been evaluated so thoroughly as the strategies noted in point 4. above, there are grounds to believe that some wilderness/sporting/recreational programs may be effective in reducing delinquency. In addition, job placement and community programs targeted at juveniles (such as the French crime prevention scheme) appear promising.
6. Situational crime prevention strategies aimed at reducing the opportunities juveniles have for committing crime are cost-effective with certain categories of behaviour. This point is illustrated by the \$9 million

reduction Telecom made in one year in its theft and vandalism to public telephone costs.

7. We deplore the lack of proper evaluations of juvenile prevention programs that mark Australian work in the juvenile delinquency field. Millions and millions of dollars have undoubtedly been wasted not through the lack of good intentions but by the lack of proper evaluation strategies. Programs are copied from one part of Australia to the other without any evidence that they are cost-effective. In future, government funding for prevention strategies should be conditional on those who promote such programs building in properly conducted evaluation strategies.

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Project

This project has two major purposes. The first purpose is to provide an overview of the costs of juvenile justice in Australia. The second purpose is to assess, at least in a preliminary way, evidence relating to the benefits the citizens and governments of Australia receive from the various expenditures they make on the various components of the juvenile justice prevention and treatment system. Given these two purposes an adequate conceptual foundation for examining juvenile costs is essential. This report consists of three parts. **Part One** presents a conceptual framework for examining costs. **Part Two**, using this framework, presents evidence on some of these costs for Australia (both of crime and crime prevention). **Part Three** examines the benefits of particular program interventions and is supported by some examples of International Program evaluations as summarised by David Williams, in **Appendix C**. Special emphasis has been given to overseas material owing to the paucity of data in the Australian research literature.

Without such a foundation any examination of the relative efficacy of major expenditure categories (for example, expenditures on police versus expenditures on the courts) or the relative worth of particular programs is impossible. Such a framework is also a precursor to any expansion, or re-organisation, of juvenile justice expenditure data if it is to be used to examine the costs and benefits of the Australian juvenile justice system.



PART ONE

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE COSTING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

A Social Cost Perspective: Crime and Crime Prevention

The cost aspect of juvenile justice can be examined at four different levels. First, and most broadly, we can examine the costs of juvenile crime from a social perspective. This approach, then, combines data on the cost of crime *and* the costs of preventing crime. For many purposes this is the most appropriate level of analysis as it potentially reveals the aggregate cost of crime to Australian society. At this level of analysis the costs of juvenile crime include all relevant gross government expenditures¹, other governmental costs which may not be carried on particular agency budgets or, indeed, appear directly on any budget, private sector expenditures on prevention and policing, victim costs including pain, suffering and fear, family costs and property loss and damage. In **Part Two** of this Report we examine some of these costs for Australia, for example the cost of arson, vandalism and household burglary. It must be remembered that all government expenditures are ultimately borne by private individuals either via taxation or deficits (deferred taxation).

Government budgetary costs cover a wide range of activities, including prevention, investigation detection, apprehension, prosecuting, diversion, adjudication, detention, supervision and post-release supervision. However,

1 Commonwealth documents frequently provide net aggregate State expenditure figures, that is gross expenditures **minus** criminal justice receipts, such as fines. From a social cost perspective it is appropriate to include **either** gross expenditures **or** net expenditures plus such receipts. From a convenience perspective it is usually easier to utilise gross budgetary expenditures. From an analytic perspective net expenditures plus receipts has the advantage that it reminds us that even the costs borne by offenders are a component of social cost.

although government budgetary costs are extremely significant, they are only one component of the total social costs of juvenile crime. It must be remembered that the total costs of juvenile crime are borne extremely broadly. Further, many of the non-governmental costs are likely to be carried in budgets that do not easily show their relationship to crime - such as the expenses of private firms and households. For example, it has been estimated that in the United States approximately \$22 billion is spent by firms and institutions on such items as burglar alarms and private security forces (Cohen, 1988) as against \$35 billion for police, defence counsel and prisons etc. Other costs include increased retail prices, witness time and insurance payments (Smith, Alexander and Thalheimer, 1980). This does not include the expenditures of private households on alarms and locks (Zedlewski, 1985) or the decrease in residential property values (Minnesota, 1977). Additionally at least three important categories of costs are not 'monetized' in most circumstances. Using US data Cohen argues that the 'pain and suffering' victim costs may exceed more direct victim costs such as lost wages and medical bills. Further he estimates that loss of life costs (in the US) may exceed both of the preceding costs (see also Smith, Alexander and Thalheimer, 1980). Gray (1979) has surveyed the costs associated with changing behaviour to avoid becoming a victim.

We must further keep in mind that only those costs which actually result from juvenile crime should be included in juvenile crime costs. For example, Zimring and Hawkins (1988), among others (Niederhoffer, 1969), have pointed out that crime prevention is only one of many police functions, including traffic control and domestic dispute intervention.

Many governmental and non-governmental budgetary items in the criminal justice arena are devoted to the prevention and processing of both adult and juvenile crime; the police and the courts are perhaps the primary examples in this category. This raises the difficult question of deciding which of these 'shared' crime costs should be appropriately attributed to juvenile crime. Of course, if such costs are truly joint any such allocation between adults and juveniles will be essentially arbitrary. If, on the other hand, one can reasonably assume that most of these expenditures would have occurred in the absence of juvenile crime the real social cost (that is, the marginal cost) attributable to juvenile crime will probably be low.

Costs, from this broad social perspective, are summarised in **Figure 1**.

Even at this early stage of this report we should emphasize that cataloguing such costs should not be seen as implying that is possible, necessary, or even desirable, to collect monetary, or quantify, of all of these costs. Extensive experience has shown that it is virtually impossible to use data at this level of analysis to make aggregate budget allocation decisions between governmental departments (see the experience of the *President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice*, 1967, and see *Weimer and Vining*, 1989 for a discussion and review of this issue at a more theoretical level).

FIGURE 1

Costs of Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Crime Prevention	=	government budgetary costs + non-government budgetary costs + private sector costs (prevention, 'policing', losses, etc.) + victim costs + family costs + property loss and damage costs - non-opportunity cost items
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A Social Cost Perspective: Crime Reduction

A second (narrower) cost focus is upon the social costs of *preventing* crime - that is the costs involved in attempting to control or reduce the level of crime in the community. These costs can be broadly divided into prevention costs and treatment costs. If one adopts either a deterrence or a rehabilitation perspective, treatment costs are one subset of prevention costs because presumably treatment effects the probability of re-offending.

The major budgetary costs are police patrol, investigation, arrests and detention; court processing (including prosecution and defence services) and 'treatment' (including institutional treatment, probation and other programs). Typically, these are costs which go to maintaining and servicing the criminal justice system as well as components of the child welfare system. Additionally many costs borne by governments are not 'captured' in budgets (e.g. lost taxes on wages not earned during institutionalisation or welfare payments to dependents (Maine, 1977)). Other expenditures may be found in budgets not

normally associated with the juvenile justice system, such as the federal Department of Health which is spending many millions of dollars on the task of educating the public about the harmful effects of drugs (the Drug Offensive).

Again this perspective still includes most non-governmental expenditures, but would exclude other costs which result directly from crime such as victim costs, family costs and property loss costs. This second more restricted definition of cost is summarised in **Figure 2**.

FIGURE 2

Cost of Juvenile Crime Prevention	=	government budgetary costs + government non-budgetary costs + private sector (prevention and policing) costs - non-incremental budgetary and other costs
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A Government Cost Perspective

A third, even more restricted, definition of cost looks only at the *governmental* costs of crime *prevention*. In practice, this usually means the budgetary costs, but conceptually it can, and should, include costs that are sometimes not included in agency budgets such as the opportunity cost of the land used for juvenile justice purposes. This version of cost is summarised in **Figure 3**.

FIGURE 3

Governmental Cost of Crime Prevention	=	Government budgetary costs + government non-budgetary costs - non-incremental costs
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In **Part Two** of this Report most of the cost estimates relating to the juvenile justice system is based on a Government cost perspective, and is further restricted to budgetary items.

A Program Cost Perspective

A fourth, and final version of cost is to examine the cost of particular prevention or treatment juvenile justice programs. This clearly is the most 'micro' level of cost analysis and, typically, the level at which it is possible (although still not simple) to present policy prescription. Here one examines the (marginal) cost of particular government programs. These costs typically focus on government budgetary costs, but once again the more conceptually correct approach is to include all costs (see Long, Mallar & Thornton 1981, for an excellent example of such costing).

FIGURE 4

Cost of Particular Prevention or Treatments Program (marginal)	=	Government budgetary costs
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
Cost Minimisation

If we look at this question from the social cost perspective the objective is to minimize total social costs. The problem for a rational government (that is, one acting in the interests of all citizens), then, is to minimize the aggregate costs of crime and crime prevention. Up to a point the more resources we put into crime prevention the less crime we will have; it is clear that, over at least some ranges, crime costs and crime prevention costs are inversely related to each other. We face a trade-off: as public and/or private expenditures on crime prevention increase the incidence and costs of crime go down. However, we face diminishing returns as we continue to increase expenditure on crime prevention. Therefore, we are searching for the combination of crime costs and crime prevention costs that minimises total social costs. This focus is by no means unique to juvenile justice. For example, the major benefit of health care is *avoided* illnesses and delayed death.

Economists represent such problems in terms of a set of indifference curves between the relevant 'goods' (crime and crime prevention costs). These

curves represent various levels at which we would be indifferent between a unit of crime and a unit of crime prevention costs: thus they represent our preferences for 'trading-off' crime and crime prevention cost. Such a set of indifference curves i are shown in Figure 5.² In this case we are interested in minimising *disutility* because individuals do not gain utility from either crime or crime prevention. Government can 'consume' different combinations of crime and crime prevention for a given budget. This trade-off is shown by the curve f .³

FIGURE 5



Given this the government reaches a minimum level of disability by consuming at point M. To repeat, the crucial point of this simple analysis (and this point can be lost at more restricted levels of analysis that focus on crime prevention expenditures) is that it should not be the purpose of government to minimize crime prevention costs, or government budgetary costs.⁴

2 We assume that these indifference curves are concave to the origin O (the normal assumption when dealing with this kind of problem).

3 This curve is shown as convex to the origin because it is assumed that there are diminishing marginal costs of consumption.

4 For further refinements to such a model see C. Smith, P. Alexander and D. Thalheimer *A National Assessment of Serious Juvenile Crime and The Juvenile Justice System: The Need for a Rational Response, v. IV*, Washington D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1980.

A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Benefits of Juvenile Crime and Delinquency Avoidance

Given that there are few benefits of crime itself⁵ we are primarily concerned with the benefits of crime avoidance. Assessing the benefits of any public intervention is one of the most complex and difficult tasks in public policy analysis. Assessing benefits in the criminal justice arena is more difficult than average as the primary benefits of criminal justice programs are *avoided* costs (i.e. the costs of crime). As we have already demonstrated many of these costs are extremely difficult to measure - in monetary, or even quantitative, terms.

Arguably assessing the benefits of *juvenile* crime and delinquency programs is one of the most difficult tasks within criminal justice applied research. Avoided costs (benefits) are likely to accrue over a long period, to be non-linear (i.e. avoided costs in 'outyears' may be greater than immediately [holding constant the issue of discounting such costs]), to be broadly spread throughout the community and intrinsically difficult to measure. It should also be remembered that social benefits may accrue outside the criminal justice system (that is, 'crimes avoided' are not the only benefit). These benefits are often not considered. For example, programs that increase employment, raise the level of education, teach skills, improve health and reduce unwanted pregnancy, even if they do not reduce recidivism, generate social benefits.

Given the inadequacy of cost data it has proved almost impossible to assess the benefits of 'macro' allocations, for example allocations to the police versus the courts. In practice the attempt to relate costs to benefits (broadly defined) have examined the costs and benefits of particular prevention and treatment programs.

5 Crime can sometimes be viewed as necessary or even desirable in certain circumstances, particularly if a Durkheimian perspective is adopted. The Function of crime in society is to maintain the moral boundaries of the community - it assists in maintaining the social structure through the collective conscience of the community.

We define prevention programs as being aimed at either the general juvenile population, 'at-risk' populations, or 'at-risk' individuals, while treatment programs are defined as being related to those *individuals* who have been convicted, or at least formally identified, as being juvenile delinquents.

A Social Perspective on Benefits (and Costs)

Three broad methodologies have been employed in studies that have attempted methodological rigour. Most rigorous, and most difficult to achieve, are those evaluations which compare all marginal costs (governmental and otherwise) to the total social benefits of the program (i.e. cost-benefit analysis). Thus benefits include not only avoided governmental costs but also other social costs. This type of evaluation is summarised in **Figure 6**. Clearly, to accurately determine what such avoided costs are, one needs good estimates of total social costs (see **Figure 1**). Very few (perhaps only one) studies have achieved this level of sophistication. Such a study attempts to reduce *all* the impacts of a proposed, or experimental, program to dollar impacts.

FIGURE 6

Cost of Particular Treatment or Prevention Program	<	Benefits	=	<u>avoided</u> Government budgetary costs + <u>avoided</u> non-government budgetary costs + <u>avoided</u> private sector prevention costs + <u>avoided</u> private sector 'policing' costs + <u>avoided</u> victim costs + <u>avoided</u> family costs + <u>avoided</u> property loss and damage costs - non- opportunity cost items
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Cost-Effectiveness Approaches

A more typical evaluation strategy is to compare the cost of a particular (usually experimental) program to the costs of alternative programs, most particularly the *status quo* program. Here a frequent assumption is that the benefits of such programs are equivalent (i.e. no differences can be identified). This approach is summarised in **Figure 7**.

FIGURE 7

Cost of Program	<	Other Governments' programs that achieve (or do not) the same benefits
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Finally the particular program may be compared on some quantitative, but non-monetised, measure to other programs. This can be useful if the costs of the alternative programs are approximately similar. This approach is summarised in **Figure 8**.

FIGURE 8

Quantitative Measure (benefits) of Program	<	Quantitative measure of costs of status quo program or other alternatives
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These latter two approaches are cost-effectiveness methods of assessing program worth. They have been quite commonly used in criminal justice, and juvenile justice research. Such approaches help one to determine whether particular programs are preferable to existing programs and policies. However it cannot help policymakers determine whether the program is socially desirable (compare with **Figure 6**).

This cost review suggests one clear cautionary note when thinking about the costs and benefits of such programs: costs tend to be both *immediate* and *budgetary*, while the majority of benefits are deferred (often a long time in the future) and have a large non-budgetary component. The fact that such benefits are in the future should be appropriately recognised (by the utilisation of the social discount rate), but this does not mean these benefits should be ignored.

The next section of this report examines some costs in the Australian context. First, we focus on some direct costs of juvenile crime, then on some crime prevention cost (as per **Figures 1 and 2** above), with particular emphasis on the governmental cost perspective (**Figure 3**). As a preamble the report examines two issues (1) identification of the juvenile offender; (2) identification of the extent of juvenile crime.



PART TWO A

SOME DIRECT COSTS OF CRIME

Introduction

In this part we estimate, as best we can, not only some of the direct costs of juvenile crime, but also the cost of the community's responses to it (crime prevention). For analytical purposes we distinguish between the costs attributable to the actual commission of juvenile offences and the costs attributable to crime prevention (mainly, but not exclusively governmental expenditures) according to the schemata outlined in **Part One**.

Before commencing our analysis however, it is important that we identify with some precision who are to be counted as juveniles for the purpose of this study, and also explain some of the inherent difficulties in measuring and costing the phenomena we call juvenile crime.

A Preamble to Costs: Identifying the Juvenile Offender

In Australia there is no single definition of a juvenile offender. This is because each State, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory have their own criteria for determining the age of criminal responsibility for young persons. Thus the minimum age of criminal responsibility (the age below which a person may not be prosecuted for a criminal offence) is either seven, eight or ten years, depending on the jurisdiction. Similarly the age at which young persons are treated as adults by the criminal justice system also varies from place to place and from time to time. In general, it is determined by law in each jurisdiction by reference to the age of the offender at the time that the offence is committed. Thus, depending on the jurisdiction, the upper age at which the criminal justice system will treat young persons as juvenile offenders is the age immediately

prior to their seventeenth or eighteenth birthday. Thereafter they are treated as adults by the criminal justice system.⁶

TABLE 1
Age of Criminal Responsibility and Percentage of Juveniles*
in the General Population

Jurisdiction	Min. and Max. Age of Criminal Responsibility	Population of Juveniles **	% of Juveniles in the General Population
New South Wales	10 yrs - under 18 yrs	713,863	13
South Australia	10 yrs - under 18 yrs	172,756	12
Queensland	10 yrs - under 17 yrs	321,305	12
Northern Territory	10 yrs - under 17 yrs	20,090	13
Victoria	8 yrs - under 17 yrs	476,011	11
Australian Capital Territory	8 yrs - under 18 yrs	38,335	15
Western Australia	7 yrs - under 18 yrs	198,574	13
Tasmania	7 yrs - under 17 yrs	52,499	12
Australia		1,993,433	12

* Juveniles taken to be persons aged between ten years and 17 years or 18 years, as the case may be.

** Based on ABS Estimates of Population 30 June 1987

Table 1 shows the variations in the age of criminal responsibility of juveniles in Australia, together with the estimated population as at 30 June 1987, of persons aged between ten to under 17 years, or ten to under 18 years, as the case may be (i.e. corresponding with the upper age of criminal responsibility as shown in Table 1). Occasionally, children under ten years of age are brought before the children's courts upon criminal charges (as opposed to welfare matters) but this is extremely unusual and for present purposes has not been included in the analyses. The final column in Table 1 provides an

⁶ While each state and territory has its own criminal justice system (criminal laws and procedures, police, courts, child welfare, corrections etc) for convenience the expression 'criminal justice system' is often used loosely as if there were only one such system in Australia. For an exposition of current law relating to juvenile crime in Australia, see Seymour, J. 1988, *Dealing with Young Offenders*, Law Book Company, Sydney.

indication of the proportion (expressed as a percentage) of juveniles in the general population for each jurisdiction, and for Australia as a whole.

The emphasis on age and time of offending are important because these determine to a significant extent the way in which the criminal justice system responds to the offender. Adult and juvenile procedures are deliberately different in order to protect the recognised vulnerability and diminished capacity of young persons. There are special rules which the police must follow when handling (interrogating, etc) young offenders. Special court procedures apply in the Children's Court (generally constituted by a stipendiary magistrate) and only in very exceptional circumstances (e.g. murder) will a juvenile be faced with the prospects of a trial by judge and jury. Furthermore child welfare departments rather than prison departments have the responsibility of caring for juvenile offenders who have been committed (as opposed to sentenced) by the courts to an institution or detention centre (rather than a prison).⁷

Given that there is this fundamental difference in the treatment of juveniles it follows, at least in theory, that it should be possible to estimate the amount of resources and therefore the dollar value devoted to processing juvenile offenders through the various stages of the criminal justice system. In reality however, there is a remarkable dearth of appropriate data. We simply do not have an accurate picture of the true level of crime or how much crime generally, or juvenile crime in particular, is costing the community.

The Task Ahead

It is important to stress again that it is almost impossible to quantify in precise terms how much crime is committed in the community. Official police data do provide some measure of the prevalence of various categories of crime, as illustrated, for example in **Table 2** which sets out some measure of the extent of juvenile crime in Victoria. However, in reality such data do not account for

⁷ However in rare cases juveniles are sent to gaol rather than committed to an institution. As for the power of Children's Courts to order imprisonment, see Australian Law Reform Commission report *Sentencing Young Offenders* 1988, Sentencing Research Paper No 11, AGPS Canberra, p. 157. Statistics published in the Institute of Criminology's *Juveniles Under Detention* series reveals that at any one time there are generally between 850 and 1,000 such persons in juvenile corrective institutions around Australia.

the 'dark figure' of crime - that is, they do not reveal the full extent of crime in the community. Most offences are simply not reported to the police.

TABLE 2
Child Offenders - Principal Offence by Sex and Disposition
(Vic) 1986-87

PRINCIPAL OFFENCE*	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	COURT	CAUTION	COURT	CAUTION	COURT	CAUTION
Serious Assault	205	55	36	16	241	71
Robbery	53	2	4	1	57	3
Rape	3	-	0	0	3	0
Sexual Penetration	12	2	0	0	12	2
Burglary	1340	1032	66	77	1406	1109
Shopsteal	330	336	166	302	496	638
Stopsteal Warning Notice	-	2464	-	1794	-	4258
Other Theft	983	943	87	116	1070	1059
Motor Vehicle Theft	835	312	46	37	881	349
Malicious/Wilful Damage, Arson	324	394	32	35	356	429
Deception Fraud	60	36	26	20	86	56
Firearm	49	102	3	0	52	102
Drug	124	62	15	10	139	72
Traffic	624	702	16	38	640	740
Street	448	411	73	91	521	502
Other	284	305	32	46	316	351
TOTAL	5674	7158	602	2583	6276	9741

* 'Principal Offence' is based upon the most serious charge levelled against the child.

In 1986-87, 16,017 child offenders were processed for 39,899 offences.

Source: Victoria Police 1986-87 Statistical Review, p.93.

In order to overcome this problem criminologists have sought to obtain a fuller picture by using victim surveys. There are also problems with this technique, for victim surveys rely on the knowledge and memory of victims of crime and upon the truthfulness and accuracy of their answers. Even so, they do provide an alternative measure of the size of the crime problem and indicate, in a crude form, the extent to which official police statistics understate the true level of crime. Unfortunately victim surveys are rarely conducted in Australia. The last one was in 1983 but this survey was not

designed in a way which would provide a check on the accuracy of police statistics. On best available evidence from overseas only about one third of all offences are brought to the attention of the police. This is illustrated by the British Crime Survey of 1983 (Table 3).

It should be noted that some police statistics are very reliable, such as motor vehicle theft or armed robbery of commercial premises, where insurance claims are tied to police reporting.⁸ At the other extreme, the true extent of offences within the family (consider, for example, incidents involving domestic violence) and sexual assault cases rarely come to the notice of police and those that do merely reflect a small proportion of the actual offences being committed.

Hence this report proceeds on the basis that police statistics, while understating the true level of crime, nevertheless provide the best data currently available upon the extent of crime in our society. They enable us to make some inferences and in turn, some tentative, though highly conservative, estimates as to the cost of administering criminal justice. However, even this task poses considerable difficulty - the problems exacerbated by the need to separate juvenile crime from adult crime before costs can be apportioned.

Paucity of Data

Most police departments which were approached to assist the Australian Institute of Criminology said they were unable to distinguish between general police duties from those relating to juveniles exclusively. This task was particularly difficult for those jurisdictions (the majority of States) which did not have a special unit devoted exclusively to juvenile offenders. Similarly, agencies administering the courts were often unable to provide figures on what proportion of the general budget for courts was allocated to children's courts alone.

⁸ According to a recent study by the NRMA (*Car Theft in Australia*, Sydney, 1988, p. 8) there were an estimated 60,500 car thefts in NSW in 1987. Of these 56,200 were reported to police. Direct cost to the community was estimated to be \$122 million in 1987.

