The Promise of Crime Prevention
Second Edition
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Frances Gant and Peter Grabosky
The Australian Institute of Criminology has long been a champion of crime prevention and a leader in the field. When there was little interest in the subject elsewhere in Australia or indeed, internationally, some of the Institute’s earliest publications were devoted to crime prevention. The Institute’s first permanent Director, William Clifford, was one of the earliest exponents of crime prevention as an essential element of planning. Early publications included, *Crime Prevention and the Community: Whose Responsibility?* (Clifford 1974) and *Planning Crime Prevention* (Clifford 1976).

The Institute’s crime prevention monograph series, introduced in the late 1980s, helped communicate the value of crime prevention across Australia. By the end of that decade, Australian police services and governments generally began to embrace crime prevention as an important strategy to combat criminal activity. It is now generally recognised that crime prevention is the first line of defence against crime.

Five years ago, the Australian Institute of Criminology published *The Promise of Crime Prevention* (Grabosky and James 1995), a brief digest of leading crime prevention programs within Australia and around the world. The publication was intended to provide busy people with a quick handle on what crime prevention programs entailed and what they could deliver.

That first edition of *The Promise of Crime Prevention* was regarded as a landmark contribution to crime prevention in Australia. In the five years since publication of that volume, a great deal has happened in the field of crime prevention, both in Australia and internationally. Governments have begun embracing crime prevention enthusiastically. An impressive amount of research effort has been devoted to documenting crime prevention activities and to rigorously evaluating them.

The publication of this second edition marks a continuation of the Institute’s endeavours. It describes a number of Australian initiatives that justifiably can be regarded as examples of international best practice. In addition, it illustrates a variety of overseas programs which commend themselves to Australia.

Each of the items here is laid out in a consistent manner focusing on achieved results. The items give opportunities for replication and also identify policy issues that can be structured into crime prevention.

The authors would be pleased to hear from readers about other crime prevention initiatives which have been demonstrated to work, and which the Australian Institute of Criminology might consider for inclusion in any subsequent editions of *The Promise of Crime Prevention*.

**Adam Graycar**  
**Director, Australian Institute of Criminology**  
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Introduction

Since the publication of the first edition of *The Promise of Crime Prevention*, a great deal of crime prevention activity has taken place around the world. In Australia the Commonwealth Government established the National Campaign against Violence and Crime, subsequently renamed National Crime Prevention. The Australian Institute of Criminology enhanced its website: www.aic.gov.au/research/cvp/index.html to become one of the foremost sources of crime prevention information, both in Australia and internationally.

Australian State and Territory Governments collaborated to develop a National Anti-Crime Strategy. Individual state governments established their own crime prevention capacities. A Crime Prevention Division was established in the New South Wales Attorney-General’s Department, while Crime Prevention Queensland was established in that state’s Department of the Premier and Cabinet.

Overseas, the United States Government increased its already massive investment in programs such as “weed and seed” while the British Government committed hundreds of millions of pounds to crime prevention programs and to their evaluation. An International Centre for the Prevention of Crime was established in Montreal, Canada, under the auspices of the United Nations. The issue of crime prevention was elevated on the United Nations agenda to become one of the key topics considered at the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Vienna in April 2000.

The growth of knowledge about crime prevention has been truly impressive. Researchers around the world have made significant contributions to the documentation of knowledge about the effectiveness of crime prevention programs. Perhaps the most celebrated is the work of Professor Lawrence Sherman and his colleagues at the University of Maryland (Sherman et al. 1997) whose 500-page report *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising* immediately became a benchmark. At Cambridge University in the United Kingdom, Tonry and Farrington (1995) edited a magisterial overview of crime prevention in the *Crime and Justice* series published by the University of Chicago Press. Shortly thereafter, Farrington and his colleague Brandon Welsh reviewed those crime prevention programs which have been subjected to cost-benefit analysis, to determine whether the programs in question deliver value for money, and if so, how much (Welsh and Farrington 2000). Meanwhile, Professor Ronald Clarke of Rutgers University published the second edition of his much acclaimed *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies* (Clarke 1997).

Australian researchers have also contributed to the development and organisation of systematic knowledge about crime prevention. Most prominent here have been the contributions of Professor Ross Homel of Griffith University and his colleagues, who have compiled two massive reviews of crime prevention. These are *Pathways to Prevention* (National Crime Prevention 1999), a survey of early intervention programs, and an overview of the literature on violence prevention (Homel et al. nd).

As was the case with the predecessor to this volume, the Australian Institute of Criminology does not purport to make an original contribution to knowledge here. Rather the task is to identify what we regard as some of the most promising crime prevention programs that have been implemented in Australia and around the world.
Noting the proliferation of crime prevention initiatives at home and abroad, we have been selective in identifying programs for inclusion here. As was the case five years ago, the Institute seeks to identify some of the more outstanding programs from Australia, as well as others from overseas which have received worldwide acclaim. The Institute sought a mix of programs, including situational; developmental; programs based on community development; and programs involving the mobilisation of criminal justice agencies.

The Institute also sought to identify programs that were directed at problems that are regarded as significant matters for concern in Australia. In no particular order of priority, these include violence in the home, violence in and around licensed premises, break and enter of residential dwellings, break and enter of commercial premises, and motor vehicle theft.

The Australian public, as well as practitioners of crime prevention and criminal justice, deserve to know if their initiatives in crime prevention make any difference, and to know precisely what kind of return they are getting on their investment. One of the most lamentable aspects of crime prevention in Australia is the lack of systematic evaluation of the impact of most initiatives. This is particularly the case with regard to developmental programs; those which seek to intervene relatively early in life to reduce factors which may contribute to the likelihood of subsequent offending, or to enhance protective factors which can reduce risk. With very few exceptions, we have at best an impression of whether a program works or not.

Given the limited resources available for crime prevention, it is important that society’s investment in crime control be evidence-based. One essential criterion for inclusion in this collection is whether the program in question has been demonstrably successful in preventing crime. For our purposes the program must have been subject to some form of rigorous outcome evaluation, the results of which were published in a peer-reviewed publication.

Sherman and his colleagues (1997) established a scale by which the scientific rigour of program evaluations might be assessed, with Level 5 the highest.

- **Level 1**: Correlation between a crime prevention program and a measure of crime or crime risk factors.
- **Level 2**: Temporal sequence between the program and the crime or risk outcome clearly observed, or a comparison group present without demonstrated comparability to the treatment group.
- **Level 3**: A comparison between two or more units of analysis, one with and one without the program.
- **Level 4**: Comparison between multiple units with and without the program, controlling for other factors, or a nonequivalent comparison group that has only minor differences evident.
- **Level 5**: Random assignment and analysis of comparable units to program and comparison groups.

Each of the program evaluations reported here has achieved a score of Level 2 or higher.

Beyond considerations of a program’s effectiveness (whether it actually succeeds in preventing crime), there remains the issue of efficiency: at what cost did it achieve the observed results? (Chisholm 2000; Welsh and Farrington 1999, 2000) While a number of overseas crime prevention initiatives have been shown to be cost-effective, with the one exception noted here (the target hardening of Totalisator Agency Boards (TABs) in
Victoria), we have virtually no knowledge about whether the benefits of any Australian crime prevention programs exceed their costs.

We hope that this publication provides convincing evidence that preventive measures can not only contribute to a reduction in crime but can do so in a cost-effective manner. Moreover, we hope to demonstrate that systematic assessment of a program’s effectiveness and cost-effectiveness is not a “mission impossible” but rather can be achieved with modest resources.

There are many interesting and innovative crime prevention activities currently taking place in Australia and elsewhere around the world. The fact that we have not included them here does not mean that they are unworthy, but rather that systematic evidence of their effectiveness and economic efficiency has yet to be published.

It is hoped that this volume will contribute to continued progress in crime prevention and that this in turn will soon provide new, high quality material for a third edition of The Promise of Crime Prevention.

References


Grabosky, P.N. and James, M. 1995, “The Promise of Crime Prevention”, Research and Public Policy Series, no. 1, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra.

National Crime Prevention 1999, Pathways to Prevention: Developmental and Early Intervention Approaches to Crime in Australia, Attorney-General’s Department, Canberra.


Situational Crime Prevention
Program Summary

**Aim:** To reduce the incidence of armed robbery of off-track betting facilities.

**Problem:** Large amounts of cash handled by TABs make these outlets a vulnerable target for prospective robbers.

**Strategy/Intervention:** Time locking cash boxes, cash limits on each selling drawer, and time locks on main safes were introduced to reduce the susceptibility of TABs to robbery.

**Location:** Victoria, Australia.

**Administering Institutions:** Victorian TABs.

**Key Stakeholders:** VicTAB, employees, and the police.

Program Overview

**Background:** The large sums of money handled by off-track betting facilities (referred to as TABs) are an attractive target for robbers. In North America, the development of methods to limit access to cash as a means of preventing robbery have met with considerable success in public transport systems and convenience stores. By limiting the amount of readily available cash, and by advertising this fact, prospective robbers may well come to regard the expected return to be not worth the risk.

Beginning in the early 1980s the Victorian TAB introduced a number of measures to limit the availability of cash in the majority of facilities (425 outlets) throughout the state, except those in low risk country areas. In late 1980, they introduced time-locking cash boxes in most of their betting shops. The following year cash limits of $A500 were set on each selling drawer, and in late 1987, main safes in TAB shops were fitted with time locks. These strategies illustrate target hardening approaches to crime prevention. They also seek to increase the perceived efforts of the offence and reduce the rewards, in this case, the amount of available cash.

**Method:** The number of Victorian TAB robberies which occurred during the 10-year period of the intervention (1979–89) was compared with the number of robberies which occurred in banks and all other commercial premises in Victoria over the same period of time.

(Scientific methods rigour: 2)

**Results:** Each of the prevention measures progressively introduced by Victorian TABs was effective in reducing the incidence of robberies. The introduction of time locking cash boxes in 1980 was followed by a 57 per cent reduction in the yearly total robberies, contrasting with a 9 per cent decrease in bank robberies and a 20 per cent reduction in commercial robberies during the period. The setting of a cash limit on each selling drawer in 1981 resulted in a further 20 per cent decrease in TAB robberies, compared to an increase in the incidence of robberies of banks and commercial premises. The introduction of time lock main safes in 1987 was also followed by a decrease in TAB robberies,
although similar decreases were observed in the incidence of bank and commercial robberies. Complementing these decreases, was a decline in the average amount of money stolen in the course of TAB robberies following the introduction of cash reduction procedures.

**Cost-Benefit Analysis:** A cost-benefit analysis showed that the cost of introducing time-locking cash boxes was recovered after 6 years. Welsh and Farrington (1999) calculated that the cash reduction measures produced a desirable benefit-cost ratio of 1.71. That is, for every dollar invested in the intervention $A1.71 was returned.

**Further Reading**


**Policy Issues**

Commercial operations vulnerable to robbery would do well to consider the introduction of measures designed to restrict the availability of cash. Prominent advertising of the existence of these measures on the premises may also discourage prospective robbers. Managers should be mindful of the cost-benefit considerations, as well as any possible inconvenience to customers that such measures might entail. It is possible that cash reduction measures might produce displacement when prospective robbers direct their attention to “softer”, more vulnerable targets.
**Improved Street Lighting and Crime Reduction**

**Program Summary**

**Aim:** To reduce the amount of crime in local authority residential estates through improved street lighting.

**Problem:** Poorly lit areas are more susceptible to criminal activity due to a lack of natural surveillance.

**Strategy/Intervention:** Improved street lighting was installed in two residential estates to increase informal surveillance, increase the perceived risk of detection among offenders and reduce the incidence of criminal activity.

