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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE BEHAVIOUR OF NORMAL AND RETARDED SUBJECTS IN
HYPOTHETICAL TEMPTATION TO STEAL DILEMMAS*

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This report is divided into two parts; Part I is a comparative study of the behaviour of normal and retarded subjects in temptation to steal situations and Part II is a study of two procedures designed to facilitate the development of resistance to temptation behaviour.

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The behaviour of stealing is one of the most pressing and urgent crimes in the community and appears to be on the increase (Challinger 1977; Australian Bureau of Statistics 1978; Police Commissioners Report Tasmania 1979). Normal and retarded children are represented in the juvenile offender statistics. Theft is essentially a crime of affluent societies (Jackson, 1969).

Research into crime and delinquency and attempts at explanation are formidable and cover a wide range of disciplines. Such research has focused significantly on factors relating to low socio-economic class, depressed environment, family dislocation and residence in a traditionally delinquent urban area. Challinger (1977) has observed that the largest single group of offenders has fathers who are semiskilled and mothers who are at home; less than one half of a percent of youths concerned have parents both of whom can be described as being professionally employed. Davies and Dax (1974, p.201) have demonstrated that there is a disproportionately high rate of family breakdowns or family dislocations characteristic of official offenders. They observed for example that "the members of sixteen multiproblem families have spent 201 years in jail in the past 15 years, or 250 times as great a time in jail as for Tasmanian families in general".

In addition to these phenomena the factor relating to the male role appears to have had overriding significance in that offenders have been predominantly male, although more recent reports tend to suggest that stealing by females is on the increase (Fielding 1977; Hall 1975).

The major focus of most studies is with the social, sociological and cultural factors relating to crime. This focus is right and justified. However since crime rates, in particular, stealing rates,

continue to multiply, it seems important to look at other factors which previously have received scarcely any attention at all.

The data from which theories of causation and prevention are built in studies on crime and delinquency appear to derive from three sources which are the three usual procedures employed in attempts to examine the nature of deviance. These are (i) the use of official statistics which for many offences are highly questionable and can be varied according to a range of political and social pressures; (ii) Secondly, self report measures which depend heavily upon the honest answering of subjects and which do have a reasonable measure of concurrent validity although their reliability over long periods of time is sometimes low (Farrington 1977); (iii) A third procedure is to examine the behaviour of subjects from their own perception of events. This is based on the assumption that what the actor thinks is going on can be more important in shaping an outcome than what actually goes on. Thus it is what he thinks that will shape his responses to events and pressures. This view was caught nicely by Serot and Teevan (1961) when they observed that "the child reacts to his perception of the situation and not directly to the situation itself".

Each of these procedures has major methodological weaknesses and some are more appropriate than others for examining particular types of deviance.

Because the child's perception of the situation is considered to be significant, there is a need for a refined micro analysis of the cognitive operations and characteristics of persons in stealing dilemmas. The focus of this paper is an attempt at a micro analysis of the kind that looks at the cognitive operations of children in stealing dilemmas. The major assumptions of this approach are (i) that what a person thinks is the key, time variable and precursor of his behaviour; (ii) that this

thinking is constructed from social interaction; and (iii) that the subject's thinking and perception helps to shape the world in which he lives, in a significant way.

An empirical analysis of the thought processes of subjects in temptation situations is one way of focussing on this kind of data. Given these assumptions an attempt has been made to establish a procedure for examining the cognitive processes of subjects in hypothetical temptation situations.

The situations chosen were hypothetical temptation to steal dilemmas, selected because of their ability to be objectively manipulated and varied and because they straddle the territory between the objective study of deviance on the one hand and the study of moral development on the other. Indeed there is likely to be an undeniable link between the two.

METHOD

Subjects

Permission was sought from parents, teachers and administrators to pursue this study and with the exception of one parent, was obtained from each of these sources. A random selection of 108 MR children aged between 11.2 and 16 years was obtained from six special schools in Tasmania. From this sample a further random sample of 48 subjects was selected within the age range 11.2 to 14.7 years to compare with a similar age group of normal children. Normal subjects from a neighbouring high school were selected and matched on the basis of CA and sex. There was no reason to believe that the two groups of subjects differed

in a significant way in terms of S.E.S.

In addition to this a group of 48 younger normal subjects of both sexes, with an age range of 7.0 to 9.8 years was selected to match with the older retarded sample on the basis of mental age. The final sample was thus made up of two groups of normal subjects; a younger group and an older group. Both these groups were compared with the retarded sample, one using the mental age as a base and the other the chronological age (see Table 1).

TABLE 1
The Mean Age of the Sample

	FEMALES			MALES		
	Retarded N=24	Normal N=24	Normal N=24	Retarded N=24	Normal N=24	Normal N=24
\bar{x} age	12.2	12.3	7.1	12.3	12.4	7.1

Apparatus

Two versions of the Jackson Hypothetical Temptation to Steal Tests (J.H.T.S.T.) (Jackson 1968) were used: (a) Version One - the "did do" version; and (b) Version Two - the "should do" version.

(a) Version One - the "did do" version. The original form was a paper and pencil test used with normal subjects. There were eight hypothetical temptation to steal situations of which the following is an example -
Test Situation No. 4.

Test Situation No. 4

"One day at the football after nearly everybody had gone I was walking past the stand when I saw a small purse under the seat. I bent down and picked it up. When I opened it

I found it had one dollar 20 cents in it. There was a name on the flap but you couldn't read it very easily.

I _____
_____ because _____

The most significant way in which the dilemmas in this test differ from other hypothetical dilemmas that have been used, such as those of Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1969) is, that the subject is put in a position which implies that it is s/he that is faced with the dilemma, not some third person. The form of the dilemmas is written in the first person and the subject reads it as though it were s/he. After giving a response, such as yielding or resisting the temptation, s/he is required to say what s/he did, not would or should do and express the reasons for so doing after the word 'because'. Trial examples enable the subject to practise the procedure. Subjects who have major reading difficulties or reading ages of less than 7 years have problems reading the test, but normal children aged 6.11 years and onwards can cope, when given reading assistance by the experimenter.

However, because half of this sample was mentally retarded (IQ 50-75) it was necessary to design an alternative presentation which would obviate the demand to read and subsequently comprehend by the mentally retarded group. As a consequence of this variable it was necessary to design a slide presentation procedure where the subject was seated in front of a screen and observed the dilemmas in the form of pictures presented to him. In this presentation designed by Haines (1979a) the experimenter was out of view in another room, but connected with the child via an audio link up using headphones. He read an oral presentation identical to the written one of the dilemmas to the child. As

the child responded verbally his/her responses were automatically taped. The experimenter was seated in an adjacent room to preserve anonymity.

A validity study (Haines & Jackson 1979b) using normal subjects confirmed that the responses given to the audio presentation did not differ in any significant way from those given in the paper and pencil test situation. However, this audio presentation did permit the experimenter to use more verbal probes to obtain the subject's reasons for his/her decision.

The J.H.T.S.T. has been validated against the entire sample of delinquent children in Tasmania between the ages of 12 and 16 years yielding a validity score which discriminated between delinquent and non delinquent children at the $p < .001$ level. On a series of repeat reliability tests (Jackson 1979c) using the same instrument after a period of three months from the first testing, a reliability score of .82 was obtained. Thus the instrument can be viewed with a degree of confidence.

(b) The Moral Judgement Version. A second version of the J.H.T.S.T. utilizes the identical wording for each of the tests with the exception of the last word of the test. In addition to the word "I" (where the subject is required to respond) the word "should" is added. The addition of this word offered an opportunity to assess the subject's moral judgement, i.e. to state what s/he "should do". The validity of the "should do" version has been established in a study comparing "should do" and "did do" responses by the same subjects to the same test item. These data indicate that normal subjects respond significantly differently to the two versions of the test; $p < .001$ (Jackson, 1979b. Version One of the test has been called the "did do" version and Version Two, the "should do" version.

Although the normal children were tested as a group and the retarded children were tested in a one to one situation, trials with normal subjects indicated that this was not a variable.

The following types of responses can be obtained from the test:

- (i) yield, resist or legitimately acquire
- (ii) external/internal orientation
- (iii) cognitive processes

and (iv) moral judgement scores.

This paper reports on (i) and (iv) type responses only.

RESULTS

(a) An Inter-Group Comparison of What the Subjects Reported they "Did Do"

(i) The older group of subjects matched for CA. The results for this segment of the study derive from the so called "did do" version of the test. Results obtained are in the form of yield, resist, or legitimately acquire scores. A between groups comparison of the normal and retarded children was made. The statistical analysis was computed on the resistance scores.

A two way analysis of variance test applied to the data (see Table 2) revealed a highly significant difference between the normal subjects and the retarded ($f(1,92 = 26.6195, p < .000001)$). That is, retarded subjects yielded significantly more frequently than normal subjects. Much of this difference however was accounted for by the difference between the normal females who resisted significantly more often than the retarded females ($f(1,92 = 5.4: p < .02)$). No significant difference occurred between normal and retarded males however (see Figure 1).