TABLE 3
British Crime Survey Estimates:
Levels of Recorded and Unrecorded Crime, 1983

	British Crime Survey			Criminal Statistics		
	<i>Best Estimate (000s)</i>	<i>Number Reported (000s)</i>	<i>% Reported</i>	<i>Offences Recorded by Police (000s)</i>	<i>% Recorded of Reported</i>	<i>% Recorded of BCS Best Estimate</i>
1. Vandalism	2,953	620	21	229	37%	8%
2. Theft from motor vehicle	1,364	587	43	403	69%	30%
3. Burglary in a dwelling	904	615	68	432	70%	48%
4. Theft of motor vehicle	283	275	97	278	(101%)	98%
5. Bicycle theft	287	195	68	143	73%	50%
6. Theft in a dwelling	126	29	23	48	(166%)	38%
7. Other household theft	1,671	317	19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
8. Assault	1,852	685	37	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
9. Theft from person/Robbery	650	215	33	53	25%	8%
10. Sexual offences	71	6	8	8	(133%)	11%
11. Other personal theft	1,770	549	31	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
ALL BCS OFFENCES	11,931	4,057	34			

NOTES:

1. The figures in the first column are derived from applying BCS rates to the 1983 household population of England and Wales (for categories 1. to 7.), and to the population aged over 15 (for categories 8. to 11.). Only women were asked about sexual offences; the figures are based on women only.

2. Categories 3. 7. 8. 9. 10. and 11. include attempts.

3. Assault (category 8.) includes sub-categories of common assault and wounding. These sub-categories have been combined because of problems in developing consistent and objective criteria for distinguishing between the two. For the same reason, theft from the person and robbery have been combined.

4. Offences recorded by the police are rounded to the nearest 1,000.

Source: *Home Office Research Study No. 85: Taking Account of Crime*
 Key Findings from the 1984 British Crime Survey, p. 61.

Perhaps the best, most reliable figures relating to juvenile offenders was the cost of incarcerating juveniles in institutions although even here there were variations in the reliability of figures from State to State. Each jurisdiction could provide a global figure, but could not always break these down to provide data on how many juveniles pass through their system each year. In general there was found to be a paucity of data relating to the cost of juvenile crime and the cost of administering juvenile justice in Australia.

The matter is further complicated by the fact that no two jurisdictions collect their statistics in a uniform manner. This makes comparisons difficult and leads us strongly to endorse the view recently expressed by the Australian Law Reform Commission that:

an immediate effort is needed to upgrade significantly and co-ordinate a more comprehensive and integrated approach to juvenile justice data collection and research at national and local levels. (*Australian Law Reform Commission* 1988, p. 119).

Data obtained for this report are largely a tribute to those officers contacted in the various State and Territorial departments who went to considerable trouble and effort to produce the best information they could. Inevitably some respondents were able to contribute more comprehensive data than others and therefore much 'massaging' and interpretation of the data were necessitated. At the same time, where gaps in the data were found in one jurisdiction, assumptions based on trends in another were made. In this way estimates relating to the amount of crime committed by juveniles and the costs associated with administering juvenile justice were derived.

Estimating the Proportion of Juvenile Involvement in Offences Cleared

Having regard to the proportion of young people in the general population (**Table 1**) we know that young offenders commit a disproportionately high level of offences coming to the attention of police (see **Table 4**). This suggests that juveniles also demand a disproportionately high level of police attention. Further, we also know that offences which juveniles commit are generally of a less serious nature than those of their adult counterparts. We know for example that children have a tendency to commit minor property offences

TABLE 4

**Total Offenders in Offences Cleared
with Percentage of Juvenile Involvement**

Classification of Offences		NSW	Vic	Tas	SA	Qld	WA	NT	ACT	Australia
1	Offences Against Person (excluding 2 and 3 below)	12106 10%	5166 11%	555 15%	3998 17%	4300 13%	3731 18%	1072 8%	406 17%	31334 12%
2	Sexual Assaults & Related Offences	1706 11%	871 14%	84 23%	650 19%	851 16%	682 16%	83 16%	34 12%	4961 14%
3	Robbery & Extortion	627 20%	350 21%	67 24%	277 30%	247 21%	N.A.	28 11%	32 28%	1628 22%
4	Break/Enter/Burglary	8746 44%	5273 42%	1052 46%	2989 54%	5043 56%	8229 58%	1669 47%	424 57%	33425 50%
5	Fraud and Misappropriation by Employee	4994 7%	3069 9%	130 18%	1357 20%	1790 12%	2117 16%	543 5%	228 18%	14228 11%
6	Motor Vehicle Theft	2158 48%	2812 37%	319 62%	1574 52%	2333 38%	2046 68%	599 29%	295 53%	12136 47%
7	Shop Theft	N.A. 35%	17746 43%	789 43%	6435	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	729 55%	25699 38%
8	Other Thefts (including receiving and handling)	21362 28%	6054 28%	560 32%	4367 44%	16291 45%	11854 53%	1293 30%	626 28%	62407 38%
9	Arson & Wilful Damage by Fire	220 33%	135 53%	N.A.	139 44%	N.A.	58 16%	N.A.	6 0%	558 38%
10	Damage (including criminal and wilful)	5869 23%	2271 25%	N.A.	2637 37%	2866 32%	N.A.	N.A.	311 29%	13954 28%
11	Offences Against Public Order Vag. Prostitution	18485 16%	11657 7%	3735 15%	15057 23%	5337 8%	N.A.	N.A.	406 22%	54677 15%
12	Drug Offence	17448 6%	6186 3%	533 10%	7047 17%	7859 5%	N.A.	N.A.	224 4%	39297 8%
TOTAL OFFENDERS		93721 20%	67847 20%	7824 25%	46527 30%	46917 29%	38166 44%	5287 28%	3719 34%	310008 26%

rather than large scale property offences or offences against the person (Mukherjee 1983).

Table 4 shows, for example, that half the break and enter offences cleared by police in 1986-1987 involved juveniles. Similarly, the data suggest that juveniles feature very highly in motor vehicle theft (47 per cent). This may be compared with offences where juveniles do not appear to feature significantly, for example, offences against the person (12 per cent), fraud (11 per cent) and drug offences (8 per cent).

One reason given for the high proportion of juveniles coming to the attention of police is not that they are committing property offences in much greater numbers than their representation in the general population would suggest, but rather that they tend to commit offences in groups (Mukherjee 1983).

As will be seen in **Table 4**, it has not been possible to obtain complete data for all categories of offences in each State. Where omissions exist, they are clearly marked with the abbreviation N.A. (not available).

Problem of Attributing Crime Costs to Juveniles

Even if we knew how many crimes of a particular type were committed in the community, and we seem to have reasonably reliable figures in some areas, (e.g. car theft but consider the hypothetical case that follows), we cannot be certain what proportion of the total number of these offences are committed by juveniles and therefore we cannot simply calculate the cost to the community of juvenile offending.

Consider the following hypothetical example:

It is school holiday time. Mum and Dad are at work and the children are at home, unsupervised. Junior, a 16 year old youth and two of his mates drink a few beers ('tinnies') which they take without permission from the family refrigerator. In doing this they are already engaging in criminal activity. They then retire to the garage to discuss cars and driving. The keys are in the ignition switch of the spare car which is in the garage. They turn on the car radio. One of Junior's friends says he can drive and convinces Junior to let him start the car so they can all go for a short drive. Junior has no authority

to hand over the keys but peer pressure and grog lead him to concede to their wishes. They set out on their journey and the driver of the car, unlicensed and inexperienced, rounds a bend at too great a speed, runs off the road and damages the vehicle. The boys are shaken but not injured. The car is still roadworthy, and the occupants drive the car home. The boys then attempt to patch up the damage to the car but the wheels, the steering and the duco need repair. When Mum and Dad return home they discover the damage to their vehicle, and slowly there is a full disclosure of the facts of the incident.

Police are not informed (a further offence - this time by the adults) because Junior's parents are concerned about the adverse effects of prosecution on their child and his mates. The car is insured against damage but in order to claim under the policy the parents must sign a false declaration stating that one of them, rather than Junior, was driving at the time of the accident. They are not prepared to do this, although the quantum of damage (in this case \$600) is an influencing factor in this decision, as loss of the excess and no claim bonus would also mean they would lose close to this sum. Instead they decide to consult with the other boys' parents. Ultimately the parties agree to 'cover up' the incident (each becoming accessories after the fact to car theft) and decide to contribute equally to the cost of repair of the vehicle.

This case illustrates several problems relating to defining the cost of *juvenile* crime. First, the damage caused will not be recorded as a cost of juvenile crime. There are, no doubt, many such or similar cases, the costs of which are borne by the parties rather than by insurance companies or the community generally. The long term effects of this crime may be beneficial for the parties, each learning a lesson from the experience itself, without the adverse effects of stigmatisation that could flow from court action. Secondly, there are no public costs (police, courts, welfare) because the matter is handled privately to the satisfaction of the parties involved.

Suppose further that during the course of the accident, the 'stolen' vehicle had knocked over and damaged beyond repair an Australia Post letter box. If there were no independent witnesses, the authorities would not be able to determine whether the damage caused to the letter box was accidental (that is, the result of a non-criminal act) or a result of deliberate vandalism. Further the authorities would not know whether the incident was committed by an adult rather than a young person. In these circumstances the cost which

is borne by the public, would not be attributed to juvenile crime, even though it should be.

It is against this background of uncertainty that we tentatively undertake the task of apportioning a value to the direct cost of juvenile crime. In so doing, we deliberately focus on some specific categories where we do have data. These include: motor vehicle theft, household burglary, various categories of vandalism, arson, shoplifting and some costs attributable to violent crime. We begin with motor vehicle theft - a very common form of juvenile crime.

Motor Vehicle Theft

According to the NRMA (1988a), there were 60,500 cars stolen in New South Wales in 1987. This resulted in an estimated direct cost to the community of \$122 million. This figure can be broken down to \$100 million incurred by insurance companies, \$13 million incurred by policy holders for payment of excesses on their claims for stolen and damaged vehicles and \$9 million for car owners who had no insurance cover. The NRMA points out that their figure of \$122 million does not include increased premiums paid by individual policy holders as a result of losing their no claim bonuses, the damage done to private and public property in car theft incidents, incidental costs and inconvenience suffered by victims of car theft, and the administrative burden incurred by the police in following up reported incidents of car theft.

After the Northern Territory, NSW has the highest rate of car thefts when measured against the number of vehicles registered and accordingly, an estimate of the total cost of car theft to the Australian community would be somewhat short of three times the NSW figure (3 x \$122m) or \$366 million for 1987. The NSW figure is multiplied by three because comparable data from other States were unavailable and NSW has approximately one-third of Australia's total population.

If then we assume that the damage caused by juveniles is in the same proportion as their involvement in offences cleared (our **Table 4**) then the juvenile component would be 47 per cent of the total cost. This is equal to \$169 million. We feel however that this figure may over-represent the true picture, for the reasons given previously, and particularly because juveniles tend to commit their offences in groups. Accordingly we believe that a figure

of \$150 million would be a reasonable estimate of the costs to the community of car theft committed by juveniles in 1987.

Household Burglary

According to a recent report by the NRMA (1988b), the total cost of burglary of private dwellings in NSW for 1987-88 was about \$100 million. If the figure for 1986-87 was about 10 per cent less than this (i.e. \$90 million) then, again generalising from the NSW experience, the total figure for the whole country would be about three times this amount, or \$270 million.

Although police figures show that juveniles seem to be involved in every second burglary offence (see Table 4, above) it is not unlikely that they are involved in the less serious and less professional offences. Also they are more likely to commit their offence in groups, and are more likely to be caught. Accordingly, a conservative estimate of their contribution to the total cost of household burglaries is calculated on the basis of one-third of \$270 million or \$90 million.

Note that this figure relates to household burglaries and does not include other burglaries, such as those involving commercial premises. We were unable to obtain a costing of the latter despite extensive attempts to obtain police and insurance company figures.

Vandalism and Local Government

Time has not permitted a thorough investigation of the extent and cost of vandalism sustained by local government councils. However figures for the Gold Coast City Council, which in budget terms is the second largest Council in Australia, indicates that in 1986-87 the budget was \$36 million. The cost attributed by the Council to vandalism was \$137,321 or about 0.4 per cent of their total budget.

According to the Local Government Association, the total budget for local councils in Australia in 1986-87 was about \$1.2 thousand million. If 0.4 per cent of the budget is a typical allocation of the proportion spent on repair work vandalism could cost councils as much as \$5 million per year. In

addition to this amount there would be costs which are included in their general maintenance programs, which may not be readily recognised or identified as being attributable to vandalism.

Further, in order to reduce the incidence of vandalism and other crime, security is becoming an increasingly important component of the overall budgets of councils. It has been advised that some local government councils are adding a figure of 20 per cent to their building outlays in an attempt to prevent damage from vandalism. Waverley and South Sydney councils support graffiti classes in the hope of reducing vandalism, and a number of councils employ youth workers, have youth centres, cycling tracks and various other sporting facilities, in an attempt to discourage youth from crime, drugs and boredom⁹. No attempt has been made to provide precise figures in these areas, although such cost must be substantial. In any event these costs are more properly categorised as belonging to the indirect costs of crime (i.e. crime prevention costs).

As an initial estimate we claim that direct damage from vandalism by juveniles cost local governments about \$4 million annually. We believe that this figure grossly underestimates the true cost of vandalism to local government authorities but we have erred deliberately on the side of caution in arriving at our estimate.

Arson and Vandalism

Although juveniles appear preoccupied with property offences, the value of damage they cause tends not to be significant. This of course is a generalisation, for in specific cases individual offenders have caused many hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of damage. The following press report typifies the extreme case:

⁹ An excellent review of local government recreation facilities in the Sydney metropolitan area was recently published by Natasha Bitá in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 31 May 1989.

\$1m vandalism: boy, 9, held

BRISBANE: Police were holding a nine-year-old boy yesterday and expected to detain three other children after a \$1 million rampage through three southside Brisbane schools. The other boys ranged in age up to 17, police said.

Investigating detectives believed that the four were responsible for damage estimated at \$1 million to the Buranda State Primary School, the Buranda Special School and the Buranda School for the Visually Impaired.

However a police spokesman said children under 10 were not held criminally responsible for their actions.

Some time after 5 pm yesterday vandals had broken into the schools and smashed television sets, videos and computers, police said. Paint had been poured on carpets and into computer keyboards (*Canberra Times*, 13 September 1988).

According to a study done by Nicholas Clark and Associates (1986) there are 25,000 fires per year in New South Wales of which around 4,000 are considered to involve arson or possible arson. In 1985-86 the NSW Fire Brigade figures suggested an estimated \$150 million in replacement damage costs. Children under the age of 16 years are said to be responsible for 28 per cent of the fires, yet are responsible for about 7 per cent of the fire damage. No doubt the percentage would climb slightly if young persons under 18 were included in the analysis.

The total arson bill for 1985-86 is estimated at around \$65 million. If juveniles contributed to 10 per cent of this amount they, then, would be responsible for \$6.5 million for arson fire damage in New South Wales alone. If trends were similar throughout the country the figure for 1985-86 would be \$19.5 million. Conservatively, in 1986-87 this figure could have risen beyond \$20 million, and does not take into account additional social costs of fire.

There are some reliable data on arson and vandalism in NSW Government Schools which enables some further estimates to be made upon the direct costs of these crimes. The NSW Department of Education advises that in 1986-87 arson and vandalism cost the State Government \$14 million. This figure can be broken down into two categories: (1) external vandalism and arson which accounts for \$5 million, and (2) internal vandalism which costs the State Government \$9 million dollars.

We estimate that 90 per cent of this figure could be attributable to juveniles - a total cost of \$12.6 million. If this figure applied across Australia, the total expenditure under this head would be in the order of \$35 million.

Telecom Vandalism

According to senior management in Telecom Australia, damage to their equipment and installations from vandalism for 1986-87 amounted to \$18.5 million. It was advised that 466 people were apprehended for various offences and that 60 per cent of these were juveniles. Though there are problems with arriving at juvenile rates of involvement in Telecom vandalism from arrest figures, we have estimated that juveniles were responsible for at least 60 per cent of the damages at a cost of about \$11 million. This figure does not take into account any inconvenience or harm occasioned to the public by these acts, nor the investment by Telecom in devising preventive measures in its attempt to reduce the incidents of such behaviour, nor of course the resources devoted to bringing offenders to justice.

Vandalism of Public Transport

An attempt was made to obtain reliable data from some government departments as to their estimation of the costs of vandalism to public transport facilities.

The State Transit Authority, which has responsibility for ferry and bus services in New South Wales were unable to supply any data on the question of costs attributable to vandalism. However a spokesperson for the Authority claimed that in his view, the amount involved would be small in view of the fact that buses were always attended when in action, and safely locked up when not in service. Similarly, the ferries always had supervision when carrying passengers, thus reducing the opportunities for destructive behaviour.

The Institute of Criminology has already evaluated sports and recreational schemes other than wilderness programs. While overseas research has revealed that there is a negative association between sport and delinquency, at least for males, it is by no means established that this relationship is a causal one. It is very possible that participation in sport does act as a

deterrent against delinquency, but it is equally plausible that those boys who are more prone to be delinquent choose not to be delinquent (Mason and Wilson, 1988).

Despite this reservation it was clear from the study conducted by the Institute that some sporting and recreational programs may be beneficial as a way of preventing delinquency, especially for Aboriginal youth. Certainly Aboriginal spokespersons believed that for a whole range of activities (petrol and glue sniffing, other forms of drug taking, delinquent behaviour, etc.) well thought out programs may have clear prevention potential.

The elements of sporting and recreational programs that appear to be useful have been dealt with in the Institute's report and do not need to be repeated here. However two points about such programs should be stressed.

The first point is that one of the greatest shortcomings in this area is the lack of follow-up or evaluation of the success or failure of such programs. Secondly, and of equal importance, is the fact that any sporting and/or recreational program cannot be implemented without consideration of more wide ranging measures. In both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities numerous other issues, such as unemployment, poverty and lack of self-determination (in the case of Aborigines) need to be addressed with equal priority.

As delinquency-prevention measures, sport and recreation programs may well offer advantages to young Australians. However, they should not be seen as a substitute for more wide-ranging economic and social reforms. Though this caveat is applicable to all delinquency prevention schemes we believe that it is especially relevant for sporting and recreational programs where there is a tendency to see such programs as an end in themselves.

In 1986 the Australian Institute of Criminology published a report entitled *Graffiti and Vandalism* for the State Rail Authority of New South Wales (Healy & Wilson 1986). It found that the overall costs for vandalism and graffiti in the year 1984-85 was \$4.79 million. If these offences increased by a modest 10 per cent, a figure of \$5.3 million is derived for 1986-87. The report also indicates that 73 per cent of offenders apprehended were under 20 years of age. If then a small reduction is made for offenders between 18 and 20 years of age, it is estimated that the juvenile involvement in these offences

would be in a ratio of two persons out of three. The NSW figure for the damage caused to railways by juveniles is then estimated at \$3.5 million. The estimated cost for the whole country therefore, is likely to be about three times this amount, or \$10.5 million. Though Sydney, in particular, has a major vandalism problem and therefore our estimate for the whole country could be viewed as excessive, it should be remembered that once again, there is no attempt to cost and apportion the value of preventive measures employed by these authorities. For example, the State Rail Authority has its own police (transport and investigation branch) the function of which is to reduce the incidence of crime on the railways. Such expenditures are not included in our analysis.

Shoplifting

According to the Retail Traders' Association of Australia, the value of goods stolen from retail stores is of the order of 1.75 per cent of total retail sales. This accords with the figure acknowledged as conservative, derived for the United Kingdom by Buckle and Farrington in 1984 (Burrows 1988, p. 15). Assuming this figure is correct, the value of property stolen is in the order of \$1,200 million for the financial year 1986-87. If then it is assumed that juveniles were responsible for one-quarter of this amount (and this is a conservative assumption based on data given in **Table 4** indicating a 37 per cent involvement), then juveniles could be found responsible for shopstealing to the value of \$300 million. This figure is very tentative for a number of reasons:

- . most retail theft is undetected and it is not known whether the majority of offences are committed by adults or juveniles;
- . adults may tend to be responsible for the more serious and juveniles the less serious offences in this category;
- . it does not take into account employee theft and fraud, which is thought to involve even greater losses than those attributed to shoppers (Burrows 1988, p. 17).

Estimating Some Costs of Violent Crime: The Cost of Injuries

Unfortunately there are no national data upon which to estimate on an offence by offence basis, the cost to the community, of violent crime committed by juveniles. We have only been able to estimate some hospital costs to victims.

The New South Wales Information Systems Unit, in the NSW Department of Health, has advised that in 1986-87:

- . Three thousand one hundred and thirteen males were admitted to hospital for injuries which were identified as being purposely inflicted by another person with intent to injure or kill. This amounted to a total of 32.01 hospital years or an average time of 3.75 days per patient (victim).
- . Eight hundred and twenty six females were similarly admitted, for a total of 11.35 hospital years or 4.65 days per victim.
- . The average cost per day for hospital care in New South Wales in 1986 was approximately \$260.

Thus the total amount for persons hospitalised in New South Wales as a result of injuries identified as purposely inflicted is approximately \$4.1 million. Accordingly the figure for the whole of Australia would be in the vicinity of three times this amount, or \$12.3 million for 1986.

Of the \$12.3 million referred to, the proportion of costs attributed to juveniles would probably not exceed 10 per cent of this amount, or \$1.23 million.

This figure does not include persons treated in casualty departments for deliberately inflicted injuries and not hospitalised. It does not include the cost for persons who seek medical attention and receive treatment from general practitioners. It does not include cost of ambulance services, nor the cost of operations consequent upon the more serious cases of physical injury.

It also does not include the cost of psychological damage, or incidental costs to victims, such as damage to clothing etc. Nor does it take into account the loss of wages, productivity etc., of those who are seriously injured. The 'real' cost would therefore be substantially greater than the figure suggested here.

Table 5 sets out some data on Criminal Compensation payments. Unfortunately these data do not identify what proportion of the cases involved juvenile offenders, and accordingly it is not possible to assess the contribution of juvenile offending to the total payments awarded. However, even those offences which might be seen as relatively minor assaults can lead to substantial injuries and significant payouts to victims. For example, consider the following two cases set out in the Annual Report 1986-87, of the *Criminal Injuries Compensation Ordinance 1983 (A.C.T.)*.

The first case relates to a young male applicant who was assaulted by a fellow high school student (awarded \$6,165) and the second relates to a 13 year old boy who was threatened and chased by three others on a bicycle path (awarded \$3,079.95).

The applicant was walking away from a group of students when one of them approached him from behind, grabbed his hair and twisted his head around. The boy then punched the applicant on the mouth with a clenched fist. The blow to the mouth broke the upper left central incisor and resulted in him having to undertake dental treatment for the purpose of fitting a crown to the broken tooth. The initial treatment was carried out over a period of a month, resulting in the fitting of an acrylic jacket crown. His dentist indicated that a replacement porcelain crown would be necessary at a later date. Both the injury and the subsequent treatment caused him severe pain, and future dental treatment will also cause pain. As a result of the incident, he has some difficulty eating and is fearful of playing contact sports such as football. \$4,500 was awarded for pain and suffering. (Aust. Attorney-General's Department 1987, p. 46).

[The thirteen year old victim] tried to ride away from the youths but the chain of his bicycle came off, causing him to stop. The youths caught up with him, grabbed the back of the bicycle and lifted it off the ground, causing him to fall heavily to the ground, hitting his chin and wrist on the ground. As a result of the assault, he suffered cuts and abrasions to his chin, left knee, left wrist and knuckles. X-rays revealed a fracture of the left wrist. After the abrasions healed, his arm was set in plaster for six weeks. His left knee required constant dressing for several weeks and left noticeable scarring. As he is left-handed, he was significantly inconvenienced by the incident until his left wrist

healed. \$3,000 was awarded for pain and suffering. (Aust. Attorney-General's Department 1987, p. 49).