**Location:** Dudley and Stoke-on-Trent, England.

**Administering Institutions:** Dudley and Stoke-on-Trent Councils.

**Key Stakeholders:** Local councils and residents.

**Program Overview**

**Background:** Improving street lighting to reduce crime is one of the classic situational crime prevention interventions. This strategy attempts to increase the risk of offender detection and reduce the opportunities to commit crime by increasing visibility and natural surveillance. Initiatives based on enhanced street lighting have enjoyed promising results. For an overview of how improved street lighting may facilitate successful reductions in crime see Painter and Farrington (1999).

Prior to the implementation of the lighting project, Dudley and Stoke were characterised by poor lighting, which according to the British lighting standards did not meet even the minimum requirement. In 1992 local councils agreed to upgrade lighting in Dudley and Stoke to a category 3/2 (3/3 being the minimum and 3/1 the maximum). New streetlights were installed to over 1,500 metres of roadway in Dudley and over 1,000 metres in Stoke, resulting in improvements to the quality of lighting, two-fold and five-fold respectively.

**Method:** Before-and-after victimisation surveys were carried out in experimental and control areas. In Stoke, residents in an adjacent area were also surveyed to test for any diffusion or displacement effects.

Four types of crime were analysed to determine any reductions in criminal activity (burglary; theft from outside the home, vandalism of the home or bicycle theft; theft of or from vehicles or damage to vehicles; and personal crime against any member of the household). The prevalence of crime (the percentage of households victimised) as well as the incidence of crime (the average number of victimisations per 100 households) were examined.

*(Scientific methods rigour: 4)*

**Result:** In Dudley, the upgrade of existing lighting resulted in a 23 per cent reduction in the prevalence of all crime, and a 41 per cent reduction in the incidence of all crime. In the control areas, the prevalence and incidence of all crimes showed insignificant decreases of 3 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. Changes in the experimental area.
were found to be significantly different to changes in the control area. Personal crime, burglary and outside theft/vandalism experienced the greatest percentage reductions in prevalence, while vehicle, property and personal crime experienced the greatest reductions in incidence.

In Stoke, the prevalence for all crime categories except burglary decreased significantly after improvements to lighting. Personal crime, outside theft/vandalism and vehicle crime experienced the greatest reductions of 52 per cent, 40 per cent and 37 per cent respectively. The adjacent and control areas also experienced crime reductions, but these were not found to be significant.

Changes in the incidence of crime after lighting improvements in Stoke were characterised by decreases in all crime categories except burglary and outside theft/vandalism. Personal crime and vehicle crime experienced the greatest percentage decreases of 68 per cent and 46 per cent respectively. The adjacent area also experienced significant reductions in the incidence of property (38%), personal (66%) and all crime (45%), strongly suggesting that there was a diffusion of benefits in this area.

Cost-Benefit Analysis: There were 641 crimes prevented in Dudley during the experimental year. This amounted to a saving of £136,266 in property losses alone and £237,794 when all tangible losses were included. A cost-benefit analysis found that these savings more than paid off the full capital costs of the intervention in one year. Like Dudley, the savings from crimes prevented in Stoke also paid off the full capital costs of the lighting intervention in one year. With 266 crimes prevented in the area during the intervention period, a saving of £65,892 in property losses and £103,495 in all tangible losses was achieved.

Further Reading


Policy Issues

Improving street lighting in poorly illuminated areas can achieve significant reductions in criminal activity. It is a cost-effective investment that neighbouring areas may also enjoy, given the diffusion of benefits that can flow from intervention areas. Policy makers should consider the ways in which this strategy may work to reduce crime. On one hand, enhanced street lighting triggers a number of mechanisms, which collectively or otherwise increase the risk, and reduce the opportunities and rewards of crime to ultimately reduce the incidence of the targeted offence/s. On the other hand, investments in the community may work to strengthen community cohesion and pride, in turn increasing informal social control and deterring potential offenders. Of course, these pathways may work independently or in conjunction with each other.
Preventing Refund Fraud in Coles Myer Stores

Program Summary

**Aim:** To reduce the incidence of refund fraud in Coles Myer retail stores.

**Problem:** Refund policies in Coles Myer stores that allowed customers to return items without proof of purchase and exchange goods for cash refunds contributed to the vulnerability of these stores to fraud.

**Strategy/Intervention:** Coles Myer introduced a new refund policy that required customers to provide a receipt of purchase upon request of a refund. The refund process was also altered to limit the conditions upon which a cash refund would be given.

**Location:** Australia.

**Administering Institutions:** Coles Myer Ltd.

**Key Stakeholders:** Coles Myer Ltd, customers.

Program Overview

**Background:** Retail refund policies are a part of good customer service. Allowing customers to return unwanted or unsuitable purchased items generally appeals to consumer satisfaction and increased consumer patronage. However, while retail managers seek to strengthen customer loyalty, dishonest customers may take advantage of liberal return policies and engage in refund fraud. Challinger (1996, 1997) has outlined seven types of retail fraudsters:

- **professional shop thieves:** people who steal items from stores and then claim cash refunds at any obliging store;
- **staff thieves:** employees of the company who take advantage of their position and process fraudulent refunds;
- **drug-related offenders:** active offenders motivated by a desire to support their drug habit;
- **cheque fraudsters:** people who regularly pass stolen or forged cheques to buy goods from stores;
- **opportunistic fraudsters:** people who purchase discounted or “sales” items at a reduced price and seek a full refund of the item at a later date or in another store;
- **manipulative fraudsters:** amateur or occasional offenders who want particular goods that are too difficult to steal. Rather than attempt to steal the difficult item, these offenders will steal accessible store items and claim refunds (cash or credit vouchers) in order to purchase the desired (difficult) store items; and
- **temporary thieves:** people who actually buy an item, use it, and then try to claim a refund for it.

The classification of refund fraudsters and an understanding of their *modus operandi* allows for the development of appropriate intervention strategies to reduce the opportunities for this type of activity.

Coles Myer has over 2000 retail stores in Australia and New Zealand, and in 1999 recorded sales of over $A22 billion. In May 1994, the company introduced into all its stores a new refund policy which aimed to reduce the fraudulent claiming of refunds by dishonest consumers. The policy adopted the “rule setting” approach as defined in the context of situational crime prevention and stated:
Coles Myer is committed to excellence in retailing. Customer satisfaction is an integral part of that commitment. In the event that a customer is not entirely satisfied with goods purchased from any Company business those goods will be cheerfully exchanged or a credit voucher provided. A customer who produces a valid receipt and does not wish to accept an exchange or credit voucher may be provided with a refund. Where the original purchase was made in cash, a cash refund may be given. Cash refunds will not be given for credit card sales.

Coles Myer’s new refund policy targets all types of refund fraudsters without complicating the refund process for legitimate customers. If anything, streamlining the refund system in this way makes the process easier, which may work to increase consumer satisfaction.

**Method:** Data were collected from 500 Coles Myer supermarkets, 391 discount stores and 70 department stores.

*(Scientific methods rigour: 2)*

**Result:** Coles Myer experienced a marked reduction in fraudulent activity after the introduction of their new refund policy. The number of all fraudulent refunds from all stores fell from an indexed base of 100 to 17. This equated to a dollar value reduction from an indexed base of 100 to 37. Due to the commercially sensitive nature of the data, the actual amount of fraudulent activity and the monetary values cannot be disclosed. However, in the peak months approximately 600 fraudsters were detected and associated monthly savings ran to 6-figure sums.

**Further Reading**


**Policy Issues**

Refund fraud in retail stores can be reduced with the introduction of a stringent refund policy that reduces the opportunities for this type of activity. Policy makers need to be aware of the key characteristics of a successful preventive intervention including proof of purchase and set conditions for cash refunds. Essentially, an effective refund policy will also require professional management who can exercise flexibility when needed and enforce the policy discretely in cases of suspicion. As Challinger (1997) reminds us, “notwithstanding that the commercial realities of retailing require flexibility and commonsense, there are obviously occasions when rigid application of the policy is inappropriate”.

It should be noted that Coles Myer did not eliminate all refund fraud from their stores and there was some evidence of tactical displacement. In light of this, policy makers should be mindful of the willingness of more determined offenders to test new policies by changing their methods of operation. As a general rule, areas of vulnerability should be consistently identified and addressed, as different methods of penetrating new policies become apparent.
The Accord: Reducing Pub Hopping and Associated Crime in Geelong

Program Summary

**Aim:** To reduce pub hopping and associated crime by young people in the Geelong Central Business District (CBD).

**Problem:** Groups of young people pub hopping between nightclubs in the CBD of Geelong in search of cheap drinks, entertainment and other young people resulted in high rates of drunkenness, assault, vandalism and other incivilities.

**Strategy/Intervention:** The Geelong Accord was set up to address problems associated with groups of young people drinking and moving throughout public places. Twelve principles pertaining to the service of alcohol, nightclub entry and police enforcement guided the strategy.

**Location:** Geelong, Victoria, Australia.

**Administering Institutions:** Liquor Commission, hotel licensees, Geelong Council and police.

**Key Stakeholders:** Hotel licensees, police and club patrons.

Program Overview

**Background:** Alcohol is a contributing factor in many crimes, often precipitating violence, assault and vandalism. Venues that serve alcohol are regularly the sites for this type of activity either in or around the premises. Studies of public drinking in Australia, Canada and the United States have all highlighted the increased susceptibility of licensed premises to crime, in particular, the association between the proximity of alcohol serving outlets in an area and anti-social behaviour.

In the central area of Geelong, the combination of access to alcohol, venue proximity, numbers of young people and venue opening hours led to undesirable levels of anti-social behaviour. Geelong is the second largest city in Victoria, Australia, and has a population of over 200,000 people. Intoxicated young people (usually male), pub hopping between clubs by foot and car until early in the morning created a number of problems for police including increased incidents of property and personal crimes and general public disorder.

Between 1989–90 a cooperative effort between police, liquor licensees and the Australian Hoteliers Association—the Accord—was set up to address these problems. The Geelong Accord was modelled on a similar Victorian program—the West End Forum. The primary focus of the Accord was to reduce the opportunities for young people to pub hop in the CBD and reduce violence and associated behaviour.

The strategy was guided by 12 principles, two of which made up the core of the policy—cover charges to enter bars after 11 p.m. (if there was live entertainment after 1 a.m.),
and refusal of free re-entry for those who have exited. A second set of policy provisions included—no free drinks, limitations on promotions, unextended happy hours and uniform minimum prices for drinks. These provisions, together with supplementary policy initiatives such as increased police enforcement of by-laws against drinking in the streets and seizing of fake or illegal identification, were designed to make pub hopping costly for patrons and remove the incentives for young people to find “better deals” elsewhere.

**Method:** Qualitative (police accounts) and quantitative (police data) methods were used to measure the impact of the Accord’s strategies on levels of pub hopping and related crime. Comparisons between serious assault rates for Geelong and six other metropolitan areas in Victoria were examined.

*(Scientific methods rigour: 2)*

**Results:** Qualitative accounts highlighted major improvements in Geelong, including declines in crime and damage within the CBD. Police reported that young people were going home earlier and there were fewer problems. Police also reported that fewer numbers of intoxicated people were moving about the CBD.