Insert Figure 1 about here

Insert Table 2 about here

(ii) The group matched on basis of MA. Not only was there a difference between the older normal subjects and the retarded but the same difference held up with the younger normal group and the older retarded group. That is, when matched on the basis of mental age there was a significant difference between the younger children aged 7 to 9 years and the retarded older children; the younger ones resisted significantly more often.

Duncan's new multiple range test revealed that a difference existed between the younger retarded and the younger normals at the .01 level. This indication was largely accounted for by the normal females who resisted significantly more often than the retarded. Thus, although subjects were matched on the basis of MA there was still a difference in favour of the normal subjects in terms of resistance behaviour.

(b) Inter-Group Comparisons of Legitimate Acquisition Responses

(i) Older subjects. Although some subjects resisted the temptation to yield they nevertheless did not give up the desired goal but rather thought of ways and means of acquiring it in a legitimate fashion. These responses have been called "Legitimate Acquisition Responses" under the "did do" conditions (Jackson 1968).

An analysis, using the Fishers Exact test, comparing normal males with normal females and retarded males with retarded females yielded no significant difference. However, comparisons of retarded males with normal males indicated a highly significant difference ($p < .0002$). Similarly when retarded females were compared with normal females a significant difference occurred ($p < .001$) (see Tables 3 and 4).

Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here

(ii) Younger Subjects. Certain significant differences occurred between the younger and older groups. When the young normals (\bar{x} CA 7.1) were compared with the older normals (\bar{x} CA 12.4) and the retarded there was a significant difference in legitimate acquisition behaviour between the groups ($f(2,138) = 6.75$ $p < .001$). When this difference was clarified further as to its source, through the use of Duncan's New Multiple Range Test the difference was seen to be between the younger normals and the older normals on the one hand at the .05 level and between the older normals and the retarded at the .01 level. However there was no significant difference between the younger normals and the retarded.

(c) Inter-Group Comparisons of What Subjects Reported They "Should Do"

The use of the "should do" probe enabled an examination of the question, "Would retarded subjects know more or less than normal subjects about what they should do in temptation to steal situations?"

As indicated, this version of the test differed from Version One, in one respect only, namely, the word "should" was inserted after the word "I". Previous studies with normal subjects (Jackson 1979) indicated that there was no significant difference between normal children and delinquents or between males and females in respect to this dimension.

Four possible comparisons were applicable; namely, a comparison of (i) the normal females with the retarded females; (ii) the normal males with the retarded males; (iii) the normal females with the retarded males; and (iv) the normal males with the retarded females.

Testing the means, using an analysis of variance (Teddy Bear program by J.B. Wilson, 1978), indicated that none of these comparisons was significant ($F(3,92) = 1.63, p > .05$). Table 5 reports these data.

Insert Table 5 about here)

This is consistent with the previous studies reported by Jackson (1979b).

(d) An Intra-Group Comparison of "Did Do" and "Should Do" Responses of the Older Subjects.

The use of the "should do" and "did do" versions of the test with the same group of subjects enabled a comparison of their responses under these two sets of instructions. It was possible therefore to make four within group comparisons, namely, the normal males, the normal females and the retarded males and retarded females.

There was a significant difference between the responses of the older normal males under the "should do" and "did do" conditions (related $t = 3.61; df = 23; p < .01$) (see Figure 2).

It is clear from this particular comparison that there is considerable situation variance. For example there is a much greater disparity between what normal males "do" and "should do" in Situations 1 and 8 than there is between Situations 3 and 5 for example. Situations 1 and 8 both contain an element of the handling of too much change whilst 3 and 5 represent fairly direct confrontations with a desired goal. However Situation 3 had some peer connivance whilst Situation 5 did not. The results for the older normal females indicate a similarly statistically significant difference between

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their "should do" and "did do" responses (related $t = 3.42$; $df = 23$; $p < .01$) (see Figure 3).

The data profile however indicates that the normal females responded in a more uniform way across all situations peaking in Situation 3 where they appeared to resist more under the peer pressure conditions.

The retarded females showed a more marked discrepancy between what they "did do" and what they thought they "should do" (related $t = 7.2$; $df = 23$; $p < .001$) (see Figure 4).

An examination of the retarded males' responses indicated a similar discrepancy (related $t = 5.33$; $df = 23$; $p < .001$) (see Figure 5).

Insert Figures 3, 4 and 5 about here

The results indicate that there is a discrepancy across all groups between what they say they "do do" and what they say they "should do", but that the discrepancy is much larger for the retarded than the normal and even greater for the retarded females than the retarded males of this sample. However the pattern of responding in particular situations by the normal sample varies from what was reported by Jackson (1968, p.59) although the higher responses in Situations 1 and 4 by both the retarded males and females corresponds to earlier findings reported by Jackson twelve years ago.

(e) Intra-Group Comparison of the "Did Do" and "Should Do" Responses of the Younger Subjects

The younger normal females demonstrated exactly the same kind of differences as that reported for the older females (related $t = 5.15$; $df = 23$; $p < .001$). Again the younger normal males also indicated a similar degree of difference (related $t = 6.06$; $df = 23$; $p < .001$).

Thus the retarded sample of 1979 is behaving more like the normal sample of 1968.

(f) Intra-Group Comparison of the "Should Do" with "Did Do" in Respect to Legitimate Acquisition Responses

There was no difference within the normal male and female groups when a comparison of their legitimate acquisition behaviour was examined under both the "should do" and "did do" conditions. However, using the t test for related samples it was noted that the retarded male subjects revealed significantly less legitimate acquisition responses under "did do" conditions than "should do" conditions (related $t = 2.522$; $p < .05$; $df = 23$). This same trend did not hold for retarded females ($t = 1.57$; $df = 23$; $p > .05$).

A Measure of Reflectivity

Kagan's (1970) Matching Familiar Figures test was used to assess reflectivity and to determine whether any relationship exists between such measures and yielding in these simulated stealing situations. Two measures were used: (i) the latency measure. This is a measure of how long it takes a child to detect the relevant stimulus. Utilizing a two way analysis of variance to test the data the results indicated a highly significant difference between the normal groups and the retarded ($F(2,138 = 31.6595$; $p < .0000001$). When this was analysed further it was found that the difference was accounted for by the older normals. Duncan's N.M.R. test indicated a significance at the .01 level, but no difference between the younger normals and the mentally retarded. That is, when matched for MA no difference was detected.

(ii) the efficiency measure. This is a score which assesses the accuracy with which the subject responds. The data indicate that the older normal subjects were significantly more accurate

(efficient) than the retarded and the younger subjects ($F(2,138 = 6.8007; p < .001)$). However, there was no significant difference between the groups matched on the basis of mental age, which is consistent with the finding observed for latency and is consistent with findings reported by Borys and Spitz (1978). In summary then the normals took longer to respond (i.e., had higher latency scores) and responded more accurately.

Parental Reactions Test

Jackson (1979c) has reported on the use of a parental reactions test and the relationship to the behaviour in hypothetical stealing dilemmas. In this study a significant difference was found between the normal and retarded groups ($F(2,138 = 3.1459; p < .046)$). It was also found that normal children resisted more than the retarded, hence the same relationship between the parental variables and stealing is further supported.

A Test of Person Variables

In a test of person variables reported to be significantly related to stealing by Jackson (1979), items such as : (i) the difficulty in deciding right from wrong; (ii) ability to accept blame for having committed a wrong act; (iii) the tender conscience phenomenon, where the child "comes clean and tells all"; (iv) feeling sorry after offending; and (v) being out of luck if caught stealing, were pooled and a total score derived. This was found to discriminate between the sexes in this sample at the .05 level - the girls being the group who yielded most. This difference occurred among younger sample.

DISCUSSION

There was no significant difference between normal males and females in their frequency of yielding or resisting, which is the opposite to what Jackson found in 1968. At that stage females resisted significantly more frequently than males. This same trend of no significant difference was found by Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1979, in press), and is in line with trends of community stealing patterns currently being reported (Fielding, 1977).

Since to our knowledge, there has been no work using simulated stealing tests comparing normal and retarded subjects before, the findings reported here that there is a highly significant difference between normal and retarded subjects is of importance. The difference is further complicated by the fact that the retarded females yielded significantly more frequently than the retarded males in this sample. These differences cannot be explained in terms of comprehension of the task because the data comparing the intra-group "should do" with "did do" responses clearly indicate that they understood the difference.

The community today is moving towards a greater resistance towards putting retarded children in special schools and it is growing faster for girls than for boys which may mean that this sample of girls studied represents the more difficult and more obviously looking retarded group than would have ordinarily been expected. On the other hand it may be a function of the more liberalized attitude towards females and retarded females may be greater sufferers than males in that with their former protective attitudes and indeed protection removed they do not have adequately built in cognitive resources to cope with the new freedom of exposure to such situations as temptation to steal.