These two cases illustrate one method of costing the harm resulting from 'violent' juvenile crime. However it is clear that there are many cases where criminal injuries are occasioned and compensation is not sought. Accordingly we have decided not to attempt to estimate the direct costs of such crime here. Before such an undertaking could, or indeed, should be attempted more research and better record keeping and statistics would be required.

TABLE 5
Criminal Compensation Payments 1986-87*

ITEM	NSW \$	VIC \$	QLD \$	SA \$	TAS \$	WA \$	NT \$	ACT \$	TOTAL \$
Victims of Crime (Injuries)	8,367,000	8,254,000	205,000	1,313,000	410,000	1,470,000		647,564	20,666,564
Victim Crime (Others)	4,424,000								4,424,000
Crime Comp. Tribunal		379,000							379,000
Victims of Crimes Organisation			15,000						15,000
TOTAL	12,791,000	8,633,000	220,000	1,313,000	410,000	1,470,000		647,564	25,484,564

* From the Grants Commission Annual Report 1986-87, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Annual Report of the A.C.T. 1986-87, the Statutory Report of the Assessor of Criminal Injuries (December 1986 to December 1987) Western Australia.

Summary

The estimates given above are extremely tentative. They certainly do not represent the full cost of juvenile crime to the Australian community, as there are many items that could be added to the list (see **Part One**). As indicated in the text, the figures that are presented in the following table have been derived from extrapolations from data taken from individual jurisdictions. If we take into account only the items which we have quantified and add them, the following figure for 1986-87 is obtained.

TABLE 6
Summary of Selective Categories of Direct Costs
for Juvenile Offending

ITEM	\$ MILLIONS
Motor Vehicle Theft	150.0
Burglary (excluding burglary of commercial premises)	90.0
Vandalism - Local Government	4.0
Arson and Vandalism - Schools	35.0
Telecom	11.0
Public Transport	10.5
Shoplifting	300.0
Personal Injury (only inpatient bed day costs)	1.2
Total	601.7

It should be emphasised that even for offences selected, this figure falls far short of an aggregate estimate of the real cost of juvenile crime. To reiterate, the social costs of crime consists of the cost of crime and the cost of crime prevention. Unfortunately in Australia the figures we have available on the cost of crime and crime prevention are sparse and unreliable. We would strongly urge relevant agencies concerned directly or indirectly with juvenile justice issues to keep reliable and systematic information on criminal justice matters, especially as they relate to juveniles.

We consider the keeping of such records as a matter of urgency. Without such information it is almost impossible to argue for new programs in ways which would appeal to State and Federal Treasury officials who allocate funds in this area. In addition, no thorough evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of crime prevention initiatives can possibly be conducted without such records.

Because of the lack of reliable data on the costs of crime prevention schemes we have been hampered in adequately costing crime prevention strategies. Nevertheless we turn now to consider some aspects of such schemes based on what data are available.

PART TWO B

CRIME PREVENTION COSTS

It is time to consider those aspects of the costs of juvenile crime which fall under the general heading of crime prevention. We proceed with trepidation, not only because of the paucity of the data, but also because of the nature of our inquiry. As some eminent criminologists have recently observed:

There may be many different ways to measure the harm attributable to crime. But even if we confine ourselves to trying to estimate costs in dollars, the attempt to aggregate guard-dog food expenditures with victim dollar losses with variations in police pension levels into a single monetary total seems misconceived. Those who invest resources in pursuing this goal may be barking up the wrong tree. (Zimring and Hawkins 1988, p. 435).

Accordingly we avoid the temptation of attempting to derive a simple formula which specifies the relationship between crime costs and offence rates; we are not concerned for example to show that by increasing or reducing the population of those incarcerated in juvenile institutions there will be a particular impact on the general levels of crime in the community. Rather in this part we simply seek to identify non-exhaustively, some expenditures which relate to crime prevention.

Some Estimates of Governmental Costs of Crime Prevention

The Sourcebook of Australian Criminal and Social Statistics 1856 to 1988 (Mukherjee *et al* 1989), contains details of the actual net expenditure by governments on social services in Australia. It shows that for the fiscal year 1986-1987, the amounts spent on justice, education and health were as follows:

TABLE 7
Aggregate Expenditures 1986-1987:
Justice, Education and Health

Actual Net Expenditure	\$ Thousand million
Justice	2.6
Education	9.3
Health	8.0

'Justice' here is very broadly defined and includes the police, the administration of the courts and the prison systems throughout Australia.

However, as only a very small fraction of juvenile offenders are detained in adult correctional institutions, the justice figure should be adjusted by excluding amounts contained in the corrective services budgets but including amounts in budgets relating to child welfare matters. As can be seen from the following table, when these adjustments are made, the justice figure remains at about the same level, i.e. approximately \$2.6 thousand million.

TABLE 8
Cost of Justice Administration
(excluding Corrective Services and including
Child Welfare Services)

ITEM	NSW \$M	VIC \$M	QLD \$M	WA \$M	SA \$M	TAS \$M	NT \$M	TOTAL
WELFARE SERVICES	198,687	151,119	63,138	66,405	53,491	16,989	12,421	562,250
POLICE & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE	686,378	513,264	307,804	192,793	186,724	61,104	64,125	2,012,192
TOTAL	885,065	664,383	370,942	259,198	240,215	78,093	76,546	2,574,442

Source: *Grants Commission Report 1986-1987.*

If it were possible to assume that \$2.6 thousand million spent on Justice was distributed in proportion to juveniles in the total population, then it could be concluded that 12 per cent (see Table 1) of this amount, or approximately \$312 million, would be absorbed in the administration of juvenile justice in Australia.

This assumption could be questioned on the ground that it is likely that proportionately greater resources are directed towards adult, rather than juvenile crime. For example, consider the amount of police resources required for the tracking down and bringing to justice of organised criminals involved in the international drug trade. Compare this with juvenile crime which, as we have said, is generally regarded as being of a less complicated and often trivial nature, and so demanding less resources and effort on the part of criminal justice agencies. Against this is the belief that the young are more criminogenic than mature adults and therefore demand a disproportionately higher level of care and attention on the part of criminal justice and welfare agencies.

One further important qualification should be noted. The figures cited in the previous tables are net expenditure figures. They do not include revenues by governments relating to criminal justice activities (such as fines or court costs). They do not, therefore, provide an accurate picture of gross expenditures; revenues should be *added* to net expenditures to gain a more accurate picture of social costs.

The Police

By far the largest slice of governmental expenditure on law and order - some two-thirds of the total justice budget in Australia - is spent on police. This is not an exceptionally high proportion as it is consistent with most other countries, where police consume between two-thirds and three quarters of total criminal justice expenditures (Glaser 1983, p. 19). Figures supplied to the Australian Institute of Criminology or otherwise contained in annual reports are summarised as follows:

TABLE 9
Police Budgets 1986-1987

JURISDICTION	\$ MILLIONS
New South Wales	522.9
Victoria	395.4
Queensland	250.5
South Australia	170.9
Western Australia	160.6
Tasmania	40.5
Northern Territory	47.0
Australian Federal Police	70.0*
Total Australia	1,657.8

* Excludes counter-terrorism, protective security and coastal protection (approx \$20 m.), includes \$38.3 m. for national crime investigation.

More recent figures now suggest that expenditure on police services in Australia may exceed two billion dollars (see Grabosky 1988). However, as most of the data referred to in this report relate to the financial year 1986-87, reference will continue to be made to the lower figure.

Unfortunately there are no figures which would provide a breakdown of the proportion of police resources devoted exclusively to juvenile justice matters. When asked to provide such data most police departments replied that this could not be done. The NSW response that follows typifies the kind of answers received from police:

It is not possible to estimate, nor provide any basis for 'guesstimating' the amount of police resources utilised on juvenile crime investigation or prevention. Indeed, it is impossible to estimate the total amount of police resources utilised in crime investigation or prevention, since some part (indeterminate) of any police action may be directed to these ends.

Thus, while we cannot identify with any degree of precision the amount of police resources devoted to juvenile offenders and juvenile offending, we can

safely conclude that inevitably, they must absorb a considerable proportion of police time and effort.

Table 4, which is a compilation of official police statistics (excluding traffic offences) demonstrates that with regard to offences cleared by police about one offender in four is a juvenile. If all things were equal (but, clearly they are not), and if it were to be assumed that police are not engaged in activities other than criminal investigation, crime prevention and related matters (but clearly they are), it would then be possible to say that about one quarter of police resources or approximately \$414 million of the police budget in 1986-1987 was devoted to the prevention, detection and processing of juvenile crime. The artificiality of this reasoning is conceded, and the figure derived is purely hypothetical, based as it is on the assumptions already made.

Further, we can continue to speculate that if the figure of \$414 million accounted for two-thirds of the *total* amount spent on juvenile justice generally (police expenditure being approximately two-thirds of monies spent on criminal justice generally) then the total budget (the cost to the taxpayer for the administration of juvenile justice) would be about \$620 million.

Interestingly, the latter figure is just under twice the amount (\$312 million) calculated by reference to the proportion of juveniles in the general population.


Which of the two figures is closer to the reality of what is being spent on juvenile justice? We have already indicated that young offenders commit a disproportionately high level of property offences coming to the attention of police. This suggests that they also therefore demand a disproportionately high level of police attention. On the other hand, offences which juveniles commit are generally of a less serious nature and rarely involve large scale property offences or offences against the person (Mukherjee 1983). Thus juveniles may demand more attention and resources in some respects and less in others.

Figure 9 which charts data from **Table 4** shows, for example, that half the break and enter offences cleared by police in 1986-1987 involved juveniles. Similarly, juveniles were very conspicuous in motor vehicle theft (47 per cent). This may be compared with offences against the person (12 per cent), fraud

(11 per cent) and drug offences (8 per cent), where juveniles do not appear to feature significantly.

Figure 9

Total Offenders in Offences Cleared *with % of ju*
Australia



Serious crime which occasions considerable harm to individual members of the community, or occasions considerable financial harm, (such as the \$1 million rampage of damage to schools by children in Queensland, referred to earlier), are fortunately isolated cases. **Appendix A** sets out the value of property stolen for property offences committed by juveniles appearing in the NSW Children's Court in the year ended 30 June 1987. These data illustrate that most offences committed by juveniles do not involve serious financial harm to victims.

What is worrying is the possibility, and only too often the reality, that relatively young offenders will graduate to commit more serious crime. Our child welfare institutions and prison systems testify to the failure of these traditional responses to young offenders. This is so even though a minority of those who are committed to institutions (about 30 per cent) do not recidivate. It is for this reason that the cost-effectiveness of criminal justice agencies and

the efficacy of both custodial and non-custodial programs for the young need to be evaluated.

While young offenders are less sophisticated than their adult counterparts and therefore are more easily caught (suggesting that they do not attract a great deal of effort on the part of the police) they nevertheless demand careful attention and therefore police time in the charging and interrogation process. Parents or guardians must be involved, and even the practice in some states of formally cautioning juveniles does involve considerable investment of police time and effort.

Against this it is acknowledged that young offenders do not often become involved in complicated fraud, drug or organised crime cases which demand concerted long term planning or surveillance by police, followed by lengthy court proceedings.

While we cannot say that a direct relationship invariably exists between the amount of damage or harm caused by particular offences and the amount of resources devoted to their investigation and prosecution, this is often the case. However, sometimes the cost of processing even the most trivial offence, such as shoplifting can, in a contested case, cost the police much more than the value of the item stolen (and more than some other more serious offences where the more serious offence is admitted, see **Table 10** below). Thus, while it is difficult to generalise, we believe that an evaluation of the amount of police resources devoted to juvenile crime detection and prevention is a function of the number of offences committed by juveniles coming to the attention of police, the comparative gravity of these offences, and the type of responses to them (e.g. no action, degree of investigation, caution, prosecution in children's court, full trial).

Our tentative conclusion therefore, is that the amount of resources notionally devoted by the police to juvenile justice matters exceeds in all probability that share of the police budget which might be suggested by the proportion of juveniles in the general population. However given that juveniles are rarely involved in sensational crimes or crimes involving complex matters, they would be unlikely to sap police resources to the extent of some adult crime and therefore to the extent suggested by their known rate of offending.

Accordingly if a figure must be given, and it is given tentatively, it is estimated that for the financial year 1986-1987 the police in Australia spent in the order of \$350 million out of their total budgets on law and order matters relating to juvenile offenders. If then we infer that police expenditure represents between three quarters and two thirds of public expenditures in the area of juvenile justice, we derive a figure of \$500 million dollars for expenditure on juvenile justice generally - that is for police, courts and corrections (welfare).

Costing Police Action: Some Paradigm Cases

In order to provide an alternative method of assessing police costs, the Australian Institute of Criminology approached the Queensland Juvenile Aid Bureau and asked whether it would be prepared to undertake a study which would estimate the cost of police action involving some typical juvenile cases. Certain parameters were specified, and the police themselves then designed and carried out the study themselves. A copy of the worksheet is displayed in **Appendix B**.

Costs were calculated by reference to police pay (\$12.19 per hour) travel, (35.5 cents per km), phone calls (20 cents each), photographs (\$10 per print). Armed with this basic information, police working for the Juvenile Aid Bureau were asked to determine how much was being spent out of the following run-of-the-mill offences committed by juveniles, namely, motor vehicle theft, malicious damage, arson, housebreaking, serious assault and shoplifting.

Clearly, the amount of police effort would vary depending on whether the offence was admitted at the outset or had to be proven in court. Accordingly police undertaking the experiment were requested to distinguish between the following courses (categories) of action:

- | | |
|--------------|---|
| One | Where the juvenile is a first offender and admits the offence and is cautioned. |
| Two | Where the juvenile is a first offender but this time does not admit the offence and the matter proceeds to hearing in a children's court. |
| Three | Where the juvenile is previously known to police and pleads guilty at the children's court. |

- Four** Where the juvenile is previously known to police and does not admit the offence and elects to be tried.

Table 10 sets out the various costs for some typical cases in those four categories.

TABLE 10
Estimated Cost to Police of Processing some Selected Offences:
Queensland Juvenile Aid Bureau 1988

Police Expenditure Per Case by Category				
	One	Two	Three	Four
First Offence?	yes	yes	no	no
Admits Offence?	yes	no	yes	no
Action Taken	caution	Ch.Ct. (hearing)	Ch.Ct.	trial
Cost per Offence:	\$	\$	\$	\$
Motor Vehicle Theft	145.39	570.19	263.12	963.57
Malicious Damage	132.75	602.17	254.51	949.79
Arson	270.12	846.77	393.62	1596.46
Housebreaking	166.54	639.83	318.33	1102.84
Serious Assault	195.82	739.77	331.42	1497.44
Shoplifting	59.94	413.28	193.35	641.91

It should be noted that a juvenile in category two could elect not to be dealt with by a children's court and could then be brought before a higher court for trial. In such circumstances the costs would be equivalent to those under category four. By far the cheapest process is the caution, the dearest - the contested trial.

The Juvenile Aid Bureau points out that the costings reflected in the above table should be considered as a minimum, or most conservative estimate (rather than average) cost that is achievable. It is based on the most favourable conditions applying to each situation set out in the four kinds of

examples defined above. Clearly there are many factors which might lead to the costs being greater than those shown in the table and so the figures should be regarded as a very basic guide only. They may however, be viewed as a fairly reliable indication of the differences in the costs that are likely to be encountered where the circumstances vary in accordance with the criteria described above.

Cost-Effectiveness of Police Cautions

A survey which was conducted by Dr. Sally Leivesley in 1980 revealed that 85 per cent of children cautioned by the police in Queensland were found not to have re-offended (Leivesley 1988). The Juvenile Aid Bureau therefore claims that Queensland's cautioning system is effective both in terms of diverting children from a life of crime and in minimising costs in the justice system.

A study reviewing the revised police cautioning procedures in NSW also reported favourably on the system of cautioning first offenders. The Interdepartmental Police Caution Monitoring Committee conducted a study which compared the re-offending rate of young persons cautioned and young persons coming into the system for the first time and prosecuted during the last quarter of 1985 (Luke 1987). The record of each of these young persons was then checked for any proven court appearances or cautions in the 18 months following their initial contact with the police. The results of this comparison showed that there appeared to be no significant difference in the rehabilitative effectiveness of the two approaches. For those who were cautioned, 24.9 per cent of young persons re-offended within 18 months (a success rate of approximately 75 per cent), and for those who received court appearances the re-offending percentage was 21.2 (or a success rate of approximately 79 per cent).

The Committee concluded that while there were no significant differences in recidivism rates of the two categories, the NSW cautioning system was working admirably, and was just as effective in reducing court appearances as the more traditional system of prosecuting juveniles in the courts.

This finding has important implications relating to costs. Indeed there is now ample evidence both in NSW and Queensland (the other States not having

been examined) to suggest that cautioning young first offenders is cost effective.

Aggregate Estimates of Crime Prevention Costs

After the police component (approximately \$1.7 billion) is taken out of the total cost of administering law and order in Australia, it is estimated that the courts and the agencies devoted to enforcing the orders of the courts share, almost equally, the greater part of the balance of public funds made available for this purpose (Barnard and Withers 1989).

Very roughly, this means that for the year 1986-1987 courts and corrections shared about \$400 million dollars each on the administration of justice. However, these global figures include items going far beyond expenditures on the juvenile justice system. They include for example, courts exercising civil as well as criminal jurisdiction and the quite substantial expenditures that are devoted to the adult system of corrections. Accordingly it is necessary to look in greater detail at each of the relevant items that is, the Children's Courts and the custodial and non-custodial systems dealing with juvenile offenders.

Cost of Children's Courts

A number of States were requested to provide details of the costs involved in administering the Children's Courts. Few could provide the information sought, so that once again the paucity of detailed information is highlighted and reliance upon estimations of expenditure are necessitated

Some assistance was derived from the courts division of the NSW Attorney-General's Department. It is advised that in 1987 there were seven magistrates who operated out of five specialised Children's Courts in the Sydney and Newcastle areas. The total salaries of these judicial officers together with their support staff was \$510,000. These courts had a total of 1,154 sitting days compared with a total 22,652 sitting days for all summary courts in that State.

Unfortunately, as Children's Courts are convened on a needs basis by local magistrates throughout the State, the Department was unable to provide an estimate of the total cost or the sitting days involved throughout NSW. It did

however provide data which suggested that in 1987 about 10 per cent of all summary cases were dealt with in the Children's Court.

The Department's Annual Report of 1987 indicates that the total net program payments for the Local Courts was \$38,096,000.

Excluding for the moment the fact that some juveniles are dealt with or appeal to the higher courts (and so would inflate the amount spent on juveniles beyond that which is spent on the Children's Courts alone), it would not be unreasonable to conclude that approximately four million dollars (approximately 10 per cent of \$38,096,000) was spent on courts dealing with juvenile justice matters in NSW.

If this pattern held good for the rest of the country the expenditure on Children's Courts for the whole of Australia would be three times this figure, or \$12 million.

Can this be right? An inquiry by Freckelton, specially commissioned for the purposes of this report, investigated the costs of running the Central Children's Court at Bateman Avenue in Melbourne. This facility has two to four magistrates sitting at any one time and the total cost of running this facility in 1987 was \$900,000.

Freckelton also investigated a number of other metropolitan areas before admitting that there was no clear way of accurately determining the cost of running the Children's Courts jurisdiction in Victoria. Even so he estimated that, having regard to time worked by magistrates in all Victorian courts, the cost was likely to be in excess of \$2.5 million.

This figure is not dissimilar to that obtained for NSW, after consideration is allowed for the relative populations of each State. Furthermore, it tends to support our earlier estimate of \$12 million for the whole of Australia.

Data on court costs were also received from Queensland, but these related to the total criminal jurisdiction of the magistrates courts for the year 1987-1988. The figure given was \$25,178,601. If 10 per cent of this figure is deducted, then a figure very much like Victoria's emerges. If a further 10 per cent is deducted to account for inflation, then for the three most populous States a total figure of nearly \$9 million is derived.

The finance officer from the Court Services Department of South Australia has also provided information concerning Children's Courts' costs. He advises that approximately 90 per cent of all Children's Courts matters in South Australia are dealt with by the Adelaide Children's Court. The remaining 10 per cent are heard in the various courts scattered throughout the State. He provided the following information (set out in Table 11) indicating the total running costs of the Adelaide Children's Court, including judiciary and their support staff, and added a further 10 per cent of costs for other Children's Courts.

TABLE 11
Running Costs of the Adelaide Children's Court
1986-87

CATEGORIES OF EXPENDITURE	\$
Adelaide Children's Court	
Salaries + oncosts (office staff)	132,000
Admin. expenses, accomm. costs, witness expenses, etc.	53,000
Magistrates (2) + salary oncosts	133,000
Magistrate's Clerks (2) + salary oncosts	65,000
Orderlies (4) + salary oncosts	87,000
Judges (2) + salary oncosts	211,000
Judges Clerks (2) + salary oncosts	50,000
Sub-total	731,000
Other Children's Courts	
Assume 10% of above costs excluding Judges and their support staff and 2 orderlies	43,000
TOTAL	774,000

This last figure brings the total expenditure for four States to approximately \$10 million. The remaining jurisdictions (Western Australia, Tasmania, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory) would, in view of their sizes, probably account for a further \$2 million, thus supporting our earlier estimate of \$12 million. Since a small proportion of juvenile offenders are dealt with in the higher courts (either at first instance or because they may appeal against a decision of the Children's Court and so attract a disproportionately high per unit cost) a further \$3 million should be added to our estimated expenditure, bringing the total to \$15 million.

We were unable to obtain reliable data on the expenditure of Legal Aid and prosecution costs. However we are satisfied that, for the whole of Australia, these costs would exceed \$6 million annually. If we add private legal practitioners' expenses relating to advising and representing young offenders in court, the latter figure could be doubled.

The Cost of Incarceration

One of the most significant costs in relation to juvenile offenders is that of incarceration (committal to an institution). Data presented in the following table are the most recent statistics published by the Australian Institute of Criminology, showing the number of juveniles in corrective institutions in Australia.

A senior officer of the Department of Family and Community Services in NSW advises that the relative proportions of the Department's juvenile justice budget can be broken down in accordance with the following analysis :

- . eighty-two per cent of the total budget allocated to the Department is taken up in the area of residential supervision (including escort services);
- . eight per cent is devoted to court services;
- . seven per cent to community supervision; and
- . three per cent to policy, statewide co-ordination and evaluation.

Similarly the breakdown of the budget allocated to the Department of Community Services in Victoria shows that:

- . seventy-seven per cent is devoted to institutional programs;
- . twenty per cent to community programs; and
- . three per cent to policy research and program development.