Comparison data of Geelong and other Victorian metropolitan areas showed that prior to the intervention, Geelong’s serious assault rate was 52 per cent higher than the comparison rate for the other areas. After the intervention, Geelong’s serious assault rate declined to 63 per cent of the comparison rate for the other areas.

**Further Reading**


**Policy Issues**

Manipulating the environment to reduce the opportunities that facilitate pub hopping and access to alcohol can reduce the incidence of anti-social behaviour in and around these areas. Policy makers should consider the key characteristics that contribute to violence, assault and vandalism in licensed areas. These include: the proximity of venues, the capacity of venues to cater for large numbers of people, the age of patrons, staggered venue opening hours, and the drinking behaviours of young people.

Notably, such changes require cooperation between club managers, licensees and licensed premises within the designated areas. The willingness of these players to participate in preventive efforts will go a long way to maximise the effectiveness of the model.
Reducing Vehicle Crime in Multi-Storey and Open Car Parks

Program Summary

**Aim:** To reduce vehicle crime and vandalism in two types of parking facilities; a multi-storey town centre car park and an “open” university parking area.

**Problem:** High levels of graffiti, vandalism and vehicle crime in the multi-storey car park resulted in losses of parking revenue and embarrassment to the local community. In the university car park, a lack of surveillance produced undesirable rates of car theft and theft from vehicles.

**Strategy/Intervention:** Modifications were made to the town parking facility, which restricted access to the car park and increased natural surveillance. In the university parking area, closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras, improved lighting and protective landscaping were all introduced to increase natural and formal surveillance and prevent car crime.

**Location:** Dover and Guildford, England.

**Administering Institutions:** Local council and university administration.

**Key Stakeholders:** Local council, vehicle owners.

Program Overview

**Background:** The responsibility to prevent car crime usually rests with vehicle owners to implement appropriate vehicle security. Making parking facilities more secure, however, can also reduce the susceptibility of vehicles to car crime in public places.

The Dover town multi-storey car park in England was frequently subject to vandalism, car-crime and graffiti. It was thought that the main problems were due to young people gaining access to the facility by climbing over the lower level walls and congregating in the stair and lift lobbies. Windows, lifts, doors and fire extinguishers were all targets of damage, and the staircase was often used as a public toilet.

The “pay and display” car park is characterised by 5 floors (11 split-levels) and about 400 car places, offering short and long term parking. Prior to the installation of improved security measures, there was only one parking entrance/exit and pedestrian access via a lift and staircase. Security in the car park was limited to nightly private security patrols and daily rounds by parking inspectors. A number of measures were introduced to reduce the unacceptably high levels of anti-social behaviour in the car park. These included:

- filling the lower level walls with wire mesh to prevent people from gaining access to the car park;
- fitting a self-closing door to the pedestrian entrance by the stair and lift lobby so it could only be used as an exit;
- designating the only pedestrian entrance via the main vehicle entrance;
- improving lighting at the main entrance and pedestrian door; and
- installing an office next to the main entrance and leasing this to a taxi company.

The aim of the security package was to restrict entry into the car park to users only, and to enhance natural surveillance.

Parking at the University of Surrey at Guildford, England, is generally located some distance from the buildings. There are a number of large open parking facilities situated along the roadway around the campus. Access to these parking areas is via the perimeter road that has a manned security gate close to the campus entrance.
High incidents of car crime in the university car parks led to the introduction of improved natural surveillance. Increased lighting, pruning of bushes and trees, and CCTV were all intervention strategies implemented in 1985 and 1986. The CCTV included infrared sensing and was able to scan most of the parking areas. Also incorporated into the system were loudspeakers through which security guards could provide information and give warnings to people in the car parks.

**Method:** Qualitative accounts from town officials in Dover as well as police data were examined to measure the effect of the security measures on car crime in the multi-storey car park. Crime reports for 2 years prior and 2 years post-intervention were obtained for the program car park and 2 nearby control car parks.

The control car parks also use a “pay and display” system and cater for a similar number of cars. However, they are open in design and characterised by less vehicle crime.  

* (Scientific methods rigour: 2)

University crime records were used to test the effectiveness of the intervention on campus vehicle crime.  

* (Scientific methods rigour: 3)

**Results:** Two years after the security measures were introduced in the multi-storey car park, there was a 50 per cent reduction in all criminal activity. Theft of cars dramatically reduced from 38 to 7, while theft from cars reduced from 42 offences to 33 offences. The two nearby car parks also experienced reductions in vehicle crime; overall crime decreased from 17 to 13 offences and 26 to 12 offences respectively.

Theft from cars in the university car park also reduced significantly after the introduction of improved security measures from 92 incidents in 1985 to 31 in 1986. The impact of the intervention on theft of vehicles and damage to cars is less certain.

**Cost-Benefit Analysis:** Reports by town officials suggest that savings in maintenance and repair costs paid off the cost of the security package implemented in the multi-storey car park in one year.

**Further Reading**


**Policy Issues**

Good design and management of car parks is the key to reducing the risk of vehicle crime. Restricting access works to reduce opportunities, while improving surveillance works to increase the risk of detection. Attention should be given to the strategies required to address specific offences in different settings, especially as opportunities are structured around context and management. Access control seems to have a favourable effect in reducing theft of cars in multi-level parking facilities and a less significant effect on theft from cars. Surveillance, on the other hand, appears promising in controlling theft of and from cars. Policy makers should consider the possible diffusion of benefits that may occur in less protected areas.
Preventing Shoplifting in Dixons Group Electrical Stores

Program Summary

**Aim:** To prevent shoplifting of merchandise from Dixons Group electrical stores.

**Problem:** High rates of shoplifting resulted in losses of stock and revenue.

**Strategy/Intervention:** Electronic tagging, store redesign, and uniformed guards were introduced to respective Dixons Group stores to reduce the incidents of shoplifting.

**Location:** United Kingdom.

**Administering Institutions:** Dixons Group.

**Key Stakeholders:** Dixons Group stores, customers.

Program Overview

**Background:** Based on principles of rational choice, shoplifting is generally characterised by an offender’s analysis of a situation—Is there an opportunity to engage in crime? What are the risks associated with the act? What are the rewards? Like the act itself, prevention of shoplifting also requires an analysis of the situation. This involves an examination of when, where and how shoplifting occurs, by whom it is committed and knowledge of the items most vulnerable to theft.

Previous studies on shoplifting have found that accessibility of items and the risk of being caught are key determinants in deciding whether to shoplift. Of course, this is not so for all shoplifters and more experienced offenders may not be deterred by the probability of detection or the difficulty of the offence. Nevertheless, it provides a useful point from which to develop and implement prevention strategies centred on situational crime prevention.

In 1991 an experiment in the Dixons Group stores, which include Dixons and Currys electrical stores, was carried out to test the effectiveness of three preventive measures to prevent shoplifting—electronic tagging, store redesign and a uniformed guard. The implementation of store redesign in these stores aimed to minimise the accessibility of items (increase the perceived effort of the offence). Electronic tagging and a uniformed guard, on the other hand, were employed to increase the likelihood that offenders would be detected (increase the perceived risks of the offence).

Dixons stores predominantly sell electronic merchandise such as stereos, video recorders and televisions. Currys stores specialise in domestic appliances such as washing machines, dishwashers and refrigerators. Some types of smaller goods are also sold in both stores. The focus of the shoplifting study was to measure the effects of the three intervention strategies on specified “essential” items: smaller goods such as audio tapes, films and headphones. All Dixons Group stores participating in the study were characterised by high rates of shoplifting.
**Method:** Six stores fitted with respective prevention measures—electronic tagging (2 stores), store redesign (2 stores) and security guards (2 stores)—were compared to three control stores. Daily, systematic counting of specified essential items by management trainees was carried out before and after the intervention to measure the effect of these prevention strategies on shoplifting. Follow-ups were conducted three to six weeks later.

The counting method was tested by Buckle et al. (1992) who examined the validity of repeated systemic counting to measure shoplifting. The authors concluded that it “has sufficiently high validity to be used on a large scale to evaluate the success of experiments designed to prevent or reduce shoplifting”.

(Scientific methods rigour: 3)

**Results:** Electronic tagging, store redesign and security guards all produced different effects on levels of shoplifting. Electronic tagging caused a decrease in shoplifting that was maintained over time. There was a significant decrease in the level of shoplifting at post-test and follow-up and in comparison to the control area.

Store redesign also caused a decrease in shoplifting. However, these benefits were not maintained over time. There was a significant decrease in the level of shoplifting at post-test and compared to the control area, but these decreases was not sustained at follow-up.

Unlike electronic tagging and store redesign, the presence of a security guard had no beneficial effect on the rates of shoplifting. There was no significant decrease in activity at post-test or follow-up, and no significant differences were recorded between program and control areas.

**Further Reading**


**Policy Issues**

Shoplifting can be explained as an interaction between a motivated offender and an opportunity; in other words, determined offenders will engage in crime if they can. Reducing the opportunities that facilitate this type of behaviour should therefore be the focus of crime prevention policy.

The Dixons Group experiment found electronic tagging and store redesign to be effective long and short term strategies in reducing shoplifting. All prevention measures however can benefit from periodic follow-up and adjustment, especially if any increased rates of activity are experienced. For stores with electronic tagging systems, this may involve improving technology to increase detection of unauthorised merchandise being removed from the store, and for stores with particular security designs, continually enhancing store layouts to minimise accessibility of goods and maximise surveillance of potential offenders.
Preventing Crime and Disorder at the Port Authority Bus Terminal, New York

Program Summary

**Aim:** To reduce the unacceptable levels of crime and disorder at the Port Authority Bus Terminal, as well as the number of transient people located at the station.

**Problem:** The Port Authority Bus Terminal was characterised by high rates of criminal activity and anti-social behaviour including theft, drug and alcohol-related crime, prostitution, and telephone scams. It was also home to several hundred transient people living in or frequenting the terminal each day. This situation was proving embarrassing for the Port Authority, and was contributing to fear and disgust among commuters, as well as discontent among commercial tenants.

**Strategy/Intervention:** Seventy-six intervention strategies based on situational crime prevention and crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) were implemented to reduce crime and the numbers of transient people at the station.

**Location:** New York, United States.

**Administering Institutions:** Port Authority Bus Terminal, New York Police Department and external social service consultants.

**Key Stakeholders:** Port Authority Bus Terminal, commuters.

Program Overview

**Background:** The Port Authority bus station is the largest and busiest bus station in the world. Located in the heart of midtown Manhattan, it serviced almost 56 million passenger trips in 1998 and on a typical weekday transported 187,000 people on 7,200 buses. The terminal has nine different levels and 220 bus gates.

Crime at the Port Authority bus terminal was rampant, with hundreds of transient people loitering and sleeping in the station. It was not uncommon for these people to also set up “house” in the terminal. Phone hustlers monopolised public phones to sell international calls, often driving legitimate users away. Other problems included people soliciting sex, selling and using drugs, taking over restrooms, and using parts of the station as public toilets.

