Cross-border economic crime can occur in a wide variety of ways. It can involve acts of dishonesty directed at consumers in other countries, manipulation of overseas bank accounts to obtain funds illegally, or fraud directed against governments such as through the evasion of customs duties or taxation when goods are imported from overseas. Laundering of the proceeds of crime also regularly takes place across jurisdictional borders. The commission of cross-border crime has been greatly facilitated by modern modes of transport, communications, banking and information processing. This paper presents four case studies that are illustrative of cross-border economic crime in the twenty-first century. It then examines the criminal justice issues that are involved, and sets the agenda for reform of this global crime problem.

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Unlike crimes involving personal violence, in which the offender and the victim have to be present together in one place at one time, economic criminals and their victims can be located anywhere in the world—and sometimes never meet in person. In order to illustrate the range and complexity of the issues involved in cross-border economic crime, this paper presents four case studies, grouped according to the nature and location of the offender and victim. Each raises specific problems with respect to investigation and prosecution that cross as many borders as the offenders have crossed in order to carry out their offence.

Cross-Border Economic Crime Scenarios

One Offender—One Victim

The first situation involves an offender who commits an offence in one country against a victim located in another country. Sometimes even this relatively simple scenario has complications in terms of determining legal jurisdiction.

In the English case of R v. Thompson ([1984] 1 WLR 962), for example, the defendant was a computer programmer employed by the Commercial Bank of Kuwait. He opened savings accounts at five local branches of the bank in Kuwait and then programmed the bank’s computer to debit various dormant accounts of customers and credit the five accounts he had opened. He then left Kuwait for England where he opened five new accounts with an English bank. He then requested the Kuwaiti bank to transfer the sums in his five Kuwaiti accounts to his English accounts. The Kuwaiti bank transferred about £45,000 in full which he then withdrew.

Thompson was charged in England with six counts of obtaining property by deception. The English Court of Appeal held that he had obtained control of the funds in England rather than Kuwait.

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and so was triable in England. The deception had occurred in England when Thompson requested that the funds be transferred from the Kuwaiti bank to the English bank. He was also physically present in England when he received the funds.

One Offender—Multiple Victims
The second situation concerns a single offender who deceives multiple victims in other countries. The Internet has greatly facilitated the commission of such crimes.

One recent case concerned a 24-year-old man living in a Melbourne suburb who manipulated the share price of an American company by posting information on the Internet and sending email messages around the globe that contained false and misleading information about the company.

On 8 and 9 May 1999, he posted messages on Internet bulletin boards in the United States and sent more than four million unsolicited email messages, colloquially referred to as spam, to recipients in the United States, Australia and other parts of the world. The messages contained a statement that the share value of the company would increase from the then current price of US$0.33 to US$3.00 once pending patents were released by the company, and that the price would increase up to 900 per cent within the next few months. The effect of the information was that the company’s share price on the NASDAQ doubled, with trading volume increasing by more than 10 times the previous month’s average trading volume.

The offender had purchased 65,500 shares in the company through a stockbroking firm in Canada several days before he transmitted the information. He sold the shares on the first trading day after the transmission of the information and realised a profit of approximately A$17,000.

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission prosecuted the offender for distributing false and misleading information with the intention of inducing investors to purchase the company’s stock. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on each of three counts, to be served concurrently. The court ordered that 21 months of the sentence be suspended upon his entering into a two-year good behaviour bond with a surety of $500 (Australian Securities and Investments Commission v. Steven George Hourmouzis, County Court of Victoria, 30 October 2000, Stott J).

Multiple Offenders—One Victim
Other cases may involve conspiracy to defraud, in which a number of offenders located in one or a number of jurisdictions target a victim in one of those jurisdictions or some other jurisdiction.

The Citibank case is an example of this. Between June and October 1994, a group of Russian computer hackers attempted to steal approximately US$10.7 million from various Citibank customers’ accounts in the United States by manipulating the bank’s computerised funds transfer system.