TABLE 12

**All Persons in Juvenile Corrective Institutions by Age,
as at 30 June 1988**

AGE	NSW	VIC	QLD	WA	SA	TAS	NT	ACT	AUST
10	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
11	0	8	1	0	0	1	1	0	11
12	2	8	1	1	0	0	0	0	12
13	14	27	4	3	2	3	5	0	58
14	28	28	11	9	6	4	7	1	94
15	55	40	31	23	7	5	11	5	177
16	95	56	34	22	16	4	15	5	247
17	78	30	17	23	14	4	6	3	175
TOTAL									
10-17	272	198	99	81	45	21	46	14	776
18+	17	43	3	1	5	0	0	0	69
TOTAL	289	241	102	82	50	21	46	14	845

Source: S.K. Mukherjee 1989, *Persons in Juvenile Corrective Institutions - No. 43 A.I.C.*

Assuming that Victoria and New South Wales are not atypical in the way they allocate their resources, it may therefore be assumed that approximately 80 per cent of departmental budgets devoted to juvenile criminal justice matters are allocated to residential supervision (i.e. to commitment and containment of juveniles in institutions) throughout Australia.

Table 13 provides a breakdown of the total budgets of the various community welfare departments concerned with young offenders and the amount allocated to juvenile justice matters.

If we assume that 80 per cent of the juvenile criminal justice allocation is spent on the containment of young offenders in institutions - an assumption based on averaging the Victorian and NSW data - then the total Australian figure for this item of expenditure for the year 1986-1987 is approximately \$70 million.

TABLE 13
State Youth and Community Services Budgets
1986-87

STATE	TOTAL BUDGET	JUVENILE JUSTICE BUDGET
New South Wales	327,022,000	27,596,000
Victoria	506,343,764	23,416,800
Queensland	70,285,238	8,873,507*
South Australia	78,000,000	12,033,000
Tasmania	15,836,000	N.A.
Western Australia	77,616,186	13,802,226
Northern Territory	N.A.	N.A.
Australian Capital Territory	N.R. +	1,607,800 [#]
TOTAL	1,075,103,188	87,329,333

- * Refers only to cost for institutions.
- + Not received at time of going to press.
- # Estimated only.

Clearly such a large expenditure on an item that imposes drastic measures on the lives of those who are detained against their will, warrants the most careful and thorough investigation to ensure that it is cost effective.

Costing Departmental Work and Non-Custodial Measures

It is not possible, owing to the lack of relevant data, to provide a detailed analysis of the cost to the various government agencies of the administration and servicing of the dispositions imposed by courts upon juvenile offenders throughout Australia. However, for present purposes, the following information from New South Wales may suffice in providing an indication of costs relating to these items.

The Department advises that the total number of juveniles who came into contact with the Department for criminal justice reasons for 1986/87 can be broken down into the following categories:

1492	committed to institutions
179	Community Service Orders
2850	other supervision orders
2500	remands in custody (approx.)
2400	court reports for children not in custody (approx.)

Note: This count refers to the number of final appearances, not individuals.

The Department also dealt with children who were contacted for care reasons. These showed that approximately 15,800 children were notified for child protection reasons for the first time, and that approximately 3,200 children entered substitute care. There is overlap in these two figures, although they do not include children already in the Department's care before July 1986.

When requested to provide information relating to the estimated amount of time and resources allocated to pre-trial and pre-disposition activities - including the number of pre-sentence reports and average costs for these, the Department replied that approximately 3,000 pre-sentence court reports were prepared by staff at an average time of 10 hours per report. If the cost per hour was \$20 (based on average salary + 20 per cent on-costs) then the total cost of preparing these reports amounted to \$600,000. The Department also advised that since the introduction of its Young Offender Support Services there had been another major pre-sentence service involving assistance with bail applications. There were approximately 2,000 of these per year and based on an average six hours per case, the amount spent on this item totalled \$240,000.

Information relating to the average length (duration) of each type of departmental supervision was also given. These indicated as follows:

Remand in custody	16 days
Control order (committal)	82 days (increased to 140 days in 1987-88)
Probation order	120 days active supervision
Community Service Order (up to 100 hours)	120 days

As for the average daily cost of each type of supervision, the Department reported that remand and committal to institutions cost \$140 per day (\$980 per week) and probation and community service orders cost the Department \$11 per day (\$77 per week). The latter was based on approximately four hours of supervision per week for a period of 17 weeks.

Based on these figures, a simple arithmetic calculation reveals that remanding or committing juveniles to institutions costs taxpayers some 12 or 13 times more *per day* than does a probation or community service order.

As for the proportion of departmental time and resources devoted to Court-specific activities the following information was supplied:

- . Approximately 3,000 pre-sentence court reports at 10 hours each plus approximately 2,000 bail cases at 6 hours per case equals about 35 full time positions (40 positions if including administrative support).
- . This is only for juvenile justice cases and constitutes one to two per cent of departmental staffing resources.
- . The Department also provides an escort service for children held in custody e.g. escorting children to court. Approximately 35 equivalent full time positions carry out this task.

In NSW about twice as many young persons were placed on some kind of supervision order (3029) as were committed to institutions (1492). From this it is possible to draw some inferences upon the cost, to the nation as a whole, of supervising them on probation/CSO etc. - assuming always that the ratio of those incarcerated, to those released under some kind of supervision is about the same as that found in NSW.

We have already derived a figure of \$70 million for incarcerating young offenders in institutions in 1986-87, and have concluded that in New South Wales the cost of committing young offenders to institutions is at least 12 times greater than placing them under some kind of non-custodial measure. Again assuming that the costs in other jurisdictions are about the same, the estimated cost of non-custodial supervision for the whole country may be calculated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Cost of non-custodial supervision} &= \frac{\text{cost of incarceration} \times 2}{12} \\
 &= \frac{\$70 \text{ m} \times 2}{12} \\
 &= \$11.7 \text{ million (approx.)}
 \end{aligned}$$

In round figures therefore, we conclude that in 1986-87, approximately \$12 million was spent by State government departments having responsibility for administering non-custodial sanctions which were imposed by the courts on young offenders.

Security Industry

There is little doubt that Australians have become more and more security conscious over the years. This is reflected partly in the rise of the incidents of crime, and the media reaction to it. It is also reflected in the ever increasing demand by insurance companies for better security from its policy holders. Certainly the cost of purchasing and installing security devices should be added to the direct costs of crime. For example, in addition to the direct costs of arson and vandalism in schools, there is the cost of preventive measures, such as up-grading of security. In June 1987, the Australian Institute of Criminology held a seminar entitled **Crime at School**. At that seminar one commentator from the Security Services Group of the Ministry of Education in Victoria stated that burglary and arson offences in Victorian schools had reduced substantially as a result of the introduction of electronic surveillance systems, estimated losses being in the order of \$2 million (in 1986-1987). Of those caught during 1986, (898 offenders) 68 per cent were under 17 years of age (O'Neill 1987, 163).

In New South Wales during 1987 following a school fire at Narooma High which caused damage to the extent of \$6 million, the Government allocated

an additional sum of \$40 million to be spent over a four-year period, for the purposes of up-grading and implementing new security measures in schools. The main feature was the installation of electronic surveillance devices. Currently electronic surveillance devices are operating in 374 of the 2,300 schools throughout New South Wales. This has already resulted in the arrest of over 500 people for trespassing and various offences on school grounds. While such measures are likely to lead to cost savings in the future, they are nevertheless a cost which is primarily directed at deterring juvenile crime and accordingly the greater proportion of this cost, perhaps 90 per cent, can be added to the overall direct costs of juvenile crime in schools which we considered previously.

Figures published by the *Financial Review* ('Guarding the Home is now a Necessity', *Financial Review* 25 Feb. 1985) suggested that the security industry generally, was turning over between \$400-500 million in 1983. A spokesman from the Australian Security Association, while unable to confirm those figures, nevertheless stated that the industry had been growing at about 25 per cent per annum over recent years. If these figures are correct the security industry would be turning over about \$1 billion by late 1987. If juvenile crime, including the perceived threat of juvenile crime, is responsible for a substantial slice of this increase, say a modest one quarter of this amount, then its contribution to this indirect cost of crime would be about \$250 million.

The Principle of Parsimony

Thus far we have focused on some direct costs of juvenile crime and some costs relating to the prevention or control of juvenile crime. Apart from our more detailed analysis of police action, little has been said of cost-benefit analysis, and in this regard it is important to be reminded that gross expenditure figures alone do not indicate whether funds are well spent. We have seen, for example, that substantial sums are spent on incarcerating young offenders and that such dispositions are at least twelve times more expensive than releasing juvenile offenders under some form of non-custodial supervision. If both types of disposal are equally effective in terms of recidivism rates, then it could be argued that cheaper alternatives should be used every time.

In **Part Three** of this report we shall stress the importance of selecting carefully the target group or groups which may benefit from programs designed to reduce the severity or frequency of crime in the community.

We caution however, against making assumptions about which programs work and which do not until they have been evaluated. Thus, before embarking on our review of the relevant literature, it is important to keep in mind the principles of parsimony - that so far as possible, we should by way of criminal sanction, refrain from intruding unnecessarily into the lives of young offenders. This means that if a lesser (cheaper) penalty or procedure will achieve (within the best of our knowledge) the desired end, then this option in preference, should be selected. This implies also that incarceration should be treated as a sanction of last resort. Further, the same principle has application to police action - deciding to prosecute a young offender should only be undertaken when it is considered that a warning or caution will not suffice, and it is in the public interest that the matter should be dealt with at court.

Summary

Having regard to our analysis of the governmental or budgetary costs (i.e. police, courts, corrections) and non-budgetary costs (particularly those of the security industry) we estimate that at least \$750 million is spent annually on crime prevention measures as a response to juvenile offending. If we add to this figure our estimate of approximately \$600 million for the direct cost of juvenile offending which we have previously identified, we derive a total figure of \$1.35 billion. This figure does not represent the total cost of juvenile crime to the community for the reasons already given. However we are confident that it is unlikely to be less than this estimate and that a more realistic global figure would be in the vicinity of \$1.5 billion.

While the general impression given by our analysis thus far may be that crime prevention can best be achieved by a careful allocation of resources within the criminal justice system, it is more likely that the real answers lie outside the justice system itself.

We have recently been reminded by the *Report of the National Inquiry into Homeless Children* that at least 3,000 children or young people were

discharged from Australian juvenile correctional institutions in 1986-87, and a further 3,000 were discharged from State wardship (*Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission*, p. 109). There is little follow-up as to what becomes of these children, how many return to their families and how many join the 'underclass' of homeless children (Ibid).

The de-institutionalisation movement, which has gained increasing support over the last decade or so, with emphasis on returning troubled youth to the family, or to foster care, adoption and community-based facilities, has been seen by some as an abdication for financial reasons, of the Australian Government's responsibility to make adequate provision for the accommodation, support and care of young people. The problem has been, it appears, that insufficient resources have been allocated to community facilities at the same time as the reliance on institutional care has diminished. As the *Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission*, citing a witness to its hearings into youth homelessness, stated:

substantial numbers of young people who would have originally been cared for by State welfare authorities are now being cared for in the homeless system. (Ibid).

As homelessness amongst the young is not only a social problem, but provides the breeding ground for juvenile crime, and ultimately for future adult crime, there is a need to redress this problem urgently. Housing, job training and care programs, seeking out those in need and providing them with an opportunity to acquire the necessary life skills to survive without the need to turn to crime, should be regarded as a high priority in any general crime prevention program. While no figure in dollar terms is placed on this aspect of crime prevention, it is clear that the more resources that can be directed towards these areas, the greater the benefit, not only for crime reduction purposes, but also for the quality of life, or standard of living of all Australians. The potential benefits of redressing the problem of youth homelessness has been summarised in the Report of the National Inquiry as follows:

The major beneficiaries would be the homeless children and young people who would be assisted to obtain housing, good health, a safer lifestyle and the prospect of employment and an independent income. The community would also benefit from reduced future social security payments, crime prevention and correctional outlays, lower insurance premiums and an improvement in the quality and amenities of life. The potential

social security savings, which include reduced payments of Unemployment Benefit, Supporting Parents Benefit, Sickness Benefit and Invalid Pensions, would be substantial. The Australian community as a whole would benefit both from the reintegration of these young people into social life and from their enhanced productivity. (Ibid p. 81).

We therefore wish to emphasise a very important point. In attempting to obtain the best value in dollar terms of crime prevention strategies, resources should be directed, not so much at traditional criminal justice agencies of police, courts and corrections but at the very heart of the social problems facing contemporary youth in Australia. A society which does not devote sufficient care and attention to the needs of children, and particularly to the patently obvious growing alienation of children, will inherit an increasingly amoral, violent and criminogenic society. It may be that focusing more on the educational, health, housing and employment problems of the young and disadvantaged, will reduce our need to put ever increasing resources into the criminal justice system.

We realise that arguments such as the one espoused in the last paragraph often have little impact with those in Treasury departments responsible for allocating money for government budgets. We have often heard these arguments described as 'woolly-eyed thinking' by such officials. In a sense they can be excused for their pithy dismissal of claims for more social resource, because such claims are rarely accompanied by hard data demonstrating the costs and anticipated benefits of such programs.

Consequently, we would strongly urge social scientists who advocate programs that deal with the social basis of juvenile crime prevention to provide 'hard' data on cost-effectiveness wherever possible. That such data are scarce can be seen in our own rhetoric for such programs unaccompanied, as they are, by economic facts that would strengthen our case. Unfortunately, such data are simply not available.

That which is available is described in the next section of the report. Here, as will be seen, the crime prevention effectiveness of some programs has been demonstrated and in at least one case (Job Corps) calculated. For, the reality is that the implementation of 'good ideas' in this age of economic rationalisation requires more than flourishing calls for the introduction of certain measures - it requires as well the language of the economist. Only in

this way will those officials who allocate resources consider seriously policy proposals designed to come to grips with the social and criminogenic forces that generate both delinquency and crime.

PART THREE

JUVENILE CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS

Research on Juvenile Crime Prevention and Treatment: The Grounds for Hope

An extensive review of the worldwide juvenile prevention and treatment literature suggests some bad news and some good news. This is, in itself, good news as until recently there was only bad news. For example, the President's Commission in the U.S., reporting in 1967, was extremely pessimistic: 'the great hopes originally held for the juvenile court have not been fulfilled. It has not succeeded significantly in rehabilitating delinquent youth, in reducing or even stemming the tide of delinquency or in bringing justice and compassion to the child offender' (1967, p. 80).

Most later reviews during the 1970s and the earlier 1980s were equally pessimistic (Martinson, 1974; Lipton, Martinson and Wilks, 1975; McCord, 1978). What then, is the good news? During the latter half of the 1980s there has been a distinct, if somewhat hesitant retreat from this totally pessimistic viewpoint. While the evidence is still largely negative on what might be described as relatively 'conventional' treatment programs, there are some grounds for optimism in terms of juvenile delinquency identification and prevention and in terms of less conventional treatments. Even in the area of conventional treatment there has been extremely cautious re-evaluation of results. While not necessarily concluding that a lot works this recent research does suggest a retreat from the conclusion that nothing works.

The renewed hope springs from two closely related lines of research. The first line of research has been concerned with looking again, and in more detail, at the question: 'does anything work'? Thus, this literature is primarily concerned with *substantive* issues. The second line of research has been

primarily involved in a re-evaluation of the evaluation criteria relevant to the definition of 'what works'. This literature, then, is primarily concerned with *methodological* questions.

At the substantive level recent research has generated some hopeful findings in the following three areas: (1) less 'conventional' treatment programs, such as wilderness camps and job-training programs; (2) programs which primarily have a prevention focus - whether school, community or other based; and (3) prediction efforts, especially for those likely to be serious, persistent offenders. Research has also begun to more clearly identify what does not work.

The methodological re-evaluation has been equally important. Indeed, in several important ways, it is the methodological focus which has fuelled the substantive re-evaluation. Some of the more important findings of this research are that previously utilised criteria for evaluating the success of juvenile criminal justice intervention have been: (1) unrealistic; they have sought to pick up 'strong' impacts when, all in all, only 'weak' impacts could be reasonably expected (Quay, 1977; Sechrest and Redner, 1975; Sechrest and Rosenblatt, 1987); (2) too narrow; they have focused only on recidivism (and then over too short a time frame and too narrowly) while such a measure only imperfectly captures social costs and benefits; (3) too abstract; they have failed to recognise that alternative preventative and treatment programs (relative to 'conventional' treatments) which show no difference on recidivism rates, but which *are less expensive than existing incarceration strategies* may be socially desirable; and (4) too premature; given that *most* juvenile justice interventions have not been evaluated at all (this speaks for itself), while others have been evaluated poorly (lack of controls etc. (Garrett, 1984, 1985)), others too early, while others have been impossible to evaluate (too many components, not well documented, not implemented as designed). (Sechrest and Rosenbloom, 1987).

The resurgence of interest in juvenile justice is illustrated by a vast outpouring of literature on the topic (see, for example Burchard and Burchard, 1987; Hartman, 1987; Quay, 1987; Greenwood, 1988; Wilson and Lounsbury, 1987).

What is remarkable about this 'surge' of literature is that it is broadly consistent, both in its interpretation of previous research findings and in its view of where future hope lies.

Perhaps the mood of much of this work is best summed up by James Q. Wilson, a noted policy analyst usually not considered to be someone who sees things through rose-coloured spectacles:

...It is our judgement that promising leads do exist that are worth further, carefully evaluated development and testing.

This conclusion differs both from what many of us would have decided 10 or 20 years ago and from what many experts on delinquency did decide in 1967, when the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice released the report of its Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime...

In the last 5 to 10 years new findings have appeared that constitute promising leads - glimmers of hope - for the possibility of preventing, to some significant but hard-to-measure extent, the delinquent acts of high-rate offenders. We do not wish to overstate our optimism in this regard or to encourage public and private bodies to mount massive new programs. We believe that the promising leads are just that - leads that must be subjected to further testing and refinement (Wilson, 1987: p. 291).

This report will address 'the glimmers of hope' in the following manner. First, we will examine the evidence on who commits offences. This, briefly, documents the importance of high rate offenders. Second, we review the recent research on identifying high-rate offenders and discuss the implications of this research. Third, we review the evidence on prevention programs that do not directly target high risk individuals, but rather is focussed on relatively high risk groups (primarily pre-school and school programs). Fourth, we review the evidence on prevention programs that are more oriented to high risk individual children (parent training and child abuse prevention). Fifth, the focus of the report shifts to treatment. Little emphasis is placed on traditional institutionalisation because the evidence has changed little in the last decade. Instead the emphasis is on such 'non-traditional' programs as job-training and wilderness programs. Sixth, we review the emerging evidence that some things don't work - namely various forms of psychotherapy and other community treatment programs. Seventh, we review the evidence on status offenders. Finally we present some conclusions.

Who Commits Offences?

One clear piece of evidence emerges from analysis of juvenile crime - a small minority of juveniles commit a *large proportion of all juvenile crime*. While the likelihood of *some* contact with police is quite high for juvenile males the great majority of these youths have no further contact with the juvenile justice system. The primary evidence for this comes from two major U.S. cohort studies - the well-known Wolfgang *et al* (1972) study in Philadelphia and a more recent California Youth Authority study (Griffiths and Jesness, 1981), but there is considerable additional evidence confirming this finding (see: Rojek and Erikson, 1982; Hartstone, Jang and Fagan, 1982). The available Australian evidence, while not extensive, is consistent with such a finding (Kraus, Thorpe).

TABLE 14

Law Enforcement Contact Among the Sacramento and Philadelphia Youth Cohorts

	Philadelphia Males (N = 9945)	Sacramento Males (N = 4208)	Sacramento Females (N = 4275)
% with at least one contact	35	23	13
Of those with one contact,			
% with two or more	54	56	32
% of total sample	19	13	4
Of those with two contacts,			
% with three or more	65	67	NA
% of total sample	12	9	NA

Source: Adapted by Lipsey (1984) from Griffiths and Jesness (1981).

The Philadelphia study examined approximately ten thousand male youths born during the same years between the ages of 10 and 18 years. The more recent California study examined approximately eight and a half thousand male and female youths. Table 14, from Lipsey (1984) shows the pattern of

police contact over time. It shows that while 35% of juvenile males in Philadelphia and 23% in Sacramento had some contact with police only 19% of the Philadelphia cohort and 13% of the Sacramento cohort had more than one contact with the police. As the California study shows the likelihood of females having multiple contacts is very small (4%). It should be kept in mind, additionally, that both studies are centred on large urban areas which would probably overstate aggregate national rates.

Additionally it is clear that as youths age, if they avoid contact, the probability that they will continue to avoid contact increases. These age related probabilities have been calculated on the basis of the Philadelphia data by Lipsey (1984). They are reproduced in **Table 15**.

The fact that a relatively small proportion of juveniles commit most offences, we will argue, has important policy implications. The first policy implication is that it is worth devoting considerable research effort on identifying the *specific* predictors of juvenile offending.

TABLE 15

Probability of at Least One Police Contact Before Age 18 of Juveniles Who Have Reached Given Age Without Contact

Age Reached Without Contact	Probability of Contact Prior to Age 18
7	349
8	347
9	341
10	329
11	311
12	287
13	257
14	216
15	167
16	107
17	035

Source: Calculated by Lipsey (1984) from Wolfgang *et al* (1972: Table 8.1).

The next section of this report, therefore, reviews the recent research on what we know about delinquency predictors. However, we can already present an important caveat. Juvenile justice policy at this time cannot be based *primarily* on identifying and treating these 'high-rate' offenders. As the

evidence shows high-rate offending is a low-rate occurrence. Improvements in prediction can reduce this problem, but they will never eliminate it. Thus, the evidence we present in the next section must be read in context.

What Do We Know About Delinquency Predictors?

As the previous section makes clear it is extremely important to be able to identify which children have higher probabilities of being delinquent. There have been several recent reviews of the evidence. Loeber and Dishion (1983) is one review which attempts to identify those variables which are predictors. They conclude that inadequate parental supervision and discipline (on family violence, see Wolfe, et al 1985 and Feshback, 1980) and parental criminality and anti-social behaviour are important factors as well as the child's poor academic performance and signs of early misconduct (see Hawkins and Lishner, 1987; Kelly and Balch, 1971; Phillips and Kelly, 1978; Pink, 1982; Elliot and Voss, 1974; Kimbrough, 1987, Wertleib, 1982). Separately, Loeber (1982) has noted that child misconduct is usually found in a wide variety of settings and encompasses a variety of types of antisocial behaviour.

Wilson's review of the evidence reaches essentially similar conclusions. He finds that delinquent's behavioural characteristics 'tend to be those who display a general pattern of anti-social conduct' and 'tend to be those who also act up at home, are truants from school, drive automobiles recklessly and abuse alcohol and drugs' (Wilson, 1987: p. 292). Their background characteristics include below average I.Q., one or both parents who have been convicted of a crime, discordant home environments, siblings who have committed crime and low income family background.

Finally, these review findings are confirmed by Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber (1987), in perhaps the most comprehensive of these reviews. Their findings (pp. 370-371) are sufficiently detailed to be worth reporting in detail:

1. Early conduct problems - aggression, stealing, truancy, lying, drug use - are not only predictive many years later of delinquency in general, but especially of serious delinquency, and in certain cases, of recidivism. These results are virtually consistently replicated across studies on subject samples from different places and countries. The data, although less available for girls than for boys, indicate considerable consistency between the sexes.