Among the seventy-six measures developed and introduced to reduce crime and anti-social behaviour at the bus terminal were:

- **discouraging loitering and hustling:** modifying window ledges; removing benches and installing single flip seats; and using technology to block access to international telephone calls;
- **increasing visibility:** installing new lighting; using glass walls, light coloured paint and tiles; and removing obstructing walls and fixtures;
- **improving natural surveillance:** closing off nooks, stairwells, and areas between walls; improving entrances to buildings; and introducing centralised ticketing;
- **improving restrooms:** modifying stall doors; improving ventilation; installing corner mirrors; modifying sink sizes; enhancing lighting, stall walls and tiles; and introducing attendants;
- **improving commuter flow:** improving stairway and escalator flow; and improving commuter assistance and communication; and
- **improving retail ambience:** introducing chain retailers and improved management; redesigning space; and removing betting facilities and violent video games.
These measures were primarily introduced to “design out crime” and make it more uncomfortable for transient people to live in the station. Another key initiative was the development of a coordination service (Operation Alternative) for the homeless. This program assisted transient people to access a range of support and crisis services.

**Method:** Annual Port Authority customer surveys and police data were used to test the effectiveness of the prevention measures. Assessment referral data, daily counts of the homeless and customer complaints were all used to measure the effectiveness of prevention strategies on transient populations. Observations by Port Authority staff and police were also included as qualitative measures.  

(Scientific methods rigour: 2)

**Results:** *Transient Population:* Between 1991–94, Operation Alternative made 33,000 client referrals on behalf of homeless people. Surveys show a decline in the number of people who were “often” bothered by homeless people: from 51 per cent in 1991 to 19 per cent in 1994.

*Telephone fraud:* After the introduction of technology that restricted telephone access to local calls only, no more international calls were made on these phones. Port Authority staff and local police observed that offenders had abandoned these areas and there were fewer customer complaints.

*Retail trade:* Retail trade data showed that sales in the Port Authority bus terminal increased 70 per cent in four years: from $US388 per square foot in 1990 to $US659 in 1994. Store revenue also increased by 34 per cent over the same period.

*Police Complaints (made by commuters and police):* Complaints to police decreased from 5,650 complaints in 1988 to 2,888 complaints in 1994. Complaints made to police regarding predatory crime including larceny, robbery, pickpocketing, assault, burglary and rape decreased from 3,053 in 1988 to 1,358 in 1994. Most notable were the declines in larceny, robbery and vehicle related crime.

*Commuter Surveys:* Commuter surveys revealed enhanced cleanliness, safety, and security at the station. Improvements in police “effectiveness” and “visibility” were also observed.

**Further reading**


**Policy Issues**

Sensible prevention strategies contributed to the Port Authority’s success in reducing crime at the bus terminal. Removing many of the station’s nooks and crannies, redesigning restrooms, introducing cleaner and brighter space, and improving policing have all led to significant improvements throughout the station. From a situational crime prevention perspective these strategies predominantly focused on deflecting offenders, removing targets and improving natural surveillance. Policy makers should consider the value of incremental change. Although each modification introduced by the Port Authority was small, collectively they worked to reduce offensive and undesirable behaviour.
Program Summary

**Aim:** To reduce violence and anti-social behaviour in and around licensed premises.

**Problem:** To examine whether a community action model trialed in Surfers Paradise, Queensland is effective in reducing alcohol-related crime and violence in other diverse communities.

**Strategy/Intervention:** A replication of the Surfers Paradise project was implemented in Cairns, Townsville and Mackay. The project sought to introduce responsible hospitality practices in licensed venues.

**Location:** Queensland, Australia.

**Administering Institutions:** Cairns, Townsville and Mackay City Councils, Griffith University.

**Key Stakeholders:** Cairns, Townsville and Mackay City Councils, Queensland Department of Health, Queensland Police, nightclub managers and owners, liquor licensing divisions and patrons.

Program Overview

**Background:** The majority of alcohol-related violence occurs in and around licensed venues. For people who frequent these entertainment areas at night, there is a higher than average risk of being assaulted. In 1993 a community safety action project was implemented in Surfers Paradise, Queensland, to reduce these high levels of violence as well as other alcohol-related activity occurring in the town centre (Homel et al. 1997). The strategies focused on the development of community-based committees, forums and task groups, and the implementation of a code of practice that regulated serving and security staff, alcohol use, advertising, and entertainment.

The project was a success. There was a significant reduction in levels of violence, lower rates of drinking and drunkenness, and a marked increase in visible warnings about underage drinking and notices about house policies. Associated improvements in server practices and the physical environment were also found. Following the apparent effectiveness of the model, steps were taken to implement it in other communities. The aim—to test the model’s rigour in reducing violence and alcohol-related crime, to enhance understanding of the change process, and to strengthen the relationship between the intervention and crime reduction.

Three North Queensland towns—Cairns, Townsville and Mackay—were chosen for the study based on their capability to participate in the project and a desire to reduce high levels of alcohol-related crime. Cairns, Townsville and Mackay are respectively located about 1800km, 1400km and 1000km north of Brisbane. Townsville has the largest permanent population of 125,000 residents, followed by Cairns (114,000 residents, and on any given night 30,000 tourists) and Mackay (72,000 residents). The three towns are socially and economically different.
The interventions were implemented in the participating cities in 1995 and 1996. They were all replications of the Surfers Paradise model with slight variations to accommodate the respective conditions in each city.

**Method:** Teams of students conducted structured unobtrusive observations in 1994 (pre-implementation) and 1996 (post-implementation) in nightclubs and hotels in Cairns, Townsville and Mackay to measure the effectiveness of the community action models. Police data were also used to examine the effectiveness of the intervention on assault, stealing, disturbance/dispute, drunkenness and street disorder.

*(Scientific methods rigour: 2)*

**Results:** Observed violent and aggressive behaviour decreased by 56.5 per cent in Cairns, Townsville and Mackay. The models appeared to have the greatest impact on observed physical assault which declined between 75.5 per cent and 81.2 per cent from 1994 to 1996. Police data showed significant decreases in the levels of most alcohol-related crime in Cairns and Townsville; however, there were no significant changes recorded for Mackay. Significant improvements were also observed for the physical characteristics of venues including lighting, cleanliness, comfort, ventilation and transport availability. Bar and security staff were noted as being friendlier, patronage increased, and levels of male drunkenness appeared to decline.

**Further Reading**


**Policy Issues**

Theories of community action, situational crime prevention and regulatory theory influenced the development and implementation of the community action safety model. Results suggest that the intervention can be effective in reducing violence and alcohol-related crime in and around licensed premises. Although each city adapted the model to address their respective problems, particular features were shared. These included: the formation of a steering committee, community forums, and task groups; the employment of a project officer, the conduct of a safety audit, and the development of a code of practice. As with all community strategies, commitment, communication and cooperation among key players are essential.
Preventing Domestic Burglary: The Safer Cities Program

Program Summary

Aim: To prevent the incidence of domestic burglary and fear of crime in designated areas participating in the Safer Cities program.

Problem: Large urban areas are more likely to experience higher levels of crime and anti-social behaviour than smaller urban or rural areas. In populated areas there is a greater onus on residents to band together and protect themselves from possible victimisation.

Strategy/Intervention: The British Government made £31 million available under the Safer Cities program for the development and implementation of local crime prevention initiatives. Over 500 projects funded under this program targeted the prevention of domestic burglary. Target hardening was the predominant intervention strategy used.

Location: United Kingdom.


Key Stakeholders: Safer Cities areas, local residents.

Program Overview

Background: The Safer Cities program sought to reduce crime and fear of crime in England and Wales. The focus of the program was on the development and implementation of locally based crime prevention initiatives from a problem solving perspective. Participants were encouraged to analyse crime data and patterns in their local areas, set project objectives, develop appropriate prevention measures, evaluate outcomes and modify strategies if and when necessary.

Phase I of the Safer Cities program ran from 1988 to 1995. Over 3,600 projects targeting the prevention of domestic and commercial burglary, domestic violence, vehicle crime, shop theft, disorder and fear of crime, were funded under the initiative. Most of these projects were locally based and aimed to reduce the susceptibility of people, places and organisations to crime.

Of the 3,600 projects funded under Safer Cities, just over 500 schemes sought to prevent domestic burglary. The majority of these schemes (3 out of 4) employed target hardening as their predominant prevention strategy and focused on improving the physical security of doors, windows and fencing, as well as installing entry systems, alarms and security lighting. Less widely used initiatives included developing “tool libraries” to assist people implement their own security systems, neighbourhood watch, and property marking.

Around 5,200 households participated in the Safer Cities domestic burglary schemes. Accordingly, areas were graded as to the intensity of prevention measures adopted in households—low intensity (under £1 per household spent), medium (between £1–£13 spent per household) and high (over £13 spent per household).

Method: The evaluation of Safer Cities involved comparing changes in the risk of burglary against control areas. Before and after surveys of 96 domestic burglary prevention schemes were conducted to examine householder’s experience of crime, whether or not
it was reported to the police, and their perceptions of crime. Police data (1987–92) relating to 240 domestic burglary schemes were also analysed.

(Scientific methods rigour: 4)

**Results:** Survey results show that between 1990 and 1992, the risk of domestic burglary decreased after Safer Cities projects were implemented. Risk of burglary fell in low, medium and high action areas by 10 per cent, 22 per cent and 43 per cent respectively. This is compared to Safer Cities comparison areas which did not implement burglary prevention measures (increase of 15%) and non-Safer Cities areas (increase of 3%). Analysis by statistical modelling also shows marked decreases in the risk of burglary—24 per cent in low intensity areas, 33 per cent in medium intensity areas, and 37 per cent in high intensity areas.

Police data found that in 1991 all police beats in action areas experienced a reduction in the risk of burglary. In 1992 risks in high intensity areas continued to decline. In medium intensity areas there was a slight increase but still lower than expected. In low intensity areas there was an increase above what was expected. These results suggest the short-lived effectiveness of low intensity measures.

There was a diffusion of benefits (territorial and functional) to areas surrounding those with high to medium burglary prevention measures. Crime in low intensity areas, however, appeared to be displaced on a limited scale to adjacent areas and targets.

**Cost-Benefit Analysis:** A cost-effectiveness analysis conducted by the Home Office found that the investment in Safer Cities domestic burglary schemes prevented 56,000 burglaries and saved £31 million—the cost of the whole Safer Cities program.

Welsh and Farrington (1999) conducted a cost-benefit analysis by dividing the total benefits of burglary prevention, £1,100 (money saved by victim and state) by the total cost of preventing burglary (£900 for low risk areas and £300 for high risk areas). The authors estimated that the benefit-cost ratio for the projects ranged from 1.22 in low areas to 3.67 in high areas. On average, this amounts to 1.83; for every pound sterling invested in the scheme, £1.83 was returned.

**Further Reading**


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**Policy Issues**

The Safer Cities program highlights the benefits that flow from community involvement in problem solving and the value of intensive prevention measures to reduce crime and fear of crime. It seems that the greater the investment in crime prevention, the greater the reduction in the risk of crime. In this case, target hardening was effective in reducing high levels of domestic burglary. Like all prevention initiatives, however, strategies need to be carefully monitored and adjusted to account for any increases in crime. As highlighted in the Safer Cities program the effect of low intensity prevention measures may be short-lived. Policy development in this area should focus on the value of implementing a number of crime prevention strategies to minimise the opportunities for crime and reduce the vulnerability of people and other targets to undesirable activity.
**Tackling Subway Graffiti in New York City: The Clean Car Program**

**Program Summary**

**Aim:** To reduce the level of graffiti on New York City trains.

**Problem:** High levels of graffiti on New York City trains developed into a serious public policy issue. The condition of the trains was eroding and contributing to increased fear of crime.

**Strategy/Intervention:** The Clean Car Program was implemented to prevent the graffiti of subway trains. The project involved cleaning vandalised trains within two hours of being “tagged” and was employed to reduce the motivation of offenders: seeing their tags on trains.