As indicated, one of the alternatives open to subjects is to spontaneously generate what have been called legitimate alternative responses (Jackson 1968). On cognitive and intellectual grounds and on the assumptions of MA validity, it would presumably be predicted that normal subjects would not differ in any significant way in their ability to generate legitimate alternative responses. The picture which emerged indicated that indeed there were no differences between the normal males and females but there was a difference between the abilities of the normal males and retarded males and likewise between normal females and retarded females.

The use of legitimate acquisition responses is somewhat of a creative phenomenon and it might be predicted that retarded subjects do not have the cognitive resources for generating legitimate alternatives for acquiring the desired objects. This is not meant to imply that they could not learn them, only, that at this moment in time they did not have them. In part the significant difference between the retarded and the normal subjects in their ability to resist the temptation to steal is accounted for by the difference between the two groups in their ability to generate legitimate alternative strategies. This difference in relationship to legitimate acquisition strategies has provided data on which to design an intervention strategy. This has been done and the authors are shortly to report these findings.

On the judgement measure, that is, what subjects reported they "should do", no statistically significant inter-group differences were noted. This is what would be predicted if one assumes that knowledge of how to behave in a temptation to steal situation has been satis-

factorily communicated. On the basis of matched MA is is not surprising that the retarded discriminated, as accurately as the normal sample, between what they "did do" and what they "should do". This means that the retarded as well as the normals knew what they should do and no difference existed between the two groups on this measure of judgement. However when each of the groups was compared on a within groups basis that is, when the same group's responses on the "should do" test probe were compared with their "did do" responses it was predicted that if the test were valid and the subjects felt under the constraints of a real temptation to steal situation then there should be a distinct difference between the same individual's responses in one situation and the other. This is what happened.

When the intra-group "should do" and "did do" responses of each of the groups, was compared there was a highly significant difference between their "should do" and their "did do" responses. With the retarded however the within group differences were greater, at the .001 level, than the within group differences of the normals ($p < .01$). This finding substantiates earlier findings by Jackson (1979) relating to validation studies done on these measures and would seem to indicate that subjects can and do make judgement about what they should do but when confronted with a first person simulated temptation to steal situation this functions for them not greatly different from a real life temptation and their responses are significantly different from what they say they should do.

When intra-group legitimate acquisition response differences were examined, that is, when the retarded group's responses relating to what they "did do" were compared with what they "should do" it was observed that retarded male subjects revealed significantly less

legitimate acquisition responses under the "did do" condition. However this trend did not hold for retarded females. The fact that the two sets of conditions produced a different response in legitimate acquisition amongst the males would seem to imply that the "did do" conditions tended to produce a finality about their actions whereas the "should do" version produced less psychological closure and permitted a possibility for exploring alternative options.

A measure of reflectivity (Kagan, 1970) was used in this study. It was found that normal subjects were more reflective than retarded subjects when matched on the basis of CA but were no different when matched on the basis of MA. In other words when young normals were matched with older retarded subjects no difference in reflectivity occurred. This finding of no difference based on MA is in keeping with the findings of Borys and Spritz (1978) who simply compared normal and retarded subjects, matched for MA on Kagan's measure of reflectivity. However they did not have an older CA group so their observations were somewhat limited.

Since the retarded subjects in our study yielded more than the normal subjects it is altogether possible that as children get older and they become more reflective they thus yield less. One of our aims might therefore be to get children to reflect and think other than act impulsively.

The Parental Reactions test reported on by Jackson (1979c) indicated that children who steal more come from family contexts where discipline - punishment is more physical than cognitive. These findings receive further support from this study in that the retarded differed from the normal and the retarded yielded more often than

the normal. These findings only support the overwhelming body of evidence available that certain parental variables contribute to deviance in children (Medinnus, 1967).

The further differences reported by Jackson (1979c) on person variables discriminated between those who yielded most, i.e. the retarded females in this sample.

Implications

One of the implications of these findings would appear to be that we should try to train subjects to cope with such stealing dilemmas in the hope that this would generalize to real life situations on the one hand and that the gap between what they "do do" and what they report they "should do" would be closed.

The second part of this paper reports on an attempt to test the feasibility of changing children's responses to temptation to steal situations. It examines two procedures with retarded children.

The study has shown that there are differences between the retarded and the normal sample on certain variables but not on others. It tends to suggest that programs will need to be written for the retarded to assist in the discrimination of temptation to steal situations and the means of handling such situations so that they could be satisfactorily resolved.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. In the eight temptation to steal situations when asked to report what they "did do", retarded subjects yielded significantly more often than normal subjects matched for C.A.
2. When matched on the basis of mental age, the younger normal subjects resisted significantly more often than the retarded, the younger females being the ones who resisted most strongly.
3. A measure of the degree to which subjects resist temptation to steal but then acquire the object of their desire legitimately, was utilized. Normal males and females acquire legitimately significantly more often than retarded males or females. This is an important finding.
4. Older normal children acquire legitimately significantly more often than younger normal children.
5. There were no significant differences between normal and retarded subjects, either male or females, in respect to what they said they 'should do'.
6. A technique was devised to compare what subjects reported they did in temptation to steal situations with what they said they should do. In every case both normal males, retarded males and normal females, retarded females showed a marked and statistically significant discrepancy between what they did do and what they should do. We regarded this as a highly significant finding. This same finding was true for the 6 and 7 year old males and females.

7. We found that there was a highly significant difference between retarded and normal subjects in respect to the degree to which they reflect on. Children who reflect more yield less.
8. In a series of measures relating to the perception of parental punishment or otherwise to stealing, it was found that stealing was related to punishment type behaviour.
9. In a test of person variables relating to "ability to accept blame", "ability to decide right from wrong", a sex difference was noted which indicated that retarded females who stole more had such personal difficulties.

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Table 1

The Mean Age of the Sample

	FEMALES		MALES	
	Retarded N=24	Normal N=24	Retarded N=24	Normal N=24
\bar{x} age	12.2	12.3	12.3	12.4

Table 2

Mean Differences Between Normal and Retarded Subjects
on the "Did Do" Version of the J.H.T.S.T.

Males	retarded	3.75
	normal	5.12
Females	retarded	2.20
	normal	5.84

Table 3

The Number of Retarded Males and Normal Males
Who Acquire Legitimately

	Retarded Males	Normal Males	Total
Legitimate Acquisition	0	10	10
No Legitimate Acquisition	24	14	30
Total	24	24	48

Table 4

The Number of Retarded Females and Normal Females
Who Acquire Legitimately

	Retarded Females	Normal Females	Total
Legitimate Acquisition	2	12	14
No Legitimate Acquisition	22	12	34
Total	24	24	48




FIG. 1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX, RETARDATION AND RESISTANCE




FIG. 2 THE RESPONSES OF NORMAL MALES UNDER BOTH "DID DO" AND "SHOULD DO" CONDITIONS - EIGHT TEMPTATION TO STEAL SITUATIONS




FIG. 3 THE RESPONSES OF NORMAL FEMALES UNDER BOTH "DID DO" AND "SHOULD DO" CONDITIONS IN EIGHT TEMPTATION TO STEAL SITUATIONS




FIG. 4 THE RESPONSES OF RETARDED FEMALES UNDER BOTH "SHOULD DO" AND "DID DO" CONDITIONS IN EIGHT TEMPTATION TO STEAL SITUATIONS




FIG. 5 THE RESPONSES OF RETARDED MALES UNDER BOTH "SHOULD DO" AND "DID DO" CONDITIONS IN EIGHT TEMPTATION TO STEAL SITUATIONS

PAPE R FOR AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY

PART B

THE TREATMENT OF EMR CHILDREN'S BEHAVIOUR AND
MORAL REASONING IN HYPOTHETICAL TEMPTATION TO
STEAL SITUATIONS

A.T. Haines and M.S. Jackson
University of Tasmania
1980

THE TREATMENT OF EMR CHILDREN'S BEHAVIOUR AND MORAL REASONING
IN HYPOTHETICAL TEMPTATION TO STEAL SITUATIONS

A.T. Haines and M.S. Jackson

During the socialisation process children are taught to internalise a set of rules which prohibit stealing. Although most children acquire these rules they sometimes lack the ability to control the impulse to steal.

Cognitive training programmes focus on teaching children strategies to control their behaviour. Such programmes rest upon the rationale that children's inappropriate behaviour has been largely due to poorly organised cognitions and self-statements, such as sub-vocal speech, thoughts and images (Meichenbaum, 1977).