2. Children who have not outgrown their aggressiveness by early adolescence appear to be at high risk for delinquency and aggressiveness later.
3. Although juvenile arrest or conviction is a predictor of arrest or conviction in adulthood, the seriousness of the juvenile offense appears to be a better predictor of the continued, serious delinquency in adulthood.
4. Individual family variables predicted moderately well subsequent delinquency in offspring. Particularly strong predictors were poor supervision and the parents' rejection of the child, while other child rearing variables such as lack of discipline and lack of involvement were slightly less powerful. In addition, parental criminality and aggressiveness, and marital discord were moderately strong predictors. Parent absence, parent health, and socioeconomic status were weaker predictors of later delinquency. The strongest predictors were multiple family handicaps.
5. Poor educational performance predicted later delinquency to some extent, but available evidence suggests that the effect is mostly mediated through accompanying conduct problems.
6. A majority of eventual chronic offenders can be recognized in the elementary school years on the basis of their conduct problems and other handicaps.
7. A majority of the later violent delinquents appear to have been highly aggressive as children.
8. Similar offense-specific precursors were observed for other categories of crime: early theft predicting later theft and burglary, and early drug use predicting later drug use.

In other words research is essentially unanimous on delinquency predictors (see also Lorion, Tolan and Wahler, 1987).

Loeber and his colleagues (Loeber *et al*, 1984) have suggested one method by which this knowledge of predictors can be used to screen for youths at risk. Such screening is vital in avoiding what has been called the 'low-base rate' problem (i.e. false positives). Lipsey (1984) and others have pointed out that unless potential delinquents can be identified with a fair degree of accuracy most prevention programs are likely to be cost-ineffective because the costs of 'treating' those who would not have become delinquent must be attributed to those who do. For example, if average program costs are \$1,000, but only 50% of the treated youth would have become delinquent the relevant cost per delinquent child is \$2,000 per capita.

Loeber *et al* (1984) suggest that multiple gating is one way of rectifying juveniles who have high risk of delinquency. They suggest that independent identification by parents and teachers that a child has conduct problems plus interviews to assess the efficacy of family management practices (Morton & Ewald, 1987). Their experimental findings suggest that multiple gating can be successfully used as a screening device. It is important to recognize that gating is a *sequential* process. They report their findings as follows:

- (a) Each successive gate provided an increment in the predictive accuracy and increased the percentage of valid positives in the risk group from 25.4% to 56.3%.
- (b) The three gates together produced an overall false positive error rate of 43.8% and a false negative error rate of 35.7%.
- (c) Almost all of the recidivist youths had been correctly identified.
- (d) The average level of self-reported delinquency of the youths in the false positive category was above that of youths in the valid negative category, suggesting that the youths currently without police contact are at a substantially high risk for becoming officially delinquent in the future.
- (e) The multiple gating procedure was as effective as a single-stage composite screening procedure. Moreover, its cost was 58% lower than that of a single-stage screening procedure (Loeber *et al*, 1984, p. 28).

The importance of a sequential approach in terms of reducing screening costs is illustrated by Table 16 (Loeber *et al*, 1984, Table 12). The multiple-gating procedure is 58% cheaper than an equivalent composite procedure.

The Loeber *et al* approach suggests that there are reasonably cost-effective methods of identifying at-risk individuals. This does not, of course, imply that it always makes sense to identify *individuals* at-risk. We will discuss, at length, programs that do not identify individuals (e.g. pre-school programs), but rather focus on at-risk communities. While these inevitably raise costs, for the reason already described, they potentially raise benefits more. However, interventions aimed at individuals and interventions based on groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, school-based prevention programs can be focused on groups, while home-based prevention programs can be focused on individuals.

TABLE 16

**Costs of Screening for the Multiple-Gating Procedure
Compared to a Single-Stage Approach**

Assessment	Professional Time per Subject (hours)	Single-Stage Assessment		Multiple-Gating Procedure	
		N	Cost(\$) ¹	N	Cost(\$) ¹
Teacher Ratings	.16	102	212.00	102	212.00
Parent Telephone Interview (six phone calls)	1.2	102	1,591.00	55	858.00
Structured Interview with Parent and Child	2	102	2,652.00	30	780.00
Total			4,455.00		1,850.00

¹ Cost of professional time is computed on a hourly wage of \$13.00 for a Research Assistant 1.

Source: Loeber *et al*, 1984.

The next sections of this report first examine group-focused strategies that are centred on pre-schools and schools. Then we examine home-based parent-training (and potentially child abuse) prevention programs that focus on the individual child or juvenile.

Pre-School Based Prevention Strategies

Prevention has obvious benefits and advantages. But equally obvious, given the above discussion, only if it: (1) concentrates on child populations with a reasonable probability of actually becoming delinquent (ie a population that has low false positives), and (2) is non-coercive and does not involve negative labelling, in short programs that are perceived by the parents of participants to be a 'benefit' (this eliminates most dimensions of the 'false negative' problem - although not the economic dimension).

One type of program that falls into this category is pre-school education. Indeed there has been increasing interest in these programs over the last decade. By far the most sophisticated evaluation of the impact of pre-school

education on a proto-delinquent population (low income families, low education families, minority etc) is the Perry Pre-School program begun in Michigan in 1962. Children were randomly assigned either to pre-school or the control group. The program consisted of either one year or two years of pre-school education plus weekly home visits. Ongoing research has reported extensively on Perry (see, for example, Berrueta-Clement, Schweinhart and Weikart, 1983; Schweinhart and Weikart, 1980; Weber, Foster and Weikart, 1978).

A survey of the Perry evidence has recently been completed by Berrueta-Clement, Schweinhart, Barnett and Weikart (1987). Overall they conclude: 'Preschool can reduce levels of delinquent behavior, and has other important lifetime outcomes, for individuals from low-income families viewed early in life as being at risk of educational failure' (p. 237). One striking feature of the study is that the social benefits of pre-school are much broader than reduced recidivism, including increased employment and earnings, reduced teenage pregnancy and higher rates of high school graduation and tertiary education. However it is worth detailing the recidivism findings (through mid-1982). **Table 17** reproduces the pertinent recidivism data (Berrueta-Clement *et al*, 1987, Table 9.3: p. 230) which show reduced crime according to a wide variety of measures. As the researchers point out 'Taken together, the data present a remarkable picture' (p. 232). There is also some evidence (although only minimally reported) on the costs and benefits of the Perry program. Total benefits were approximately \$28,000 (U.S.) per participant, approximately 6 times the cost of the one-year program and three times the two-year program (1981 dollars) (Schweinhart, 1987:145). However Perry is not the only pre-school evidence.

The Perry Pre-school findings are broadly consistent with other recent pre-school findings (Schweinhart, 1987). **Table 18** reproduced from Schweinhart, 1987 (Table 6.4) summarizes these results. As the table shows, 'a respectable number of studies provide evidence that good pre-school programs help prevent school failure' (Schweinhart, 1987:143).

TABLE 17

**Effects of Pre-School on Crime and Delinquency:
Official Records Data**

Category	Pre-School (N=58)	No Pre-School (N=63)	p
Percentage ever arrested or charged ^a (as juveniles or adults)	31	51	.022
Percentage ever detained as juveniles	16	25	ns
Percentage ever arrested as adults	25	40	.078
Total number of arrests	73	145	.0001
Percentage with no arrests	69	50	
Percentage with one or two arrests	19	25	.068
Percentage with three or more arrests	12	25	
Seriousness Scores^b			
Percentage arrested for property or violent offences	24	38	.078
Number of property/violence arrests	47	74	.005
Mean person total seriousness score	6.7	5.8	ns
Percentage with scores over 3	19	22	ns
Juvenile Records			
Total number of arrests	30	44	ns
Total petitions requested	11	25	.037
Percentage with petitions requested	7	13	ns
Total petitions adjudicated	2	5	ns
Percentage with adjudications	3	3	ns
Adult Records^{c,d}			
Total minor arrests or charges	1	21	.0001
Percentage with minor arrests/charges	2	16	.007
Total non-minor arrests	42	80	.028
Total convictions	20	24	ns
Percentage convicted at least once	16	21	ns
Case dispositions:			
Percentage receiving probation	7	6	ns
Mean months probation received	12	33	.093
Percentage receiving fines	3	14	.037
Mean fine amounts	\$168	\$209	ns
Percentage confined	10	13	ns

Source: Berrenta-Clement *et al.*, (1987)
(For a fuller explanation of this Table refer to pp. 230-331)

TABLE 18
Documented Effects of Good Pre-School Programs for Poor Children

Finding Per Study	Pre-School	No Pre-School	p
Intellectual ability (IQ) at school entry			
Early Training	96	86	.0001
Perry Pre-school	94	83	.0001
..Harlem	96	91	.01
Mother Child Home	107	103	
Special education placements			
Rome Head Start	11	25	.02
Early Training	3	29	.004
Perry Pre-school	16	28	.039
New York Pre-kindergarten (age 9)	2	5	.006
Mother Child Home (age 9)	14	39	.005
Retentions in grade			
Rome Head Start	51	63	
Early Training	53	69	
Perry Pre-school	35	40	
Harlem	24	45	.006
New York Pre-kindergarten	16	21	.02
Mother-Child Home	13	19	
High school dropouts			
Rome Head Start	50	67	.04
Early Training	22	43	.08
Perry Pre-school	33	51	.03
Additional Perry Pre-school findings			
Functional competence (average or better score)			
Postsecondary enrollments	38	21	.03
19 year olds employed	50	32	.03
19 year olds on welfare	18	32	.04
Teenage pregnancies (per 100 girls)	64	117	.08
Arrests (per 100 people)	126	230	.0001

Source: Schweinhart (1987)

What are the factors that characterise 'successful pre-school programs'? Not surprisingly they appear to share many of the characteristics of good school-based programs (to be discussed below). These characteristics are: (1) Staff who have adequate early childhood training and maintain a curriculum focus through inservice training; (2) Use of a validated curriculum model, derived

from principles of child development that permits children to plan or choose their own activities; (3) Support systems to maintain the curriculum model - daily team planning and evaluation and curriculum leadership by the administration; (4) A ratio of teaching staff to children of about 1:8 and a classroom group size of about 16; (5) Collaboration between teaching staff and parents as partners, with teachers as child development experts and parents as experts on their own children (Schweinhart, 1987:149).

While the *overall* result of all pre-school programs is clearly positive there are worrying differences among programs in the 'strength' of the program impact. Besharov (1987), among others, believes that pre-school programs may involve significant threshold effects. He notes that, for example, in the U.S. that Headstart spends 60% less per pupil than Perry and that Headstart 'is also a loosely monitored program which provides little incentive for individual grantees to maintain high levels of program design and management' (Besharov, 1987:212). Additionally, although it is not mentioned by these reviews, we suspect that leadership is a crucial threshold element (cf. school-based programs and wilderness programs below).

In summary, pre-school education is one of the most hopeful areas for new programs. Programs are likely to be perceived as beneficial by parents, they can be targeted to low income neighbourhoods and it is almost certain that they can do no harm.

School-Based Prevention Strategies

While we believe that the most convincing evidence relating to prevention can be found at the pre-school level the emerging evidence at the school level should not be ignored. School-based strategies have disadvantages compared to pre-school based strategies. A major disadvantage is that any intervention is necessarily at a later stage of the child's cognitive, behavioural and social development. A second, *potential* disadvantage is that there is a tendency for school-based programs to concentrate on students that have been 'flagged' as being delinquency-prone (i.e. with low academic achievement, poor discipline etc.). As we have seen this is based on a growing body of convincing research that demonstrates that likely delinquents can be identified relatively early in the school career by a set of predictors that are themselves partly based on

school performance and behaviour (for very recent U.K. evidence on this, see Graham, 1988; see also Greenwood and Zimring, 1985; Farrington, 1983; Monahan, Brodsky and Shah, 1981; Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982, Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber, 1987). As Greenwood (1987:207) puts it 'Those who are most likely to persist on this delinquent path can be identified at around age 13 with about 50 percent accuracy, using predictor variables that reflect their criminal record to date; their behaviour and achievement in school; the child-rearing practices to which they are exposed; and other characteristics of their family environment'. The disadvantage of this finding is that programs that focus on such youth inevitably raise labelling problems given that such children are 'flagged' by misconduct. This kind of labelling raises false positive problems. The potential advantage of this approach is the economic benefit - it concentrates on juveniles who have a relatively high probability of becoming delinquent (see our discussion of this above/below). Another perceived advantage was that there did not appear to be any viable alternative. This is because a viable alternative (i.e. one that does not risk labelling) must be implementable at the school level rather than the individual level. (We discuss such school-based treatment programs in a separate section of this report).

The difficulty with such an approach is that, until recently, we have known little about *policy-relevant* variables that effect school performance and behaviour. The evidence suggested that poor academic performance is highly correlated with (low) parental income and status. Yet research indicated that this 'strong' relationship could not be appreciably mediated by higher school expenditures (Coleman *et al*, 1966; Jencks *et al* 1972). These findings have generated considerable pessimism that school-based strategies focused on schools in areas with low income families could effectively reduce juvenile delinquency. However it is clear that these studies placed almost no emphasis on the organisational characteristics of schools. This is not surprising. Such characteristics are difficult to measure using the aggregate data available.

However, recent evidence, from the United States, does suggest that there are organisational policy-relevant variables that can be used to improve some outcomes (most notably academic performance) of schools in low income neighbourhoods as measured by comparisons to other such schools. Obviously given the differences between Australia and the United States (such as the percentage of single parent families) such findings should be interpreted with great caution (although in some dimensions these differences

are lesser with respect to schools in low income neighbourhoods than in other areas; Australia has an increasingly diverse immigrant population for many of whom English is a second language).

What are some of the strategies that schools can engage in that might reduce delinquency and what is the evidence on their effectiveness? The evidence has been recently reviewed by Kimbrough (1987). She concludes that until the last few years 'The literature generated by school-based delinquency prevention programs has not been very enlightening. Evaluation of these programs has been hampered by flaws in program design that make it difficult to interpret program results' (195). She finds preliminary evidence that some things make a difference (Gottfredson, 1982; Hawkins and Lam, 1983; Grant and Cappell, 1983; Wayson and Lipsey, 1984, Armor *et al*, 1976; Brookover, 1979; Weber, 1971; Austin, 1971, Spartz *et al*, 1977; Purkey and Smith, 1983; Ayllon, Garbers and Pisor, 1975; Madsen, Becker and Thomas, 1967; Boelgi and Wasik, 1978). Her overall conclusion is worth repeating: '[the literature] has produced remarkable consistency in specifying school-based strategies for preventing delinquency and delinquency-related behaviors' (p. 203).

Greenwood (1987:211) has summarised the research relating to the characteristics of 'instructionally effective' schools. These factors are: (1) Continuing instructional leadership and support for teachers from principals; (2) High expectations for student performance; (3) The development of an integrated curriculum that focuses on academic skills; (4) Frequent monitoring of student progress; (5) An orderly and quiet atmosphere without being oppressive; (6) Maximisation of time spent on academic activities; (7) Collaborative planning and collegial relationships among teachers; (8) School wide staff development and recognition of academic success; (9) Techniques for minimising turnover among the most competent staff.

While these findings may seem obvious, all the evidence suggests that implementation of such programs on a wide scale would be difficult: At the very least training, the development of new materials, incentives and monitoring would all have to be addressed. There is a strong suspicion that the quality of personnel is a crucial factor. There is one further caveat. We know of no study that has yet convincingly demonstrated that recidivism reductions would flow from such programs. While clearly such programs can have other important social benefits it is important to effectively evaluate

such programs over a sufficiently long time-frame to estimate their impact on recidivism.

Parent-Training Prevention Programs and Child Abuse Prevention

Previous sections of this report have established that: (1) there is strong emerging evidence that potential delinquents can be identified with reasonable probabilities; (2) the primary loci of pre-criminal identification is the school and the home; (3) there is tentative evidence that pre-school and school-based programs can reduce juvenile crime and generate other social benefits; (4) pre-school and school-based programs can usefully focus on 'proxies' for delinquency potential that will avoid certain kinds of false positive problems.

We now turn to the home. Can the home be a focus for prevention or treatment? This section addresses this issue.

A preliminary important point to make about parent-training is that it has a distinctly different orientation from the therapy approaches that will be described below. Gordon and Arbuthnot (1987:307) have succinctly described the differences:

Parent training, as it is generally described, differs from family therapy in that the focus of most of the sessions is on teaching parents specific child management skills [parental monitoring and control skills] in a relatively structured, didactic fashion. In family therapy, the focus is on assessing the interrelationships among all family members and the target child's behaviors, and overcoming family members' resistance to change. Skill training, if it occurs, comes later in the treatment and generally consumes a minor portion of the total contact time.

A preliminary important caveat is that parent-training, in the sense that it is defined here, is unlikely to deal with one important source of home problem that is linked to later delinquency (Alfaro, 1981; Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985), namely serious child abuse. We will discuss this question later in this section.

A majority of the research on parent-training has been conducted by the Oregon Social Learning Center in Eugene, Oregon. One advantage is that the Center has provided excellent evaluative research. A disadvantage is that

there is some doubt concerning the generalisability of their findings (to large urban areas, for example). While there has been some research of earlier parent-training programs they involved short, 'weak' and small interventions (Stuart and Loth, 1972; Weathers and Liberman, 1975; Csapo and Friesen, 1981).

The findings of the Oregon Social Learning Centre have been published in an extensive series of studies (Patterson and Reid, 1973; Patterson, Reid, Jones and Conger, 1975; Patterson and Fleishman, 1975; Wiltz and Patterson, 1974; Patterson, Chamberlain and Reid, 1982; Bernal, Klinnert and Schultz, 1980; Marlowe, Reid, Patterson and Weinrott, 1986).

The Oregon Learning Center approach trains parents in how to reverse child disruptive behaviour. Essentially, this involves reversing disruptive behaviour that has allowed the child to manipulate parents. The programs are typically open-ended and resource-intensive (for example five sets of parents and up to four therapists). The evidence suggests that trained staff are essential. The research results show significant reductions in delinquency and other behavioural improvements.

A closely related approach 'Behavioral-Systems Family Therapy' also appears to have reduced recidivism (Gordon, Arbuthnot, Gustafson and Green, 1986; Gordon, McGreen and Arbuthnot, 1984; Barton, Alexander, Waldron, Turner and Warburton, 1985). A review of this later literature concludes: 'The general results are similar to the Oregon Social Learning Center results with highly aggressive boys, in that independent replications of the effectiveness of a moderately well-articulated treatment model occurred in different sites with different populations' (Gordon and Arbuthnot, 1987:312).

The other context where parent intervention is a central issue is child abuse. This obviously raises very different, and more complex, issues. Yet there seems little doubt that child abuse is linked to juvenile delinquency: 'the cumulative weight of these research studies establishes, beyond doubt, a fundamental association between child maltreatment and later delinquency' (Beshirov, 1987:214, see also Standing Senate Committee, Canada, 1980 and Wolfe, 1987). Clearly in Australia, as elsewhere, there has been major changes in both attitude and government policy on the question of child abuse. While it would take this report too far afield to discuss the issue at length there do appear to be programs that can assist such parents (Beshirov,

1987). But the problems of these parents are such that most of them are unlikely to be 'volunteers' for treatment (Polansky, Chalmers, Buittenwieser and Williams, 1981).

Non-Traditional Treatment Programs

This rather cumbersome title encompasses several types of program, mainly falling into two categories: adventure, wilderness and camp programs and job-training programs.

A study from the Australian Institute of Criminology by Mason and Wilson (1988) has recently reviewed the literature and evidence on wilderness and adventure programs. Before reporting their findings it is worth briefly dwelling on three problems that inevitably mitigate drawing any very strong policy conclusions from this literature. The first is the (almost bewildering) variety and type of programs. As Mason and Wilson point out:

Programs range from anywhere between one week and three months duration. Some involve severe physical challenges (often of a dangerous nature), while others are of a more sedate camping and bushwalking nature. The majority of outdoor programs combine a full spectrum of activities, including, hiking, cooking, fishing, camping, rockclimbing, solo survival, canoeing, manoeuvring water rapids et cetera. Most programs for delinquent youth also include informal group discussion and interaction, problem solving sessions and the establishment of goals and responsibilities. (p. 77).

This variety inevitably reduces the generalisability of any research findings.

The second problem is the quality of evaluation (once again!): 'It is unfortunate, but the standard of program evaluation in this field has been quite poor' (Mason and Wilson, 1988:79). The third problem is the atheoretical foundation of these programs; in other words there is little clear explanation of why these programs might work (but see Hunter, 1987).

In spite of these caveats Mason and Wilson conclude:

In summary, it appears that great results have been claimed to emerge from wilderness and survival programs for delinquents. To a lesser extent, program evaluation has revealed that some of these claims are valid and reliable; namely, that wilderness/survival programs do lead to improvements in self-

concept and reductions in recidivism rates for participants. To date these results have only been clearly evidenced within a short time span. Long term results (over a number of years) are not sufficiently conclusive, but there are indications that the impact of outdoor programs upon juvenile offenders decreases over time. (p. 84).

Greenwood (1987) has also recently reviewed the same literature, although concentrating on those programs which are oriented to chronic offenders. Greenwood delineates the following critical features of the programs that he looked at: (1) Almost all the programs have been delivered by private sector contractors; (2) Staff to juveniles ratios are high, approaching 1 to 1; senior staff have exceptional characteristics, they are 'cheerful, positive, hardworking, friendly, affectionate and slow to anger' (Greenwood, 1987:219); (3) The programs typically involve increasingly severe physical challenges; (4) The programs place a high premium on specific skill development; (5) Peer group co-operation is constantly stressed and reinforced; (6) Charismatic leadership is central to continued success.

Greenwood also found that there were common problems, most notably staff continuity. Although Greenwood addresses these programs in terms of offenders it is clear that if there are demonstrated benefits these programs do not necessarily have to be limited to offenders, but can be extended to relatively high risk populations or juveniles in general: 'There is also no obvious method or rationale for singling out particular children, based on their delinquent behaviour and perceived risk, for participation in these programs without a large number of false positives there is no justification for excluding those who do not exhibit behavioural problems but suffer from the same social economic or physical disadvantages' (p. 225).

Finally Bleich (1987) has also reviewed the effectiveness of wilderness programs for serious and violent offenders. His conclusions are basically similar. Bleich also argues that the evidence is positive (McKenzie & Roos, 1982; Greenwood & Zimring, 1985) although he argues that the evidence suggests that such programs will not be easily replicable on a broad scale: 'the key ingredients of success seemed to be the superman charisma of the program's leaders and the quality of the program's staff' (Bleich, 1987: 163).

There is only anecdotal evidence on the effectiveness of wilderness programs in Australia. However, based on visits to several programs Windschuttle

(1986:21) concludes 'I am convinced that well-conducted wilderness projects can be valuable components of community training programs for youth'.

The other major category of non-traditional program is job-skills training.

Job-training is of especial interest because it is an area where there has been some experimentation outside of North America, including Australia. The focus of this review will be upon relatively strong interventions, as not surprisingly, make-work, short-term job programs (which definitionally do little training) have no discernable impact (Borns, 1980; Bendick, 1985; Windschuttle, 1986).

The following review of Australian programs draws heavily on Windschuttle (1986). Australian labour and training programs with a somewhat more substantial focus include the Special Youth Employment Training Program (wage subsidies to long-term unemployed youth), the Education Program for Unemployed Youth (short-term basic education and job seeking skills), the Wage Pause Program and the Community Employment Program. However, all of these programs could be said to have weak, or non-existent training components. More recently the Australian Traineeship Scheme offers a minimum of one-year part-time work and technical training to 16 and 17 year olds who have dropped out of school.

Unfortunately, there has been no systematic evaluation of these programs. Windschuttle (1986) has reported his conclusions based on on-site interviews over 30 programs. His interviews and observations suggest that relatively intensive programs that teach a combination of basic and specialized skills are most successful (for example Compuskill at Matraville, Sydney).