**Location:** New York, United States.

**Administering Institutions:** New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), police.

**Key Stakeholders:** NYCTA and commuters.

**Program Overview**

**Background:** Graffiti is often considered the “colourful expression of creative adolescents” on one hand, and the “criminal defacing of public property” on the other. Whichever view one may hold, graffiti usually involves defacing public property with political humour, sexual innuendo or street art. In the case of public transport, graffiti, especially when coupled with broken windows, vandalised doors and marked cars, has a considerable impact on the quality of transportation and fear of crime.

In New York City the graffiti problem reached undesirable levels and was characterised by hundreds of young people defacing windows, maps and carriages. Previous attempts to curb the problem proved futile. Police became frustrated by a criminal justice system that released offenders on the basis of the nature of graffiti compared to other serious juvenile crimes. Offender cleaning campaigns generated expensive supervision costs and usually provided offenders with greater knowledge of the technology needed to create more durable tags. Securing train yards was also ineffective because of the large areas that required securing and the fact that offenders could jump, cut or negotiate their way through the security barriers.

In 1984, under new management, the NYCTA implemented the Clean Car Program as an initiative to tackle subway graffiti. The aim of the project was to remove graffiti from trains within two hours of the cars being vandalised in order to prevent offenders seeing their “tags”. This involved teams of cleaners working at the end of train lines to immediately remove graffiti or to pull particular cars from the service. The core of the program stressed that tagged vehicles would not leave storage, maintenance or lay up areas until the graffiti had been removed. The philosophy behind the Clean Car Program was that
by removing graffiti “tags”, one is also removing the offender’s motivation to deface property; that is, seeing their “tags” on trains.

The Clean Car Program commenced with two trains. Yearly project goals were set by the NYCTA, which aimed to have the entire fleet of subway trains graffiti free within five years. Other initiatives included in the Clean Car Program were the assignment of police to ride clean trains, the protection of train storage yards by NYCTA staff, improvements to lighting in storage yards, daily checking and maintenance of yard fences, and undercover police officers acting as cleaners.

Method: Trains involved in the Clean Car Program were checked at the end of subway lines for graffiti.

(Scientific methods rigour: 2)

Results: In the first year of the program, 400 cars were rid of graffiti vandalism. By 1989, five years later, the entire fleet of cars (6,245) was graffiti-free. The program not only succeeded in removing graffiti from trains, but it did so ahead of its scheduled annual goals.

Further Reading


Policy Issues

The Clean Car Program was based on the theory of “broken windows” (Wilson and Kelling 1982). If a window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken...one unrepaired window is a signal that no-one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing (Kelling and Coles 1996). In the case of subway graffiti, trains that have been visibly tagged are more likely to be tagged again. The key to prevention is therefore timely removal of graffiti and vandalism.

Three factors contributed to the success of the Clean Car Program—a commitment to rid the subway of graffiti, a problem solving approach to crime reduction, and the coordination of administering institutions. It has been suggested that the success of the project was due to the efficiency of cleaning rather than a reduction in offending behaviour. However, as pointed out by Clarke (1997), one would have expected graffiti to increase once the cleaners had stopped attending to trains at the end of the third year. This did not occur. The Clean Car Program required an intense commitment to cleaning; the graffiti problem had dramatically reduced by the time all the cars were cleaned.
Developmental Crime Prevention
The Elmira Prenatal/Early Infancy Program: At Age 15

Program Summary

Aim: To address the behavioural and psychosocial conditions which lead to poor maternal and child outcomes for disadvantaged first time mothers.

Problem: Families characterised by poverty and a lack of social and personal resources are at greater risk of adverse maternal health related behaviours during pregnancy, compromised care of the child, and stressful conditions in families’ homes that interfere with parental and family functioning.

Strategy/Intervention: Nurse home-care visitors were employed to implement a structured prenatal and early infancy program with at-risk mothers. The program was designed to educate, assist and support women and their families.

Location: Elmira, New York, United States.

Administering Institutions: United States Department of Health and Human Services, National Centre on Child Abuse and Neglect.

Key Stakeholders: At-risk families, community and health care workers, wider community and tax payers.

Program Overview

Background: In the late 1970s, a prenatal and early infancy program was implemented in Elmira, New York, to assist disadvantaged first time mothers. Specifically, the program sought to modify the risks linked to poor birth outcomes, child abuse and neglect, welfare dependence and poor maternal life course. Many of these factors are associated with the early onset of anti-social behaviour in children which may lead to violent behaviour and offending.

The program employed nurses to visit at-risk mothers at home before the child’s birth (pre-natally) and up to the child’s second birthday (early infancy). Home visits were generally between 75 to 90 minutes long and nurses followed detailed program protocols that were designed to:

• improve pregnancy outcomes by helping women alter their health-related behaviours, including reducing use of cigarettes, alcohol and illegal drugs;
• improve child health and development by helping parents provide more responsible and competent care for their children; and
• improve families’ economic self-sufficiency by helping parents develop a vision for their future.

Four hundred women were enrolled in the Elmira Prenatal and Early Infancy Program. Eighty-five per cent of these women were either of low income, unmarried, or younger than 19 years of age at registration. Eighty per cent of the sample was white.

Results of the Elmira study found that by the time children of home visited mothers were 4 years old, women who were nurse-visited experienced greater participation in the workforce, a reduction in the number of subsequent pregnancies, an improvement in diet, and had reduced their smoking.

Other benefits included a reduction in child abuse and neglect, fewer child emergency care visits, and an increase in the use of social support and community services. To test the program’s long-term effects, a follow-up study was undertaken at age 15.
Method: The age 15 follow-up study was conducted with 324 women. Data were obtained from interviews and observations, and via examination of medical and social service records dated from pregnancy to the child’s 15th year of life. Participants were compared to a control group of women receiving comparison services.

(Scientific methods rigour: 5)

Results: At follow-up, nurse-visited mothers experienced fewer subsequent births and greater spacing between the first and second child. Compared to the control group, participating mothers also spent fewer months on welfare, had fewer arrests and convictions, and fewer verified reports of child abuse and neglect.

The children of home-visited mothers were characterised by fewer instances of running away, fewer arrests, fewer convictions and violations of probation, fewer sexual partners, and fewer days of alcohol consumption and smoking. Parents reported that their children had fewer behavioural problems relating to the use of alcohol and drugs.

Cost-Benefit Analysis: A cost savings analysis conducted by the RAND Corporation (Karoly et al. 1998) found that while there were no net savings to government or society from families in the lower risk group, savings flowed from single parent and low-income families. These savings—including reduced welfare, criminal justice expenses and increased tax revenue—exceeded the cost of the program four-fold, well before the child’s 4th birthday.

Further Reading


Policy Issues

Prenatal and early infancy home care by nurses is an effective means of reducing many of the risk factors associated with poor maternal and child outcomes in high-risk families. Providing at-risk mothers with appropriate education, parenting skills and social support can go along way to improve child and family functioning.

Key policy issues arising from the Elmira and related studies stress that services should be provided by qualified and experienced nurses and target the neediest populations. Clinically tested methods of modifying health and behavioural risks should be incorporated into program protocols, and services should also be implemented with a high degree of fidelity.
Program Summary

**Aim:** To reduce the risk of young people from disadvantaged backgrounds failing school and continuing a life of poverty.

**Problem:** Low intelligence and poor school performance have been associated with continued cycles of poverty, dependence on welfare, and the onset of anti-social behaviour and offending.

**Strategy/Intervention:** The Perry Preschool Project was designed to promote intellectual and social development in children aged 3 and 4. The preschool curriculum was complemented by weekly home visits by teachers to improve parents’ involvement in the education process.

**Location:** Ypsilanti, Michigan, United States.

**Administering Institutions:** United States Office of Education, United States Administration for Children, and at-risk families.

**Key Stakeholders:** Parents, children, United States Government and taxpayers.

Program Overview

**Background:** In the 1960s a wave of early intervention initiatives, funded under the Head Start Program, were designed to create opportunities for children from disadvantaged backgrounds to improve their quality of life. The Perry Preschool Project was one such program. As an educational enrichment program, the project was designed to break the cycle of poverty for children by improving their chances of finishing school and thus attaining greater economic and social wealth.

For almost 3 decades, the Perry Preschool Project followed 123 disadvantaged children who attended the Perry Elementary School in Ypsilanti, Michigan. Children participating in the program were African American, from low socioeconomic backgrounds and of low intellectual performance. The program involved daily high quality classroom sessions for children, as well as weekly home visits by teachers for mothers and children. Home visits were designed to involve mothers in the educational process and to encourage greater educational development within the home. The curriculum was based on active learning and specifically sought to develop children’s cognitive and social skills.

Throughout the assessment years, children who participated in the Perry Preschool Program scored significantly better on school achievement and intellectual performance tests than non-program students. At age 7, the intervention group scored significantly higher on intelligence and language tests. At age 14, the group excelled in reading, mathematics, language and overall school achievement, and at age 19, significantly higher scores were recorded for overall literacy, health information and occupation knowledge.
Method: At the beginning of the Perry Preschool Program, children were assigned to program and control groups; the former group receiving the early intervention educational program and home visits, and the latter group, regular preschool education. Data on participants were collected and analysed annually from ages 3–11 years, at 14–15 years old, at 19 years old and at 27 years old. To examine the effects of the program on participants at age 27, interviews with participants as well as school, police, court and social service records were analysed. 

(Scientific methods rigour: 5)

Results: At age 27, 71 per cent of the participants in the Perry Preschool Project had finished school, compared to 54 per cent of the control group. Children who received the intervention were also characterised by higher monthly earnings and a higher percentage of home ownership. As a group a significantly lower percentage of program participants received social services benefits (59% opposed to 80% for the control group), and were recorded as having significantly fewer arrests, including arrests for drug making or dealing. Women who received the early childhood intervention had significantly fewer births out of wedlock and were more likely to be married at age 27.

Cost-Benefit Analysis: A cost-benefit analysis showed that the Perry Preschool Project returned $US7.16 to the public for every dollar invested in the program. When benefits to program participants ($US1.58) are included in the analysis, the return increases to $US8.74. Also, see Karoly et al. (1998) for an analysis of program costs and benefits to government.

Further Reading


Policy Issues
Early childhood intervention for at-risk children can produce significant education, economic and crime prevention benefits that are highly cost efficient. By breaking the cycle of poverty through enriched education programs and experiences, children are more likely to become independent and socially responsible adults. Characteristics of successful early intervention programs include high quality classroom education for all pre-schoolers from disadvantaged backgrounds, and the design and implementation of appropriate practices and activities that facilitate social and cognitive learning among children. Coupled with this, effective early intervention should include a high level of home-visit support for parents, carried out by appropriately trained staff.
Triple P: Positive Parenting Program

Program Summary

Aim: To prevent severe behavioural, emotional, and developmental problems in children.

Problem: Familial relationships and family functioning strongly influence children’s development. Family risk factors such as poor parenting, family conflict and non-supportive environments may increase the susceptibility of young people to major behavioural and emotional problems including substance abuse, anti-social behaviour and juvenile crime.

Strategy/Intervention: Triple P was developed to equip parents with appropriate skills for managing child behavioural problems. Based on theories of social learning, the program seeks to enhance the knowledge, skills and confidence of parents to deal with family dysfunction and child conduct problems.

Location: Queensland, Australia.