Recently cognitive programmes have been successful in modifying children with various problems, including children with 'cognitive impulsivity' (Finch et al, 1975), 'behaviour problems' (Camp et al, 1977), 'hyperactivity' (Cole, 1978) and 'stealing behaviour' (Guidry, 1975; Stumphauzer, 1976). The cognitive programmes that have reported success in modifying stealing behaviour have been restricted to single case studies and unfortunately have not been based on a sound analysis of the cognitive processes children use in temptation to steal situations.

Jackson (1968) has explored the cognitive processes of normal children in hypothetical temptation to steal situations. He found that the children's use of yielding, resisting or legitimate acquisition strategies involved the retrieval of schemata from memory. Jackson (1968) delineated these schemata as: internal principle, right/wrong,

model, self-image, consequences, habit, self-control and guilt.

He suggested that when the individual was confronted with a temptation to steal problem he was able to reflect and retrieve schemata, which he could then use to form the basis of strategies to solve the problem.

Haines (1979) conducted a similar type of study to Jackson's (1968) with EMR children, and found that they used the same kinds of cognitive processes as normal children.

An analysis by Jackson (1968) of cognitive processes of children who resisted in temptation to steal situations also revealed a series of stages in their processing, namely (a) sense of dilemma; (b) discussion and reflection of schemata; (c) decision to resist or yield; and (d) end type response.

A cognitively oriented programme, based directly on Jackson's (1968) content analysis of children's responses in temptation to steal situations, and put into a direct instruction format by Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1979), was shown to be significantly more effective than a general instruction programme in facilitating normal children's resistance behaviour.

As the direct instruction format has been shown to be the most effective teaching method with retarded children (Becker and Carnine, 1978; Maggs and Patching, 1979), and while EMR children use the same kind of cognitive processes in temptation to steal situations as normals, it would seem appropriate to use a similar type of cognitively oriented direct instruction programme with the retarded.

Specifically, it was hypothesised that a direct instruction programme (DIP) would produce significantly more behavioural and moral reasoning resistance responses than a general instruction programme (GIP) group.

Two further hypotheses were proposed. Firstly, that there would be no significant difference between the experimental group on a general moral judgement measure. Secondly, that there would be a significant increase in the DIP groups reflectivity scores as compared to the GIP group.

METHOD

Sample

A population of 115 EMR children between 11 to 16 years of age, IQ 50 to 75 was drawn from children attending special schools in two major centres of Tasmania (Hobart and Launceston). Parental permission was obtained for 108 of the children. These 108 children were randomly allocated to one of four groups.

Design

The design of the study is illustrated in Figure 1.

Insert Figure 1 about here

A four group design was used. Each group, which consisted of 27 children, was termed as follows :

Two treatment groups -

- (a) Direct Instruction Programme (DIP)
- (b) General Instruction Programme (GIP)

Two control groups -

- (c) No Treatment Pre and Post Control (PPC)
- (d) No Treatment post Only Control (POC).

The PPC group was included to control for the possibility of improvement merely as a function of time. The POC group was designed to measure the

degree to which PPC group subjects improved as a result of sensitization on the pre-test measure alone.

The study was divided into approximately three 6 week intervals which corresponded to the pre-testing, treatment, and post-testing periods.

Testing Procedure

Three experimenters, two female and one male, administered the pre-test measures and one further female was employed to administer post-tests. Pilot testing indicated there was an inter-tester reliability ranging from 0.8 to 1.0.

The measures included : Kagan's Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT) (Kagan et al, 1964) to measure reflection; Stephen's et al (1969) tests of collective responsibility and clumsiness and stealing, to assess the children's general moral judgement level; and Jackson's Hypothetical Temptation to Steal Test (JHTST) (Jackson, 1968) as a measure of both behavioural and moral reasoning in temptation to steal situations.

The JHTST was originally presented as a paper and pencil test.

The test consists of 8 everyday temptation to steal situations. It requires the child to indicate on the first run through the test what s/he 'did' do in the situations, as a measure of his/her behavioural response, and on the second run, to indicate what s/he 'should' do, as a measure of his/her moral reasoning response. Since many of the EMR children were unable to read and write, and in order to facilitate the children's comprehension of the test stories a special apparatus was designed to orally present the test.

Apparatus

Haines (1979) has previously detailed and illustrated the apparatus used in this study. Briefly, the child was seated behind a screen

and viewed slides of the test situations, while the tester, in another room, operated the presentation of the slides automatically, and communicated with the child via an audio link-up by headphones. This procedure also assured the child of anonymity during testing.

Pre-testing

For experimental design purposes the DIP and GIP children were randomly divided into two sub-groups. Hereafter labelled DIP 1 and 2, and GIP 1 and 2.

The DIP 1 and GIP 1 children were tested over the first 3 weeks of the 6 week pre-test period, and the DIP 2 and GIP 2 children over the following 3 weeks. The PPC children's pre-testing ranged over the 6 week period.

Treatment Procedure

The treatment period extended over 6 weeks. Each of the DIP and GIP children were given ten sessions of 20 minutes over a 3 week period, four sessions in each of the first 2 weeks and two sessions in the third week.

Four experimenters conducted the training sessions. To control for extraneous effects, each trainer was required to treat approximately seven DIP and seven GIP children, who were randomly assigned to the trainer.

In order to minimize the influence of pre-testing on the treatment procedure there was a 3 week interval between the testing of the sub-groups (GIP 1, DIP 1, and GIP 2 and DIP 2) and their subsequent treatment.

Post-testing

Following the same reasoning of trying to diminish the interaction between testing and treatment, the DIP 1 and GIP 1 children were post-tested first over 3 weeks, and then the DIP 2 and GIP 2 children during the next 3 weeks. The PPC and POC children's testing extended over the 6 week post-test period.

The Treatments

The GIP. Each child was individually trained for 10 twenty minute sessions over 3 weeks. The content of the programme involved discussion of temptation to steal situations. The following is an example of a conflict situation used :

FRED/Jan looked at the comics on the stand. He/she thought to himself/herself 'Wow! I would really like one of those Superman comics. The comic looks just like the movie Superman'. Fred/Jan knew that he/she did not have any money and therefore could not buy one. He/she looked around and could not see anybody looking at him/her. He/she then looked hard at the Superman comic again and wondered if he/she should quickly grab it and run.

Each child individually discussed approximately two problem situations with the experimenter per 20 minute session.

As the DIP was to use a slide apparatus to project pictures of stories during training, the GIP children were similarly exposed to visual representations of the story. Accordingly, a slide was projected on a screen while simultaneously the experimenter read out the corresponding problem situation. Following the presentation of the story, which was always in third person, the experimenter presented sequentially seventeen issues related to the stealing situation, and represented in the form of probe questions. An example of some of the

probes and issues covered were (see Appendix 1):

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Probe</u>
General reference	Do most people take things that they want? Why/why not?
Model's behaviour	Do you think that a friend of yours would steal from you, or from anyone? Why/why not?
Law	The law is made up of rules. One rule says that it is not right to steal. Do you think that it is a good rule? Why/why not?

The child was encouraged to discuss each issue. The experimenter did not tell the child what he thought was the right or wrong answer. The experimenter's role was merely to act as a catalyst for discussion and to attempt to keep the child's responses relevant to the issue being discussed.

The underlying rationale of the GIP was that by using an awareness training procedure the children would actually think about the issues related to stealing, and discover for themselves the critical components in a stealing situation which should influence their decision making to resist the temptation to steal. No moral absolute answers were offered to the children in this programme.

The DIP. Each child was individually trained for 10 twenty minute sessions over 3 weeks. In order to facilitate learning a special treatment apparatus was constructed.

Treatment Apparatus. The treatment apparatus was in most respects similar to the testing apparatus. However, there were two notable differences. Firstly, the experimenter was seated beside the projector in the same room as the child. This was necessary as part

of the training procedure involved close trainer-child interaction. Secondly, the child had a display panel in front of him with two buttons on it. A red button marked 'NO' and a green button marked 'YES'. He was taught the association between colour and label. The display panel was installed so that the child could indicate his decision to resist or yield during exposure to temptation to steal situations. The wires from the display panel led to a box with a green and red bulb which corresponded to the display panel buttons, and was situated near the experimenter.

Training Procedure. The ten training sessions consisted of concept training during the first session, and resistance training, using the treatment apparatus, on the following nine sessions. As certain key concepts were to be presented during later training sessions it was necessary to make sure the children understood these concepts. Accordingly, following a similar format of concept instruction as set out by Becker, Engelmann and Thomas (1971), and with the assistance of special instructional aids, the children were taught the concepts of "own", "do not own", "yours", "mine", and "stealing" which was defined as taking something without asking the owner.

The content of the resistance training, per se, was similar to that presented by Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1979). However, in this earlier programme the child was required to define, or recognise the stealing situation, then to recall nine schemata, and on the basis of these schemata to resist and then make a legitimate acquisition response. Due to memory limitations, the retarded child was only required to recall one schema. This schema, "be fair", was chosen as it represents a rule the child can internalise,

and is morally superior to some of the more externally oriented schemata.