The evidence that job training is successful at reducing recidivism and in generating other social benefits comes primarily from the Job Corps program in the United States. The Job Corps provides a comprehensive set of skills and services to 'disadvantaged', unemployed youth. In other words an 'at risk' population, but not a population where *individuals* were selected on the basis of their particular delinquency predictors (although approximately 70% had come to the attention of the police at least once). The provided services are 'primarily vocational skills training, basic education, and health care' (Long, Mallar and Thornton, 1981). The program consists of 6 months to 12 months in residence.

The Job Corp is of especial interest because it has received the most sophisticated analysis of cost and benefits that we know of. It is a model which generates both optimism and caution. Optimism because it clearly demonstrates that sophisticated analysis is achievable and that job-training programs can have positive net benefits. Cautionary in showing the high level of analytic commitment that is required to do a convincing evaluation of such a program.

The Job Corps evaluation is also of interest because it breaks down benefits (avoided costs) between budgetary (governmental) impacts and other social impacts. It also shows that there are important social benefits of such a program in addition to the crime reduction benefits.

The costs and benefits of Job Corp are presented in **Table 19** (Table 6, Long, Mallas and Thornton, 1981). The 'bottom line' is that the net present value of the program per entrant is \$2,271 (in 1977 U.S. dollars) or a benefit-cost ratio of 1.45 (i.e. for every \$1 invested in the Job Corp program (the cost) there is a return of \$1.45 (the benefit). This is likely to underestimate actual net benefits because the analysts did not include other benefits which were difficult to quantify.

Related but different from the Job Corp program is the French Crime Community Prevention Scheme. The Scheme has received considerable publicity in this country and the Victorian **Good Neighbour** program is partly based on the French model.

In France, over 500 city and regional crime prevention councils operate bringing together elected officials from all levels of government as well as official and voluntary welfare agencies.

Well co-ordinated programs target local problems leading to or attracting crime. Employment, social and summer camp activities are carefully planned and co-ordinated by those involved in the crime prevention councils.

TABLE 19

**Estimated Net Present Value Per Corpsmember
Under the Benchmark Assumptions (1977 dollars)**

	Society	Corpsmembers	Rest of Society
Benefits			
A. Output produced by Corpsmembers			
In-program output	\$757	\$83	\$673
Increased postprogram output	3,896	3,896	0
Increased tax payments on postprogram income	0	-582	582
Increased utility due to preferences for work over welfare	+	+	+
B. Reduced dependence on transfer programs			
Reduced transfer payments	0	-1,357	1,357
Reduced administrative costs	158	0	158
C. Reduced criminal activity			
Reduced criminal justice systems costs	1,152	0	1,152
Reduced personal injury and property damage	645	0	645
Reduced value of stolen property	315	-169	484
Reduced psychological costs	+	+	+
D. Reduced drug/alcohol use			
Reduced treatment costs	30	0	30
Increased utility from reduced drug/alcohol dependence	+	+	+
E. Utilisation of alternative services			
Reduced costs of training, educational and PSE programs	390	0	390
Reduced training allowances	0	-49	49
F. Other benefits			
Increased utility from redistribution			
Increased utility from improved well-being of Corpsmembers	+	+	+
Total Benefits	\$7,343	\$1,823	\$5,520

TABLE 19 (cont'd)

	Society	Corpsmembers	Rest of Society
Costs			
A. Program operating expenditures			
Center operating expenditures, excluding transfers to Corpsmembers	\$2,796	\$ 0	\$2,796
Transfers to Corpsmembers	0	-1,208	1,208
Central administrative costs	-1,347	0	1,347
B. Opportunity cost of Corpsmember labor			
Foregone output	881	881	0
Foregone tax payments	0	-153	153
C. Unbudgeted expenditures other than Corpsmember labor			
Resource costs	46	0	46
Transfers to Corpsmembers	0	-185	185
Total Costs	\$5,070	-\$665	\$5,736
<i>Net present value</i> (benefits less costs)	\$2,271	\$2,485	-\$214
<i>Benefit-cost ratio</i>	1.45	1.82	0.96

Note:

Details may not sum to totals because of rounding.

See the original text for a review of the assumptions, estimation procedures, and their implications relevant to this table.

The numerators for the benefit-cost ratios include all of the benefits listed in this table as either positive benefits or negative costs, and the denominator includes all of the costs listed in this table as either positive or negative benefits.

Unique features of the Scheme include the bipartisan support given to the councils by all politicians, the involvement of local councils in the planning of the crime prevention activities and the diverse and planned nature of the programs provided for young people.

Though no formal evaluation has yet been conducted of the French Scheme, it has been noted that the national rate of crime per capita in France declined in 1985 and 1986. These two years saw a decrease in those offences

commonly committed by young people. In addition, the number of petty crimes fell over the summer months in those cities which have introduced crime prevention activities (*LIAISON*, December 1988, pp. 10-14).

Programs introduced as part of the Scheme include those that attempt to improve social integration, job acquisition, individual self-confidence and self-image. There can be no doubt that these programs, regardless of their crime prevention potential, improve the quality of life of communities in France and are generally welcome by all sections of the population.

However, the lack of any effective evaluation of the Scheme makes it difficult to pin point the relevance of the French model for Australia. What can be said, though, is that the Scheme looks very promising and should be considered carefully in any planning of community initiatives in crime prevention.

We should mention at this stage an alternative approach to juvenile crime prevention known as the 'situational' approach. As applied in the area of juvenile delinquency, this approach rests on two assumptions. The first is that juvenile offenders are rational decision makers who only go ahead with a crime where the benefits outweigh the costs or risks; the second assumption is that the 'opportunity' to commit a crime must be there.

Essentially situational crime prevention aims to remove the opportunity and make the costs of a crime greater than the benefits. In order to do this a range of measures, directed at highly specific forms of crime, are introduced into the environment.

The measures introduced can operate at different levels, affecting the individual, the community or the physical environment. In the case of crimes directed at households, for example, initiatives that can be employed at the individual level include encouraging people to make their homes more secure (sometimes called target hardening) by good security measures and property identification programs (Geason and Wilson, 1988). At the community level the most common situational crime prevention strategy is Neighbourhood Watch. While at the level of the physical environment there are design innovations focusing on improved street lighting, controlling access to buildings, restricting pedestrian and traffic flow and dividing residential spaces into identifiable areas (Geason and Wilson, 1989).

Though there are problems with using situational measures - not the least being displacement or offenders carrying out offences in other areas or engaging in different offences - there are also some remarkable successes. For example, Telecom Australia, by implementing a number of 'target hardening' and other situational measures have been able to reduce vandalism and theft in public telephones from \$18 million per year to \$9 million (Telecom Australia). As much of this vandalism and theft was committed by juveniles, it is apparent that situational measures have an important place to play in juvenile crime prevention strategies.

There are many other areas where a situational crime prevention approach could be used in juvenile crime prevention. These areas include vandalism on private and public property (housing, council parks, public transportation), car-theft and household burglary. Provided the situational initiatives are directed at specific crime problems and a proper methodology is employed, it is reasonably apparent that a situational approach to much juvenile crime may be cost-effective. Though no Australian studies have yet been carried out on the cost-effectiveness of such measures the area appears to be extremely promising (see Geason and Wilson, 1989).

The Evidence on Psychotherapy Treatment and Other 'Community' Programs

Counselling and other forms of individual therapy generally do not appear to be successful. 'When casework as the primary intervention has been investigated with appropriate comparison groups, literature reviews have been conclusively negative' (Gordon & Arburthnot, 1987; 291). However, the same authors conclude:

When the treatment goals are global and vague (such as self-awareness) and when the treatment description is similarly non-specific and extremely brief (such as providing a warm relationship with the therapist and helping the delinquent achieving insight into his/her behavior), reductions in subsequent delinquent behavior are rarely achieved. On the other hand, success in behavioral improvement is associated with specific behavioral treatment goals, a treatment plan specific to these goals, and goals that are not complex and that are potentially teachable to the client (Gordon & Arburthnot, 1987: 294).

Some of the evidence on group 'cognitive-behavioural' interventions is somewhat more positive; especially in developing problem-solving skills, the reduction of impulsiveness and socio-moral reasoning. Gordon and Arbuthnot conclude on problem-solving skills: 'this would appear to be a very promising approach for both preventative and treatment programs' (1987:299). On impulsiveness they conclude: The technology involved is highly developed, and appears to be effective over a wide range of populations' (1987:300). On socio-moral reasoning: 'developmental interventions of a cognitive nature appear to be quite successful both internally (in terms of acquisition of cognitive skills) and externally (in terms of behavioural improvement)' (1987:303).

However, a recent meta-analysis of 'community-based' interventions (this includes 'behavioural', individual psychotherapy, group psychotherapy and casework/probation) essentially concludes that all forms of such intervention whether with a group or behavioural orientation have demonstrated little evidence of success: 'we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect' (Gottschalk, Davidson, Gensheimer and Mayer, 1987). Clearly the researchers had a great deal of difficulty in working out exactly what the majority of the programs actually did. They conclude that psychologists ran most programs and that 'a picture of not particularly intense interventions seemed to emerge' (p. 277). Their only positive conclusion is that there is some evidence that there are threshold effects, both in terms of strength of treatment and length of treatment.

Bleich (1987) has reviewed the evidence on individual and group therapy and 'behaviour modification' for a particular subset of juveniles: serious (usually violent) offenders. He concludes that 'the literature concludes that psychotherapy does not have any significant impact on most youths in secure care facilities and that the impact of confined behavior modification is fleeting' (Bleich, 1987:161). He further finds that these kinds of programs tend to be more expensive than other kinds of programs. This is not surprising as the particular treatment costs are on top of custodial costs.

It would be foolish, we believe, to implement expensive programs based on individual or group psychotherapy approaches to serious juvenile offenders without a careful analysis of the literature. For example, in Australia at the moment there is real concern about juvenile sex offenders. We have

discovered that some agencies are considering elaborate treatment programs for incarcerated juvenile offenders based on psychotherapy models.

The problem here is that evaluations of current treatment methods of dealing with both adult and juvenile sexual offenders are not promising. In the most recent review of this area the writers concluded that 'there is as yet no evidence that clinical treatment reduces rates of sex offences in general and no appropriate data for assessing whether it may be differentially effective for different types of offenders' (Furby *et al*, 1989, p. 27).

Given this rather pessimistic finding it may well be more appropriate to place scant resources into programs that appear to be effective in reducing delinquency as a whole - as outlined earlier - than into specific programs for incarcerated juvenile sex offenders.

At the very least a thorough review of the literature on the effectiveness of programs for juvenile sex offenders should be undertaken before such programs are devised, let alone implemented.

Gottschalk *et al* did not include family interventions in their analysis. Gordon and Arbuthnot do include them but note that family intervention evaluation has been hindered by 'the appalling lack of detail in the description of the interventions' (1987:305). On 'systems' and non-behavioural family therapies Gordon and Arbuthnot conclude: 'there is cause for optimism since three of the five studies did reduce recidivism relative to a comparison group not receiving family treatment, but the experimental designs were contaminated' (1987: 307). In fact, these studies appear to be various versions of parent-training and could be included in the evidence already discussed on parent-training.

In general the conclusion on various forms of psychotherapy and 'weak' counselling must be extremely negative. There is no current evidence that these kinds of well-intentioned programs will have any impact on delinquency. They may generate other social benefits, although there is little evidence to support such a view. Probably the worst thing that could happen to juvenile justice is a whole panoply of these kinds of programs that masquerade as juvenile delinquency 'prevention' programs. Leitenberg (1987) puts this view bluntly:

There is not statistical or experimental evidence that I know of that suggests that lack of organised recreation opportunities causes delinquency. There is also no statistical evidence that I know of to support the belief that the provision of such opportunities reduces the incidence of delinquency (Wright & Dixon, 1977). Yet this is almost always the first program introduced in a community in the name of delinquency prevention. The second is a drop-in centre. We have to stop kidding ourselves that relatively easily implemented programs prevent delinquency when the evidence indicates they do not. (Leitenbery, 1987: 317).

Conclusions

What can Australia learn from this review? We believe that there are both process (methodological) conclusions as well as substantive conclusions. It may seem unusual that we have chosen to report the process conclusions first. In this case we believe that their process conclusions are probably more important than any substantive findings.


Our process conclusions may not be surprising given the fact that few Australian programs or experiments have been reported on in this study. Australian governments, either at the Commonwealth or State level, have developed few of the innovative programs that might reduce juvenile delinquency. Equally importantly, indeed given uncertainty, perhaps more importantly, governments have devoted almost no effort to *learning* what might work. As this report has documented the costs of the current system are enormous, and by no means limited to government budgets.

Why should Australian governments learn? We think it appropriate to make a strong statement here. If governments are not prepared to insist on programs that: (1) involve simple and 'strong' treatments; (2) are implemented as designed and maintained over time, and (3) to systematically evaluate these experiments, *they are not worth doing*. This may seem obvious. The evidence is that it is anything but. In the cyclical rush of good intentions these points are likely to be lost.

Figure 10 - presents a simple framework for understanding the different levels at which the juvenile delinquency issue can be addressed.

FIGURE 10

**A Framework for Understanding
Juvenile Justice Interventions**



As the figure shows, the different levels can be thought of as a funnel. At the broadest level programs can be addressed at the total juvenile population. Next at-risk populations can be addressed (obviously there is a considerable range, here, depending on the socio-economic or demographic variables that are used to identify such populations. At the next (narrower) level we focus on at-risk *individuals*, in other words particular juveniles are identified and treated on the basis of individual behaviour whether manifested in school, at home or in the community (or a combination, as in 'multiple-gating'). At a still narrower level the criminal justice system can focus on status and crime offenders. At the next level only on crime offenders. Finally, the system can concentrate on chronic, or high repeat, offenders. The approaches can be approximately divided into prevention approaches (before an individual has been either identified or adjudicated as being a juvenile delinquent) or treatment approaches (after such a finding, including diversion).

Of course, juvenile justice strategies do not have to be exclusively addressed at only one level. For example, some policy analysts appear to favour strategies that concentrate on at-risk juveniles and chronic offenders (see, Greenwood, 1987). However, choices do have to be made both because of costs and because, as we have seen, solutions based on each level have advantages and disadvantages. **Figure 10** - tries also to summarise these advantages and disadvantages. Not surprisingly there are some advantages associated with attacking the juvenile justice problem at the broadest level (i.e., at the top of the funnel) : (1) *per capita* budget costs are likely to be relatively low (conversely, however, absolute, or total, budgetary costs will tend to be extremely high and perhaps importantly will be associated with different agencies (e.g. schools) than treatment budgets (i.e. corrections); (2) *potentially* parents and juveniles need be less concerned with labelling problems at this level if interventions are perceived to be advantageous to juveniles, but especially to their parents; (3) behaviour *may* be somewhat easier to alter if these population programs are addressed at children and younger juveniles.

As we have already discussed the disadvantages tend to be the mirror image of these advantages: high aggregate costs and high false positives (this later phenomenon is only a problem if there is some negative labelling). The major problem of the false positive phenomenon, in the absence of labelling,

is that overall cost-benefits ratios are depressed by the costs of 'treating' the false positives.

In our view, approaches which address both at-risk populations and at-risk individuals with programs that are viewed positively by their parents (and which, therefore, do not label) probably offer the best combination of advantages: they are likely to provide the best benefit-cost outcomes. Clearly, the two categories will overlap considerably (for example, the U.S. Job Corps programs was designed for at-risk populations, but most of the clients would probably have been defined as high-risk juveniles.

The first major substantive conclusion is that there is hope for *prevention* strategies, mainly those that are pre-school and school-focused. But these prevention strategies raise several potential problems. The most serious is that because of the inevitable problem of a very large number of 'false positives' in a universal, unscreened population (for example, all 13 year olds in Australia) it will usually never make sense to 'treat' all children. It might make sense if we had no reliable predictors of the likelihood of becoming delinquent. It does not make sense given that many of these characteristics are known by 12 or 13 years of age. But as soon as false positives are reduced in *number* there is a danger that the *costs* for remaining false positives increase. The reason is that in universal programs false positives are purely an economic problem (money is being spent on juveniles who will not, in fact, become delinquent). But universal programs virtually guarantee that there will be no social stigmatisation or net widening. However, once prevention programs become *non-universal* they potentially become treatment programs with attendant labelling and stigmatisation problems.

Non-universal programs reduce the *budgetary* implications of the false positive problem (if the predictors actually have some predictive power) because resources are no longer wasted on youth who will not become delinquent. However it should be recognised that non-universal programs will tend to raise the private (and perhaps the longer-run budgetary) costs of the remaining false positives because of labelling, stigma etc. In other words, although there are short-run budgetary savings there may be long-run social costs. Additionally, of course, non-universal programs (especially those that attempt prediction at the individual level) also generate false negative problems.

How can these problems be avoided when designing prevention programs? One meta-strategy is to ensure that any such program is perceived as potentially beneficial by parents. In practice, this is synonymous with programs that are non-coercive. We should stress '*perceived to be beneficial*'. It is not enough that such programs be beneficial according to some set of objective criteria, clients (children's parents) must perceive this to be so. Pre-school programs have a major advantage, in that they are likely to fall into this category.

Non-coerciveness is absolutely vital to any program that attempts to select *individuals* for prevention treatment. Indeed, programs that rely on parents to identify potential problem children could not effectively function unless the parents see benefits.

Another strategy is to focus on schools in low income communities (low income is probably the most practical proxy for delinquency for policy purposes, but there may be others). As this report has documented the most promise can be found in programs that focus on school organisation and culture. One disadvantage is that such programs cannot truly be said to be voluntary. (School culture is a 'public good' which must be consumed by all pupils attending a given school). There are several advantages. Concentrating on low income communities decreases the budgetary false positive problem (because there is a higher underlying degree of delinquency), but if truly school-wide is not likely to generate significant labelling problems. Additionally, although not voluntary in the purest sense of the word many parents are likely to perceive benefits, especially if home behaviour is improved.


A second conclusion is that another major focus can be upon at-risk individuals (see **Figure 10**). However, the evidence of positive effects is limited to specific kinds of parent-training programs. We believe that this area should be the focus of well-designed Australian experiments.

A third conclusion is that there is fairly good evidence that some things do not work. For example, it has been shown that individual therapy and group therapy of children identified as pre-delinquent have been shown to be worthless time after time (Leitenberg 1987, p. 2320).

However, our fourth conclusion is that certain types of 'non-traditional' treatment programs do appear to be effective. We must caution, however, that these findings are tentative and appear to be dependent on hard-to-replicate conditions. Again, this suggests well-controlled experiments at this stage rather than wholesale adoption. The two major programs here are camp and wilderness sentences and 'Job-Corps' style training programs (we have already noted that these programs are also appropriate for at-risk populations, i.e. prevention, as well as a treatment mode). These programs appear especially valuable for chronic offenders.

We should also mention here the potential of situational crime prevention measures for specific forms of juvenile anti-social behaviour. Telecom Australia have already demonstrated the enormous savings that can be obtained by using such measures in the case of theft and vandalism in relation to public telephones. We consider that in regard to other forms of delinquent behaviour - vandalism, graffiti, car-theft, household burglary and so on - situational measures could also be very effective.

Finally, regardless of whether situational or social crime-prevention strategies are employed in the juvenile field we consider that it is essential that funding be withheld for such programs unless proper evaluation paradigms are built into policy or research proposals. For too long government and private bodies have funded prevention schemes in the juvenile field without demanding any accountability in terms of the outcome of such schemes. The consequent duplication of programs in the absence of critical assessment or the implementation of programs that have failed elsewhere (or for which there is no real evidence of success) is unacceptable in these times of limited budgets for social innovations. Researchers and policy implementators must ensure that proper evaluation strategies are part of the research or policy proposal.



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APPENDIXES

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N.S.W. CHILDREN'S COURT TABLES - CRIMINAL MATTERS

12 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 1987

TABLE 1.1.14: FINAL COURT APPEARANCES
PROPERTY OFFENCE* BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN
BY OUTCOME BY SEX.

MALES

PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN	OUTCOME												TOTAL NOT PROVEN OUTCOME	TOTAL ALL OUTCOME
	COMMTD TO INSTIT	COMMTD CARE YACS	COMNTY SERV ORDER	RECOG WITH SUPVN	RECOG W/OUT SUPVN	PROBN	COMMTD CARE NOT YACS	FINED	PROVED NO PENLTY	DISMSD AND CAUTND	OTHER PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL PROVEN OUTCME		
\$NIL														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	25	0	6	11	13	19	0	4	0	3	5	86	8	94
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	17	0	2	10	24	32	0	3	3	7	7	105	19	124
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	40	0	6	19	43	55	0	8	0	17	13	201	18	219
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	47	0	2	18	38	27	0	8	1	1	6	148	25	173
STEAL FROM PERSON	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
SHOPLIFTING	0	0	1	3	5	6	0	2	0	2	0	19	2	21
OTHER THEFT	14	0	1	8	23	22	0	17	0	26	9	120	17	137
TOTAL	144	0	19	69	146	161	0	42	4	56	40	681	89	770
\$1 TO \$9														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	5	0	5
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	0	0	0	2	1	4	0	0	0	2	0	9	1	10
STEAL FROM PERSON	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	3
SHOPLIFTING	4	0	1	5	5	14	0	15	0	15	1	60	1	61
OTHER THEFT	2	0	0	4	5	5	0	10	4	13	1	44	4	48
TOTAL	11	0	1	12	12	26	0	25	4	32	3	126	6	132
\$10 TO \$49														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	13	0	1	0	2	12	0	0	0	4	1	33	1	34

CONTINUED

N.S.W. CHILDREN'S COURT TABLES - CRIMINAL MATTERS

12 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 1987

TABLE 1.1.14: FINAL COURT APPEARANCES
PROPERTY OFFENCE * BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN
BY OUTCOME BY SEX.

MALES

PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN	OUTCOME											TOTAL PROVEN OUTCOME	TOTAL NOT PROVEN OUTCOME	TOTAL ALL OUTCOME
	COMMTD TO INSTIT	COMMTD CARE YACS	COMNTY SERV ORDER	RECOG WITH SUPVN	RECOG W/OUT SUPVN	PROBN	COMMTD CARE NOT YACS	FINED	PROVED NO PENLTY	DISMSD AND CAUTND	OTHER PROVEN OUTCME			
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	3	0	2	1	7	10	0	0	0	4	0	27	2	29
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	3	0	0	3	5	9	0	1	1	2	0	24	0	24
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
STEAL FROM PERSON	3	0	2	1	1	2	0	2	0	0	1	12	0	12
SHOPLIFTING	4	0	1	7	25	30	1	27	5	19	2	121	8	129
OTHER THEFT	6	0	0	11	24	38	0	44	5	22	8	158	13	171
TOTAL	32	0	6	23	64	101	1	74	11	51	12	375	25	400
\$50 TO \$99														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	3	0	0	0	3	5	0	1	0	1	0	13	0	13
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	1	0	0	1	2	5	0	0	0	4	0	13	0	13
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	2	0	0	2	7	2	0	0	0	2	1	16	0	16
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
STEAL FROM PERSON	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	5	1	6
SHOPLIFTING	1	0	0	0	10	4	0	8	1	12	0	36	4	40
OTHER THEFT	13	0	1	4	23	19	0	18	3	24	6	111	9	120
TOTAL	21	0	1	8	46	36	0	28	4	43	8	195	14	209
\$100 TO \$249														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	8	0	0	3	3	5	0	1	0	6	2	28	0	28
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	8	0	1	2	10	11	0	1	0	3	5	41	3	44
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	6	0	3	7	11	12	0	1	0	3	2	45	1	46
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	1	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5

CONTINUED

N.S.W. CHILDREN'S COURT TABLES - CRIMINAL MATTERS

12 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 1987

TABLE 1.1.14: FINAL COURT APPEARANCES
PROPERTY OFFENCE* BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN
BY OUTCOME BY SEX.