One offender, Vladimir L. Levin, who was working in a Russian firm, gained access over 40 times to Citibank’s funds transfer system using a personal computer, stolen passwords and stolen account identification numbers. Using a computer terminal in his employer’s office in St Petersburg, he authorised transfers of funds from Citibank’s head office in New Jersey to accounts which he and his co-conspirators held in California, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Israel.

Levin was arrested at Stansted Airport in England on 3 March 1995 and, after protracted legal proceedings which went to the House of Lords, he was extradited to stand trial before the Federal District Court in New York’s Southern District. On 24 February 1998, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud and was sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay Citibank US$240,015 in restitution.

Citibank has required customers to use an electronic password generator for every transfer of funds. The consequences for Citibank’s business reputation were, however, considerable (R v. Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Levin [1996] 3 WLR 657; In re Levin House of Lords, 19 June 1997).

Multiple Offenders—Multiple Victims
Finally, a number of offenders may target a number of victims located in a number of different countries, but employ essentially the same fraudulent strategy.

A good example of this concerns the various advance fee frauds perpetrated by a group of West Africans and others since the 1980s. Various offenders began working from Nigeria targeting victims across the globe by sending letters soliciting the assistance of victims in transferring funds from Nigeria in return for a proportion of the total as commission. Victims were asked to provide advance payments to facilitate the transactions; the advance payments were then stolen.

Confederates and other fraudsters in other African countries, the United States, Britain, Canada, Hong Kong and Japan then began using the same techniques. The scale of these frauds increased considerably and has created a global problem for law enforcement. Email has proved to be an effective way of disseminating advance fee letters, as the true identity of the sender is easy to disguise and original supporting documentation cannot be checked for authenticity. Some prosecutions have taken place in West Africa, the United States and England although many offenders have evaded detection and punishment (Smith, Holmes & Kaufmann 1999).

Prevention and Control

Providing and Sharing Information
The first approach to preventing cross-border crimes of this nature involves providing information to the public regarding the potential risks involved, and freely sharing information between regulatory and law enforcement agencies.
Providing and sharing information sounds relatively simple, but in the context of cross-border crime, many practical problems emerge. Language difficulties, geographical distance, lack of knowledge of foreign legal systems, time differences, telecommunications and technological differences and expense are all likely to impede the effective sharing of information.

Many public sector agencies now provide considerable information regarding fraud victimisation and how to avoid it. Most consumer protection organisations have web sites with information on current scams, as do many police commercial crime agencies and financial services regulators. Global organisations such as the International Organisation of Securities Commissions can also help to provide information and to set standards which are conducive to reducing economic crime.

In July 2000, an important initiative in sharing information occurred when the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) entered into an agreement with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to provide access to the FTC’s Consumer Sentinel database of consumer complaints. Regulators in the United States, Canada and Australia can now share information about consumer complaints and assist each other in cross-border prosecutions—such as those involving Internet sales and online auctions.

Operational policing information also needs to be shared between regulatory and law enforcement agencies. In the case of Steven George Hourmouzis, who manipulated the NASDAQ through the use of false email, collaboration was needed between securities regulators in the United States and Australia before a successful prosecution could be mounted.

It is important at the outset for agencies to establish networks of information so that when an investigation begins, contact can be made immediately with the appropriate person in another country’s corresponding department. Secure intranets, such as that used by the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, are an excellent way in which this can be achieved. They can also be used to share “Fraud Alert” information and to exchange intelligence needed in investigations.

Twenty-four-hour computer crime response centres are now being established in many countries. These centres, which are to be used for genuine emergencies only, enable requests for real-time computer investigations to be handled at any time of the day or night in the participating country. In Australia, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) handle such requests and refer queries to relevant State and Territory police services or other AFP regional offices (Geurts 2000). The AFP also maintain an extensive overseas liaison network, with federal agents posted in a number of countries. This clearly facilitates the sharing of information and the operation of mutual assistance.