Resistance training with the DIP involved presenting the child with a series of slides synchronised with verbal instructions which the child was required to repeat. During the initial sessions the child slowly repeated each key word presented by instructor. As sessions progressed the child was given less verbal prompting by the experimenter, until during the final two sessions the child was required to recall the resistance chain unassisted.

Example of a training session (Appendix 2). The child, seated behind the screen, was told to imagine he was the boy/girl in the temptation situation which was on the slide in front of him/her. The experimenter told the child s/he would be able to recognise a temptation to steal situation by the cue words he would say to himself, "Will I take it or not?" After repeating this phrase, the slide changed to a "THINK" slide which was designed to make the child 'reflect' before making a decision. The child repeated "think". Next came a 'BE FAIR' slide, after repeating the key phrase designed to give the child an internal rule to guide his decision, the original temptation situation slide was represented. At this stage the child was required to make his decision and indicate it by pressing the "YES" or "NO" button in front of him. This exercise provided the child with decision-making practice and therefore more closely approximated a real life temptation to steal situation.

NO Choice. If the child pressed the "NO" button, the following slides and verbal instructions sequentially appeared to reinforce the

child's decision and further guide his response : THINK, BEING FAIR MAKES THE OWNER HAPPY (owner is represented smiling), BEING FAIR MAKES YOU HAPPY, THINK, TRY ANOTHER WAY. During this final slide the child was required to select from a split screen, which had pictures of four ways of obtaining the desired object without stealing. They were - saving, asking a parent, doing odd jobs, collecting bottles.

The child selected which alternative s/he would like to try. The slide session stopped, and the child and experimenter then 'acted out' the alternative using scaled models.

YES Choice. If the child pressed the "YES" button the following slides and verbal instructions appeared in order to correct the child's response : THINK, NOT BEING FAIR MAKES OWNER UNHAPPY, NOT BEING FAIR MAKES YOU FEEL SAD, TRY AGAIN. At this point the earlier sequence of slides leading up to the point of making a decision were repeated. The child could only press the "YES" button twice, after this s/he was directed to press the "NO" button. This procedure was introduced to ensure that the child could experience the reinforcing effects of the correct decision and have practice "acting out" legitimate alternatives.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The data consisted of the following kinds of responses :

- (1) Behavioural responses on the Jackson Hypothetical Temptation to Steal Test (JHTST).
- (2) Moral reasoning responses on the JHTST.
- (3) General moral judgement responses on Stephen's measure (MFT).
- (4) Reflection scores on Kagan's Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT).

Each of the aspects of the data will be considered separately.

J.B. Wilson's (1978) "Teddybear" Statistical Package was used for all statistical analysis.

(1) Behavioural responses on the JHTST. An analysis of the data was made in order to compare the relative effectiveness of the treatment groups. A one way analysis of variance on the post-scores indicated no significant difference between the experimental and control groups ($p = 0.18$). This result does suggest that the sensitization effect produced by the PPC group being exposed to pre-testing was not great as there was no significant difference between the PPC and POC post scores.

The overall lack of a significant finding across the groups on the post scores may have been due to a large error variance. Accordingly it was reasoned that a more sensitive measure would be derived by analyzing the children's improvement scores.

A one way ANOVA on the children's improvement scores indicated that there was a significant difference between the group means. Further, Duncan's new multiple range test showed that the DIP group improved significantly more than the GIP or PPC groups ($p < .05$), while there was no significant difference between the GIP and PPC groups ($p > .05$).

A schematic representation of the DIP, GIP, and PPC groups' pre and post behavioural responses situation by situation further illustrates the greater improvement of the DIP group (see Figure 2).

Insert Figure 2 about here

One component of particular importance in the DIP programme was to help children generate a legitimate alternative response to stealing. A comparison of children's legitimate alternative change scores indicated no significant difference between the groups. Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1979), however, did find with normal children that a DIP procedure produced significantly more legitimate alternative responses than a GIP procedure.

(2) Moral reasoning responses on the JHTST. An analysis was performed on children's improvement moral reasoning scores. A one way ANOVA indicated no significant differences between the groups ($p = 0.36$). A schematic representation of the subject's pre and post responses situation by situation also supports this finding (see Figure 3).

Insert Figure 3 about here

An inspection of Figure 3 indicates that most children resisted the temptation to steal across situations at the pre and post test levels.

An analysis of children's legitimate alternative improvement scores indicated no significant difference between the groups.

In balance, the data derived from the hypothetical temptation to steal test, indicated that the DIP group improved significantly more than the GIP or PPC groups on the behavioural measure; and that there was no significant difference between the groups on the moral reasoning measure, although most children in all the groups demonstrated a high level of resistance at the time of pre and post testing. Together these findings indicate that children trained to employ specific cognitive resistance strategies (DIP) displayed a greater concordance between their behavioural and moral reasoning responses, than children

trained by a general, non-directive, awareness of stealing programme (GIP). Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1979) reported a similar finding with normal children.

The failure of the DIP group to achieve significance over the GIP and PPC groups on the legitimate alternative measure may have been due to the inability of the retarded children to make the required two level resistance response outline in the programme. It could be argued that the retarded child, unlike the normal child in the Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1979) study, considered he had successfully responded to a temptation situation when he made a terminal resistance response. He may not have considered it necessary to generate a legitimate alternative. Further research seems necessary on this aspect of the study.

(3) General moral judgement responses on the MFT. In order to determine whether the effects of a specific (DIP) and general (GIP) stealing programmes would spread to children's wider moral judgement reasoning, two moral judgement tests were administered.

The clumsiness and stealing test examined whether the child made a response based on a consequence of the action, or the intentions of the actor. A repeated measures ANOVA on the DIP, GIP, PPC groups indicated that the children's scores did not differ significantly between the groups.

The collective responsibility test analyzed whether the subjects would punish everyone without reason for one actor's misdemeanour, or would only punish the perpetrator of the act with a clear reason.

A repeated measure ANOVA on the DIP, GIP, PPC groups indicated that there was no significant difference on children's scores between the treatment groups, but that both the DIP and GIP children made

significantly higher collective responsibility responses than the PPC group.

Overall these findings suggest that the effects of specific training in stealing situations, whether the training has been a direct instruction programme or a general awareness of stealing programme, do not spread to children's moral judgement of intentionality, but does influence how they judge a character should be punished.

(4) Reflectivity scores on Kagan's MFFT. An important aspect of the DIP training was to encourage children to reflect or 'think' before acting. An analysis of covariance on the DIP, GIP, PPC indicated that there was a significant difference between the groups. Duncan's new multiple range test on the group means revealed that the DIP subjects were significantly more reflective as measured by response latency, than the GIP or PPC groups. Also that there was no significant difference between the GIP and PPC groups.

This result is also consistent with the findings in the literature that cognitive training can influence impulsive children to become more reflective in their approach to problem solving (Finch et al, 1975).

The finding of significantly greater reflectivity by the DIP children coupled with their great improvement in resistance scores suggests a definite relationship between reflectivity and resistance in temptation to steal situations.

CONCLUSIONS

The major finding, using the hypothetical temptation to steal measure, was that the DIP procedure increased EMR children's behavioural resistance significantly more than the GIP, or pre-post control group

procedures. Moral reasoning data indicated high levels of resistance generally amongst the children, but with no significant difference between the groups.

These findings suggest that most children had internalised a 'no stealing' rule. However, the children instructed specifically in resistance strategies (DIP) revealed a higher concordance between their behavioural and moral reasoning responses than children trained by a general, non-directive, awareness of stealing programme (GIP). This outcome is consistent with the results of an earlier study by Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1979).

When the children's behavioural and moral reasoning resistance responses were analysed for legitimate alternative solutions to stealing there was no significant difference between the groups. Although hypotheses were generated to account for this result further research was recommended on this aspect of the DIP procedure.

The data from the general moral judgement measure indicated no significant difference between the groups on the clumsiness and stealing measure, but a significant improvement by both the experimental groups as compared to the pre-post control group on the collective responsibility measures. These results suggest that, irrespective of the specificity or generality of a stealing programme, it will have a minimal influence on a child's judgemental orientation toward intentionality, and a maximum influence on his/her orientation toward placing responsibility for a transgression response on the wrongdoer.

When it comes to the reflectivity data there was a significant improvement by the DIP group compared to the GIP and pre-post control groups. The overall findings of a significant improvement in the DIP group's

reflectivity and resistance responding suggests a positive relationship between a child's reflection in a temptation to steal situation and his/her resistance responding.

The main implication of the study is that a cognitively orientated procedure may be regarded as an effective strategy for the prevention and treatment of EMR children's stealing behaviour.