MALES

OUTCOME

PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN	COMMTD TO INSTIT	COMMTD CARE YACS	COMNTY SERV ORDER	RECOG WITH SUPVN	RECOG W/OUT SUPVN	PROBN	COMMTD CARE NOT YACS	FINED	PROVED NO PENLTY	DISMSD AND CAUTND	OTHER PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL NOT PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL ALL OUTCME
STEAL FROM PERSON	1	0	1	3	1	4	0	1	0	0	0	11	1	12
SHOPLIFTING	3	0	0	3	19	7	0	4	1	4	0	41	4	45
OTHER THEFT	14	0	5	9	43	42	0	29	3	27	13	185	16	201
TOTAL	41	0	10	27	90	82	0	37	4	43	22	356	25	381
\$250 OR MORE														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	21	0	2	8	28	23	0	0	0	5	1	88	5	93
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	16	0	4	15	31	23	0	2	1	5	3	100	3	103
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	9	0	1	13	29	27	0	7	1	7	2	96	2	98
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	97	0	13	38	52	31	1	8	2	18	6	266	22	288
STEAL FROM PERSON	2	0	1	1	3	0	0	4	0	0	0	11	2	13
SHOPLIFTING	2	0	0	4	11	5	0	4	0	2	0	28	1	29
OTHER THEFT	23	0	6	25	63	51	0	31	3	29	11	242	27	269
TOTAL	170	0	27	104	217	160	1	56	7	66	23	831	62	893
VALUE UNKNOWN														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	63	1	6	46	61	57	2	7	1	13	6	263	23	286
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	54	0	5	32	44	59	0	3	1	25	5	228	16	244
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	102	0	11	65	109	166	0	13	3	54	24	547	31	578
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	111	0	9	32	54	53	0	12	1	12	11	295	19	314
STEAL FROM PERSON	2	0	0	2	3	1	0	1	0	1	1	11	1	12
SHOPLIFTING	3	0	0	0	6	20	0	16	2	14	0	61	4	65
OTHER THEFT	47	0	3	22	67	92	1	72	13	54	11	382	21	403

CONTINUED

N.S.W. CHILDREN'S COURT TABLES - CRIMINAL MATTERS

12 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 1987

TABLE 1.1.14: FINAL COURT APPEARANCES
PROPERTY OFFENCE* BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN
BY OUTCOME BY SEX.

MALES

PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN	OUTCOME													
	COMMTD TO INSTIT	COMMTD CARE YACS	COMNTY SERV ORDER	RECOG WITH SUPVN	RECOG W/OUT SUPVN	PROBN	COMMTD CARE NOT YACS	FINED	PROVED NO PENLTY	DISMSD AND CAUTND	OTHER PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL NOT PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL ALL OUTCME
TOTAL	382	1	34	199	344	448	3	124	21	173	58	1787	115	1902
TOTAL MALES	801	1	98	442	919	1014	5	386	55	464	166	4351	336	4687

CONTINUED

N.S.W. CHILDREN'S COURT TABLES - CRIMINAL MATTERS

12 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 1987

TABLE 1.1.14: FINAL COURT APPEARANCES
PROPERTY OFFENCE* BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN
BY OUTCOME BY SEX.

FEMALES

PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN	OUTCOME												TOTAL NOT PROVEN OUTCOME	TOTAL ALL OUTCOME
	COMMTD TO INSTIT	COMMTD CARE YACS	COMNTY SERV ORDER	RECOG WITH SUPVN	RECOG W/OUT SUPVN	PROBN	COMMTD CARE NOT YACS	FINED	PROVED NO PENLTY	DISMSD AND CAUTND	OTHER PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL PROVEN OUTCME		
\$NIL														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	0	0	0	1	1	7	0	1	0	1	2	13	0	13
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	1	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	2	2	1	11	1	12
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
STEAL FROM PERSON	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
SHOPLIFTING	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	5	0	12	1	13
OTHER THEFT	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	2	0	3	1	10	0	10
TOTAL	2	1	0	4	10	10	0	5	4	11	4	51	2	53
\$1 TO \$9														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
SHOPLIFTING	0	0	1	1	3	3	0	3	1	9	1	22	1	23
OTHER THEFT	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	4	1	9	1	10
TOTAL	1	0	1	2	4	5	0	3	1	13	2	32	3	35
\$10 TO \$49														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	3

CONTINUED

N.S.W. CHILDREN'S COURT TABLES - CRIMINAL MATTERS

12 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 1987

TABLE 1.1.14: FINAL COURT APPEARANCES
PROPERTY OFFENCE* BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN
BY OUTCOME BY SEX.

FEMALES

PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN	OUTCOME											TOTAL PROVEN OUTCOME	TOTAL NOT PROVEN OUTCOME	TOTAL ALL OUTCOME	
	COMMTD TO INSTIT	COMMTD CARE YACS	COMNTY SERV ORDER	RECOG WITH SUPVN	RECOG W/OUT SUPVN	PROBN	COMMTD CARE NOT YACS	FINED	PROVED NO PENLTY	DISMSD AND CAUTND	OTHER PROVEN OUTCME				
SHOPLIFTING	1	0	0	1	24	7	0	12	0	13	1	59	9	68	
OTHER THEFT	1	0	0	0	3	3	0	4	0	7	2	20	2	22	
TOTAL	2	0	0	2	29	11	0	16	0	22	3	85	12	97	
\$50 TO \$99															
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	
SHOPLIFTING	2	1	0	1	9	5	0	6	0	8	0	32	3	35	
OTHER THEFT	1	0	0	0	4	0	0	2	0	5	0	12	0	12	
TOTAL	4	1	0	3	14	5	0	9	0	13	0	49	3	52	
\$100 TO \$249															
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	3	
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3	
STEAL FROM PERSON	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	
SHOPLIFTING	1	0	0	1	13	6	0	2	0	5	0	28	2	30	
OTHER THEFT	2	0	0	0	3	10	0	3	0	3	3	24	2	26	
TOTAL	6	0	0	1	16	18	0	5	0	8	4	58	5	63	

CONTINUED

N.S.W. CHILDREN'S COURT TABLES - CRIMINAL MATTERS

12 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 1987

TABLE 1.1.14: FINAL COURT APPEARANCES
PROPERTY OFFENCE* BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN
BY OUTCOME BY SEX.

FEMALES

PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN	OUTCOME											TOTAL PROVEN OUTCOME	TOTAL NOT PROVEN OUTCOME	TOTAL ALL OUTCOME
	COMMTD TO INSTIT	COMMTD CARE YACS	COMNTY SERV ORDER	RECOG WITH SUPVN	RECOG W/OUT SUPVN	PROBN	COMMTD CARE NOT YACS	FINED	PROVED NO PENLTY	DISMSD AND CAUTND	OTHER PROVEN OUTCME			
\$250 OR MORE														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	0	2	0	7	0	7
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	5	1	6
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	0	0	0	2	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	8	0	8
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	2	0	0	1	4	1	0	0	1	0	0	9	0	9
STEAL FROM PERSON	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
SHOPLIFTING	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	13	1	14
OTHER THEFT	1	0	0	1	9	6	0	4	0	4	1	26	4	30
TOTAL	3	0	0	5	25	18	0	6	0	11	1	69	6	75
VALUE UNKNOWN														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	4	0	0	3	9	14	1	0	0	6	3	40	2	42
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	4	0	0	6	8	14	0	0	0	2	0	34	1	35
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	1	0	0	5	5	6	0	0	0	5	4	26	4	30
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	2	0	0	5	3	5	0	0	0	1	0	16	1	17
SHOPLIFTING	0	0	0	0	4	2	0	6	2	8	1	23	3	26
OTHER THEFT	3	0	0	5	13	9	0	13	4	9	7	63	3	66
TOTAL	14	0	0	24	42	50	1	19	6	31	15	202	14	216
TOTAL FEMALES	32	2	1	41	140	117	1	63	11	109	29	546	45	591

CONTINUED

N.S.W. CHILDREN'S COURT TABLES - CRIMINAL MATTERS

12 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 1987

TABLE 1.1.14: FINAL COURT APPEARANCES
PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN
BY OUTCOME BY SEX.

PERSONS

OUTCOME

PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN	COMMTD TO INSTIT	COMMTD CARE YACS	COMNTY SERV ORDER	RECOG WITH SUPVN	RECOG W/OUT SUPVN	PROBN	COMMTD CARE NOT YACS	FINED	PROVED NO PENLTY	DISMSD AND CAUTND	OTHER PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL NOT PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL ALL OUTCME
\$NIL														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	25	0	6	12	14	26	0	5	0	4	7	99	8	107
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	18	0	2	11	25	32	0	3	3	7	7	108	19	127
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	41	0	6	20	45	57	0	8	2	19	14	212	19	231
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	47	0	2	18	39	27	0	8	1	1	6	149	25	174
STEAL FROM PERSON	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
SHOPLIFTING	0	1	1	3	6	7	0	4	2	7	0	31	3	34
OTHER THEFT	14	0	1	9	26	22	0	19	0	29	10	130	17	147
TOTAL	146	1	19	73	156	171	0	47	8	67	44	732	91	823
\$1 TO \$9														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	5	1	6
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	5	0	5
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	1	0	0	2	1	4	0	0	0	2	0	10	1	11
STEAL FROM PERSON	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	3
SHOPLIFTING	4	0	2	6	8	17	0	18	1	24	2	82	2	84
OTHER THEFT	2	0	0	5	6	7	0	10	4	17	2	53	5	58
TOTAL	12	0	2	14	16	31	0	28	5	45	5	158	9	167
\$10 TO \$49														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	13	0	1	1	2	12	0	0	0	4	1	34	1	35

CONTINUED

N.S.W. CHILDREN'S COURT TABLES - CRIMINAL MATTERS

12 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 1987

TABLE 1.1.14: FINAL COURT APPEARANCES
PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN
BY OUTCOME BY SEX.

PERSONS

PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN	OUTCOME											TOTAL NOT PROVEN OUTCOME	TOTAL ALL OUTCOME	
	COMMTD TO INSTIT	COMMTD CARE YACS	COMNTY SERV ORDER	RECOG WITH SUPVN	RECOG W/OUT SUPVN	PROBN	COMMTD CARE NOT YACS	FINED	PROVED NO PENLTY	DISMSD AND CAUTND	OTHER PROVEN OUTCME			TOTAL PROVEN OUTCME
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	3	0	2	1	9	10	0	0	0	4	0	29	3	32
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	3	0	0	3	5	10	0	1	1	4	0	27	0	27
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
STEAL FROM PERSON	3	0	2	1	1	2	0	2	0	0	1	12	0	12
SHOPLIFTING	5	0	1	8	49	37	1	39	5	32	3	180	17	197
OTHER THEFT	7	0	0	11	27	41	0	48	5	29	10	178	15	193
TOTAL	34	0	6	25	93	112	1	90	11	73	15	460	37	497
\$50 TO \$99														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	4	0	0	2	3	5	0	1	0	1	0	16	0	16
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	1	0	0	1	2	5	0	1	0	4	0	14	0	14
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	2	0	0	2	8	2	0	0	0	2	1	17	0	17
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
STEAL FROM PERSON	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	5	1	6
SHOPLIFTING	3	1	0	1	19	9	0	14	1	20	0	68	7	75
OTHER THEFT	14	0	1	4	27	19	0	20	3	29	6	123	9	132
TOTAL	25	1	1	11	60	41	0	37	4	56	8	244	17	261
\$100 TO \$249														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	9	0	0	3	3	6	0	1	0	6	3	31	0	31
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	9	0	1	2	10	12	0	1	0	3	5	43	4	47
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	6	0	3	7	11	12	0	1	0	3	2	45	1	46
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	1	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5

CONTINUED

N.S.W. CHILDREN'S COURT TABLES - CRIMINAL MATTERS

12 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 1987

TABLE 1.1.14: FINAL COURT APPEARANCES
PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN
BY OUTCOME BY SEX.

PERSONS

PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN	OUTCOME											TOTAL NOT PROVEN OUTCOME	TOTAL ALL OUTCOME	
	COMMTD TO INSTIT	COMMTD CARE YACS	COMNTY SERV ORDER	RECOG WITH SUPVN	RECOG W/OUT SUPVN	PROBN	COMMTD CARE NOT YACS	FINED	PROVED NO PENLTY	DISMSD AND CAUTND	OTHER PROVEN OUTCOME			TOTAL PROVEN OUTCOME
STEAL FROM PERSON	2	0	1	3	1	4	0	1	0	0	0	12	1	13
SHOPLIFTING	4	0	0	4	32	13	0	6	1	9	0	69	6	75
OTHER THEFT	16	0	5	9	46	52	0	32	3	30	16	209	18	227
TOTAL	47	0	10	28	106	100	0	42	4	51	26	414	30	444
\$250 OR MORE														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	21	0	2	8	30	25	0	1	0	7	1	95	5	100
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	16	0	4	16	33	24	0	2	1	6	3	105	4	109
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	9	0	1	15	31	30	0	8	1	7	2	104	2	106
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	99	0	13	39	56	32	1	8	2	19	6	275	22	297
STEAL FROM PERSON	2	0	1	1	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	12	2	14
SHOPLIFTING	2	0	0	4	16	10	0	4	0	5	0	41	2	43
OTHER THEFT	24	0	6	26	72	57	0	35	3	33	12	268	31	299
TOTAL	173	0	27	109	242	178	1	62	7	77	24	900	68	968
VALUE UNKNOWN														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	67	1	6	49	70	71	3	7	1	19	9	303	25	328
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	58	0	5	38	52	73	0	3	1	27	5	262	17	279
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	103	0	11	70	114	172	0	13	3	59	28	573	35	608
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	113	0	9	37	57	58	0	12	1	13	11	311	20	331
STEAL FROM PERSON	2	0	0	2	3	1	0	1	0	1	1	11	1	12
SHOPLIFTING	3	0	0	0	10	22	0	22	4	22	1	84	7	91
OTHER THEFT	50	0	3	27	80	101	1	85	17	63	18	445	24	469

CONTINUED

N.S.W. CHILDREN'S COURT TABLES - CRIMINAL MATTERS

12 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 1987

TABLE 1.1.14: FINAL COURT APPEARANCES
PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN
BY OUTCOME BY SEX.

PERSONS	OUTCOME													
	COMMTD TO INSTIT	COMMTD CARE YACS	COMNTY SERV ORDER	RECOG WITH SUPVN	RECOG W/OUT SUPVN	PROBN	COMMTD CARE NOT YACS	FINED	PROVED NO PENLTY	DISMSD AND CAUTND	OTHER PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL NOT PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL ALL OUTCME
PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN														
STEAL FROM PERSON	2	0	1	3	1	4	0	1	0	0	0	12	1	13
SHOPLIFTING	4	0	0	4	32	13	0	6	1	9	0	69	6	75
OTHER THEFT	16	0	5	9	46	52	0	32	3	30	16	209	18	227
TOTAL	47	0	10	28	106	100	0	42	4	51	26	414	30	444

\$250 OR MORE														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	21	0	2	8	30	25	0	1	0	7	1	95	5	100
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	16	0	4	16	33	24	0	2	1	6	3	105	4	109
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	9	0	1	15	31	30	0	8	1	7	2	104	2	106
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	99	0	13	39	56	32	1	8	2	19	6	275	22	297
STEAL FROM PERSON	2	0	1	1	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	12	2	14
SHOPLIFTING	2	0	0	4	16	10	0	4	0	5	0	41	2	43
OTHER THEFT	24	0	6	26	72	57	0	35	3	33	12	268	31	299
TOTAL	173	0	27	109	242	178	1	62	7	77	24	900	68	968

VALUE UNKNOWN														
BREAK/ENTER- DWLG	67	1	6	49	70	71	3	7	1	19	9	303	25	328
BREAK/ENTER- SHOP	58	0	5	38	52	73	0	3	1	27	5	262	17	279
BREAK/ENTER- OTHER	103	0	11	70	114	172	0	13	3	59	28	573	35	608
STEAL MOTOR VEHICLE	113	0	9	37	57	58	0	12	1	13	11	311	20	331
STEAL FROM PERSON	2	0	0	2	3	1	0	1	0	1	1	11	1	12
SHOPLIFTING	3	0	0	0	10	22	0	22	4	22	1	84	7	91
OTHER THEFT	50	0	3	27	80	101	1	85	17	63	18	445	24	469

CONTINUED

N.S.W. CHILDREN'S COURT TABLES - CRIMINAL MATTERS

12 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 1987

TABLE 1.1.14: FINAL COURT APPEARANCES
PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN
BY OUTCOME BY SEX.

PERSONS

PROPERTY OFFENCE BY VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN	OUTCOME													
	COMMTD TO INSTIT	COMMTD CARE YACS	COMNTY SERV ORDER	RECOG WITH SUPVN	RECOG W/OUT SUPVN	PROBN	COMMTD CARE NOT YACS	FINED	PROVED NO PENLTY	DISMSD AND CAUTND	OTHER PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL NOT PROVEN OUTCME	TOTAL ALL OUTCME
TOTAL	396	1	34	223	386	498	4	143	27	204	73	1989	129	2118
TOTAL PERSONS	833	3	99	483	1059	1131	6	449	66	573	195	4897	381	5278

CONTINUED

FOOTNOTES: * ONLY THE PROPERTY OFFENCE WHICH IS ALSO THE MOST SERIOUS
OFFENCE MATTER FINALISED AT EACH COURT APPEARANCE IS
REPRESENTED HERE.

COUNTING RULE: EACH FINAL APPEARANCE IN THE CHILDREN'S COURT AT WHICH ONE OR
MORE CRIMINAL MATTERS WERE DEALT WITH DURING THE REFERENCE
PERIOD.

END OF TABLE 1.1.14

WORK SHEET.

OFFENCE.

JUV. AID BUREAU QLD.

<u>EVENT.</u>	<u>Distance</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>=</u>	<u>Phone.</u>	<u>Photo.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
(a)							
Police to Scene							
Initial Inqs. at scene							
Radio Time							
P.C. Attendance							
Uniform Scene duties							
P.C. Scene duties							
Intv. Witnesses							
Photographics							
Develop & Print							
Scientific							
Scientific Report							
Obtain Statements							
(b)							
Prepare C.O. Report							
Complete C.O. Report							
Index, Distribution etc							
(c)							
Contact Offender							
Checking Offender							
(d)							
Interview Parents							Convert time spent here to Record Of Interview for further process.
Interview Child							
Intv. P & C							
(e)							
Type F.C.O.R. & J.A.B.R.							Subtract this Section when further process involved.
Processing							
Computer Time							
Report to Coroner							
Further Processing							
CAUTION SUBTOTAL							
(f)							
Arrest							
Typing							
Charging							
Conveying home/ detention.							

EVENT.	Distance	Time	X	=	Phone.	Photo.	Remarks.
(g)							
Preparation of Brief Sheet							
Preparation of Statements							
Witness Statements.							
(h)							
Prosecution Preparation							
Children's Court.							
Convey Offender.							
CHILDREN'S COURT PLEA "Guilty"							
SUBTOTAL							
(i)							
Statement of Witnesses							
Prosecutor Conference							
Prosecutor Preparation							
Tpt. Witnesses-							
Preparation of Witnesses							
Court (Chlds/Commit)							
CHILDREN'S COURT DETERMINATION/ COMMITTAL SUBTOTAL							
(j)							
Delivery of Brief							
Contact Witnesses							
Prosecutor Conf.							
Witness Preparation							
Trial							
Tpt. Witnesses							
FINALISATION TO TRIAL							
TOTAL							

**EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMME
EVALUATION**

by

DAVID WILLIAMS



Pre-Court Programmes
Court-Based Programmes
After-Court Programmes
Community Development Programmes

EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMME EVALUATION

While there is extensive international evidence of literature focussing on descriptions of programmes in the juvenile justice field, there is a limited amount of empirical data through which policy decisions may be accurately addressed. *Wright and Dixon* (1977) reviewed 6,600 abstracts of juvenile delinquency projects mostly from the United States, and concluded that less than 2% presented data that had policy utility.

Similarly, *Luudman et. al.* (1976) reviewed 6,500 delinquency prevention programmes and located outcome data regarding only 25 of them. They concluded that measures of the operational success of programmes were not correlated with positive outcomes and that most studies failed to demonstrate differences in outcomes between treatment and control groups.

For this reason, it is appropriate to briefly examine a limited range of overseas programme evaluations which provide possible directions for policy decision making in Australian jurisdictions, as well as a view of the present 'state of technology' in overseas evaluation techniques. The material chosen does not necessarily signify the most 'important' work but rather, attempts to outline a cross-sectional representation of fields of study and evaluative techniques within the general scope of juvenile justice policy.

Pre-Court Programmes

This section considers a number of evaluated programmes in the area of pre-court decision making while still within the criminal justice system, such as police and court intake diversionary programmes. Programmes which operate outside

of the criminal justice system but attempt to influence criminal justice outcomes will be considered in section 2.4

PRATT, J. 'Diversion from the Juvenile Court', British Journal of Criminology V.26 No.3, July 1986.

This article gives an historical analysis of police cautioning in Britain as the now predominant form of disposition and sanction of juvenile offenders. Greater emphasis was given to cautioning through policy initiatives such as Home Office White Papers 'Children in Trouble' (1986), 'Juvenile Offenders' (1980) and 'Cautioning by the Police : A Consultative Document' (1984) and through legislation in the 1969 Children and Young Person's Act, as a primary form of diverting juveniles from formal processing. Pratt notes that the heightened use of cautioning has instead generated an 'inflationary spiral in the processing of delinquency cases, leading to greater regulation in the lives of young people' (p.212).

GRAHAM, J. and MOXON, D. 'Some Trends in Juvenile Justice', Home Office Research Bulletin, No.22, HMSO.

Graham and Moxon outline recent research which support the conclusion above by Pratt that police cautioning 'widens the net' of juveniles experiencing intervention, although also find that cautioning slightly reduces the proportion of 10 to 13-year-olds entering the criminal justice system.

This article also describes research by Bowden and Stevens (1986) regarding a Juvenile Liaison Bureau Project in Northampton (U.K.) aiming to divert juvenile offenders from courts and reducing the use of custodial sentences, involving five agencies responsible for work with juveniles. The Bureau encourages agency liaison through all stages, from initial police recommendations regarding a particular offender, to the monitoring of all aspects of the local

juvenile justice system and the development of community resources for youth.

Bowden and Stevens report success in a number of aspects - the number of juvenile prosecutions between 1980-1985 fell by 80%, the number of custodial sentences by 65%, the number of orders by 82%, and remands in custody by 64%. Further, the commission of juvenile crime as a percentage of all detected crime fell from 33% to 22% over that period whilst the numbers of crimes known to have been committed by juveniles fell by 3%. These measures are estimated to have resulted in an annual saving of some £500,000 in the Northampton juvenile justice system, quite apart from savings that may have been achieved through any reductions in crime.