In another initiative in the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National White-Collar Crime Centre co-sponsored the establishment of a central repository for complaints relating to Internet fraud. The Internet Fraud Complaint Centre (IFCC) was created to identify, track and investigate new fraudulent schemes on the Internet on a national and international level. IFCC personnel collect, analyse, evaluate and disseminate Internet fraud complaints to the appropriate law enforcement agency and provide analytical support. They also aid in the development of training modules to address Internet fraud.

In the European Union, Europol, which was created in 1998 and based in the Hague, is an information clearing house and analysis centre with law enforcement liaison officers in various member states. It aims to increase cooperation and communication between and among law enforcement agencies in member states rather than acting as a European police service (Sussmann 1999, p. 480).

In June 1996, the G-8 countries established a group of experts (“The Lyon Group”) to examine better ways in which to fight international crime. This group has met regularly and has discussed ways of enhancing the ability of law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute international crime. In January 1997 it created a subgroup to look specifically at high-technology crime. This subgroup has examined law reform, investigatory and procedural issues to do with prosecuting cross-border computer crime (Sussmann 1999).

The G-8’s High-Tech Crime Group, as it is known, has also recommended the establishment of cooperative arrangements between public sector police and regulatory agencies and the private sector.

One example of a cooperative venture involving public and private sector bodies is the Cybercrime Unit created by the International Chamber of Commerce’s Commercial Crime Bureau in London in 1999. This brings together law enforcement bodies such as Interpol, Scotland Yard and the FBI, as well as organisations within the private sector including major financial institutions and businesses. The unit acts as a clearing house for information on electronic crime and passes details of frauds and solutions between companies and the police.

Cooperative cross-border ventures to deal with money laundering have also been established. The International Money Laundering Information Network (http://www.imolin.org/organiza.htm) is an Internet-based network assisting governments, organisations and individuals in the fight against money laundering. It has been developed with the cooperation of the world’s leading anti-money-laundering organisations that include the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Council of Europe, the Financial Action Task Force, Interpol, the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention’s Global Programme against Money Laundering, the European Commission and others. The Egmont Group of the Financial Action Task Force also coordinates the activities of various Financial Intelligence Units globally. In the Asia-Pacific
region, anti-money-laundering initiatives are coordinated by the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, while the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region maintains a Transnational Crime Working Group.

Finally, there is a need for cooperation within the private sector itself. This is sometimes difficult owing to commercial confidentiality requirements. An example of a recent initiative to combat computer abuse is an alliance that was formed in January 2001 between 19 of the world’s largest information technology corporations. The alliance—the Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Centre—is supported by the United States Government and seeks to ensure that security threats involving information infrastructures such as the Internet are identified quickly in order for mutually effective solutions to be devised.

Similarly, professional and business organisations need to share information about the risks of economic crime and devise global solutions to facilitate its prevention. Multinational corporations, such as large accounting and consulting practices, have considerable leverage in the business community and are able to identify weaknesses in business systems that may be conducive to the commission of economic crime, and recommend the adoption of appropriate solutions. Their global power is also such that they often represent an authoritative voice in communicating with governments.

**Encouraging Reporting**

The second approach aims at encouraging victims to report incidents of economic crime to regulatory and law enforcement agencies globally—rather than simply accepting the fact of their victimisation and taking no further action.

At present many victims of economic crime simply do not report the matter to the authorities. In KPMG’s latest fraud survey, conducted in 1999, approximately one-third of organisations failed to report frauds to the police (KPMG 1999). Some of the reasons for not reporting fraud to the police, given by respondents to Deakin University’s (1994) fraud victimisation survey, included:

- a belief that the matter was not serious enough to warrant police attention;
- a fear of consumer backlash;
- bad publicity;
- inadequate proof; and
- a reluctance to devote time and resources to prosecuting the matter.

In the case of cross-border economic crime, this last explanation is of great significance, as the time and resources needed to prosecute an offender in another jurisdiction can be considerable.