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TESTING
AND
TREATMENT
ORDER




Figure 1 Design of the Study






FIG. 2 CHILDREN'S BEHAVIOURAL RESISTANCE RESPONSES SITUATION BY SITUATION FOR EACH GROUP




FIG. 3 CHILDREN'S MORAL REASONING RESISTANCE RESPONSES SITUATION BY SITUATION FOR EACH GROUP

G.I.P. DISCUSSION STORY AND PRIMER QUESTIONS

TPS Money in Sue's Bag

John/Jean opened the door to the room where the school bags are kept. S/he looked at Sue's bag and saw two \$1 notes sticking out of her bag. John/Jean thought to himself/herself that if s/he took the money s/he could buy some lollies with the money.

ISSUE

PROBE

Initial Reaction

1. What do you think John/Jean did?
(If relevant answer) Did s/he take it or not?

2. Why do you think s/he did that?

General Reference

3. Do most people take things that they want?
Why/Why not?

4. If John/Jean did not know who owned the bag do you think s/he would do the same thing?
Why/Why not?

*Friend
v
Stranger*

5. Is there a difference between stealing from a friend and a stranger? What is the difference? Why should that be important?

Model's Behaviour

6. Do you think that a friend of yours would steal from you, or from anyone?
Why/Why not?

Reaction to Model

7. If you found out that a friend of yours did steal something would you still be his/her friend?
Why/Why not?

Parent Reaction

8. What do you think John's/Jean's mother might say if she found out s/he had taken the money?

9. What do you think would happen to him/her then?

Parent vs Child Status

10. If John's/Jean's parents had talked about taking things from the office at work do you think they would punish John/Jean for taking the money or not?

Lack of Detection

11. Is it OK for John/Jean to take the money if there is no chance of his/her mum or dad finding out?
Why/Why not?

Headmaster/Headmistress Reaction

12. What do you think the headmaster/headmistress would do to John/Jean if s/he found out s/he took the money?
Why?

*School
Friends
Reaction*

13. What do you think the other boys and girls at school would do when they found out that John/Jean took the money?
Why?

Law

14. The law is made up of rules. One rule says that it is not right to steal. Do you think that it is a good rule?
Why/Why not?

15. If John/Jean broke the rule and took Sue's money does s/he deserve to be punished?
Why/Why not?

Penalty

16. What should be John's/Jean's punishment if s/he takes the money?

*Need &
Punishment*

17. Should the punishment depend on how badly John needs the money?
Why/Why not?

Feelings

18. How do you think Sue would feel if John/Jean took her money?
Why?

*Wealthy
Owner*

19. Suppose Sue was very wealthy (had lots of money). Do you think that would make it alright for John/Jean to take the money then?
Why/Why not?

*Poverty
of
Thief*

20. Suppose John/Jean came from a very poor family and was never given pocket money. Do you think it would be alright for John/Jean to take the money then?
Why/Why not?

*Share
Money*

21. If John/Jean was going to share the money with a needy friend, would that make it alright for him/her to take the money?
Why/Why not?

DIRECT INSTRUCTION PROGRAM

SESSION 2

TRAINING SEQUENCE A

Make yourself comfortable. Good.

Slide of Temptation Problem Situation thrown onto screen and the story related to the child.

The boy/girl in the picture is YOU.

You just walked into a shop and the shopkeeper is turning away.

So there you are in the picture - you are looking hard at the (*state the object*) that you want very much and say, "Will I take it or not?". You say out loud, "Will I take it or not?"

Now before you decide, say THINK.

- *Slide change*

You say out loud after me THINK

- *Slide change*

Think about the owner and say BE FAIR. You say out loud after me BE FAIR. Yes, you should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying to yourself, "I can keep what is mine but cannot take yours". By saying that, you are following the RULE of treating others as you would like to be treated. Now you say after me out loud (*go slowly*), "I will treat others as I would like to be treated". Good. After all you would not like other people to take things that belong to you. So BE FAIR and treat others as you would like to be treated.

- *Slide change*

- *TPS* - Here you are looking back at ----- that you want very much. Now you make your decision.

Did you take it or not?

If you did take it - press the YES button - that's the green one.

If you did not take it - press the NO button - that's the red one.

PRESS NOW.

NO Choice

- *Slide change*

THINK

Say out loud after me THINK

- *Slide change*

Think about BEING FAIR to the owner. Say out loud after me
BE FAIR.

Because you were fair to the owner and did not take the owner's
things - that has made the owner happy.

By treating the owner as you would like to be treated - you have
made the owner happy.

That's good!

- *Slide change*

By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy.

By treating the other person as you would like to be treated -
you feel good.

Say BEING FAIR feels good.

- *Slide change*

Can you think of another way to get what you want without taking
it?

- *Slide change*

I will try another way

Say out loud after me, "I will try another way".

Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it.

Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it -
and I will check so you can actually do it.

EXIT

*Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out.*

YES Choice

- *Slide change x 6*

THINK

Say out loud after me THINK

- *Slide change*

Think about not BEING FAIR to the owner. Say out loud, "I am not BEING FAIR". Because you were not fair to the owner and took what belonged to the owner you have made the owner unhappy.

By NOT treating the owner as you would like to be treated you have made the owner unhappy. That is not BEING FAIR.

- *Slide change*

By not BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself unhappy. By NOT treating the other person as you would like to be treated you feel unhappy. Not BEING FAIR does not make you happy.

- *Slide change*

Try again

Slide change

There you are in the picture.

You are looking hard at what you want very much and say "Will I take it or not?". Say out loud after me, "Will I take it or not?". Now before you decide say : THINK.

- *Slide change*

Say THINK out loud now.

- *Slide change*

THINK about the owner and say BE FAIR.

You say out loud after me BE FAIR.

Yes, you should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying to yourself, "I can keep what is mine but cannot take yours". By saying that you are following the RULE of treating others as you would like

to be treated.

Now you say out loud after me (*go slowly*) "I will treat others as I would like to be treated". Good. After all you would not like other people to take things that belong to you. So BE FAIR and treat others as you would like to be treated.

- *Slide change*

- *TPS* - Here you are looking back at ----- that you want very much. Now you make your decision.

Did you take it or not?

If you did take it - press the YES button - that's the green one.

If you did not take it - press the NO button - that's the red one.

PRESS NOW.

NO Choice

- *Slide change*

Say THINK

Say THINK out loud now

- *Slide change*

THINK about BEING FAIR to the owner. Say out loud after me BE FAIR.

Because you were fair to the owner and did not take his things - that has made him happy. By treating the owner as you would like to be treated - you have made the owner happy.

That's good!

- *Slide change*

By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good.

- *Slide change*

Can you THINK of another way to get what you want without taking it?

- *Slide change*

"I will try another way"

Say out loud after me, "I will try another way"

Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it.

Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it

- and I will check so you can actually do it.

EXIT

Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the appropriate situation so that this child can act it out.

YES Choice

- *Slide change*

THINK

Say out loud after me THINK

- *Slide change*

Think about not BEING FAIR to the owner. Say out loud, "I am not being fair". Because you were not fair to the owner and took what belonged to the owner you have made the owner unhappy. By NOT treating the owner as you would like to be treated you have made the owner unhappy. That's not BEING FAIR.

- *Slide change*

By NOT BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself unhappy. By NOT treating the other person as you would like to be treated you feel unhappy. NOT BEING FAIR does not make you happy.

- *Slide change*

Try Again

- *Slide change*

There you are in the picture.

You are looking hard at what you want very much and say, "Will I take it or not?". Say out loud after me, "Will I take it or not?"

Now before you decide say : THINK.

- *Slide change*

Say THINK out loud now

- *Slide change*

THINK about the owner and say BE FAIR

You say out loud after me BE FAIR

Yes, you should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying to yourself, "I can keep what is mine but cannot take yours". By saying that you are following the RULE of treating others as you would like to be treated. Now you say out loud after me (*go slowly*) "I will treat others as I would like to be treated". Good. After all you would not like other people to take things that belong to you. So BE FAIR and treat others as you would like to be treated.

- *Slide change*

- *TPS* - There you are looking back at ----- what you want very much.

This time decide not to take it. Press the NO button. That's the red one.

PRESS NOW!

NO Choice

- *Slide change*

Say THINK

Say THINK out loud now

- *Slide change*

THINK about BEING FAIR to the owner. Say out loud after me BE FAIR. Because you were fair to the owner and did not take

his things - that has made him happy. By treating the owner as you would like to be treated - you have made the owner happy.

That's good!

- *Slide change*

By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good.

- *Slide change*

Can you THINK of another way to get what you want without taking it?

- *Slide change*

"I will try another way"

Say out loud after me, "I will try another way".

Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it.

Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it

- and I will check so you can actually do it.

EXIT

Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the appropriate situation so that this child can act it out.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE RESPONSES OF NORMAL
AND RETARDED SUBJECTS IN HYPOTHETICAL
TEMPTATION TO STEAL SITUATIONS

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The study compared the responses of 48 retarded and 48 normal subjects matched for sex and CA, in a series of eight hypothetical temptation to steal dilemmas. Utilizing a moral judgement component it was possible to make inter and intra group comparisons. The results indicated that normal subjects resisted significantly more often than retarded subjects, and that normal subject generated significantly more legitimate acquisition responses than retarded subjects. Using the "should do" measure, inter-group comparisons yielded no significant differences between any of the groups. However when the intra-group "did do" responses of subjects were compared with their "should do" responses there were highly significant differences for all groups.