DECKER, S.H. 'A Systemic Analysis of Diversion : Net Widening and Beyond', Journal of Criminal Justice, V.13, 1985, pp.207-216.

This article focuses on the operation of a juvenile diversion programme in a large U.S. metropolitan area, where youths who had committed status offences and would otherwise have been processed to the Juvenile Court were instead referred to the Status Offender Service Unit for counselling treatment after police cautioning. Contrary to the aims of diverting youths from the juvenile court, *Decker* found that the existence of this programme led to an increase in referral activity, both directly in status-offence patterns and indirectly in other offence categories. Using these results, *Decker* questions both police commitment to the goals of diversion and the legal safeguards in juvenile processing.

These results of diversion programmes leading to a net increase in juveniles receiving justice system attention are supported in many other studies, for instance, *Blomberg*

(1977, 1978, 1980), *Blomberg and Carabello* (1979), *Bohnstedt* (1978), *Klein et. al.* (1976), *Lemert* (1981), *Pearson* (1984).

PALMER, E.B. and LEWIS, R.V. 'Differentiated Approaches to Juvenile Diversion', Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, V.17, No.2, 1980, pp.209-229.

Palmer and Lewis considered in overview 74 juvenile diversion projects operated by the California Youth Authority, and using quasi-experimental design, closely evaluated 15 representative projects to determine (1) how much diversion was occurring; (2) whether recidivism (illegal behaviour) was being reduced; and (3) how much diversion was costing. The 15 projects concentrated on direct service provision to the juveniles as an alternative to formal processing, with no attention on community development or primary prevention.

Palmer and Lewis found that delinquent behaviour of diversion clients was reduced relative to that of a matched comparison group, and that modest financial savings resulted for justice system referrals. Significantly, they found that no single type of programme and no single programme setting were found to be optimal for all or even most youth deemed appropriate for diversion; a series of programmes and settings are recommended for specific groups of youths. The researchers also focus on the question of when intervention in a youth's criminal career might be most desirable in balancing conflicting goals and interests.

SCHNEIDER, A.L. and SCHRAM, D.D. 'The Washington State Juvenile Justice System Reform : A Review of Findings', Criminal Justice Policy Review, V.1, No.2, 1986, pp.169-197.

This article outlines substantial changes to the Washington State juvenile justice system through legislative and structural change in 1978. As a result of considerable

research detailing failures of the *poreus patriae* model of the juvenile court (e.g. *Wheeler 1978, Empey, Barton 1976*), the Washington State legislature completely amended juvenile justice legislation (House Bill 371), changed Probation and Prosecution responsibilities and developed diversionary programmes and sentencing guidelines with very different emphases.

Schneider and *Schram* note that the changes to the Washington State system reflect many of the tenets of a 'just deserts of justice' model as articulated by commentators such as *Von Hirsch* (1976). The intent of the Washington system is to hold juveniles accountable for their crimes and, simultaneously, to hold the system accountable for what it does to juveniles.

The justice model emphasises fairness, uniformity and proportionality in the court's response to juvenile offences, through both the philosophy and operations of the court and associated structures.

Schneider and *Schram's* evaluation of the reforms highlighted numerous changes in system decision-making. The practice of informally adjusting cases at intake was completely eliminated, and sentences were considerably more uniform and more proportionate in the post-reform era. The overall level of sentence severity, however, was actually reduced at least during the first two years after the law went into effect. Status offences were removed from court jurisdiction without any noticeable net-widening effect but with considerable relabeling.

While *Schneider* and *Schram* attempted to evaluate the effects of the reformed system on recidivism through recontact rates, methodological flaws resulted in confounding between changes in system processing and changes in actual behaviour of the youths.

Court-Based Programmes

There has been an extensive international history of reforms at the adjudication phase of the juvenile justice process, i.e. at the court itself. Indeed, the earliest reforms focussed on this phase rather than police actions or alternative correctional policies, such as the Illinois decision to create a separate jurisdiction for decision making in juvenile justice matters.

However, this section will concentrate on relatively recent international examples of programme evaluations within the court stage of processing. Given that reforms at this stage of the process have particular relevance for some Australian jurisdictions, it is interesting to note that there are relatively few international evaluations of programmes at this level.

TRIGG, S. 'Diversion and the Delinquency Prevention Division of the Travis County Juvenile Court', American Journal of Criminal Law, V.9, No.1, 1981 (89-111).

Trigg describes the operations and goals of a branch of Travis County (Texas, U.S.) JUVENILE COURT known as the Delinquency Prevention Division, which was established in 1971 within the general diversionary policies of the U.S. Federal Government. In contrast to the widespread practice of setting up Youth Service Bureaux outside of the court structure (see *Palmer* and *Lewis* article on Californian model), Travis Court established the Division within the operational and funding structure of the juvenile court, using court probation officers as staff.

In her evaluation of almost a decade of operations of the Delinquency Prevention Division, *Trigg* found that the

Division's role within the system of providing counselling, probation supervision and resource referral had led to a strong identification with the legal process of the court and an emphasis on the coercive functions of the juvenile justice systems. As a consequence, *Trigg* identifies a basic contradiction between the diversionary goals of the Division and the joint staff roles of counselling and petition to court on breakdown. *Trigg* identifies the funding and staffing structure as leading to these frustrations and operating difficulties.

MARTIN, F.M. and MURRAY, K. 'The Structure and Operation of the Children's Hearings System', in STEWART, V.L. (ed.) Justice and Troubled Children Around the World, New York Univ. Press, N.Y. 1981.

This article sets out the philosophy and operation of the Children's Hearings system in Scotland, introduced in 1971 by the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. Contrasting quite sharply from the system then (and now) prevailing in England, responsibility for dealing with children and young people in trouble was transferred from the courts to a new and largely welfare-oriented system of 'children's hearings', made up of voluntary community members, advised by a full-time officer, the Reporter. This officer is also a gatekeeper to the system with considerable discretionary powers as to whether the circumstances of a case indicate the juvenile being in need of 'compulsory measures of care', which are then referred to the children's hearings.

Initial referrals to the Reporter may come from any source and for reasons of an alleged offence, truancy, or because they are believed to have been neglected or harmed by parents. On average, Reporters refer some 50% of cases to the Children's hearings, where private consultations are held with the three-member panel, reporter, social worker, the child and parents, If the facts or interpretation of

law are in dispute, the case may be referred to the Sheriff's Court for resolution of that point only, and referral back to the Reporter for disposition. The Lord Advocate retains the power to direct prosecution of children in serious cases.

Martin and *Murray* outline some criticisms which have been made of the Scottish system by commentators such as *Brown* and *Bloomfield* (1979), *Curran* (1976) and *Bruce* (1978). In particular there has been criticism of the dual focuses of welfare and control leading to conflicting practice across Scotland, and a net-widening result through the acceptance of non-offending juveniles as referrals on a 'preventative basis'. The narrow make-up of the members of panels has also been criticized; however, this is also a criticism of the English system where the lower courts hearing most juvenile matters consist of lay magistrates.

Martin and *Murray* point out that a full assessment of the operations of the hearing system was not possible at that stage, as evaluative research on the outcomes of the system had been 'small in scale, limited to particular geographical areas, and unduly concentrated on a small number of relatively peripheral topics'. Such a conclusion highlights the need for accurate and reliable evaluative research in considering the outcomes of a complete system reform, such as has occurred in Scotland.

After-Court Programmes

Evaluations of the operations and outcomes of post-court services forms by far the largest number and greatest diversity of research in the juvenile justice area, in particular with regard to U.S. material. This section will attempt to provide an indication to the nature of evaluative research carried out on differing types of programmes.

RUTHERFORD, A., Growing out of Crime, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1986.

Rutherford describes a locally based project set up in Basingstoke (U.K.) by the Rainer Foundation, specifically arrived at diverting juveniles from custody through intensive counselling and supervision after court decision. The programme was restricted to those juveniles who would otherwise receive a custodial sentence and regarded as a serious 'last chance' alternative by magistrate, youngster and local community alike; indeed a number of referrals were refused as not likely to receive a custodial sentence. *Rutherford* reports that the diversion from custody aims had been successful; local records show that no juveniles had been given a custodial sentence for over a year, while 18 juveniles received a custodial sentence in the year prior to the scheme being established. The programme has been replicated in *Greenwich* and *Southend* with similar results.

ELY, P., SWIFT, A. AND SUTHERLAND, A., Control without Custody? Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1987.

Ely, Swift and Sutherland undertake an extensive evaluation of intensive supervision as a form of community-based corrections, particularly regarding the Medway Close Support Unit in Kent (U.K.). They undertake a variety of evaluative tasks on the operations and outcomes of the Unit; in addition, there is a particularly interesting analysis by *Martin Knapp* of the University of Kent, entitled 'Costs of the Unit Compared with Costs of Detention Centres'.

In this section, *Knapp* outlines a model of comparative economic analysis with which to consider community-based corrections and residential corrections, through comparison of: (1) Direct provision costs; (2) Indirect public sector costs; (3) Offender costs; (4) Family costs; and (5) Social costs. As *Knapp* himself notes, 'There have been few

attempts to examine the relative costs or, more ambitiously, the relative cost effectiveness of different sentences. The main reason for this dearth of previous cost research is perhaps that it is extremely difficult to calculate valid cost measures for almost all sentences currently used in this country because the necessary data are not available' (p.132). Given the provisos on the validity of available data, *Knapp* calculated the average direct accounting costs per trainees day to be £12.04 per day in the Unit, and £23.33 per day in detention centres.

However, in taking account of costs incurred by other public sector agencies, by offenders' families, and by society as a whole, the cost differential is considerably reduced; £17.33 per day for Unit and £23.25 per day for detention centres. Again, in taking into account the average time periods for each type of sentence at 110 days for the Unit and 47 days for the Detention Centres leading to an average 'sentence cost of £1,906.30 for the Unit, and £1,092.75 for Detention Centres; this illustrates that the important sentencing decisions in diversionary practice are in the length of sentence as well as the type of disposal; *Knapp* points out that these periods set by the Courts 'may or may not reflect equivalent amounts of social control or punishment' (p.142). See also *Knapp M.R.J., The Economics of Social Care, 1984, Macmillan, London.*

SCHNEIDER, A.L., The Impact of Deinstitutionalization on Recidivism and Secure Confinement of Status Offenders, 1985, U.S. National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Washington D.C..

Schneider reviewed more than 70 empirical studies of U.S. deinstitutionalization projects undertaken since 1974, and found that only 14 evaluation studies collected recidivism data on 'programme groups' compared to 'institutionalized control groups; of these, a positive impact was observed in

three, eight showed no difference and three indicated a negative effect in the programme group. While *Schneider* queries the methodological basis for the studies which produced negative impacts, it is clear that there was little if any overall effect on recidivism rates.

However, *Schneider* also pointed to the four studies where comparative costs data was collected for programme period and residential period; one study showed the same 'sentence cost', and three showed considerable lower costs for the alternative programmes.

Peat et. al. (1979) concluded a study of three State's programmes and institutional costs for the 1980 National Evaluation of the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders (*Kobrin and Klein, 1980*), with the following sentence results:

State	Programme	Institutional
Arizona	\$ 520	\$ 630
Delaware	\$3,313	\$4,173
Washington	\$ 544	\$ 759

In addition, *Palmer's* (1978) study in California found that the sentence costs were the same, but also found that the deinstitutionalization programmes were significantly better in terms of recidivism outcomes. Therefore, *Schneider's* conclusions show that, even if alternative programmes are no better than institutional sentences for recidivism outcomes, on a cost-outcome basis they still perform more efficiently.

KLEIN, M.W. 'Deinstitutionalization and Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A Litany of Impediments', in Morris, N.

and Toury(?), *M. Crime and Justice - An Annual Review of Research*, V.1, 1979, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Klein reviews evaluation studies of three large-scale U.S. juvenile justice programmes with differing aims; the California Treatment Programme, the Massachusetts Experiment, and the National Deinstitutionalization of Offenders Programme. *Klein* comments on the generally poor evaluations done on the California and national programmes and draws links to overall evaluation of criminal justice projects. He uses a *Coates, Miller and Ohlin* (1978) evaluation of the Massachusetts Experiment, where the State Legislature abruptly closed virtually all residential institutions and forced the development of community-based alternatives, both before and after court. This strategy has succeeded in emptying institutions and at no major cost in increased recidivism or serious delinquency. *Klein* also states that the regions of the state which developed a greater variety of community programmes were the regions which also manifested lower subsequent recidivism rates; the *Coates* report suggests a causal relationship in that.

However, while *Klein* found that some reliability could be placed in the *Coates* report in general he is critical in this article of the operations of the majority of juvenile justice programmes; he stresses that 'it is the basic contention of this essay that juvenile diversion and deinstitutionalization, two major reform movements in juvenile justice, have seldom in fact been implemented...They have not been meaningfully evaluated and their effectiveness, accordingly cannot be shown' (pp.145-6).

In fact, *Klein* has produced important work in the field of criminal justice system evaluation and analysis, c.f. *Klein and Teilman*, Handbook of Criminal Justice Evaluation.

ROBERTS, A.R., 'National Survey and Assessment of 66 Treatment Programs for Juvenile Offenders : Model Programs and Pseudomodels', *Juvenile v Family Court Journal*, V.38, No.3, 1987, pp.39-45.

Roberts gathered data from a national survey of 66 juvenile justice programmes deemed to be 'model programmes' by systems administrators. He found that only five of these 66 had undertaken evaluative research on the effectiveness of their programmes, though most had provided data on costs per participant. Roberts found that the community-based corrections were much cheaper per participant youth than residential programmes, and of these, juvenile restitution programmes were the most inexpensive.

Restitution - \$82 per youth

Family Treatment - \$589 per family

Community-based Treatment - \$1,450 per youth

Pre-release and after-care programmes - \$3,086 per youth

Roberts concluded that 'In view of the millions of dollars expended each year to protect society, care for, and rehabilitate juvenile offenders, it is astonishing that so few systematic research and follow-up studies have been conducted by juvenile justice agencies' (p.44).

For a recent review of programme evaluations in a particular field (Wilderness/Survival/Adventure Programmes), see Mason, C..

Community Development Programmes

There are a multitude of community development programmes which have reduction of crime as part of their rationale. This section will however, only consider a small number of those which have reductions in juvenile crime as an important and explicit intended outcome, with general community interventions directly related to criminal justice system goals.

KING, M., 'How to make Social Crime Prevention Work - The French Experience', 1988, Occasional Paper of the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (U.K.).

KING reviews three major French inquiries dealing with crime and causative factors:

Peyrefitte A. 'Response a la Violence - Rapport de la Comite, d'etudes sur la Violence, la Criminalite et la Delinquance', 1977, Press Pocket, Paris.

Dubedont, H. 'La Commission pour le Developpement Social des Quartiers' 1982, Collection des Rapports Officiels Documentation Francaise, Paris.

Bonnemaison, G. 'Face a la delinquance : Prevention, Repression, Solidarite', 1983, Commission des Maires dur la Securite, La Documentation Francaise, Paris.

KING directs most of his attention to the latter report, which came about as a result of the 'hot summer of 1981 where youth violence erupted in parts of Lyon and Marseille. *King* claims that 'the ever-decreasing police clear-up rates and the high level of recidivism are ample evidence that investment in traditional crime control apparatus of police, courts and prison attracted a diminishing return' (p.4). The *Bonnermaison* report highlights the failure of

traditional French methods of crime control and underlined the need for a joint approach, for a combination of social preventative measures working hand in hand with the existing forces of law and order.

The *Bonnermaison* Committee's solution was to create the structures that would encourage two forms of partnership, the first between local and central Government, and the second between these two administrations and groups at the local community level responsible for putting schemes into effect. These structures would use the philosophies of both 'classical crime prevention' (i.e. protecting children from the dangers presented by their moral and social environment) and a more 'political' response, in revitalising the inner-cities by restoring community life and improving the physical and moral environment.

The Commission envisaged three major strategies in carrying out these aims, namely:

1. Supplementary funding of existing organisations which had already proposed activities over the summer period;
2. New activities of a 'holiday' nature or games, sporting and theatrical activities organised on a local basis;
3. Efforts to mobilize groups of young people or whole communities in the direction of claiming grants and benefits for local projects or simply into giving people a feeling of solidarity.

King concludes from his evaluation of programmes set up across France as a direct result of the *Bonnemaison* Report that these strategies have been successful on a number of criteria;

- . French criminal statistics indicate a decline of the type of offence likely to be committed by young people. As a whole crime in France has fallen by 10.5% during the period 1985-87, and in Lille, with extensive programmes set up, has experienced a fall of 12% between 1985 and 1986.

However, given that many of the effects will only be long-term, *King* has identified features of the Report's outcomes which he views as positive for the future:

- . Co-operation between government departments at the national, regional and community levels, in providing funding, equipment, staff and facilities;
- . The conceptual links forged between crime-prevention and involving children and young people in social and recreational activities, rather than merely employing modes of State control as 'deterrence';
- . The gradual involvement of ethnic minority groups in 'mainstream' social and recreational activities without enforcing assimilation of those communities;
- . Encouraging and responding to initiatives from young people themselves.
- . Political consensus concerning the causality of youth crime.
- . A clearly conceived youth policy aimed at providing training programmes and eventual

employment, particularly for those young people who leave school without qualifications;

- . The avoidance of criminal prosecutions as the only or most favoured way of dealing with juvenile crime.
- . Taking an analytical approach to crime prevention. Simple solutions to problems of youth crime, such as use of custodial measures or exhortations directed at teachers or parents, finds little favour now. Rather, the complexity of the causes of youth crime is generally recognized, as is the need to base preventative action on careful analysis of these causes within specific geographical localities.

King concludes that 'the creative and imaginative projects that have emerged ... were the result of careful assessment of specific problems and the search for a solution which would not only play a part in reducing crime, but which would also melt the needs of young people' (p.39).

LONG, D.A., MALLAR, C.D. and THORNTON, C.V.D., 'Evaluating the Benefits and Costs of the Job Corps', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, V.1, No.1, 1981, pp.54-76.

This article outlines a sophisticated benefit-cost analysis carried out on a social programme and which succeeded in applying economic criteria to evaluating a programme with both economic and social costs and benefits.

The Job Corps programme was established in 1960's to provide a comprehensive set of services to disadvantaged youths, primarily vocational skills training, basic education and health care within residential settings. These services are intended to improve the employability of participants

leading to increased earnings, reduction in dependence on public assistance and a decline in criminal behaviour. The programme was evaluated using a sophisticated accounting method not normally used in social programmes nor even in services with a distinct economic outcome (see *Betsey et. al.* 1985). In this way, a benefit-cost analysis was done from three perspectives; society as a whole, programme participants and society outside the Corps members (taxpayers). In brief, the evaluation found that the programme was effective in all goal areas with improved work skills, employment histories, health condition and reduced delinquency involvement as measured by arrest figures and self-reporting. In arriving at an economic figure for the reduced criminal activities, the evaluators used U.S. National Crime Panel Survey data to cost each criminal act not carried out, as well as reduced criminal justice system costs and reduced psychological costs on victim and offenders.

The evaluation concluded that, for every \$1 spent on the Job Corps programme, a total of \$1.45 was returned to society in the form of benefits of some kind. While there may be debate on different values used, particularly for crimes of violence, there can be no doubt that the Job Corps programme was proven to effectively provide a service to the target population at a net benefit to society as a whole. The benefit-cost analysis carried out on the Job Corps programme was acclaimed by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences as a model of public programme accountability - see also, evidence presented by *Dr. T.H. Bell* and *Dr. R. Hollister* to the U.S. Congress Committee on Education and Labour Hearing, 22 April 1986 (Serial No. 99-98, U.S. Govt. Printing Office).

CURTIS, L. 'The Retreat of Folly : Some Modest Replications of Inner-City Success', Nov. 1987, The Annals of the

American Academy of Political and Social Science, V.494, Sage Publications, Beverley Hills.

Curtis considers four community-based programmes operating for over 15 years in the U.S. in inner-city areas with an emphasis on, but not exclusively directed towards, crimes committed by juveniles. He considers the following programmes:

- . the Community Board Programme in San Francisco which creates neighbourhood-based solutions to everyday urban conflicts through mediation by citizen volunteers;
- . the Argus Community in the South Bronx providing both residential and non-residential extended-family environments for adjudicated offenders and other high-risk youths city-wide;
- . The House of Unioja in Philadelphia also providing residential environment with considerable community interaction;
- . The Centro Sister Isolina Ferre in Puerto Rico providing a balance of neighbourhood organizing, extended-family supports and employment opportunity.

Curtis highlights the unique properties of these projects being the extensive involvement of the overall community, not just criminal justice system professionals, emphasis on community revitalization through education, social and recreational services and on employment provision for high-risk youth.

Curtis points to a consensus among observers that these programmes have been successful and cost-effective. For

instance, Argus participants showed lower recidivism rates than any other programme in New York working with such high-risk offenders. Another study reported a 3% rearrest rate for Unioja participants compared to a rate of 70% to 90% for young people released from conventional corrections facilities. Over a 15-year period the number of adjudicated delinquents in the area where Centro is located has dropped by 85% despite an increase in the population of high risk youth.

Curtis also reports that these community-based alternatives are much more cost-effective than conventional corrections - annual cost per person in N.Y. State prisons is \$30,087 and in Federal maximum security prisons is \$22,433, while it is \$16,000 for Argus residents and \$2,000 for non-residents, \$16,000 for Unioja residents, and \$200 for Centro non-residents; the Community Board Programme 'achieves impressive success through volunteers, compared to expensive lawyers and court system' (p.13).

OHLIN, L.E. 'The Future of Juvenile Justice Policy and Research', Crime and Delinquency, 1983, V.29 No.29, pp.463-472.

Ohlin reviews U.S. juvenile justice policy developments over the past 20 years, with a focus on the 1982 Austin and Krisberg assessment of some consequences of using community-based alternatives to juvenile incarceration, namely: (1) wider nets in which more youth are officially processed; (2) stronger nets that hold more youths in the system; and (3) different types of nets other than corrections (such as mental health and welfare placements). (*Austin and Krisberg, p.377*).

Ohlin uses this assessment of two decades focus on diversion and deinstitutionalization to put forward an alternative analysis of future policy and research directions in the

juvenile justice arena. Specifically he suggests six policy issues worthy of integration into consideration of juvenile justice problems, namely:

- (1) Confronting the Alienation of Youth - by considering theoretical areas of social control, economic and social strain, cultural conflict and deviance as complementary, formulate policies which concentrate resources at those points where youth are making critical choices in their lives so as to avoid careers in crime.
- (2) Building Community Resources - recognising and strengthening the characteristics of communities which make them capable of encouraging their young people in constructive behaviour.
- (3) Allocation of Federal State and Local Resources - defining how much allocations from which source will best bring about effective crime control.
- (4) Employment and Education - formulating policies in these two areas which best deal with the expected reduction in the 15-24 age group, to foster involvement in constructive community activities.
- (5) Fear of Crime - surveys indicate that the link between fear of crime and actual risk is not as direct as might be assumed, yet the relationships of class, race and gender to crime are potentially explosive issues.
- (6) Creating Co-operation - *Ohlin* stresses the view the 'juvenile justice policies cannot be successfully dealt with outside the context of a more general youth policy ... (he sees) resorting to incarceration as a

confession of bankruptcy of ideas and initiative in
this field'. (p.471).

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