Failure to take official action, however, has a number of adverse consequences. Those who have acted illegally may believe that because they have not suffered any adverse consequences from their conduct, they are free to act illegally again, either against the same victim, or by employing the same strategy to target others. The West African fraudsters have done exactly this, simply going from one victim to another using the same techniques.

**Reforming and Harmonising Laws**

A third approach involves the reform and harmonisation of laws internationally to permit the effective prosecution and punishment of offenders and also to prevent offenders from “forum shopping” (in which they choose the country with the least onerous legal controls in which to base their activities). It would also enhance uniformity of sanctioning and reduce some evidentiary difficulties that arise in proceedings.

Achieving uniformity of legislation is, however, neither simple nor quick. In a survey carried out by McConnell International (2000), the laws in 52 countries were examined. Of the countries surveyed, only 13 (25%) had updated their laws relating to computer-related fraud (including Australia).

In terms of procedural reform, a number of improvements could be made. These include:

- taking early steps to ensure that evidence and facts are agreed and admitted wherever possible;
- streamlining interviewing procedures and using teleconferencing technologies for interviewing;
- using documentary evidence in preference to oral testimony wherever possible;
- overcoming the barriers to the use of computer-generated evidence;
- ensuring that evidence is not altered or destroyed before it can be obtained from another country; and
- ensuring that police have access to the plain text version of encrypted files, either by requiring the suspect to disclose the encryption key, or by employing trusted third parties to hold copies of private encryption keys which can then be used by law enforcement on production of a warrant.

There is also a need to have appropriate arrangements in place either for the apprehension and extradition of suspects to foreign authorities or for their prosecution within the jurisdiction in which they are arrested. Appropriate memoranda of understanding or conventions need to be signed, with as many countries as possible participating.

Such agreements and conventions need to deal not only with substantive laws relating to crimes of dishonesty and computer crime, but also jurisdictional and procedural laws concerning mutual legal assistance. In particular, laws concerning digital search and seizure need to be consistent and complementary internationally so that police can obtain evidence from computers in other jurisdictions.

The creation of multilateral treaties is not, however, without problems. The Council of Europe’s Draft Convention on Cybercrime (2000) has taken almost four years to reach its present fifth revision and it must still be approved by the Parliamentary Assembly—which is expected to take place in April 2001. It must then be revised by the European Committee on Crime Problems (which is expected to take place in
December 2001) before it is finally submitted to the Committee of Ministers for adoption—presumably sometime in 2002.

The convention will, however, be the first international treaty to address criminal law and procedural aspects of various types of criminal behaviour directed against computer systems, networks or data and other types of similar misuse. As such, it will hopefully provide a framework for international reform in this area (Sussmann 1999; Tan 2000).

In November 2000, another milestone was achieved with the adoption by the United Nations of the Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime. This convention is intended to provide a legal framework for concerted action against organised crime, and to be the basis for the harmonisation of national legislation. It contains provisions requiring the criminalising of certain conduct (including participation in an organised criminal group, money laundering and corruption), as well as provisions on corporate liability, special investigative techniques, witness and victim protection, cooperation between law enforcement authorities, exchange of information on organised crime, training and technical assistance, and prevention at the national and international levels.

The convention offers great potential for enhanced cooperation among countries with respect to implementation of anti-money-laundering measures, confiscation of criminal assets, promotion of extradition and mutual legal assistance mechanisms, and the application of modern technology in the fight against crime.

Allied to the harmonisation of laws is the need to harmonise other aspects of business practices in order to provide a global environment in which economic crime is difficult to perpetrate and yet simple to detect. Bodies such as the International Accounting Standards Committee, for example, help to promote uniform accounting practices and procedures within the business community that seek to reduce the risk of improper conduct.

Similarly, international professional bodies have a role to play in creating uniform ethical practices globally which militate against fraud (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, p. 121).

**Training and Resourcing Personnel**

The fourth approach involves the provision of training and resources to ensure that police and investigators are able to detect and investigate crimes effectively.