There are three usual procedures employed in attempts to examine the nature of deviance. These are (i) the use of official statistics which for many offences are highly questionable and can be varied according to a range of political and social pressures; (ii) self report measures which depend heavily upon the honest answering of subjects and which do have a reasonable measure of concurrent validity although their reliability over long periods of time is sometimes low (Braithwaite, 1977); (iii) a third procedure is to examine the behavior of subjects from their own perception of events. It is based on the assumption that what the actor thinks is going on can be more important in shaping an outcome than what actually goes on. Thus it is what he thinks that will shape his responses to events and pressures.

Each of these procedures has major methodological weaknesses and some are more appropriate than others for examining particular types of deviance.

There is a need for a refined micro analysis of the mental operations and characteristics of persons in stealing dilemmas. This paper reports on a test procedure for looking at the mental operations of children in stealing dilemmas. The major assumptions of this approach are (i) that what a person thinks is the key, time variable and precursor of his behavior; (ii) that this thinking is constructed from social interaction; and (iii) that the subject's thinking helps to shape the world in which he lives in a major way.

An empirical analysis of the thought processes of subjects in temptation situations is one way of focussing on these kinds of data. Given these assumptions an attempt has been made to establish a procedure for examining the cognitive processes of subjects in hypothetical temptation situations.

The situations chosen have been hypothetical temptation to steal dilemmas, selected because of their ability to be objectively manipulated and varied and because they straddle the territory between the objective study of deviance on the one hand and the study of moral development on the other. Indeed there is likely to be an undeniable link between the two.

The behavior of normal subjects in such hypothetical dilemmas has been reported by Jackson (1969, 1970). In addition the perceived behavior of parents by children in moral dilemmas has also been reported (Jackson, 1979a). This current study examined and compared the responses of normal and retarded subjects in the Jackson Hypothetical Temptation to Steal Tests (Jackson, 1968) and their responses on a Moral Judgement version of the same tests (Jackson, 1979b).

The study was exploratory; it was not known whether a difference between the groups would occur or not. Would mentally retarded children yield or resist significantly more than normal subjects? Although there is a genuine paucity of evidence relating specifically to stealing behavior Moore and Stephens (1974, p. 152) report data, which, they argue, has "served to destroy the myth that retarded persons are more prone to misconduct than non retarded persons. There is equivalence in the conduct of non retarded and retarded subjects of comparable MA." Jackson had reported previously (1979b) that there was no difference between delinquent and normal children on a moral judgement measure—known as the "should do" measure. Would this hold for MR children as well? We did not know.

METHODS

Subjects

Permission was sought from parents, teachers and administrators to pursue this study and with the exception of one parent, permission was obtained from each of these sources. A random selection of 108 MR children aged between 11.2 and 16

years was obtained from six special schools in Tasmania. From this sample a further random sample of 48 subjects was selected within the age range 11.2 to 14.7 years to compare with a similar age group of normal children. Normal subjects from a neighboring high school were selected and matched on the basis of C.A. and sex. There was no reason to believe that the groups of subjects differed in a significant way in terms of S.E.S.

The final sample thus derived was 24 normal females and 24 retarded females, 24 normal males and 24 retarded males (see Table 1).

Table 1
The Mean Age of the Sample

	FEMALES		MALES	
	Retarded N = 24	Normal N = 24	Retarded N = 24	Normal N = 24
x age	12.2	12.3	12.3	12.4

Apparatus

Two versions of the 'Jackson Hypothetical Temptation to Steal Tests' (J.H.T.S.T.) were used (Jackson, 1968): 1. Version One - the 'did do' version; and 2. Version Two - the 'should do' version.

1. *Version One* — the 'did do' version. The original form was a paper and pencil test used with normal subjects. There were eight hypothetical temptation-to-steal situations of which the following is an example of Test Situation No. 4.

Test Situation No. 4

"One day at the football game after nearly everybody had gone I was walking past the stand when I saw a small purse under the seat. I bent down and picked it up. When I opened it I found it had one dollar 20 cents in it. There was a name on the flap but you couldn't read it very easily.

I _____
_____ because _____"

The most significant way in which the dilemmas in this test differ from other hypothetical dilemmas that have been used, such as those of Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) is, that the subject is put in a position which implies that it is s/he that is faced with the dilemma, not some third person. The form of the dilemmas is written in the first person and the subject reads it as though it were s/he. After giving a response, such as yielding or resisting the temptation, s/he is required

to say what s/he *did*, not would or should do and express the reasons for so doing after the word 'because.' Trial examples enable the subject to practise the procedure. Subjects who have major reading difficulties or reading ages of less than 7 years have problems reading the test, but normal children aged 6-11 years and onwards can cope, when given reading assistance by the experimenter.

However, because half of this sample was mentally retarded (IQ 50-75) it was necessary to design an alternative presentation which would obviate the demand to read and subsequently comprehend by the mentally retarded group. As a consequence of this variable it was necessary to design a slide presentation procedure where the subject was seated in front of a screen and observed the dilemmas in the form of pictures presented to him. In this presentation (designed by Haines, 1979a) the experimenter was out of view in another room, but connected with the child via an audio link up using headphones. He read an oral presentation identical to the written one of the dilemmas to the child. As the child responded verbally his/her responses were automatically taped. The experimenter was seated in an adjacent room to preserve anonymity.

A validity study (Haines and Jackson, 1979b) using normal subjects confirmed that the responses given to the audio presentation did not differ in any significant way from those given in the paper and pencil test situation. However, this audio presentation did permit the experimenter to use more verbal probes to obtain the subjects reasons for his decision.

The J.H.T.S.T. has been validated against the entire sample of delinquent children in Tasmania between the ages of 12 and 16 years yielding a validity score which discriminated between delinquent and non delinquent children at the $p < .001$ level. On a series of repeat reliability tests using the same instrument after a period of three months from the first testing, a reliability score of .82 was obtained (Jackson, 1979c).

2. *The Moral Judgement Version* — A second version of the J.H.T.S.T. suggested by Haines utilizes the identical wording for each of the tests with the exception of the last word of the test. In addition to the word "I" (where the subject is required to respond) the word "should" is added. The addition of this word offered an opportunity to assess the subject's moral judgement, i.e. to state what s/he "should do." The validity of the "should do" version has been established in a study comparing "should do" and "did do" responses by the same subjects to the same test item. These data indicate that normal subjects respond significantly dif-

ferently to the two versions of the test; $p < .001$ (Jackson, 1979b). Version One of the test has been called the "did do" version, and Version Two, the "should do" version.

Although the normal children were tested as a group and the retarded children were tested in a one-to-one situation, trials with normal subjects indicated that this was not a variable.

The following types of responses can be obtained from the test:

- A. yield, resist or legitimately acquire;
- B. external/internal orientation;
- C. cognitive processes;
- D. moral judgement scores.

This paper reports on A. and D. type responses only.

RESULTS

1. *An Inter-Group Comparison of What the Subjects Reported they "Did Do"*

The results for this segment of the study derived from the so called "did do" version of the test. Results obtained are in the form of yield, resist, or legitimately acquire scores. A between groups comparison of normal and retarded children was made. The statistical analysis has been computed on the resistance scores.

A two-way analysis of variance test applied to the data (see Table 2) revealed a highly significant difference between the normal subjects and the retarded ($F [1,92 = 26.6195, p < .000001]$). That is, retarded subjects yielded significantly more frequently than normal subjects.

Much of this difference however was accounted for by the difference between the normal females who resisted significantly more often than the retarded females ($F [1,92 = 5.4, p < .02]$). No significant difference occurred between normal and retarded males however (see Figure 1).

Table 2
Mean Differences Between Normal and Retarded Subjects
on the "Did Do" Version of the J.H.T.S.T.

Males	retarded	3.75
	normal	5.12
Females	retarded	2.20
	normal	5.84




Figure 1
The Relationship Between Sex,
Retardation and Resistance

2. Inter-Group Comparison of Legitimate Acquisition Responses.

Although some subjects resisted the temptation to yield they nevertheless did not give up the desired goal but rather thought of ways and means of acquiring it in a legitimate fashion. These responses have been called "Legitimate Acquisition Responses" (Jackson, 1968).

An analysis, using the Fishers Exact test, comparing normal males with normal females and retarded males with retarded females yielded no significant differences. However, comparisons of retarded males with normal males indicated a highly significant difference ($p < .0002$). Similarly when retarded females were compared with normal females a significant difference occurred ($p < .001$) (see Tables 3 and 4).