Administering Institutions: Parenting and Family Support Centre, University of Queensland. (Website: www.pfsc.uq.edu.au)

Key Stakeholders: Parenting and Family Support Centre, participating families and children.

Program Overview

Background: The Triple P program is a multilevel model of behavioural family intervention that aims to prevent and treat the risk factors associated with severe behavioural and emotional problems in pre-adolescent children. The program seeks to enhance parents’ self-sufficiency and resourcefulness, promote children’s social, emotional and behavioural development, and promote safe, nurturing and non-violent family environments.

Triple P includes five levels of intervention, ascending in intensity and program focus.

- **Level 1 (universal Triple P):** provision of information on how to solve developmental and minor behavioural problems. Targets all parents.
- **Level 2 (selective Triple P):** provision of specific advice for a discrete child problem behaviour. Targets parents with a specific concern about their child’s behaviour or development.
- **Level 3 (primary care Triple P):** brief therapy program to teach parents to manage a discrete child problem behaviour. Targets parents who require active skills training.
- **Level 4 (standard Triple P):** intensive program focusing on parent-child interaction and parenting skills for a broad range of target behaviours. Targets parents of children with more severe behavioural problems.
- **Level 5 (enhanced Triple P):** intensive program including home visits, skill development and partner support skills. Targets parents with concurrent child behavioural problems and family dysfunction.

Each Triple P level is designed to offer families appropriate strategies and modes of delivery to deal with familial problems and child behavioural issues. Intervention may involve face-to-face, group, telephone assisted, and self-directed programs.

Numerous studies have highlighted the effectiveness of Triple P. Reported here are the results of a study that was designed to test the effectiveness of three variants of Triple P with a large sample of parents. Families participating in the study were characterised by at least one of the following: maternal depression, relationship conflict, single parent
household, low gross family income or low occupational prestige. Children were aged between 3 and 4 years, and mothers reported a concern about their child’s behaviour.

**Method:** Three hundred and five participating families were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 groups: Enhanced Behavioural Family Intervention (EBFI; level 5 enhanced Triple P); Standard Behavioural Family Intervention (SBFI; level 4 standard Triple P); Self-Directed Behavioural Family Intervention (SDBFI; level 4 self-help Triple P); or a waiting list (WL; control).

SDBFI offered participants parenting information in a written self-administered format. SBFI offered participants a 10 session (1 hour per week) parenting skills program delivered on an individual face-to-face basis and EBFI integrated SBFI with strategies to increase support from partners and to also help parents manage their own feelings.

Interviews, observations, and parent-report inventories were all used to test the effectiveness of these interventions on parenting and child behaviour. Pre- and post-measures were conducted as well as a one-year follow-up.

*Scientific methods rigour: 5*

**Results:** At post-intervention, mothers in the EBFI and SBFI conditions reported significantly less negative child behaviour than did mothers in the SDBFI and WL conditions. In turn, mothers in the SDBFI reported fewer child problems compared with mothers on the WL. Both mothers and fathers in the EBFI condition reported less use of dysfunctional discipline strategies at post-intervention than those in the SDBFI and WL conditions. Mothers and fathers in the SBFI condition also reported less use than those in the WL condition. At the one-year follow-up significant decreases in levels of child negative behaviour were reported for all three interventions.

At post-intervention, mothers in the EBFI and SBFI conditions reported greater parenting competence than mothers in the SDBFI and WL conditions, while mothers in the SDBFI reported greater parenting competence than mothers in the WL condition. Although parents in the three intervention conditions reported satisfaction with their respective programs, parents in the EBFI and SBFI conditions were significantly more satisfied than those parents who received the self-directed program condition.

In 1997 the Triple P program was awarded Overall National Winner of the Australian Violence Prevention Awards.

**Further Reading**


**Policy Issues**

Triple P is an effective intervention for parents of children with social, emotional and developmental problems. Equipping parents with skills to manage child behavioural problems may go a long way to reduce many of the risk factors associated with antisocial and at-risk health behaviours. The core feature of the program is its flexibility. The multilevel model offers respective programs and strategies designed to address specific familial and child behavioural problems. Notably, those families experiencing severe child conduct problems may require more intense and targeted intervention.
Multisystemic Therapy: Treating Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders

Program Summary

Aim: To reduce recidivism and out-of-home placement of offenders through tailored home-based treatment.

Problem: Traditional approaches to the treatment of serious juvenile offenders via mental health services have a number of limitations. Not only are some of these services institutionalised, costly and ineffective but they fail to address many of the wider issues related to offending behaviour.

Strategy/Intervention: Multisystemic therapy (MST) is a home-based treatment that addresses the risk factors associated with juvenile delinquency. Nine principles guide the strategy, which ultimately aims to empower and support parents and teenagers.

Location: Columbia, Missouri, United States.

Administering Institutions: Clinical therapists.

Key Stakeholders: At-risk offenders and families, taxpayers.

Program Overview

Background: MST is highly individualised treatment that addresses the key factors—family, peers, school and community—associated with anti-social behaviour in juvenile offenders. To this end the approach examines and addresses an offender’s familial and extra-familial systems and the ongoing interactions between them.

Nine treatment principles guide MST, which generally targets chronic, violent and substance abusing juveniles at high risk of out-of-home placement, and their families. The predominant aim of the model is to empower parents with the skills and resources needed to independently address the difficulties that arise in raising teenagers and to empower young people to cope with family, peer, school and community problems.

MST is an alternative to traditional mental health services and is provided on a home-based model of service delivery. The duration of the intervention is approximately 60 hours of contact over four months. Intervention, facilitated by qualified and experienced therapists, usually involves family therapy, behavioural parent training and cognitive behaviour therapies. MST has enjoyed success in treating serious clinical samples including child abuse and neglect, adolescent sexual offenders, juvenile delinquents and chronic juvenile offenders. In the past decade a number of studies have examined the effects of MST with violent/chronic or substance abusing juvenile offenders. Generally, results have shown significant reductions in long term rates of re-arrest and out-of-home placements, decreases in drug use, and improved family relations.

This case study reports the findings of MST intervention undertaken in Columbia, Missouri, with 176 juvenile offenders. All young offenders, aged between 12 and 17 years, had extensive criminal histories (average 4.2 previous arrests) and were previously incarcerated for at least 4 weeks. The majority of offenders were characterised by a low socioeconomic background. Over 65 per cent of the sample were male and 70 per cent were white.

Method: Participants were randomly assigned to either the treatment group (MST) or a control group (individual therapy). Standardised assessment batteries were carried out.
before and after the intervention. Re-arrest data four years after the intervention were also examined.

(Scientific methods rigour: 5)

**Results:** MST had significant effects on family relations and offending behaviour. Families in the MST group reported increases in family cohesion and adaptability, as well as positive changes—increased supportiveness and decreased conflict-hostility—in dyadic familial relationships (mother-adolescent, father-adolescent, mother-father). Decreases in adolescent behaviour problems were also noted. These results differ markedly from control families who reported decreases in family functioning and increased juvenile antisocial behaviour.

Four years after treatment, analysis of arrest data revealed that MST participants who completed their programs were significantly less likely to be rearrested than those who received individual therapy. The overall rate of recidivism for MST completers was 22.1 per cent compared to 71.4 per cent for the control group. Coupled with this, those MST participants who were arrested committed significantly less serious offences than control participants.

**Cost-Benefit Analysis:** A report from the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (Aos et al. 1999) showed that MST was the most cost-effective intervention of a wide range of treatments to reduce serious juvenile offending. Based on an estimated cost of USD4,540 per participant, MST returned USD8.38 in criminal justice system benefits for every dollar spent on the program. Combined criminal justice system and victim benefits totalled USD13.45 for every dollar spent.

**Further Reading**


**Policy Issues**

Multisystemic therapy is a cost effective alternative to traditional mental health services aimed at reducing recidivism. The highly individualised program appears successful in treating anti-social behaviour and reducing out-of-home placement for a significant number of young offenders. The essence of MST is addressing the multiple determinants of juvenile offending and the relationship between these variables. Intervention should take place within the offenders’ natural settings and be carried out by qualified therapists who are regularly monitored for program fidelity.
**Program Summary**

**Aim:** To improve the social bonding of children to school and family in order to reduce the risk factors associated with delinquency and anti-social behaviour.

**Problem:** Young people who feel disengaged from family, peer networks and social institutions are at greater risk of engaging in many hazardous health and social behaviours, including drug use and delinquency.

**Strategy/Intervention:** An elementary school intervention package combining teacher training, parent skills development and child education was implemented in selected treatment schools to foster stronger links between individuals and their social networks.

**Location:** Seattle, Washington, United States.

**Administering Institutions:** Seattle public elementary schools.

**Key Stakeholders:** Participating Seattle public schools, at-risk students, parents and wider community.

**Program Overview**

**Background:** Violent and non-violent crime, substance abuse and irresponsible sexual behaviours are common social and health problems experienced by young people and their families. Research suggests that most of these problems are manifest in many of the same risk factors—dysfunction within, and disenchantment with, family, peer, school and community networks. Bonding to family and school, therefore, are important protective mechanisms against many adolescent health and social behavioural problems.

In 1981 the Seattle Social Development Project began with the aim of strengthening the attachment of students to family and school. It was based on the premise that key determinants of a child’s ability to bond socially include—the degree of opportunity for active involvement in family and classroom, the skills possessed and applied by the child during participation, and the subsequent reinforcements provided to the child.

Teachers were trained to teach and manage their classrooms in ways that promoted bonding to school. Parents were provided with training on how to manage their families in ways that promoted bonding to family and school, while children were taught cognitive and social development—as well as problem solving skills for social interaction. It was envisaged that this intervention package would positively affect children’s attitudes toward school, their behaviour at school and their academic achievement, to facilitate positive long-term outcomes.

**Method:** Eight Seattle public schools were assigned to full intervention and control groups. The full intervention groups received the treatment program from grades 1 through 6 while the control groups received regular education. In 1985, a “late intervention group” was formed with year 5 students who received the treatment in years 5 and 6 only.
Six years after the intervention period (at age 18), 593 students assigned to the three different conditions were interviewed. Data obtained from these interviews and self-administered questionnaires were used to examine the effectiveness of the project on anti-social behaviour. Juvenile court records as well as school records and reports (standardised achievement test results, grade point averages and disciplinary action reports) were also used in the analysis.

(Scientific methods rigour: 5)

Results: At age 18, the full intervention group reported significantly more commitment and attachment to school, better academic achievement and less school misbehaviour than the control students. Students receiving the full intervention also reported fewer violent delinquent acts (48.3% v. 59.7%), less heavy drinking (15% v. 25%), fewer multiple sex partners (49.7% v. 61.5%) and fewer pregnancies or cases of causing pregnancy (17.1% v. 26.4%) than the control groups. No significant program effects were reported for those who received the late intervention in grades 5 and 6 only.

Cost-Benefit Analysis: Aos et al. (1999) estimated the costs and combined benefits of the Seattle Social Development Project and found that the program produced a desirable benefit-cost ratio of 1.79. For every dollar spent on the program, $US1.79 was returned in criminal justice system and victim benefits.

Further Reading


Policy Issues

Intervention focused on increasing the social bonds of young people to school and family can reduce the likelihood of children dropping out of school and engaging in anti-social behaviour. Parent education, teacher training, and children’s skill development are all important features of successful strategies. The Seattle social development project reinforces the value and importance of informal social controls in the prevention of crime. Policy makers should consider the benefits that arise from the development and implementation of programs designed to strengthen and maximise the effectiveness of these institutions.
**PeaceBuilders: School-Based Violence and Crime Prevention**

**Program Summary**

**Aim:** To reduce bullying and the risk factors associated with violence and crime through school-based prevention programs.