On a more general level, increasing resources to law enforcement agencies would help ensure that individuals in the community have confidence in the ability of agencies to investigate and prosecute allegations of fraud. At present, many cases which are reported simply cannot be investigated due to law enforcement agencies being under-resourced—particularly in relation to the investigation of serious, complex and time-consuming allegations involving fraud and deception.

The resources provided for the investigation of economic crime generally are often inadequate; the resources given to the investigation of computer-related crime in particular are even scarcer. There are also considerable retention problems in ensuring that highly trained police remain in the public sector and are not persuaded to work in the private sector where salaries and conditions are often considerably better. Either governments need to allocate increased budgets for the investigation of economic crime or else the private sector will need to work cooperatively with law enforcement to conduct its own investigations.

Adequate resources are also required for continuous training and for regular updating of equipment. The provision of funds for this is problematic. One solution may be for a specified portion of assets confiscated from offenders each year to be dedicated to improving training and equipment in this way.

**Publicising Outcomes**

We need to ensure that the outcomes of judicial proceedings are effectively and widely disseminated internationally in order to enhance general deterrent effects on potential offenders and to emphasise crime prevention for the public.

In the case of white-collar offenders who can be said to carry out their activities on the basis of some rational calculation, deterrence remains an important component of fraud control. The confiscation of assets, in particular, represents one of the most effective means of achieving deterrence from economic crime.

Deterrence can best be achieved, however, if offences are reported to the authorities. The media, victims and regulatory agencies can all play a part in publicising the outcomes of cases. Effective use can be made of the Internet as well as traditional print and electronic media such as television.

The media need to act responsibly, however, to ensure that these complex cases are reported accurately, and without alerting potential offenders to ways in which crime can be committed. Victims such as businesses and financial institutions also have a duty to let the wider public know of the outcome of criminal proceedings in which they have been involved—even if this entails some negative publicity concerning their own activities or the lack of fraud prevention measures within their organisation.

Finally, law enforcement agencies have a role to play in publicising their activities.

**Conclusions**

The solution to cross-border economic crime lies in the hands of us all, or, as Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) argue, global regulation of business requires active world citizenship. Similarly, the prevention of global economic crime involves:

- members of the public who transact business and make use of financial services to take steps to protect themselves from victimisation;
- businesses engaged in international trade or who may be targeted by overseas criminals, who can adopt various fraud prevention initiatives, such as making

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Finally, law enforcement agencies have a role to play in publicising their activities.
effective use of the latest information security technologies;

- financial institutions whose electronic funds transfer systems provide opportunities for criminals in other countries to transfer funds illegally, or who may receive the proceeds of crime anonymously from overseas, who can take steps to prevent these problems from occurring and identify security weaknesses in banking infrastructures;

- regulatory agencies, who have the ability to ensure that those at risk are informed of ways in which economic crime occurs, and who can prevent offenders from acquiring positions of responsibility from which they can perpetrate crimes;

- parliaments and law reform agencies, who can seek to harmonise laws internationally and to ensure that legal and procedural problems of cross-border proceedings are dealt with;

- the media, who can publicise the outcomes of criminal and regulatory proceedings taken against those who perpetrate economic crime; and

- police agencies, who can cooperate with each other internationally, ensure that their staff are appropriately trained and make the most effective use of the resources at their disposal in order to enable action to be taken within their own jurisdictions.

For the future, some of the most pressing issues that need to be addressed include:

- the continuing harmonisation of laws, particularly concerning computer-related crime and the use of electronic commerce, and the adoption of international conventions that seek to control economic and organised crime;

- the need for those jurisdictions that are seen as safe havens for economic offenders to strengthen their laws and procedures in order to make economic crime difficult to commit and profit from;

- the provision of adequate resources to law enforcement and regulatory agencies to enable appropriately trained staff to be engaged (and retained) for the invariably complex investigations that cross-border economic crime requires; and

- the effective use of the work of the many local and international organisations now involved in controlling cross-border economic crime. It will be important in the future to ensure that these organisations do not duplicate the work of each other or produce conflicting strategies to deal with the problem.

Note

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