Table 3
The Number of Retarded Males and Normal Males
Who Acquire Legitimately

	Retarded Males	Normal Males	Total
Legitimate Acquisition	0	10	10
No Legitimate Acquisition	24	14	30
Total	24	24	48

Table 4
The Number of Retarded Females and Normal Females
Who Acquire Legitimately

	Retarded Females	Normal Females	Total
Legitimate Acquisition	2	12	14
No Legitimate Acquisition	22	12	34
Total	24	24	48

3. *Inter-Group Comparison of What Subjects Reported They "Should Do"*.

The use of the "should do" probe enabled an examination of the question, "Would retarded subjects know more or less than normal subjects about what they should do in temptation to steal situations?"

As indicated, this version of the test differed from Version One, in one respect only, namely, the word "should" was inserted after the word "I." Previous studies with normal subjects (Jackson, 1979b) indicated that there was no significant difference between normal children and delinquents or between males and females in respect to this dimension.

Four possible comparisons were applicable; namely, a comparison of (i) the normal females with the retarded females; (ii) the normal males with the retarded males; (iii) the normal females with the retarded males; and (iv) the normal males

with the retarded females. An analysis of variance indicated that none of these comparisons was significant. This is consistent with the previous studies reported by Jackson (1979b).

4. *An Intra-Group Comparison of "Did Do" and "Should Do" Responses.*

The use of the "should do" and "did do" versions of the test with the same group of subjects enabled a comparison of the responses of each subject under the two sets of instructions.

It was possible therefore to make four within-group comparisons; namely, the normal males, the normal females and the retarded males and retarded females.

There was a significant difference between the responses of the normal males under the "should do" and "did do" conditions (related $t = 3.42$; $df = 23$; $p < .01$) (see Figure 2).




Figure 2
The Responses of Normal Males Under Both "Did Do" and "Should Do" Conditions— Eight Temptation to Steal Situations

It is clear from this particular comparison that there was considerable situation variance. For example, there was a much greater disparity between what normal males "did" and what they thought they "should do" in Situations 1 and 8 than there was between Situations 3 and 5. Situations 1 and 8 both contain an element of the handling of too much change, whilst Situations 3 and 5 represent fairly direct confrontation with a desired goal. However, Situation 3 had some peer connivance whilst Situation 5 did not.

The results for the females indicated a similarly statistically significant difference between their "should do" and "did do" responses (related $t = 3.42$; $df = 23$; $p < .01$) (See Figure 3)




Figure 3
 The Responses of Normal Females Under Both
 "Did Do" and "Should Do" Conditions—
 Eight Temptation to Steal Situations

The data profile however indicated that the normal females responded in a more uniform way across all situations, peaking in Situation 3 where they appeared to resist more under the peer pressure conditions.

The retarded females showed a marked discrepancy between what they "did do" and what they "should do" (related $t = 7.2$; $df = 23$; $p < .001$) (see Figure 4).




Figure 4
The Responses of Retarded Females Under Both "Should Do" and "Did Do" Conditions— Eight Temptation to Steal Situations

An examination of the retarded males responses indicated a similar discrepancy (related $t = 5.33$; $df = 23$; $p < .001$) [see Figure 5].




Figure 5
 The Responses of Retarded Males Under Both
 "Should Do" and "Did Do" Conditions—
 Eight Temptation to Steal Situations

5. Intra-Group Comparisons of the "Should Do" and "Did Do" in Respect To Legitimate Acquisition Responses.

There was no difference within the normal male and female groups when comparison of their legitimate acquisition behavior was examined under both the "should do" and "did do" conditions. However using the t test for related samples it was noted that the retarded male subjects revealed significantly less legitimate acquisition responses under "did do" conditions than "should do" conditions (related $t = 2.522$; $df = 23$; $p < .05$). This same trend did not hold for retarded females (related $t = 1.57$; $df = 23$; $p < .05$).

The results indicated that there was a discrepancy across all groups between what they said they "did do" and what they said they "should do," but the discrepancy was much larger for the retarded than the normal and even greater for the retarded females than the retarded males of this sample.

However the pattern of responding in particular situations by the normal sample varied from what was reported by Jackson twelve years ago (Jackson, 1968, p. 59) although the higher responses in Situations 1 and 4 by both the retarded males and females corresponded to the earlier findings. Thus the retarded sample of 1979 appears to be behaving more like the normal sample of 1968.

DISCUSSION

There was no significant difference between normal males and females in their frequency of yielding or resisting, which is the opposite to what Jackson found in 1968. At that stage females resisted significantly more frequently than males. This same trend of no significant difference (although nearly so) was found by Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1979, in press), and is in line with trends of community stealing patterns currently being reported (Fielding, 1977).

Since to our knowledge there has been no work using simulated stealing tests comparing normal and retarded subjects before, the findings reported here, that there was a highly significant difference between normal and retarded subjects is of importance. The difference however was further complicated by the fact that the retarded females yielded significantly more frequently than the retarded males in this sample.

These differences cannot be explained in terms of comprehension of the task because the data comparing the intra-group "should do"/"did do" responses clearly indicated that they understood the difference.

The community today is moving towards a greater resistance to putting retarded children in special schools and it is growing faster for girls than for boys which may mean that this sample of girls studied represents a more difficult and more obviously looking retarded group than would have ordinarily been expected. On the other hand it may be a function of the more liberalized attitude towards females and retarded females may be greater sufferers than males in that with the former protective attitudes and indeed protection removed by parents and guardians they do not have adequately built in cognitive resources to cope with the new freedom of exposure to such situations as temptation to steal.

As indicated, one of the alternatives open to subjects was to spontaneously generate what have been called legitimate acquisition responses (Jackson, 1968). On cognitive and intellectual grounds and on the assumptions of MA validity, it would

presumably be predicted that normal subjects would not differ in any significant way in their ability to generate legitimate alternative responses. The picture which emerged indicated that indeed there were no differences between the abilities of the normal males and females, however there was a difference between the abilities of the normal males and retarded males and likewise between normal females and retarded females.

The use of legitimate acquisition responses is somewhat of a creative phenomenon and it might be predicted that retarded subjects do not have the cognitive resources for generating legitimate alternatives for acquiring the desire objects. This is not meant to imply that they could not learn them, only, that at this moment in time they did not have them. In part the significant difference between the retarded and the normal subjects in their ability to resist the temptation to steal is accounted for by the difference between the two groups in their ability to generate legitimate alternative strategies. This difference in relationship to legitimate acquisition strategies has provided data on which to design an intervention strategy. This has been done and the authors are shortly to report these findings.

When intra-group legitimate acquisition response differences were examined, that is, when the retarded group's responses relating to what they "did do" were compared with what they thought they "should do" it was observed that retarded male subjects revealed significantly less legitimate acquisition responses under the "did do" condition. However this trend did not hold for retarded females. The fact that the two sets of conditions produced a difference response in legitimate acquisition amongst the males would seem to imply that the "did do" conditions tended to produce a finality about their actions whereas the "should do" version produced less psychological closure and permitted a possibility for exploring alternative options.

The study has shown that there are differences between the retarded and the normal sample on certain variables but not on others. It tends to suggest that programs will need to be written for the retarded to assist in the discrimination of temptation to steal situations so that they could be satisfactorily resolved.

The judgement measure, that is the measure of what subjects reported they should do proved to be a significant probe in that it continued to support validity of the test through the significant differences found between the "did do" and "should do" responses reported previously by Jackson (1979b). It has continued to demonstrate the cognitive directioning function of a particular instruction and lends support to the growing body of literature on mediating children's self control and behavior through cognitive interventions (Pressley, 1979).

Two aspects of this judgement facet were examined. Firstly, the normal subjects were compared with the retarded subjects to see whether there was any significant difference between the groups in respect to the frequency with which they reported they should yield or resist. The analysis revealed no statistically significant inter-group differences. Had the groups been matched on the basis of MA (which is the basis of another study, in press) this would not have been surprising. However, it is somewhat surprising to note that matched on the basis of CA no difference existed. This would seem to suggest that children with mental ages of 7+ appear to know what they should do. This is in contrast to the results reported and discussed earlier on what they "did do." In this respect there was a significant difference between the normals and the retarded indicating that self control is more a function of increasing age and development and the social learning implied thereby.

Secondly, intra-group comparisons were made contrasting the responses of the same subjects on the judgement (what they "should do") dimension and on the "did do" dimension. In this instance subjects responded to the identical stimulus, one word only being manipulated, "should."

All groups showed a marked difference between their "did do" and "should do" responses, the retarded showing a greater difference than the normal subjects.

The fact that the "should" word, added to the temptation situation, created distinct differences in the child's cognitive orientation indicates the guiding role of words and their meanings in the directing of behavior. It is assumed that the subject self verbalized the difference between "should" and "did do" responses and as such these data lend support to the cognitive manipulation data of Patterson and Mischel (1975).

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