**Problem:** Wider community problems of violence and anti-social behaviour are often manifest in school settings. Young people at risk of delinquency and violent behaviour are usually characterised by different cognitive and social behaviours than more socially responsible children.

**Strategy/Intervention:** PeaceBuilders is a school-based intervention designed to alter the way in which students respond to each other and manage interpersonal situations. The program is a cooperative effort involving students, teachers, parents and the wider community.

**Location:** Queensland, Australia.

**Administering Institutions:** South-east Queensland school.

**Key Stakeholders:** Schools staff, students, local police and local community.

**Program Overview**

**Background:** PeaceBuilders aims to change the way children perceive, think about and act upon their physical and interpersonal environment. It is based on the premise that violence and anti-social behaviour can be reduced through early intervention by increasing children’s resilience and reinforcing positive behaviours. In addition, altering the school environment to emphasise rewards and praise for desirable behaviour can reduce bullying and aggressive behaviour.

PeaceBuilders is guided by nine core strategies and is essentially built on five messages:
- give up “put-downs”;
- praise people;
- seek wise people as advisers and friends;
- notice hurts and correct those hurts that we cause; and
- right wrongs.

The core of the program addresses the cognitive, social and imitative risk factors associated with anti-social behaviour. These include, among other things, difficulties associated with reading verbal and non-verbal cues; thinking illogically; being violent and insulting towards peers, siblings and family; disrupting class room activities; and being easily distracted and influenced by others. Emphasis is placed on the development of protective factors within the individual, family and community to combat these problems.

PeaceBuilders was introduced to a south-east Queensland school in 1997 as a pilot study. The school, designated as a special programs school, averaged enrolments of 420-480 students a year. Located in a high crime and drug use area, the school’s community is characterised by high levels of unemployment, family breakdown, and
tension among culturally diverse groups in the area. Prior to the introduction of PeaceBuilders, problems experienced at the school included high student and staff turnover, regular police call outs, and unacceptable levels of anti-social behaviour among students.

**Method:** Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to test the effectiveness of the PeaceBuilders program. School records, school opinion surveys and learning outcomes were examined before and after the intervention.

*(Scientific methods rigour: 2)*

**Results:** The number of detentions and suspensions, as well as the level of truancy, fell after the introduction of PeaceBuilders. The school principal also reported lower levels of referrals to his office for disruptive and disobedient behaviour. School opinion surveys showed an increase in the overall rating of the school for student satisfaction and parent satisfaction. Qualitative data also suggests that parent involvement in the school increased, and staff turnover declined to the point where no one requested stress leave or a transfer in 1997 or 1998 when the program was in place. The number of police call outs to the school also fell from 24 in 1996, to 15 in 1997 to 4 in 1998.

**Further Reading**


**Policy Issues**

The school is a logical setting for shaping cognitive, social and imitative behaviours of young people. It is also a base for the development of protective interventions against many anti-social behaviours and health related problems. Short-term results indicate that strategies which attempt to alter the way young people respond to each other and manage their social environments can be effective at reducing the factors associated with violence and criminal activity. School-based programs not only benefit students on an individual level but also have positive outcomes for schools, families of students and the wider community.
Quantum Opportunities Program

Program Summary

**Aim:** To increase the likelihood of disadvantaged young people completing high school and developing into economic and socially independent adults.

**Problem:** Problems associated with living in poverty prevent many young people from finishing high school and leading socially acceptable lives. Low levels of intelligence and a lack of opportunities continue the cycle of poverty for many of these people and may also contribute to the onset of delinquency and anti-social behaviour.

**Strategy/Intervention:** Intensive coordinated services—academic tutoring, skill development, personal enrichment programs and community service activities—were offered to students from disadvantaged backgrounds throughout their high school years.

**Location:** United States.

**Administering Institutions:** Opportunities Industrialization Centres (OIC) of America.

**Key Stakeholders:** Participating students, families, OIC America and wider community.

Program Overview

**Background:** The Quantum Opportunities Program provides disadvantaged young people with enriched learning experiences in an effort to increase their likelihood of completing high school and leading more fulfilling adult lives. The pilot program ran from 1989 to 1993 and sought to test whether young people from families receiving public assistance could make a “quantum leap” up the ladder of opportunity by participating in an intensive array of coordinated services over their four years of high school. The program sought to facilitate sustained relationships between participants, their peer group and an adult throughout their high school years.

The Quantum Opportunities program specifically involved:
- **250 hours of education:** computer assisted instruction and peer tutoring;
- **250 hours of development activities:** cultural enrichment and personal development, life and family skills, further education and/or job preparation; and
- **250 hours of service activities:** community service projects, assisting with public events and volunteer work.

A supervised after-school learning centre was also made available to participants who were offered financial and scholarship incentives to encourage their continued involvement in the program.

The pilot project involved five American cities and 125 year nine students—25 students in each city. Over 70 per cent of participants, recruited from high schools in disadvantaged
neighbourhoods, were African American. A coordinator was also assigned to each program group to work with, and mentor, students over and beyond the duration of the program.

**Method:** Students of families receiving welfare were selected by participating schools and randomly assigned to program and control groups. Questionnaires and standardised battery tests for academic and functional skill development were used to measure the effectiveness of the Quantum Opportunities Program on participant development throughout the program’s four years. Follow-up interviews were also conducted with program and control students.

* (Scientific methods rigour: 5)

**Results:** While there were varying degrees of success between the five program cities, compared to control students, Quantum Opportunity participants were more likely to have completed high school (42% v. 63%) and less likely to have dropped out of high school (23% v. 50%). In addition, program participants were less likely to be teen parents (24% v. 38%).

By the end of high school, more program students compared to control students had no contact with the police in the past twelve months. Program participants’ attendance was also twice and three times higher than control participants in 2-year and 4-year college courses.

**Cost-Benefit Analysis:** Cost-benefit analysis reveals that the Quantum Opportunities Program returned between $US3.04 and $US3.68 for every dollar invested in the program.

**Further Reading**


**Policy Issues**

The Quantum Opportunities Program provides disadvantaged young people with opportunities to further their economic and social development. Policy makers should consider the key features of this cost-effective intervention. The program offers resources to those most in need, and involves continual long-term intervention. It adopts a multidisciplinary approach that emphasises a balance between education, personal development and community activities, and also encourages the development of positive and influential relationships with peers and responsible adults.
Community Crime Prevention
Community Justice Groups: Kowanyama and Palm Island

Program Summary

**Aim:** To reduce the high levels of personal and property crime in Indigenous communities and divert young Indigenous people away from the criminal justice system.

**Problem:** Traditional mechanisms for dealing with Indigenous offenders—police, courts and imprisonment—have proved largely ineffective, and many Indigenous people continue to offend after imprisonment.

**Strategy/Intervention:** Community justice groups were developed and implemented in Kowanyama and Palm Island. The role of each community group generally involves conflict resolution, sanctioning, and liaison between criminal justice agencies and the community.

**Location:** Queensland, Australia.

**Administering Institutions:** Participating communities.

**Key Stakeholders:** Participating communities, offenders, state government institutions and taxpayers.

Program Overview

**Background:** In 1993, the Queensland Corrective Services Commission trialed the development and implementation of community justice groups in Palm Island and Kowanyama. A third community justice group was implemented in Pormpuraaw in 1995.

The pilot projects were a response to the unacceptably high levels of crime—drug abuse, family violence, property crime—in these remote North Queensland communities, and the perceived ineffectiveness of traditional criminal justice responses. The groups were developed to provide Indigenous communities with a mechanism for dealing with their own social and justice issues according to their customary laws and practices, and to divert Aboriginal people away from the criminal justice system. Community justice groups have no statutory authority. Rather, authority is afforded to the group through cultural norms and practices that recognise the wisdom of “elders” and other respected community members.

Three elements characterise the justice groups: nominated members of the Aboriginal community; a community development officer who provides ongoing facilitation and support to the group; and community consultation.

Each community justice group adopts similar roles and responsibilities within their communities. This may include settling family disputes and addressing anti-social behaviour, preparing pre-sentencing reports for courts, supervising community based orders, visiting prisoners in correctional centres, conducting “night patrols”, and undertaking justice of the peace training. Referrals to the justice groups are usually made from those within the criminal justice system or by members of the community.

**Method:** Interviews were conducted with members of both justice groups and others within the wider community, including people and families brought before the groups,
corrective services staff, police, and community organisations. Police and community corrections records were also examined.

(Scientific methods rigour: 2)

**Results:** Qualitative reports suggest that the groups are effective in diverting offenders from the criminal justice system, sanctioning anti-social behaviour, resolving family disputes and reducing the levels of personal and property crime in these remote areas. Police statistics support many of these findings.

Kowanyama police statistics reveal a remarkable decrease in the number of juvenile charges made since the justice groups were implemented in 1993, especially for property offences. In 1994 the number of juvenile charges declined from 207 to 37 (break and enter), 123 to 11 (stealing), and 179 to 2 (receiving) from the previous year. Juvenile crime rates also reduced from approximately 40-50 charges each month prior to March 1994 to four charges (one offence) in April 1995. Palm Island police statistics reveal similar findings—a decrease in the number of charges from 1060 in 1992 to 738 in 1994.

Official court records also suggest significant declines in juvenile criminal activity. In Kowanyama, court appearances declined from 24 in 1993–94 to 6 in 1996-97 while charges reduced from 116 in 1993–94 to 11 in 1996–97. Similarly, in Palm Island court appearances and charges declined from 32 to 13, and 115 to 17 respectively, over the same periods.

**Further Reading**


Other papers written by Dr Paul Chantrill can be found on the Australian Institute of Criminology website: [www.aic.gov.au/index.html](http://www.aic.gov.au/index.html)


**Policy Issues**

Palm Island and Kowanyama community justice groups highlight the effectiveness of local initiatives in Indigenous communities to reduce crime and divert young offenders away from the criminal justice system. By applying their own processes and working through traditional structures, the community justice groups have successfully resolved disputes, addressed family problems, and reduced the levels of crime and anti-social behaviour within the community. The success of the pilot programs also led to the development of the Local Justice Initiatives Program, a Queensland Government program that offers funding to similar community justice projects.

Indigenous community justice groups complement and support many formal and informal structures within the community. The relationship between these groups and their respective communities will therefore have a significant impact on group effectiveness. Policy development needs to include the provision of appropriate and adequate resources to sustain the work of the groups.
PALS: Reducing Anti-Social Behaviour
Through Sport and Cultural Activities

Program Summary

Aim: To integrate young people from disadvantaged backgrounds more fully into the community and to increase their skill development in non-school curricular activities.

Problem: In addition to lower levels of academic achievement, young people from disadvantaged backgrounds generally have lower levels of competence in sport, music and other non-curricular activities compared to more fortunate young people.

Strategy/Intervention: A program offering non-curricular activities to young people living in public housing was developed and implemented over a 3-year period. Young people aged 5 to 15 years were recruited into sport and cultural activities with the aim of facilitating increased skill development and greater participation in the wider community.

Location: Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

Administering Institutions: Participate and Learn Skills (PALS).

Key Stakeholders: Participants and their families, public housing residents, schools and wider community.

Program Overview

Background: Programs aimed at improving the psychological and social development of disadvantaged young people attempt to improve their quality of life and future prospects. It is accepted that providing such development opportunities can potentially decrease the likelihood of these young people leading adolescent and adult lives characterised by anti-social and at-risk health behaviours. While most development programs have sought to introduce and analyse measures in school and academic settings, few have scientifically explored the value and effects of non-school skill development.

PALS was a skill development program offered to young people between 5 and 15 years living in public housing in Ontario, Canada. The program ran for a period of 32 months (January 1980 to August 1982) and sought to provide young people with opportunities for participation in extra-curricular activity and personal development. Over 40 programs in 25 different skill areas—sports, guitar, ballet, baton, scouting and other non-sporting activities—were offered by PALS, which was guided by three main objectives:

- to advance participating children to higher skill levels of non-school skill development;
- to integrate children from the housing complex into on-going activity in the community; and
- to determine if skill development programs had “spill-over” effects into other areas of children’s life.

PALS comprised two full time workers located in the community centre of the housing complex. There was a strong drive to recruit young people into the program and to foster greater partnerships and involvement with the wider community. Direct contact and advertising was employed for the bulk of recruitment, and special efforts were made to recruit non-participating young people. Most of the children who participated in PALS were from low-income families on welfare or “working poor” families, and just over half were single parent families.
Method: Two public housing complexes, (an experiment and control complex) were examined to test the effectiveness of the PALS program on participant skill development and community involvement. The sex distributions of the children in the two sites were comparable but there were more children in the control group (488) than the experiment (417). Program data collected by PALS staff, housing records, family surveys, teacher rating scales and unobtrusive data were all used to analyse the PALS program. Before-and-after measures, together with a follow-up at 16 months, were carried out.

It should be noted that during the intervention period a new recreational facility opened directly adjacent to the control site offering similar activities and programs to young people between 6 and 18 years. Participants in these programs however were not as aggressively recruited, as was the case with the PALS program.  

(Scientific methods rigour: 3)

Results: Participation by young people in the PALS program was high. The experiment group experienced marked increases in the number of skill levels advanced and was more involved in the community compared to the control group. An increase in self-esteem for PALS participants was also reported.

Anti-social behaviour among PALS participants decreased from an average of 18 charges per month in the two years prior to the intervention to 7 charges per month during the program, to 5 charges per month at follow-up. This significantly differed to the control group who recorded 15, 31 and 18 changes per month over the same time periods. In addition there were fewer security violations filed at the housing complex for the experiment group during PALS compared to the control group. Family surveys and teacher rating scales revealed no significant changes between the groups in behaviour at home or school.

Cost-Benefit Analysis: A conservative cost-benefit analysis was carried out on the PALS program. Based on estimated costs of $CAN258,694 and benefits of $CAN659,058, Farrington and Welsh (2000) calculated that the program returned $CAN2.55 for every dollar invested in PALS. Benefits arising from the program included potential savings to the Ottawa police, housing authority, community centre and fire department.

Further Reading


Policy Issues

Providing young people with skill development activities and opportunities to participate in wider society may be effective in reducing the risk factors associated with anti-social behaviour. Like all intervention measures, a program’s success appears dependent on the duration and intensity of interventions. The benefits arising from the PALS program far exceeded its costs. While there were no notable increases in family and school functioning, there were signs that the intervention had positive effects in areas where the programs were implemented—in and around their housing environments.
Prevention Measures by Criminal Justice Agencies
Preventing Motor Vehicle Theft in New South Wales

Program Summary

**Aim:** To reduce the incidence of motor vehicle theft through problem oriented policing.

**Problem:** Unacceptably high levels of motor vehicle theft were experienced in New South Wales.

**Strategy/Intervention:** A program based on strategic analysis and planning, coordination with a variety of relevant institutions and carefully managed publicity was implemented across the state.

**Location:** New South Wales, Australia.

**Administering Institutions:** New South Wales Police Service.

**Key Stakeholders:** Motorists, insurance companies, law enforcement agencies and taxpayers.

Program Overview

**Background:** By the early 1990s Sydney was described as the car theft capital of the world. With a state population of just under 6 million people, the rate of car theft in New South Wales was nearly 6,000 motor vehicle thefts per month. Systematic analysis of the problem by the state police service revealed a number of possible reasons for this trend. These include:

- **insurance fraud:** it was estimated that between 10–15 per cent of reported stolen vehicles were intentionally disposed of by their owners in order to claim insurance;
- **spare parts:** it was estimated that approximately 40 per cent of vehicles were stolen and stripped, either totally or partially, for spare parts; usually by professional thieves;
- **transport for criminal, recreational or general purposes:** cars were stolen for use in the commission of another crime or for fun, joy riding, and/or transportation; and
- **rebirthing:** cars were stolen and resold under the identity of another vehicle, usually one that had previously been written-off after an accident, or abandoned.

The State Premier requested that New South Wales Police reduce the incidence of motor vehicle theft within existing budgets and without additional resources. In 1991 a new mix of initiatives was introduced, each of which was accompanied by publicity.

The media were enlisted to assist in educating the public about practical counter-measures, such as locking one’s car, using steering column locks and component part labelling. They were also encouraged to promote insurance fraud as not a victimless crime; it impacts not only on the insurance companies but also on the motoring public through increased insurance premiums.

Vehicle manufacturers were encouraged by the Commissioner of Police to introduce measures to enhance vehicle security. It was estimated that more readily identifiable parts through vehicle component marking could reduce car theft by 25 per cent. Insurers were encouraged to improve liaison with police and manufacturers, to report suspected frauds, to invite more attention to the design of security mechanisms, and to
take steps to discourage over-valuing insured vehicles, thereby removing an incentive to fraud. Repairers were encouraged to verify the legitimacy of spare parts used in repairs, and to keep detailed records of parts purchases. Local governments and developers were encouraged to design more secure facilities for cars, such as restricted access to car parks and boom gates, and the Road Traffic Authority was encouraged to develop a register of wrecked and written off vehicles to enable detection of rebirthing.

**Method:** Before-and-after motor vehicle theft rates were examined to measure the effectiveness of the car theft prevention initiatives.

*(Scientific methods rigour: 2)*

**Results:** Between July 1991 and June 1992, the incidence of motor vehicle theft declined by over 25 per cent. This represented an estimated saving of $A50 million.

*Written-Off Vehicle Register:* The recording of written-off and wrecked vehicles onto a written off vehicle register became mandatory in New South Wales in 1998. To measure the effect of this system on professional vehicle theft, an independent consultant conducted interviews with representatives of vehicle-related industries and agencies, as well as examined vehicle-theft data and auction sales data. An evaluation of the first three months of the register’s operation revealed that the incidence of professional theft in New South Wales may have decreased. This is primarily indicated by a decrease in the number of unrecovered stolen vehicles up to 15 years old, and a decrease in the number of vehicles recovered after one week. The proportion of written-off vehicles re-registered in New South Wales, as well as the price of written off vehicles sold at auctions, also decreased.

**Further Reading**


**Policy Issues**

Strategic assessment and concerted planning can make a significant contribution to the reduction of motor vehicle theft. Traditional reactive policing can have at best a limited impact, because many factors contributing to motor vehicle theft lie beyond the control of police. On the other hand, cooperation with the private sector and with other government agencies can achieve much more, at no additional cost.

Carefully orchestrated publicity can also contribute to a successful prevention campaign; police in New South Wales observed a decrease in reported vehicle thefts after each new initiative was announced. Of course, leadership at the highest levels of state government, and cooperation between public and private agencies is required to achieve program success.
Reducing Domestic Violence and Repeat Victimisation

Program Summary

**Aim:** To reduce the incidence of domestic violence and repeat victimisation through police initiated responses.

**Problem:** Many offenders and victims of domestic violence are caught in a cycle of violence and usually have a history of abusive behaviour and victimisation.

**Strategy/Intervention:** A domestic violence prevention model involving graded police responses to domestic call outs was developed and implemented by the Killingbeck Division of West Yorkshire Police in Leeds.

**Location:** Leeds, United Kingdom.

**Administering Institutions:** Killingbeck Division of West Yorkshire Police.

**Key Stakeholders:** Police, perpetrators and victims of domestic violence, community.

Program Overview

**Background:** In 1997 the Repeat Victimisation Project was implemented in Killingbeck as a further development of the West Yorkshire Police domestic violence policy. This policy involved setting up domestic violence and child protection units, an independent domestic violence database, a domestic violence index, new training modules for officers, and police involvement in inter-agency forums. Prior to the Repeat Victimisation Project, the policy was to arrest perpetrators wherever possible, collect evidence and ensure the safety of the victim.

The Repeat Victimisation Project introduced a new approach to policing domestic violence that involves police implementing respective levels of intervention depending on the context of the offence and the history of offenders/victims. Civil and criminal law responses are integrated into the model, which progresses through three levels. Level 1 intervention generally involves those victims and perpetrators who have not been drawn to police attention within the past 12 months. Level 2 responses increase in intensity and include criminal justice, (enhanced) police and community service involvement, while level 3 interventions involve more rigorous strategies.

The repeat victimisation model includes four major elements:
- equal focus on the victim and the offender;
- involvement of all officers in the division;
- low additional resource implications; and
- inter-agency involvement.

The dual focus of the model seeks to protect the victim and demotivate the offender. Perpetrators are confronted with the unacceptable nature of violence and victims are encouraged to protect themselves through seeking help. The model also emphasises inter-agency cooperation between police and criminal justice agencies, as well as the provision of support services to victims of domestic violence.
Method: Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to examine the effectiveness of the model on domestic violence and repeat victimisation. Police attendance data for three months (April–June 1996) prior to the implementation of the model (assigned hypothetical intervention levels) was compared with project data (Jan–Dec 1997). The 1997 data was also examined for variations in repeat offending between different intervention levels. Police officers, other criminal justice agency officials and victims were also interviewed.

(Scientific methods rigour: 2)

Results: The aim of the project was to reduce domestic violence attendances by police at levels 2 and 3. Results show that the number of offenders entering the project at these levels decreased significantly since the project began. In the pre-project period 21 per cent and 13 per cent of offenders were respectively assigned to levels 2 and 3. In the first three months of the project, these figures decreased to 12 per cent and 6 per cent respectively, and continued to decrease to 1 per cent in each level during the last three months of the project.

Relative to the decrease in police attendance for levels 2 and 3 was an increase in the number of offenders attended to in the first level—60 per cent at the beginning of the project to 85 per cent at the end of the project. Repeat attendance analysis reveals that 75 per cent of offenders who were attended to at level 1 did not require repeat attendance during the year. Within 5 weeks, 91 per cent, 85 per cent and 74 per cent of those attended to at levels 1, 2 and 3 respectively were not attended to again. Survival analysis predicted that on average, 61 per cent of first level offenders, 42 per cent of second level offenders and 36 per cent of third level offenders would not re-offend again.

Further Reading


Policy Issues

The Repeat Victimisation Project enjoyed intervention and organisational achievements by modifying the operational procedures of police attending domestic violence calls. The program reduced repeat attendances and increased the time intervals between attendances. On an organisational level, it streamlined the recording of domestic violence incidents, placed equal intervention focus on the offender and victim, and improved inter-agency cooperation.

One of the primary aims of the Repeat Victimisation Project was to implement a program using limited resources by reallocating staff and redefining police duties. While the actual costs of the project were not calculated, the project only employed two additional domestic violence officers and an administrative clerk, suggesting that the program may be cost-effective given the investment of modest resources.